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ABSTRACT 
Alissandra T. Stoyan: CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES, PRESIDENTIAL MAJORITIES 
AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 
(Under the direction of Dr. Jonathan Hartlyn) 
How do presidents with ambitious reform agendas successfully implement them in a 
democratic context? This dissertation examines the dynamics of one particular method of 
reform: a Constituent Assembly (CA) with supreme power to change the political system. 
Executives have several options for reform in a democratic context. They can enact reform 
through standard legislative channels, making use of a legislative majority or moderating and 
building a coalition with other parties in Congress (eg. Brazil under Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva, 2003-2011). They can live with legislative stalemate and bypass Congress through 
other institutions, by using executive decree power or influencing the judiciary (eg. 
Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega, 2007-present). Or, they can marginalize Congress in a 
process centered on citizen participation and reform of the Constitution, which, if successful, 
will lead to a new Congress with a supportive majority. This last strategy is my focus. I draw 
on case-studies of three recent successes (Venezuela 1999, Ecuador 2008, and Bolivia 2009), 
eight months of fieldwork, and evidence from one unsuccessful case (Honduras 2009). I 
identify a range of factors increasing the likelihood a president will choose a CA, of which 
the two most important are insufficient partisan/coalitional support in Congress and a 
willingness to bend institutional rules. In turn, I argue that the success of reform via CA is 
determined by two features. The executive needs mobilizational leverage, the ability to rally 
popular support behind the reform agenda, and institutional leverage, the ability to convince 
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the Judiciary or Electoral Council to allow the initiation of the reform process. By 
marginalizing or closing Congress, presidents who successfully implement this strategy have 
undercut a primary institution of liberal representative democracy. Yet, they have also 
retained democratic legitimacy by relying on mechanisms of direct democracy and 
constitutional reform. Thus, these reforms enhance one pillar of democracy – participation – 
while undermining the other pillar – contestation. This dissertation examines one way that 
executives seek to sidestep legislative opposition, contributing to a deeper understanding of 
democracy and power in contemporary Latin America. It also sheds light on the inherent 
tension between majoritarian, participatory democracy and representative conceptions of 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation centers on executives with an ambitious reform agenda in a 
democratic context and the decision to implement reform through a Constituent Assembly 
(CA). I develop a conceptual framework through which it is possible to understand the 
executive's decision to pursue their agenda through an innovative reform mechanism, the 
determinants of the success or failure of that reform process, and lastly the short-term 
consequences of the reform process for contestation and participation, and hence democracy 
more generally. This dissertation proceeds through an examination of four primary cases: 
Venezuela under the presidency of Hugo Chávez in 1999, Ecuador under Rafael Correa in 
2008, Bolivia under Evo Morales in 2009, and Honduras under Manuel Zelaya in 2009. All 
four executives had an ambitious reform agenda as defined below, and they chose to pursue 
them through an innovative use of the CA. Reform was successful in the first three cases 
while the process attempted by Zelaya failed dramatically and resulted in his removal from 
office.  I also consider a number of shadow cases where executives had an ambitious reform 
agenda but chose a different strategy for pursuing reform. 
Executives with Ambitious Reform Agendas 
At the heart of this analysis are presidents with an ambitious reform agenda. There 
are many potential ways to define and operationalize this concept. Here, I understand a 
reform agenda to be the underlying intentions of the executive with respect to changes in 
policy. This refers not only to the policies that an executive succeeds in implementing but 
what he or she hopes to implement during his or her time in office. Of course, it would be 
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impossible to know the sincere intentions of an executive. Still, presidents are perhaps the 
most public of elected officials, who regularly state their ambitions during campaigns, 
speeches, and interviews. Likewise, their failed attempts at policy reform rarely go 
unnoticed. Beyond espousing rhetoric openly, the agenda must be observed through some 
attempt at implementation, even if it fails very early on. 
An agenda is ambitious if it proposes a restructuring of laws or political institutions to 
redistribute power within the political arena. This definition encompasses those executives 
who endorse and attempt to pass policy altering elites‘ property rights, either decreasing or 
increasing those rights. Ambitious agendas that empower popular vis-à-vis elite sectors of 
society include: land reform, nationalization, progressive tax reform, and redistributive social 
policy. Those that empower elite vis-à-vis popular sectors of society include neoliberal 
reforms such as privatization, liberalization, balancing budgets primarily through cutting 
expenditures, regressive tax reform, and other structural adjustment policies associated with 
IMF standby agreements. I distinguish 'ambitious' from 'revolutionary' agendas. Ambitious 
agendas may but do not necessarily have to represent a complete break with policies of 
previous executives.
1
 An agenda is ambitious as long as it seeks to redistribute power, even if 
that is through a continuation or deepening of a predecessor's policies. 
Why Focus on the Constituent Assembly? 
How do presidents with an ambitious reform agenda successfully implement them in 
a democratic context? This dissertation takes, as its starting point, ambitious attempts by 
presidents to reform the structure of the state and its institutions. It then analyzes the decision 
to employ a CA with "plenos poderes" or supreme power to enact such reform. This is only 
                                                 
1
 The set of revolutionary agendas would fall within the set of ambitious agendas, but which also distinguish 
themselves from politics as usual because they seek to shift power within the political system. 
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one of many options available to executives in a democratic context. They can enact reform 
through standard legislative channels, making use of a legislative majority or moderating and 
building a coalition with other parties in Congress (Brazil under Lula).  They can live with 
stalemate and bypass Congress through other institutions as much as possible, by using 
executive decree power or by forging alliances with the judiciary (Nicaragua under Ortega). 
Or, they can marginalize Congress in a process centered on citizen participation and reform 
of the Constitution, which is likely to lead to a new Congress with a supportive majority 
(Venezuela under Chávez in 1999, Ecuador under Correa in 2008, and Bolivia under Morales 
in 2009). This last strategy is my focus. 
By marginalizing or closing Congress, these presidents have undermined one of the 
primary institutions of liberal representative democracy but they have also retained 
democratic legitimacy by relying on mechanisms of direct democracy and constitutional 
reform. Determining why and how this reform process occurs will lead to a deeper 
understanding of democracy and power in contemporary Latin America. It will also shed 
light on the inherent tension between majoritarian democracy and the checks and balances 
present in representative conceptions of democracy. To this end, I ask three core questions. 
When might presidents with ambitious reform agendas choose a referendum and CA over 
other available options? What factors ultimately determine the success of this path of reform? 
Finally, what are the consequences for democracy of pursuing reform in this way? In 
answering these questions, this dissertation offers a conceptual framework for understanding 
institutional innovation and change in comparative perspective. 
I examine this path of reform in Latin America by considering three successful cases 
and one case of failure. Recently, constitutional reform has unfolded successfully in 
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Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009) through a strikingly similar sequence 
of events and within a similar socio-political context. Presidents were elected without the 
comfortable majority in Congress necessary to make sweeping reforms promised during 
campaigns. Calling a referendum, these presidents encouraged citizens to vote ‗yes‘ to 
establish a CA to rewrite the Constitution, even though this action was not explicitly allowed 
under the current Constitution. The presidents then pressured the Supreme Court or Electoral 
Council to allow this line of action and to entrust the CA with plenos poderes, or supreme 
powers. Presidents have been able to gain a majority of seats in the CA through elections. In 
some cases, the CA closed or marginalized the Congress, where the president lacked a 
majority, calling for early legislative elections. To varying extents, executives were able to 
control the process of reform and hence its outcome. Likewise, nuances in the dynamics of 
these processes have led to slightly different consequences for democracy in each case. 
Underlying all three cases were demands for social and political inclusion by a poor 
and/or indigenous majority. Discontent with neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
activated these groups politically and led to a crisis of representation, whereby the majority 
realized that their interests were not at all represented by traditional parties. As the UNDP 
acknowledged, ―The replacement of the majority, which awards original legitimacy through 
elections, by minorities in the exercise of government is a repeated experience in the region. 
In general, it has left governments isolated from their bases and dependent on particular 
powers‖ (2010, 37).2 Growing popular dissatisfaction with representation has increasingly 
led Latin American leaders to acknowledge the active role of citizenship and the rights that 
follow. There has also been greater theoretical emphasis placed on widespread well-being – 
                                                 
2
 Original text: ―El remplazo de las mayorías, que otorgaron la legitimidad originaria a través de las elecciones, 
por minorías durante el ejercicio del gobierno es una experiencia reiterada en la región. Por lo general, ha 
concluido con gobiernos aislados de sus bases y dependientes de poderes particulares.‖ 
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including social justice and redistribution – as the end goal of democracy (PNUD 2010, 44), 
leading to a practical shift toward more majoritarian forms of democracy in the region. The 
historical elitism and racism embedded in these societies along with the exclusion and 
exploitation of poor sectors of the population has generated a strong critique of the existing 
political system, and especially its emphasis on representation. At the same time, these 
previously excluded sectors of the population have also inspired innovation - an institutional 
creativity, whereby what has seemed impossible within the confines of existing political 
structures is now possible in the course of a major project to reconstitute the state. 
In Latin America, many presidents have been able to gain widespread popularity 
because they are political ‗outsiders‘ who can credibly level criticism at the existing 
structures of government, especially the 'partidocracia' or corrupt elites of the traditional 
parties entrenched in Congress. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez had a reputation for challenging 
the existing political order long before he was elected in 1998, having perpetrated an 
attempted coup in 1992. In Bolivia, Evo Morales was the first indigenous president ever 
elected and he was also the first to take seriously popular calls for reform of the political 
system, though these had existed since the 1990s. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa was a U.S.-
educated economist but he took up a radical stance against existing institutions of the state. 
During his campaign, he refused to run legislative candidates from his party, citing the 
corrupt nature of Congress and being open about his plans to close it. Moreover, all three 
presidents framed their projects of reform as attempts to re-found the country in a more 
democratic form. Thus, historical context and the recent evolution of democratic ideals in the 
region have played an important role in shaping new paths toward constitutional reform. 
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In stark contrast, an attempt at reform via CA failed in Honduras. Zelaya was the first 
executive in Latin America who was elected on a moderate right-leaning agenda but then 
subsequently developed an ambitious left-leaning agenda toward the end of his term in 
office. Hence, he is the first case of a right-to-left policy switch, though there have been 
many cases of the reverse. His decision to pursue a CA reflected a miscalculation of the 
chances of success of this reform process, likely influenced by diffusion of successful 
examples in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  However, he faced growing institutionalized 
opposition and proceeded with reforms anyway.  Zelaya's case demonstrates just how crucial 
institutional and mobilizational leverage are for successful reform. Moreover, his removal 
from office after attempting a CA has had dramatic negative consequences on democracy in 
Honduras in the short-term, proving that failed reform processes may sometime be just as 
influential as those that are completed successfully. 
Outline of the Argument and Dissertation 
In an effort to elucidate the causes and consequences of constitutional reform via a 
CA, I proceed as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature and hypotheses, conceptual 
framework, and methodological approach of the dissertation. First, the chapter situates my 
research at the intersection of several larger bodies of literature on: policymaking and 
conflict between the executive and legislative branches; institutional creation, change, and 
manipulation; the diffusion of innovations; and divergent conceptions of democracy - liberal 
representative vs. participatory conceptions - that produce tension within modern Latin 
American democracies. I derive a number of hypotheses from previous research which 
allows me to begin to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of 
reform via CA. My principal contribution is to advance the literature by situating this 
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innovative path of reform within the full range of reform mechanisms available to executives. 
Moreover, academics have often held overly simplistic views of it, claiming that it is 
intrinsically authoritarian or unquestionably democratic (Colburn and Trejos 2010; Engler 
2010). Instead, I acknowledge the nuances inherent to reform via CA. In doing so, my work 
on this topic sits at the intersection of four distinct bodies of literature.  
Moreover, Chapter 2 explains my methodological approach, which is centrally 
qualitative and draws on fieldwork in Bolivia and Ecuador where I developed elite 
interviews. This approach is supplemented with quantitative analysis of public opinion data 
in Chapter 6. I also devote attention to the conceptualization and measurement of key 
concepts advanced through this dissertation, including the concept of an ambitious reform 
agenda and the CA. To identify the universe of cases, I classify 125 presidential terms in 18 
Latin American countries from 1978 to the present according to whether or not the executive 
advanced an ambitious reform agenda. This demonstrates interesting trends across the region.  
As this dissertation focuses primarily on a recent trend in constitutional reform, it is 
important to understand the ways that constitutional reform and particularly the mechanism 
of the CA has evolved over time. Chapter 3 draws on relevant bodies of political theory to 
demonstrate the theoretical foundation that executives have used to justify attempts to reform 
via CA where no legal precedent exists. It then provides a brief historical overview of such 
reform. I conclude by examining briefly the case of constitutional reform of the Articles of 
Confederation in the United States in 1787. This example is drawn from what is now 
considered one of the most long-lasting and stable democracies in the world. Interestingly, 
there are striking similarities with modern cases of reform examined by this dissertation; for 
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example, it demonstrates how an environment of crisis can lead to a reform process that 
violates the existing constitution. 
Chapter 4 examines the decision of Latin American presidents to pursue reform via a 
CA with ―plenos poderes‖ or supreme power to restructure the political system. It advances a 
theoretical model of executive policy-making that differentiates between clearly legal reform 
paths (legislative statutes, legal decrees, or partial constitutional reform) and those options 
that bend or break the institutional rules of the game (abuses of decree power, constituent 
assemblies, judicial manipulation, or autogolpes). To situate this decision empirically and 
analyze the conditions that make distinct paths of reform more likely, I engage in qualitative 
analysis of three cases of reform via CA (Venezuela 1999 - Chávez, Ecuador 2008 - Correa, 
and Bolivia 2009 - Morales), while also drawing evidence from 7 cases of different reform 
mechanisms. I find five factors that increase the likelihood of reform via a CA: (1) the 
number of seats in Congress and/or ability to build a sufficient coalitional majority, (2) 
decree powers, (3) viability of partial constitutional reform, (4) willingness to bend or break 
existing institutions, and (5) the perceived chance of success in relation to other strategies. 
This chapter emphasizes the power of Latin American presidents to navigate the institutions 
of democracy and enact reform. 
Once presidents have made the decision to reform via a referendum and CA with 
―plenos poderes,‖ what factors determine the success of such an attempt? In Chapter 5, I find 
that two variables jointly determine success. I identify two main factors that jointly increase 
the likelihood of success.  These are mobilizational leverage, or the ability to rally popular 
support behind the reform agenda, and institutional leverage, the ability to convince the 
Judiciary or Electoral Council to allow a referendum to form a CA and empower it with 
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supreme power.
3
  I examine this argument qualitatively by examining three cases of success 
(Venezuela 1999 – Chávez, Bolivia 2009 - Morales, and Ecuador 2008) and a case of failure 
(Honduras – Zelaya 2009). This analysis leads to a deeper understanding of democracy and 
power in contemporary Latin America, and sheds light on the inherent tension between 
majoritarian democracy and representative democracy‘s checks and balances. This chapter 
contributes to our understanding of the interplay between leadership, popular mobilization, 
and institutions in flux. 
In Chapter 6, I analyze the consequences for democracy of reform via a CA with 
―plenos poderes.‖ I focus on two dimensions of democracy, as advanced by Dahl (1971): 
contestation and participation.
4
 By contestation, I mean horizontal and vertical mechanisms 
of accountability. I hypothesize that executive power will be consolidated after this process, 
potentially leading to a lack of accountability. By participation, I mean the inclusion of 
minority or previously-excluded voices in the political process. There is likely to be a 
decrease in representation and participation of elites while the previously-excluded poor and 
indigenous groups are more likely to participate. In cases where reform via CA has failed 
dramatically, I expect to find reductions in both contestation and participation. The 
investigation pursued in Chapter 6 is preliminary and focuses on short-term effects of these 
processes, given that three of the four under consideration have occurred only really taken 
effect within the last five years. For this period, what it demonstrates is that successful cases 
of reform via CA have, to varying extents, privileged inclusive participation over rights to 
contestation. There has generally been a concentration of power in the executive everywhere 
that reforms were successful. This has resulted in practical, and even sometimes legal, 
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 Referenda and Constituent Assemblies are not explicitly allowable by the current constitution in these cases. 
 
4
 Dahl, Robert A., 1971, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press. 
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restrictions on the mechanisms of both vertical and horizontal accountability. New 
constitutions have also implemented more participatory forms of democracy, including new 
mechanisms for citizens' participation. In general, the texts of these constitutions emphasize 
inclusionary language and mechanisms for the incorporation of previously-excluded groups. 
Perhaps as a result, there have been important socio-demographic shifts across voting 
participation and political tolerance throughout the time period of reform. 
In Chapter 7, I conclude with a summary of the dissertation and my main findings and 
contributions. By analyzing the causes and consequences of reform via CA, as well as the 
dynamics for success, I make three principle contributions.  First, the framework that I 
develop places this choice in comparative perspective with the full range of policymaking 
options, drawing additional theoretical and empirical attention to the point  that executives 
often decide to bend the institutionalized rules in order to have a chance to achieve their 
preferred policy agendas. Secondly, by drawing out the factors that allow these executives to 
succeed - mobilizational and institutional leverage - this dissertation provides an explanation 
behind some of the most remarkable political processes that have occurred in the region in 
recent years. Lastly, I uncover a preliminary link between the nature of the CA process and 
its consequences for democracy. The most genuine advances in inclusive participation,  and 
the least backsliding in terms of contestation has occurred where the reform process was 
more deliberative overall. 
In Chapter 7, I also illuminate several potential future areas of research. First, in order 
to develop a deeper understanding of executive power, future studies should focus on the 
policymaking tendencies of executives with ambitious reform agendas.  This dissertation 
approximates this topic, and has begun the work of coding executives according to their 
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agendas, but a more thorough analysis is beyond its scope. Secondly, there is very little 
reason to expect that the broad class of phenomena within which a CA falls - that is a novel 
approach to policymaking - should be limited to Latin America. It would be interesting to 
expand this framework to presidential systems around the world, particularly in Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Central Asia where states are increasingly linked to the west and 
sensitive to the need to preserve democracy but also where the institutional context is 
relatively weak. I conclude chapter 7 with a discussion of the broader theoretical and 
normative issues raised by this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE, CONCEPUTAL FRAMEWORK, & METHODOLOGY 
This chapter develops a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of 
policy-making by executives with ambitious reform agendas. First, it situates the present 
analysis at the intersection of four larger bodies of literature and defines specific theoretical 
contributions to each. Thus far, insufficient attention has been dedicated to understanding this 
innovative reform path and how it fits into the full range of reform options available to Latin 
American executives. Therefore, I draw upon the findings of previous research to develop a 
theoretical model of ambitious reforms that encompasses the full range of policy-making 
options in a democratic context. This model differentiates between reforms which are clearly 
legal and reforms that bend or break the institutional rules of the game. Next, I lay out a 
number of expectations about the causes, conditions for success, and results of reform via a 
CA. Lastly, I elaborate on my methodological approach, justifying the use of a centrally 
qualitative design supported by fieldwork and interviews. 
Existing Literature, Conceptual Framework, and Hypotheses 
This dissertation examines an innovative process of institutional change with the 
potential to drastically alter the distribution of power within democracies. Examining 
relatively recent reforms via CA, it tests the causal factors proposed through a comparative 
research design. The analysis results in a clearer understanding of when and why this type of 
institutional innovation occurs and is successful, and also what potential consequences it may 
have for democracy.  
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Presidential Policymaking & Executive-Legislative Relations 
First, this dissertation advances a strategic choice framework of executive attempts to 
implement ambitious policy agendas via CA.
5
 This framework makes the assumption that the 
executive has discretion over policymaking strategies, albeit constrained by history, context, 
and institutions. In general, there is a need to move away from scholarship focusing on a 
single policymaking strategy in isolation. As Carlos Pereira, Timothy J. Power, and Lucio 
Rennó (2005) have pointed out, in the context of understanding the use of executive decree 
powers, it is important to consider that the volume of decrees issued represents "a prior 
choice from a menu of options" and, moreover, that this choice will vary within "different 
environments of presidential power and executive-legislative relations" (179). Thus, in 
examining the executive‘s decision to pursue a CA, I contextualize this method of reform as 
one possible choice. Presidents decide among several key options for how to influence 
policymaking and change the status quo. When executives have an ambitious reform agenda, 
they are more likely to employ certain policymaking strategies than others. Additionally, 
policymaking strategies are not mutually exclusive, and so the executive may try to employ 
multiple strategies during a single term. These points will be discussed further below. 
There is a growing wealth of literature on policymaking in presidential democracies 
in Latin America.
6
 It has examined the interactions between the legislature and executives 
during the process of policymaking (Shugart and Carey 1992; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). 
It also has detailed the proactive and reactive powers available to the executive and the 
conditions under which they are likely to be used (Carey and Shugart 1998; Tsebelis and 
                                                 
5
 For an overview of strategic choice analysis, specifically as it relates to Latin American politics, see David 
Collier and Deborah L. Norden (1992). 
 
6
 Ernesto Alemán (2013) provides a thorough review of recent developments in the study of legislative politics. 
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Alemán 2005; Durán-Martínez 2012). Lastly, it has considered the legislative productivity of 
the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, through individual case studies (Figueiredo and 
Limongi 2000; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Alemán and Navia 2009) and in 
cross-national studies (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira 
2009). This literature has generated a host of important observations about the policymaking 
process, which will be crucial to understanding the executive‘s decision over how to pursue 
ambitious reform. I will draw upon these observations in developing a framework of 
executive policymaking below. 
However, very few studies have analyzed executives' decisions over how to pursue 
policy in light of the full range of options available to them. An important exception is 
Octavio Amorim Neto‘s (2006) decision-theoretic model of a president's policy-making 
strategies. In his view, a president may choose between enacting policy through statutes or 
through executive prerogatives. The former implies the passage of law through standard 
legislative channels, while the latter implies ―all constitutional and para-constitutional 
practices that allow presidents to act unilaterally vis-à-vis the legislative branch‖ (Amorim 
Neto 2006, 416). In this way, he is focused on the ‗legal‘ or constitutionally proscribed 
powers of presidents with the central goal of examining the relationship between presidential 
policymaking and patterns of cabinet formation. He finds that executives can use cabinet 
posts to obtain the approval of statutes; they are less likely to do so when employing the 
strategy of executive decree.
7
 
                                                 
7
 I consider the offering of cabinet positions to members of the opposition in exchange for legislative support as 
a key part of the tactics employed by minority presidents in order to build coalitions to gain a legislative 
majority. Therefore, this tendency is folded into my understanding of how presidents with weak partisan power 
approach the legislative route of policymaking. 
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In Amorim Neto's model, presidents decide which strategy to employ based on the 
potential value, cost, and probability of success of implementing each. The value of statutes 
is that they are viewed as legitimate and are much less likely to be overturned than decrees. 
However, in order to pass laws through legislative channels, the president must have a 
sufficient majority in Congress or be able to form a coalition, which can be costly because of 
―the side payments the president has to make to secure a majority favorable to the bill‖ 
(Amorim Neto 2006, 420). Furthermore, the president is likely to have to compromise 
regarding his policy objective. On the other hand, decrees are valued for their relatively short 
time horizons, allowing presidents to ―immediately affect the policy status quo and move it 
to the position they want‖ (Amorim Neto 2006, 420). Still, they are seen as exceptional and 
often may only be used legally in emergencies. Hence, they are costly because they may be 
considered illegitimate and are more likely to be overturned.  
I move beyond Amorim Neto‘s model specifically by considering two additional 
constitutionally prescribed policymaking options: partial constitutional reform and accepting 
failure in the short-run.  I also consider four quasi- or extra-legal options the executive may 
seek to employ or rely on: abusing decree power, judicial override, establishing a new legal 
precedent for the CA, and the self-coup. Therefore, my understanding of the policymaking 
options available to executives is broader than Amorim Neto‘s model. In considering 
additional options, I recognize that executives often bend or break the rules of the game, as 
established by the existing constitution.
8
 Amorim Neto also makes a key simplifying 
assumption: presidents can only try statutes or prerogatives but not both. My framework 
                                                 
8
 In a similar vein, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2013) recognize that some political actors 
display intransigence in defending or impatience in implementing their policy preferences. This may lead to a 
willingness to subvert democracy in order to achieve policy goals or to prevent others from achieving their 
goals, or in the extreme, to the use of violence (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 36–39). 
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diverges on this point, as I recognize the tendency of executives to attempt multiple strategies 
within a single term.
9
 
In the model of executive policymaking that I develop below, I make a key starting 
assumption: presidents are concerned with the success and legitimacy of the policy-making 
process. They care about the legitimacy of their reforms because they want to minimize their 
risk of failure or subsequent policy reversal. Therefore, they will prefer to pass reforms 
legally, if possible. It is also important to note that, although the decision tree below presents 
incremental steps in the decision making process, we should not always expect to see the 
same rigid pattern of attempts at reform. While optimal policy may not be self-evident to 
executives, they can learn from their predecessors and rule out the possibility of certain 
options based on previous experiences. Instead of always starting with attempts at statutes, 
the president may rule out this path of reform from the beginning, deciding not to even make 
an attempt because of a perceived low probability of success.
10
  They may also attempt one 
strategy at first, and then attempt a different strategy when the first fails or proves insufficient 
for accomplishing the preferred reforms. 
A reform agenda is ‗ambitious‘ if it aims to redistribute power in the political system 
between elites and masses. In operationalizing this concept, I take an economic approach. 
Ambitious agendas that empower popular vis-à-vis elite sectors of society include: land 
reform, nationalization, progressive tax reform, and redistributive social policy. Ambitious 
reform agendas that empower elite vis-à-vis popular sectors of society include neoliberal 
                                                 
9
 Amorim Neto (2006) also recognizes this tendency (418) but must keep his model simple for computational 
purposes and so limits himself to explaining executive policymaking behavior under very short time-horizons. 
 
10
 A good example of this might be the decision calculus of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. His immediate 
predecessor, Alfredo Palacio, made many failed attempts to pass a constitutional reform package through 
Congress. 
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reforms such as privatization, liberalization, balancing budgets primarily through cutting 
expenditures, regressive tax reform, and other structural adjustment policies associated with 
IMF standby agreements. I am careful to distinguish the ambitious agendas considered here 
from revolutionary agendas; unlike revolutionary agendas, ambitious ones may be but do not 
necessarily have to be a complete break with policies of previous executives.
11
 
Susan C. Stokes (2001) analyzes executive 'policy-switching' in Latin America in the 
1990s, in other words the tendency of some presidents to campaign on a rejection of 
neoliberal ideals but then implement neoliberal policy reforms after winning office. Stokes 
follows the work of Jon Elster (1995) by envisioning a continuum from "efficiency-oriented 
policies of market competition to security-oriented policies of state intervention" (2). This 
definition captures policies with both left and right ideological orientations. My definition 
does as well, though it conceptualizes left-oriented policies as shifting power to the popular 
sectors while right-oriented policies shift power to elites. Because Stokes is interested in the 
phenomenon of policy-switching, she considers only those policies implemented in the first 6 
months of the executive's time in office to capture switches that are not generated by 
changing economic and political conditions. However, I do not limit my understanding of 
executive's policy agendas temporally. First, I want to understand how executives attempt to 
implement an ambitious agenda, regardless of when in their term they initially develop it. 
Secondly, not placing a time limit on the development of an ambitious agenda allows me to 
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 The set of revolutionary agendas would fall within the set of ambitious agendas, but which also distinguish 
themselves from politics as usual because they seek to shift power within the political system. 
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divorce success from the definition of an ambitious agenda.
12
 Thus, in my consideration, 
executives may develop a more ambitious policy agenda later in their term.  
Lastly, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2013) develop a definition of 
"radical policy preferences" of political actors, with one key actor being the executive. To be 
'radical,' policy preferences must be toward one pole of a policy spectrum (left or right, 
assuming a unidimensional policy space) sufficiently far from the preferences of other actors 
as to cause polarization, and also intense enough to lead actors to be intransigent or impatient 
(Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 15). They measure intransigence or impatience by the 
executive's: (1) expression of unwillingness to compromise; (2) expression of willingness to 
subvert the law; (3) implementation of polarizing policies; (4) acts of violence in support of 
policy (78). My own definition differs substantially in that it does not require intransigence 
or impatience. Rather, pragmatic executives with an ambitious agenda may realize that they 
need to respect the rule of law and/or compromise. Quite simply, some presidents may judge 
that it is worth resorting to non-democratic means to implement their preferred policy so as 
not to negotiate with the opposition, yet others may find that it is worth compromising and 
sticking strictly to legal mechanisms of reform. I want to understand both of these decisions, 
not just the former. Again, to some extent, my definition seeks to separate a decision over 
implementation from the definition of the ambitious agenda itself. As will be explored below, 
the degree of intransigence or impatience should help to determine the executive's decision 
over how to attempt to implement his or her preferred agenda. 
Institutional Change, Innovation, & Manipulation 
                                                 
12
 My aim in the following chapter is to analyze the factors leading to the successful implementation of a policy 
agenda and it is plausible that timing may actually have important consequences for success. 
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Reform via CA represents an innovative process of institutional change.  As such, 
most cases lack legal precedent dictating the normal function of this process. Presidents have 
had to wade into uncharted territory and appeal to courts to legitimize these processes. 
Bolivia was the only case where a previous constitutional reform paved the way for the 
election of a CA. However, even there, many aspects of the process diverged from the letter 
of the law. During a ceremony in Cochabamba on July 28, 2008, Evo Morales infamously 
said: ―When some lawyer tells me: ‗Evo, you are lawfully wrong, what you are doing is 
illegal,‘ I just get started on it, however much it is illegal, and after I say to the lawyers: if it 
is illegal, then you legalize it. Why else have you studied law?‖13 This statement 
simultaneously generated both anger and pride in Bolivia, during a highly polarized CA 
process. For some, it was a blatant expression of Morales‘ contempt for the rule of law. 
However, for others, existing institutions were so discredited that the ends justified the 
means. 
Rather than focusing exclusively on the effects of institutions, some scholars have 
begun from the assumption that institutions matter, seeking to explain the design and 
implementation of new institutions (North 1990). This research has taken a variety of 
approaches, some rooted in the historical institutionalist tradition and others within the 
tradition of rational choice. However, scholars have increasingly argued that these 
distinctions are limiting, causing scholars to separate questions of institutional reproduction 
from institutional change when really there is some value in synthesizing the findings of both 
approaches (Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999). Research within the tradition of historical 
institutionalism has sought not only to explain drastic and dramatic moments of institutional 
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 http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/actualidad/cuando-la-ley-se-convierte-en-una-piedra-en-el-
zapato/20081212/nota/728477.aspx  (accessed: July 1, 2013) 
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change, but also more gradual processes with significant impact over time (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). 
A number of scholars have focused explicitly on determinants of constitutional 
durability or change (Hayek 1973; Buchanan 1977; North 1981; Voigt 1999). Studies within 
positive constitutional economics have questioned how constitutions become self-sustaining, 
and they have diverged starkly from the normative approach by rejecting the idea of the 
constitution as a social contract. Peter C. Ordeshook (1992) explains the dilemma for 
positivists: 
…if contracts ensure that people do things that they would not otherwise do, it is 
difficult to isolate the ultimate source of a constitution‘s durability. Are its provisions 
enforced by yet a second contract, that is enforced by a third, and so on? Are they 
enforced from within, by the police, the courts and the military? Or must they be 
enforced by force to be administered by an oligarchy that stands removed from 
constitutional limits? (144). 
 
Therefore, in the positive view, constitutions are understood as tools to aid 
coordination; they facilitate voluntary agreements by reducing their transition costs. In order 
to be self-sustaining, this view contends that democratic constitutions must bring political 
action into equilibrium and this equilibrium must be deemed ‗reasonable‘ by a sizeable 
portion of the population (Ordeshook 1992, 155). Literature growing out of this vein has also 
focused on the question of why lawmakers would select a given set of institutions over 
another  (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2004; Ticchi and Vindigni 2009). In Latin America, 
Gabriel L. Negretto (2013) analyzes constitutional choice, using large-n quantitative analysis 
as well as qualitative cases studies. He finds that ―constitutional choice is endogenous to the 
performance of preexisting constitutional structures and to the partisan interests and relative 
power of reformers‖ (7).  
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During the process of constitutional change, there is a great deal of potential for 
informal practices and institutional manipulation. In line with a large body of literature, I 
acknowledge that formal institutions in Latin America may be weak, allowing leaders to 
manipulate them. Guillermo O‘Donnell (1998) develops the conception of 'delegative 
democracy' within which a powerful executive is chosen to protect the will of the majority. 
This often results in a lack of horizontal accountability and the weakening of other 
institutions and agencies of the state. ―In the short term, delegative executives tend to ignore 
such agencies, while elimination, cooptation, or neutralization are the preferred longer-term 
strategies‖ (O‘Donnell 1998, 120). Likewise, Monica Barczak (2001) recognizes that while 
tools of direct democracy can potentially enhance participation, "consultas and initiatives can 
[also] be used in more pernicious ways. An authoritarian-minded president, for example, 
might see the referendum as a way to circumvent (and thereby weaken) the legislature" (39). 
More recently, this literature has recognized the existence of informal institutions. 
These are unwritten, socially shared rules that are "created, communicated, and enforced 
outside officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 5). My research speaks 
to this tradition in several ways. First, I acknowledging the central role of the president and 
other political actors, such as high-ranking elected officials and bureaucrats as well as social 
movements, in pursuing this type of institutional change. Furthermore, the institutional 
change on which I focus is related to the literature about informal institutions because it often 
occurs both within and outside of officially sanctioned channels. For example, reform of the 
constitution through a referendum and CA has not been allowed by the existing constitutions 
in these countries. Instead, the Supreme Court or Electoral Council has had make the 
decision to allow the referenda to move forward. Executives have proven willing to bend or 
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break the institutionalized rules at several points during the process, not least of which at the 
initiation of reform. The manipulation of institutions backed by broad popular support is not 
new within Latin America. For example, while the autogolpe (self-coup) of Alberto Fujimori 
represented a dramatic break with democracy in Peru, it was also backed by broad popular 
support within the population (Kenney 2004). With this in mind, I integrate in the analysis in 
subsequent chapters analysis over precisely when executive are more likely to engage in 
institutional manipulation and change. Moreover, this analysis illuminates the factors that 
determine the success or failure of institutional innovations. 
Diffusion of Innovations 
The cases where reform via CA was attempted are arrayed throughout time and 
clustered geographically in a way that suggests the potential for diffusion to have been at 
work in the region. Early applications of diffusion of innovations theory within comparative 
politics represented the first time that scholars studying domestic-level innovations had 
acknowledged the role of the international context (Dahl 1971; Li and Thompson 1975). The 
literature has since proliferated and become rather disjointed. Perhaps this trend is most 
apparently through the diverse array of concepts used by scholars, including: diffusion, 
interdependence, contagion, convergence, harmonization, demonstration effects, policy 
transfer, and emulation. Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons (2005) define diffusion as ―a set 
of processes characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision making‖ (35). 
However, this definition is a bit restrictive in that it eliminates the possibility of coercion. 
More generally, Kurt Weyland (2005) defines diffusion as ―the adoption of the same 
innovation in diverse settings‖ (267).  An innovation, in turn, can be understood as an idea or 
policy that is perceived to be new by the adopter (Rogers 2003, 12). It is the ‗newness‘ of the 
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idea which places adopters in an environment with high levels of uncertainty.
14
 With this in 
mind, it makes sense that policymakers might look to the experiences of their counterparts in 
other countries for information. 
Scholars have also identified a number of mechanisms through which ideas may 
diffuse.  Generally, though scholars have used a number of different terms, these can be 
reduced to: learning, competition, coercion, and socialization (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 
2012, 24; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 10; Weyland 2006, 32). Two of these 
mechanisms seem highly unlikely to have influenced attempts at reform via CA. First, some 
ideas or policies are propagated through coercion. That is, external forces may compel 
domestic actors to adopt certain policies.
15
 However, with respect to the phenomenon of 
interest here, the mechanism of coercion has clearly not been at play. The degree of domestic 
agency in propelling forward these reforms is undeniable; likewise, there has not been an 
external actor strong enough to force the idea on another country. Secondly, innovations may 
also spread through the mechanism of competition. This type of diffusion is often understood 
in purely economic terms, describing the competition among states for capital and the 
maximization of market share.
16
 However, theoretically, this mechanism could apply to any 
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 This idea has become central to recent claims that policymakers operate with bounded – instead of complete – 
rationality when deciding whether or not to adopt new ideas (Weyland 2006; Weyland 2008). 
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 International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank promote the 
neoliberal economic model through conditionality, coercing countries into economic reform. With the end of 
the Cold War, the United States has shifted its international policies away from the containment of communism 
and toward the promotion of democracy, fighting wars with at least the officially stated goal of implementing 
democratic regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The European Union has imposed strict conditionality through the 
accession process, holding countries hoping to join to high standards of political and economic policy 
(Vachudova 2005). In the end, many authors argue against the viability of this type of diffusion because it is 
usually impossible to enforce compliance in the long run (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 11–12; Weyland 
2006, 38). In the case of the EU, while countries may not be backsliding (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010), they 
also do not appear to making progress as initially hoped (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). 
 
16
 Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2008, 17) explain how it might relate to political systems and the spread of 
political liberalization. 
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policy ―with economic spillovers‖ (Shipan and Volden 2008, 842). Though competition has 
likely become more of a driving influence in recent years, with the spread of neoliberalism 
and the integration of the world market, when it comes to reform via CA, this mechanism is 
not perceptibly at work. 
However, it is more convincing that the two remaining mechanisms – learning and 
emulation – may be driving the diffusion of reform via CA. Diffusion may occur through a 
process of learning, described as ―a change in beliefs, or a change in the strength of one‘s 
confidence in existing beliefs, resulting either from observation and interpretation or from 
acquisition of new theories or behavioral repertoires‖ (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, 
25). With a basis in rational choice assumptions, learning emphasizes the autonomy of 
decision makers and conceptualizes the decision to adopt an innovation as driven by interests 
of policymakers (Weyland 2006, 43). The experience that leads the updating of 
policymakers‘ beliefs does not have to be personal; instead, policymakers may observe the 
experiences of others as well.  
Learning is understood generally as a process of rational inference through which 
leaders utilize observational information to make decisions. Leaders learn not only from their 
own personal experiences, but also from the experiences of other leaders within their own 
country, as well as the from ―the policy experiments of their peers‖ in other countries 
(Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007, 449). 
Lastly, diffusion may occur through socialization or emulation.
17
 This constructivist 
approach maintains that adoption of an innovation is voluntary but focuses on the normative 
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 Others have also referred to this mechanism as imitation (Shipan and Volden 2008, 842). It differs in its 
emphasis on the ―inter-subjectivity of meaning,‖ which implies that policymakers‘ understanding of the ends 
and the means of policy reform are socially constructed, and may actually change over time (Simmons, Dobbin, 
and Garrett 2008, 32). 
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and symbolic pull of the particular innovation being adopted. Again, emulation implied that 
rationality may be bounded; policymakers may simply follow the example set by others, even 
if there is not extensive evidence of the success of such policies. ―Moral suasion or the quest 
for international legitimacy may induce many countries to import the new policy scheme‖ 
(Weyland 2006, 39).
18
 Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden (2008) provide a basic example 
of how emulation differs: whereas learning is equivalent to not touching a hot burner because 
you saw someone do so and get burned, socialization/emulation is jumping off of the roof 
because you see that your older brother is doing so (Shipan and Volden 2008, 843). 
Emulation could certainly have been at play in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, particularly 
as they followed portions of the Colombian experience and in their desire to maintain the 
international legitimacy of the reform process. 
Yet, the learning mechanism is the one most likely to be at work in these cases. 
Sociologists have identified four types of cognitive short-cuts typically used by decision 
makers as they learn from the experiences of others.
19
 These are: (1) temporal limits, (2) 
geographical limits, (3) an unwarranted emphasis on successful examples, and (4) the 
perception of the domain of gains or losses. First, there are temporal trends in diffusion. The 
adoption of an innovation across countries typically displays an S-shaped cumulative 
frequency curve because diffusion begins slowly, ―as decision makers take some time to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
18
 This very observation implies that not all countries will be subjected equally to the mechanism of emulation.  
For example, innovative policies may be more likely to diffuse from the United States, as the hegemon, to a 
smaller country than the reverse, even if the policies are equally innovative and perhaps have more of a track 
record of success.  On a regional level, policies might be more likely to diffuse from Chávez in Venezuela than 
the reverse because of his geopolitical significance within Latin America. 
 
19
 There is an important debate as to whether or not decision makers are capable of assessing the costs and 
benefits of every potential strategy. Some argue that they are fully rational, in that ―individual actors make 
optimal use of available information‖ to update their beliefs in a Bayesian process (Simmons, Dobbin, and 
Garrett 2008, 28). Others, most prominently sociologists, identify a number of cognitive shortcuts employed by 
decision makers that may bound rationality (Weyland 2008, 293). 
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assess their promise. Yet, once there are indications of initial success, this cognitive shortcut 
inspires enthusiasm and triggers an upsurge of emulation‖ (Weyland 2008, 293). Eventually, 
decision makers become aware of the actual performance of the innovation and become more 
reluctant to adopt it, causing the innovation‘s spread to taper off. Another temporal trend in 
diffusion is caused by the fact that ―recent changes are far more likely to be on the minds of 
decision makers than are reform efforts undertaken many years earlier‖ (Weyland 2008, 
292). Decision makers may not make use of all of the cumulative evidence over time. 
Secondly, rationality may be bounded geographically, explaining patterns of regional 
clustering. Policies or ideas are more likely to diffuse between neighbors because the view of 
local policymakers ―is limited by geographical, cultural, and temporal boundaries. 
Innovations adopted in their neighborhood have special immediacy and impact and attract 
much more attention than equally important changes occurring halfway around the globe‖ 
(Weyland 2008, 292). Moreover, a degree of cultural, economic, and political similarity 
between the innovator and the adopter lend to the perception of a higher chance for 
successful adoption.  
Third, rationality can be bounded because actors may also be tempted to overstate the 
significance of a single successful case. An innovation in one country may signal to other 
countries that change is possible because the ―precedent suggests that the opposition of 
powerful sectors to reform can be overcome. What looked difficult if not impossible 
suddenly appears realistic‖ (Weyland 2008, 294). The frontrunner‘s experience with reform 
thus weighs more heavily in the minds of policymakers and makes them more confident in 
the ability to successfully implement policy reform than they perhaps should be after only 
witnessing a singular successful case.  
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Lastly, rationality may be bounded with respect to the decision-makers perspective on 
risk. ―According to a core finding of prospect theory, people who face prospects of losses go 
to great lengths to avoid any costs, even if the chosen remedy holds considerable danger. 
They are willing to incur great risk—including the danger of further deterioration—to avoid 
any losses at all‖ (Weyland 2008, 286). Thus, policymakers may not only overestimate their 
own chances for success after seeing the innovation for the first time, but they may also view 
themselves in the domain of losses, making them less risk-averse than usual. While 
acknowledging that the implementation of an innovation is risky, it still might be considered 
by policymakers to be better than the alternatives available to them. This finding also points 
to how perceived crisis may help to ignite the diffusion of innovation.  
Throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I evaluate evidence of 
diffusion at work, particularly through the mechanism of learning. I move beyond existing 
literature, which has focused primarily on the diffusion of liberalism, to examine the 
diffusion of a process without precedent in many of the countries where it has occurred. 
Moreover, I consider how the actors involved in the process of diffusion matter. Their 
geographic and temporal location, their state of mind, and the conditions placed on them by 
institutions or outside forces will all likely play a role in the decision-making process. In 
analyzing presidents‘ decisions to undertake reform via CA, there is evidence of learning as 
well as the use of cognitive shortcuts. For Zelaya in Honduras, these cognitive shortcuts led 
him to overestimate of the likelihood of success, with a disastrous result – his removal from 
office. In this way, I complicate the literature‘s approach to diffusion by considering also 
how the opposition may similarly engage in a reciprocal process of learning and, as in 
Honduras, may preempt the President‘s attempts to employ this innovative strategy. 
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Liberal Representative vs. Participatory Democracy 
The key to understanding the initiation, success, and consequences of this innovative 
process of institutional change is the tension between constituent and constituted powers. 
According to Maxwell A. Cameron (2009), this distinction sits ―at the heart of an unresolved 
dilemma of liberalism: that the people, the demos, are the source of all legitimate authority 
and, at the same time, that the first expression of this authority is the constitution of power 
that becomes constituted power‖ (340). This is an age-old conflict,  
These two concepts, forever in tension, are embodied in two dichotomous 
conceptions of democracy (Roberts 1998, 19). The first is a liberal representative conception 
emphasizing constituted power through representation and effective institutions of horizontal 
accountability (O‘Donnell 1998). In this view, elected officials should be constrained by a 
constitution; independent institutions, parties and branches of government are necessary in 
order to enforce the constitution and constrain leaders. The second idea focuses on the 
constituent power or popular sovereignty. Put more simply, it is the idea that ―a government 
should do what most of its citizens want it to do‖ (O‘Donnell 1998, 166). Some theorists 
argue that popular sovereignty is really the essence of democracy (Canovan 1999; Canovan 
2002; Tännsjö 1992). This conceptualization stresses the participation of all citizens in the 
decision making process and the importance of majority rule. This often leads to a reliance 
on participatory mechanisms, such as referenda, plebicites, recall, and popular initiatives. 
These do not necessarily bypass existing processes of representative democracy, but may 
also complement them depending on the context (Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain 2004, 126).  
Ultimately, representative and participatory conceptualizations of democracy are 
ideal concepts; in practice, there is often a more unpleasant reality. They both carry their own 
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potential dangers and pitfalls. In representative democracy, Margaret Canovan (2002) argues 
that there is a fundamental paradox: ―…empowerment undermines transparency.  Attempts to 
give a political voice to the population at large tend to produce institutions that separate 
people and power in the very process of mediating between them‖ (28). In other words, even 
with the best of intentions, fixed and tangible institutions and practices are often at odds with 
the dynamic organization that plays out in the streets - ―the sentiments and collective 
representation, the opinions and the public rituals, the social movements and civil society 
[organizations, which] animate [democracy] and give it life‖ (Cameron 2009, 340). Since the 
return to democracy in Latin America, conflicts between representative institutions and the 
popular will have come to the forefront. Recent processes of constitutional change via CA 
grew out of these tensions and the widespread disillusionment with the liberal representative 
status quo. 
At the same time, participatory democracy is not without the potential for problems.  
With its reliance on the mechanisms of popular participation, popular leaders may be able to 
manipulate the popular will and consolidate power because they feel that they speak for the 
population as a whole. Even Schmitt (2008), who champions popular sovereignty, recognizes 
the special challenges that arise from the initiation of the people‘s constitution-making power 
―through some recognizable expression of their direct comprehensive will‖ (130-131). For 
him, ―The weakness is that the people should decide on the basic questions of their political 
form and their organization without themselves being formed or organized. This means their 
expressions of will are easily mistaken, misinterpreted, or falsified‖ (Schmitt 2008, 131). 
Likewise, Canovan (1999) admits that ―this claim to speak for ‗the people‘ is far from 
straightforward, for the term is ambiguous and populists tend to be adept at exploiting its 
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rhetorical possibilities‖ (5). Who are ‗the people?‘ At what point does the leader believe he 
or she knows what the people want without asking them? 
My research emphasizes the tradeoff between the representative and participatory 
democracy, constituent and constituted powers, vertical and horizontal accountability, and 
majority rule and the protection of minority rights (Schmitter and Karl 1991; O‘Donnell 
1998; Coppedge 2003). I also use the experiences of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador to 
explore some of the many consequences of moving away from liberal representative 
democracy and toward more direct or participatory models. 
This dissertation contributes important conclusions that will resonate within as well 
as beyond the region of Latin America. Most centrally, it examines how popular presidents, 
constrained with respect to other policymaking paths, have been able to use constituent 
assemblies as vehicle for passing ambitious reform agendas. As such, this dissertation 
explores the practical application of constituent power. Presidents like Chávez, Morales, and 
Correa have justified innovative processes of reform by pointing to the supremacy of popular 
sovereignty. I demonstrate how these leaders identified and used the context of crisis to their 
advantage; the discrediting of the social contract generated the popular support necessary for 
sweeping changes to the Constitution. Likewise, this dissertation illuminates tensions that 
exist between majoritarian participatory models of democracy and liberal representative 
models. This is an enduring and universal problem that has recently reemerged in the context 
of Latin American politics. By identifying the key political actors and observable outcomes 
of this type of reform, this research improves our understanding of the interplay of 
leadership, popular mobilization, and institutions in flux. In a region where democracy is an 
imperative for leaders, we need to understand the conditions under which reform may 
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enhance one of democracy‘s pillars (citizen participation and popular legitimacy) while 
undermining another (the elected Congress). 
Conceptualization and Measurement 
Executives with Ambitious Agendas 
I am centrally concerned with a policymaking strategy advanced by presidents with 
an ambitious reform agenda. By reform agenda, I mean the executive's principal objectives 
to change policy. The agenda encompasses not only the policies that an executive 
accomplishes, but more importantly what he or she wants to implement during his or her time 
in office. This conceptualization poses challenges, as there is an inherent bias toward 
observing cases of success. However, I observe even failed reform agenda of executives in 
several ways. First, it is common for an executive to make an ambitious reform agenda a 
central part of his or her campaign. Presidents often state their policy ambitions during 
speeches and interviews. Secondly, in a region where executive power is a central theme of 
study, presidents who fail in their attempts at reform are interesting cases. I often relied on 
secondary sources with detailed accounts of failed policymaking processes. Beyond 
espousing rhetoric openly, the agenda must also be observed through some attempt at 
implementation, even if the attempt falls short very early on. 
Moreover, a reform agenda is ambitious if it aims to redistribute power in the political 
system between elites and masses. There are many potential ways to operationalize this. 
Here, I take an economic approach. Literature on transitions to democracy have long held 
that economic and political power are highly interrelated (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens 1992; Acemoglu and Robinson 2009), and in most democratic societies this 
remains the case. With this in mind, ambitious agendas that empower popular vis-à-vis elite 
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sectors of society include: land reform, nationalization, progressive tax reform, and 
redistributive social policy. Ambitious reform agendas that empower elite vis-à-vis popular 
sectors of society include neoliberal reforms such as privatization, liberalization, balancing 
budgets primarily through cutting expenditures, regressive tax reform, and other structural 
adjustment policies associated with IMF standby agreements.
20
  I attempt to distinguish 
between economic stabilization programs, employing monetary and fiscal austerity to 
manage demand, and structural adjustment programs. The latter are ambitious, while the 
former are not. This is particularly true in situations of hyperinflation where stabilization may 
benefit both elites and the popular sector. Inflation is a ―tax‖ on all, but especially on the 
poor who have no emergency funds or access to foreign exchange. Therefore, stabilization 
measures are not considered to be part of an ambitious agenda. 
My definition of an ambitious reform agenda approximates three other definitions 
laid out by recent analyses of executive policymaking (Grindle 2000; Mainwaring and Pérez-
Liñán 2013; Stokes 2001), but also differs in important ways. Like Merilee S. Grindle 
(2000), who focuses on what she calls 'audacious' reforms, I also consider reforms that move 
beyond "the politics of incrementalism" (1) to restructure the political system and redistribute 
power. Likewise, I share Grindle's focus on the creation of new institutions. However, 
Grindle defines 'audacious' reforms as those that redistributing power between central and 
local levels of government (effectively decentralizing power). In contrast, I seek to 
understand the redistribution of power among socio-political groups rather than among 
different levels of government. 
                                                 
20
 The first set of policies is typically associated with left-leaning presidents and the second with right-leaning 
presidents.  However, the debt crisis and other economic shocks in the region in the 1980s and 1990s meant that 
many presidents from left-leaning parties also were under great external pressure to advance neoliberal reforms. 
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Secondly, my operationalization approximates that of Susan C. Stokes (2001), in her 
analysis of executive 'policy-switching' in Latin America in the 1990s. She follows the work 
of Jon Elster (1995), envisioning a continuum from "efficiency-oriented policies of market 
competition to security-oriented policies of state intervention" (2). Like Stokes, my definition 
of ambitious reform captures policies with both left and right ideological orientations. 
However, on the other hand, I do not limit my understanding of executive's policy agenda 
temporally. Stokes considers only those policies implemented in the first 6 months of the 
executive's time in office to capture switches that are not generated by changing economic 
and political conditions. I want to understand how executives attempt to implement an 
ambitious agenda regardless of when in their term they initially develop it. Secondly, not 
placing a time limit on the development of an ambitious agenda allows me to divorce success 
from the definition of an ambitious agenda.
21
 
Lastly, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2013) develop a definition of 
"radical policy preferences" of political actors, with one key actor being the executive. To be 
'radical,' policy preferences must be toward one pole of a policy spectrum (left or right, 
assuming a unidimensional policy space) sufficiently far from the preferences of other actors 
as to cause polarization, and also intense enough to lead actors to be intransigent or impatient 
(Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 15). They measure intransigence or impatience by the 
executive's: (1) expression of unwillingness to compromise; (2) expression of willingness to 
subvert the law; (3) implementation of polarizing policies; (4) acts of violence in support of 
policy (78). My own definition differs substantially in that it does not require intransigence 
or impatience. Rather, pragmatic executives with an ambitious agenda may realize that they 
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 My aim in the following chapter is to analyze the factors leading to the successful implementation of a policy 
agenda and it is plausible that timing may actually have important consequences for success. 
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need to respect the rule of law and/or compromise. Quite simply, some presidents may judge 
that it is worth resorting to non-democratic means to implement their preferred policy so as 
not to negotiate with the opposition, yet others may find that it is worth compromising and 
sticking strictly to legal mechanisms of reform. I want to understand both of these decisions, 
not just the former. My definition seeks to separate a decision over implementation from the 
definition of the ambitious agenda itself. 
As I indicated above, coding these agendas is challenging. I reject a coding which 
focuses only on campaign promises or discourse. Rather, I am interested in identifying 
circumstances where rhetoric was matched by some attempt to implement reform, even if 
that attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. Thus, I consider not only campaign promises but 
also the executive‘s actions during their term of office. In the case of policy switchers, I 
weigh more heavily their actions once in office. Thus, action outweighs rhetoric in my 
coding. For example, Carlos Menem (1989-1999) in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori (1990-
2000) in Peru both campaigned with a populist and anti-neoliberal message but quickly 
implemented neoliberal reforms once in office. For the purposes of the present analysis, they 
are both coded as having an ambitious agenda to empower elite vis-à-vis popular sectors of 
society for their efforts at privatization. Sometimes no clear agenda is discernible because 
executives attempt to implement a hybrid agenda, combining both elite-empowering and 
mass-empowering policies. For example, Vicente Fox (2000-2006) in Mexico tried to 
privatize electric utilities, but was foiled by the Supreme Court. At the same time, he 
continued the Progresa-Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program. Therefore, Fox is 
coded as not having an ambitious reform agenda. 
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Using contemporary newspaper articles, country reports from Bertelsmann Stiftung‘s 
Transformation Index (BTI), the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation, 
and detailed scholarly accounts of economic reform, I code all presidential terms in 18 Latin 
American countries since the return to democracy (1978 or later) through February 1, 2014.
22
 
I only consider terms completed by February 2014 to avoid evaluations of ongoing efforts at 
policy reform. Moreover, I take into account only those presidents whose period in office 
lasted at least 100 days. In large part, those lasting less than 100 days were interim presidents 
during moments of crisis, and they did not offer sufficient time to attempt ambitious 
reform.
23
 The shortest presidential term in my sample is Alberto Fujimori‘s third term in 
Peru, approximately 4 months (117 days) in duration. The longest term is Violeta 
Chamorro‘s presidency in Nicaragua, a little less than 7 years (2452 days) in duration. Since 
the focus here is on the President, I code a separate term when a Vice President takes over as 
President for any reason, provided that he or she remains in office for at least 100 days. 
Ambitious Reform in Latin America: 1978-2014 
I am interested in the policymaking of executives with ambitious reform agendas 
under democracy. To define the universe of cases, I code all Latin American executives since 
the return to democracy to see how many held an ambitious reform agenda. Employing the 
coding decisions outlined above generates a sample of 125 presidential terms in Latin 
America between 1978 and 2014 (detailed in Appendix B).   
  
                                                 
22
 For example, I begin coding Mexican presidents in 2000. See Appendix B for the detailed agenda data. 
 
23
 I remove: Ramón Puerta (2 days, Argentina), Eduardo Camaño (2 days, Argentina) Eduardo Rodríguez Saá (8 
days, Argentina), Jacobo Majluta Azar (43 days, Dominican Republic), Rosalía Arteaga (2 days, Ecuador), 
Gustavo Adolfo Espina Salguero (4 days, Guatemala), Octavio Lepage Barreto (15 days, Venezuela), and the 
final term of Hugo Chávez Frias (54 days, Venezuela). 
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Table 1: Presidents with Ambitious Reform Agendas, 1978-2014 
Country Empowering Popular Sectors Empowering Elites 
Argentina Néstor Kirchner (2003), 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
(2007) 
Carlos Menem (1989, 1995) 
Bolivia Carlos Mesa (2003), Evo 
Morales (2006) 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985), 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
(1993), Hugo Banzer (1997) 
Brazil Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 
(2003, 2006) 
Fernando Collor (1990), Itamar 
Franco (1992), Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995, 1998) 
Chile Lagos (2000), Bachelet (2006)  
Colombia  Álvaro Uribe (2002, 2006) 
Costa Rica  Rafael Calderón Fournier (1990), 
Miguel Rodríguez Echeverría 
(1998) 
Dominican 
Republic 
 Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982), 
Joaquín Balaguer (1990) 
Ecuador Jaime Roldós (1979), Alfredo 
Palacio (2005), Rafael Correa 
(2007, 2009) 
León Febres Cordero (1984), Sixto 
Duran Ballén (1992), Jamil 
Mahuad (1998), Gustavo Noboa 
(2000) 
El Salvador José Napoleón Duarte (1984) Alfredo Cristiani (1989), Armando 
Calderón Sol (1994), Francisco 
Flores Pérez (1999) 
Guatemala Álvaro Colom (2008) Jorge Serrano Elías (1991), 
Álvaro Arzú (1996) 
Honduras Manuel Zelaya (2006) Rafael Leonardo Callejas (1990) 
Mexico   
Nicaragua Daniel Ortega (1985, 2007) Violeta Chamorro (1990) 
Panama  Ernesto Pérez Balladares (1994) 
Paraguay Fernando Lugo (2008) Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993) 
Peru Alan García Pérez (1985) Alberto Fujimori (1990, 1995) 
Uruguay Tabaré Vásquez (2005) Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990) 
Venezuela Hugo Chávez Frias (1998, 
2000, 2006) 
Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989), 
Rafael Caldera (1994) 
Note: Bolded names indicate attempts at reform that I will discuss in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
In total, 56 out of 125 presidential terms (44.8%) advanced some type of ambitious 
reform agenda in democratic Latin America (1978-2014), as shown in Table 1  above. This 
leaves a slight majority that did not advance an ambitious agenda. Two points bear 
consideration here. First, executives are motivated people who campaigned for and won the 
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highest elected office often precisely because they developed an ambitious reform program 
that they promised to accomplish while in office. Second, the sample includes those 
executives who have succeeded in implementing reforms as well as those who have failed. 
Some of these executives will likely be remembered more for their inability to accomplish 
reform than for the ambitious agenda they failed to achieve. 
Executive advanced a left-leaning ambitious agenda to redistribute power toward 
popular sectors during 23 terms (18.4% of all terms). During 33 terms (26.4%) executives 
advanced a right-leaning ambitious agenda, advanced an ambitious neoliberal reform and 
further empowering elites in relation to popular sectors. 
Table 2: Ambitious Agendas by Time Period 
  1978-1988 1989-1999 2000-2014 
Presidential Terms 27 50 48 
Ambitious Agendas 6 22.2% 25 50.0% 25 52.1% 
Empower Masses 4 66.6% 1 4.0% 18 72.0% 
Empower Elites 2 33.3% 24 96.0% 7 28.0% 
 
Looking at different time periods, the dominance of the right during the neoliberal era 
of the 1990s as well as the resurgence of the left since 2000 is clear in this data (Table 2 
above). Between 1989 and 1999, 96% of ambitious agendas were geared toward empowering 
elites. The single agenda during this time period that aimed at empowering the masses 
belonged to Hugo Chávez Frías (1998). In stark contrast, 72% of all ambitious agendas 
aimed to redistribute power to the masses during the period from 2000-2014. Additionally, 
executives seemed to propose ambitious agendas slightly more often during the neoliberal 
era. During the earlier period, between 1978 and 1988, only 22.2% of executive terms 
advanced an ambitious agenda, while 50-52% did during the later time periods.  
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Table 3: Electoral Differences by Ambitious Agenda 
 
Ambitious Agenda 
  Empower Masses Empower Elites None 
Presidential Terms 23 33 69 
Popularly Elected 21 91.3% 28 84.4% 53 80.3% 
Average Percentage Vote 
 
52.0% 
 
48.6% 
 
50.5% 
Second Round 8 34.8% 12 32.4% 17 25.4% 
 
In the sample, there are slight electoral differences by ambitious agenda, as seen in 
Table 3 above. However, these differences are not statistically significant and so their 
meaning remains unclear. Of the 69 terms without an ambitious agenda, 53 (76.8%) were 
directly popularly elected. Of the 56 terms with an ambitious agenda, 49 (87.5%) were 
directly popularly elected. In the whole sample, only 12 terms reflect a president's second or 
third time holding office. While four executives were reelected without ambitious agendas, 
seven served two or more terms with ambitious agendas. Thus, presidents with ambitious 
agendas may be more likely to gain reelection. There is a small though not statistically 
significant difference in the average amount of time executives spend in office. Those with 
an ambitious agenda spend an average of 4.07 years in office, as compared to an average of 
3.73 years for those without an ambitious agenda. Vice presidents who take over for 
presidents that leave office early may be less likely to have an ambitious agenda and face a 
more limited period of time in office. 
Figure 1 below looks at the geographic concentration of ambitious reform agendas 
across Latin America since 1978. Ecuador has 8 presidential terms advancing ambitious 
reform, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Brazil, each had 5. In contrast, Mexico has had none and 
Panama has had only 1 ambitious agenda. But it is important to note that Mexico does not 
enter my dataset until 2000, at the return to democracy. 
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Figure 1: Density of Ambitious Reform Agendas in Latin America, 1978-2014 
 
 
   Left-Leaning   Both   Right-Leaning 
 
 
 
Note: Maps created with Open Heat Map (http://www.openheatmap.com) 
 
Constituent Assembly 
A Constituent Assembly (CA) is a body elected with the sole purpose of rewriting the 
constitution. Historically, it has been used to write a completely new constitution ―from 
scratch,‘ often when a new state emerges, a conflict ends, or the country transitions to 
democracy for the first time. However, increasingly, it has been used to rewrite the 
constitution during a time of state and regime continuity. Roberto Viciano, a Constitutional 
Law professor at the University of Valencia and an advisor to reform processes in Latin 
America, defines a Constituent Assembly as ―a process through which you redefine the rules 
of the game of the [political] system‖ (2012).24 The subsequent chapter takes a closer look at 
the legal theory underlying the CA and its use in Latin America over time. It also 
underscores an important distinction between the Constituent and Constitutional Assemblies, 
                                                 
24
 Original quote: "Un proceso en el cual se redefinen las reglas del juego del sistema." 
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which are mechanisms sometimes found in Constitutions for the partial reform but not the 
replacement of the Constitution. A key defining feature upon which I will focus is the status 
of the CA as the highest authority in the state during the time of constitution writing. CAs 
differ from ―constitutional assemblies‖ because they should be endowed with "plenos 
poderes" or supreme power. This signifies that the CA, once elected, is the highest power 
within the political system, above the legislative, judicial, and even executive branches.  
However, the term ―Constituent Assembly‖ has been used liberally in the region. 
First, not all so-called bodies have held the supreme power previously described, and thus 
would have been better classified as constitutional assemblies. Moreover, a CA as such 
should be popularly elected, but historically many have been appointed instead. As Donna 
Lee Van Cott points out, in the case of Bolivia, ―Constituent assemblies or national 
conventions previously, since 1826, had spawned fourteen new constitutions. Only the 1826 
CA, however, merits the name, as the other fourteen were convoked by de facto executives to 
legitimate non-democratic regimes‖ (Van Cott 2000, 132).  Likewise, in Ecuador, there were 
eleven CA processes during the 1800s and 8 processes between 1900-1979. However, none 
of these occurred during periods of  electoral democracy, once again making their dynamics 
likely very different from the process as it functions today. 
It is also important to clarify that while CA processes have resulted in the effective 
marginalization or closure of other branches of government, they are different from an 
autogolpe because of the participatory nature of the process. In a CA process as defined here, 
citizens vote in a referendum to reform the constitution and establish a CA, and they also 
participate directly in the election of its members. While the autogolpe necessarily results in 
regime breakdown, the CA process has recently allowed several presidents to circumvent 
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paralyzing legislative opposition and advance a reform agenda while avoiding regime 
breakdown (Stoyan 2010). I argue that, though both attempts may fail, the autogolpe is 
clearly anti-democratic while reform via a CA has the potential to lead to regime continuity. 
Hypotheses & Alternative Arguments 
With these basic definitions and conceptualizations in mind, I now move to the 
specific hypotheses that I will examine in subsequent chapters. I expect that executives 
would prefer to reform via institutionalized mechanisms, if it was feasible. However, the CA 
is a high risk strategy that offers the potential for a very high reward. It is only through a 
consideration of the full range of reform options available to an executive that the potential 
motivations for choosing a CA become clear.  
Figure 2: Executive Policymaking Decision Tree 
 
The two most important factors are likely to be a willingness to bend the institutional 
rules and insufficient partisan/coalitional support in Congress. Executives should be more 
likely to choose to reform via CA if they are willing to bend the rules. At the same time, it is 
unlikely that they are willing to break them because of a concern with international and 
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domestic legitimacy.  Moreover, this calculation will be based in part on the diffusion of the 
idea to reform via CA and other successful examples of reform.  The feasibility of other 
institutionalized reform paths should also be determined by the scope of the agenda. If the 
agenda is sufficiently broad, then it should be more difficult to use certain types of reform 
mechanisms (ex. legal decrees or partial constitutional reform). In sum, there are five factors 
that should increase the likelihood of reform via a CA: (1) low number of seats in Congress 
for the president and an inability to build a sufficient coalitional majority, (2) weak 
presidential decree powers, (3) infeasibility of partial constitutional reform, (4) willingness 
by the president to bend or break existing institutions, and (5) the president‘s perceived high 
chance of success in relation to other strategies. 
Once a president has made the decision to employ a CA as defined above, the next 
logical question is: what factors will determine the success of the reform process? By 
success, I mean the ability of the President‘s agenda to dominate the CA process and, 
ultimately, to enact the president's broader reform agenda. I hypothesize that two variables 
jointly determine success. First, the President must have mobilizational leverage, or the 
ability to rally popular support behind the reform agenda. Secondly, the President must have 
institutional leverage, or the ability to manage other democratic institutions. This includes 
the ability to convince the Judiciary or Electoral Council to allow a referendum to form a 
CA, which was not explicitly allowed by the current constitution in the cases that I examine 
here. It also includes the ability to prevent military intervention in politics should controversy 
emerge over the establishment of a CA and rewriting of the constitution. Moreover, it 
includes the ability to manage the existing Congress should it decide to try to insert itself into 
the reform process. By manage, I do not mean to gain the ability to pass legislation with 
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Congress, but rather to prevent Congress from blocking the CA. In extreme cases, this might 
involve closing Congress. 
I operationalize these two distinct types of leverage by examining a number of factors 
that jointly compose each. I measure mobilizational leverage through the presence of an 
electoral mandate, high presidential approval, and the ability to rally large sectors of the 
electorate around the president's agenda.
25
 Part of this mobilization might occur through the 
development and expansion of formal organizations, but it could also occur through more 
informal demonstrations of support, such as protests or marches. So, I also consider the 
relative strength and independence of civil society. Where an organized civil society and 
social movements exist, there will be a conditional effect of civil society on mobilizational 
leverage, depending on whether it is independent or coopted by the president. Another way 
of thinking about civil society independence is the extent to which it is organized in a top 
down or bottom up fashion. If civil society is coopted but strongly organized, then the 
president will have more mobilizational leverage. However, if civil society is independent by 
strongly organized, then the President will have less mobilizational leverage because he or 
she will need to negotiate with the leaders of social movements.  
I measure institutional leverage through exogenous measures, which are determined 
by factors that are separate from the outcome – success of reform.  These include: the 
independence of the Judiciary and the Electoral Council, the executive's partisan control of 
Congress upon entering office, and the president‘s relationship with the military before the 
process occurs. Judicial independence is an indication of institutional leverage because it 
determines the extent to which the president can influence the Supreme Court or Electoral 
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 These factors are fully operationalized in 
 
Table 11 in Chapter 5. 
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Council's ruling. With respect to Congress, I consider the executive's partisan support within 
the institution and also whether it was marginalized or outright closed during the process. 
With respect to the military, I consider the executive's ability to make concessions and also 
the military's relationship with the executive over time. I also consider whether the military 
has been progressive or conservative and whether it is deferential to civilian executive 
authority. If the military chooses to intervene, it may threaten not only the reform process but 
also the leader‘s mandate and, ultimately, democracy. 
Mobilizational and institutional leverage may exist at certain initial levels before an 
executive comes to power; however, the president also has the ability to cultivate and 
strengthen these mechanisms within certain domestic environments. For example, 
mobilizational leverage may be increased with the help of a strident, anti-institutional 
agenda. An agenda goes beyond rhetoric; the president often communicates a direct plan of 
action against existing institutions. It is anti-institutional in the sense that the president wants 
to operate outside of existing democratic institutions which constrain him or her. Anti-
institutional agendas can be particularly effective within the context of an uninstitutionalized 
party system, a crisis of representation, or economic crisis. 
Conversely, there are domestic environments which constrain the president so that he 
or she is unable to develop mobilizational or institutional leverage. Where representative 
institutions have not been discredited, the electorate may value the current model of 
democracy and be adverse to presidential challenges to the system. Furthermore, overt 
statements against representative institutions risk alerting the opposition to his or her plan 
and alienating congress, thus removing coalition-building as a viable alternative. 
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Often, however, an anti-institutional agenda is a logical precursor to mobilizational 
leverage. A president who runs on a platform of protecting the status quo would have a hard 
time subsequently generating popular support for an initiative to close Congress. Thus, there 
are certain contexts in which, even if the president had the incentives to close congress, it 
would not be a viable option. Therefore, mobilizational and institutional leverage jointly 
determine the success of constitutional reform via a CA. They also clearly interact, an idea 
that will be explored further in Chapter 5. 
Lastly, if this innovative reform process via a CA is successful, what are the 
consequences for democracy? To assess the immediate consequences of this reform process 
for democracy, I examine changes along the two principal dimensions of democratic theory: 
contestation and participation (Dahl 1971; Coppedge 2003). By contestation, I mean 
horizontal and vertical mechanisms to hold the leader accountable. By participation, I focus 
primarily on formal voting participation and the inclusion of minority or previously-excluded 
voices in the political process, but I recognize that informal participation through civic 
engagement may also play a role. I consider the ability of multiple agencies to check the 
power of the executive, including the media, independent courts, the legislature, and electoral 
councils. Through these reforms, I hypothesize that executive power has been consolidated 
vis-à-vis other branches, leading to a reduction in horizontal accountability. Vertical 
accountability, on the other hand, implies that the leader must answer to citizens. I consider 
the use of participatory mechanisms introduced through reform processes, including: 
budgeting, recall elections, and popular initiatives called from below (versus referenda called 
from above). I hypothesize that vertical accountability may have increased as a result of this 
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process, as previously excluded groups have been incorporated through the process. I 
hypothesize that they are more likely to participate. 
Thus, in Chapter 6, I explore how the use of mobilizational and institutional leverage 
has affected democracy itself, if at all. Does an attempt overall have more apparent directly-
attributable negative or positive effects on democracy? How do successful cases differ from 
unsuccessful cases in terms of their effects on democracy? The same question has been asked 
recently in relation to other outcomes of executive-legislative conflict, especially the inability 
of Latin American presidents to complete their terms (Hochstetler and Samuels 2011). 
However, consensus has not been reached and the literature on executive-legislative conflict 
is divided between pessimists (Pérez-Liñán 2007; Valenzuela 2004) and optimists 
(Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011). 
It seems plausible to think that the CA process, by undermining one of the primary 
institutions of liberal representative democracy, would cause lasting changes along the two 
aforementioned dimensions of democracy. I expect that contestation, or more specifically 
horizontal and vertical mechanisms of accountability, will be affected through the 
concentration of power in the executive. Moreover, it is possible that they will be affected 
differently, resulting in the reduction of horizontal and an increase in vertical accountability 
(Cameron 2010; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). The two dimensions of democracy do not 
necessarily move together. The executive may be less constrained by institutions of the state, 
other oversight bodies, or an independent media while, at the same time, there could be an 
increase in citizens' participation through formal and informal mechanisms of inclusion. It is 
likely that such a transformative process, predicated upon a high level of popular support, 
may have an effect on citizens‘ attitudes toward democracy, trust in government, civic 
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engagement and even their own conceptions of democracy. Recent work has shown 
preliminary evidence of such changes, including increases in support for democracy and trust 
in institutions (Corral 2011; Moreno Morales et al. 2010; Donoso et al. 2010). Overall, I 
hypothesize that there will be a decrease in representation and participation of elites while the 
previously-excluded poor and indigenous groups will be more likely to participate. 
Alternative explanations commonly argue that institutions do not matter. These critics 
may argue that these reform processes could be fully accounted for by other factors, such as: 
history, economic development, geography, culture, or demographics, for example. This 
dissertation will present strong evidence that, while these features may play a role in 
processes of reform via CA, institutions are essential at every stage above and beyond the 
effect of these other factors. For example, the analysis presented in Chapter 4 and 5 below 
will demonstrate how institutions factor directly into both the executive's decision over how 
to reform, as well as condition the success of the outcome.  Moreover, those who suggest that 
institutions are inconsequential would also expect there to be very little effect on democracy 
as a direct result of these processes. Chapter 6 addresses this alternative explanation to show 
that these institutional reform processes have the potential to generate consequences for the 
broader political system in several concrete ways. 
Methodological Approach 
While reform via CA occurs relatively infrequently, it is still important to understand 
the causes and consequences of this political phenomenon.  For example, the causes and 
consequences of other rare events such as revolutions, wars, coups, impeachment, economic 
depression or economic shocks are just as important to understand as events which occur 
frequently (King and Zeng 2001, 693). Reform through a CA is an institutional innovation 
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that has only occurred in a few cases, but it reflects important shifts in relations between civil 
society and the state, and also within the state. It has had dramatic consequences in all of the 
political systems where it has taken place. This is even true for the places where it fails.  
In Honduras in 2009, President Manuel Zelaya failed in his attempt to hold a 
referendum to establish a CA, leading to a legislative coup against him. This case clearly 
demonstrates how a failed CA process may have dramatic consequences in the region. Yet, 
the topic of a CA surfaces in presidential campaigns much more often than reform processes 
come to fruition, usually because the candidate loses. For example, in 2006 both Manuel 
López-Obrador in Mexico and Ollanta Humala in Peru campaigned on the idea of a CA 
reform. Yet, both of these candidates lost, perhaps owing in part to their commitment to 
reform via a CA. In 2013, Marco Enriquez Omanami was defeated in Chile and Xiomara 
Castro was defeated in Honduras. While the former was never a top contender, the latter 
actually came very close to winning. In these cases, the failure of the proposal for a CA 
reform had more dramatic effects for the candidates than the broader political systems of the 
country.   
The scope conditions that I employ are driven by the fact that I am interested in the 
dynamics of how presidents pursue an ambitious reform agenda through a CA.  Hence, I only 
consider CA processes that: (1) were initiated by a president pursing an ambitious agenda; 
(2) occurring during periods of regime continuity; and (3) are plenipotentiary, or in other 
words have supreme power to change the political system.  
With respect to the first condition, I take initiation to mean at least the scheduling of a 
referendum to consider the establishment of a CA or taking any subsequent step toward the 
election of CA members. I conceptualize reform via CA as one policymaking tool among 
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several others through which a president can pursue an ambitious reform agenda. If the 
president is not the actor advancing ambitious reform, the dynamics are much different. This 
excludes Colombia (1991) where the reform process was not part of President César 
Gaviria‘s agenda (Kline 1999; Kline 2007) but rather the process was advanced by civil 
society in collaboration with the opposition. Secondly, I limit myself to cases of regime 
continuity, as the dynamics of this process are quite different at moments of independence or 
regime transition, when existing institutions either do not exist or do not have the potential to 
interfere with the process. All institutions in these cases must be created "from scratch," and 
the potential for institutional conflict may not be as high. For example, this excludes Brazil 
(1988) from the present analysis because the CA wrote a new constitution after a period of 
military rule.
26
 Lastly, I am only interested in cases where the CA was endowed with ―plenos 
poderes,‖ or supreme power over all other branches of government. This excludes Ecuador 
(1998), which was a Constitutional (rather than a Constituent) Assembly, and therefore did 
not have this crucial power. Interestingly, the Ecuadorian Assembly renamed itself a CA 
after taking office; however, it was never plenipotentiary in practice.
27
 
Within Latin America, three successful cases of reform via a CA fall within the scope 
of these conditions: Venezuela in 1999, Ecuador in 2007, and Bolivia in 2008. Moreover, I 
consider Honduras (2009) as a negative case. First, the referendum to initiate the CA process 
was proposed by the executive, Manuel Zelaya. Secondly, Honduras was not undergoing a 
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 Moreover, the 1988 CA in Brazil was not a true CA, as noted in the following chapter. In addition, though it 
is more common outside of Latin America, I leave aside CAs tasked with creating a constitution for the first 
time in newly independent countries (ie. India 1947) or at moments of regime transition (ie. South Africa 1994 
and Nepal 2008).  
 
27
 The term ―Constituent Assembly‖ has been used liberally in Latin America in the past for processes not true 
to its name. In Bolivia, constituent assemblies were often convoked by dictators to legitimize their regimes. 
Since 1826, there have been fourteen constituent assemblies but only the first merits the name (Van Cott 2000, 
132).  
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regime transition at the time of the attempt.  Lastly, although the attempt to reform via CA 
failed before it could ever be granted supreme power, the opposition in Honduras felt that 
Zelaya‘s intention was to ―repeat in Honduras what had taken place in other countries, such 
as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, greatly influenced by Hugo Chávez‖ (Freitas 2010, 
157). 
My goal in this dissertation is to generate a theory about executives with ambitious 
agendas who employ innovative strategies for pursuing reform. Hence, my approach is 
largely deductive. The theory generated here, however, should travel to other cases where 
presidents use innovative strategies, perhaps without legal precedent, in the pursuit of reform. 
According to Michael Coppedge (2012), the ideal theory would be ―generalizable, integrated, 
and thick‖ (52). Generalizability implies that it would apply to all cases, observed and 
unobserved. Integration implies that it would relate directly and build off of existing theories. 
Skocpol recognized the importance of the "actual development of explanations of revolutions 
that illuminate truly general patterns of causes and outcomes, without either ignoring or 
totally abstracting away from the aspects particular to each revolution and its context" (1979, 
35). The goal of the present analysis is quite similar: to uncover general patterns, and develop 
a contextualized understanding of both the causes and consequences of reform via a CA. The 
conclusions drawn by this analysis will be generalizable to cases where an executive employs 
innovative strategies of reform within similar socioeconomic and political contexts as those 
considered here. For this reason, I employ a centrally qualitative design aimed at mid-range 
theory development. 
Case Selection 
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The primary cases that I consider throughout this dissertation are: Venezuela under 
Chávez (1998-1999), Ecuador under Correa (2007-2008), Bolivia under Morales (2006-
2009), and Honduras under Zelaya (2009). The first three successfully completed reform via 
CA and hence are "positive" cases throughout the dissertation. In Chapter 4, Honduras serves 
as an additional "positive" case where an attempt at a CA was made. I also consider seven 
shadow cases, where executives with an ambitious reform agenda chose a different reform 
mechanism: Brazil under Lula da Silva (2002-2011), Venezuela under Caldera (1994-1996), 
Argentina under Menem (1994), Ecuador under Palacio (2005-2007), Brazil under Collor de 
Mello (1990-1992), Nicaragua under Ortega (2009), and Guatemala under Serrano (1993).  
In Chapters 5 and 6, Honduras serves as a failed or "negative" case, since Zelaya was unable 
to successfully undertake reform via CA. 
In selecting these cases, I hope to control for as many factors as possible, while 
retaining useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest (Seawright and Gerring 
2008, 296). Since all of the countries I consider here are located in Latin America, they share 
a number of common features. These similarities allow me to control for a number of 
historical, structural, and institutional factors such as: colonial histories, level of democracy, 
political freedom, and political system as all are multiparty presidential system. My primary 
cases - Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador - are grouped even more tightly within the Andean 
Region. The inclusion of a number of shadow cases where a different reform path was 
employed and one primary failed case of reform via CA, Honduras, provides significant 
variation on theoretically important independent variables, as well as variation over the full 
range of values on the dependent variable. This ensures that there is no selection bias due to 
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truncation, which would be a problem if my analysis was limited only to cases where reform 
via a CA was successful.  
My analysis has three parts, and I address different types of causality in each part. 
First, I discuss conditions which make it more likely that a president will attempt reform via 
a CA. I argue that it is not possible to specify either necessary or sufficient causes for a 
president to attempt this process because whether or not a president makes an attempt is at 
least partially stochastic. The attempt depends centrally on the intentions and perceptions of 
one individual, the President. Moreover, some of the causal conditions that I identify here 
will likely be present in negative cases, where no attempt is made, as well. "Because the 
events are rare but the universe of potential cases in which the events might occur is 
extremely large, many settings in which the event does not occur are exposed to many of the 
same causal factors" (Harding, Fox, and Mehta 2002, 182-183). Thus, the presence of 
incentives, favorable international and local conditions, or even a perceived chance of 
success does not guarantee that an attempt to reform via CA will be made. An attempt may 
also occur when none of these conditions are present. With this in mind, I acknowledge that a 
degree of equifinality is inherent to the decision to attempt a reform via a CA, meaning that 
individual factors may weigh differently into the decision in distinct contexts (Mahoney and 
Goertz 2006). Taking these challenges into account, I can still identify the set of factors 
which are likely to be most important in general. The conditions that I identify in Chapter 4, 
including a willingness to bend or break the institutionalized rules and constraints on partisan 
powers in the legislature, will increase the likelihood that a president will attempt reform via 
CA, even if they do not guarantee an attempt. On the other hand, the factors that determine 
whether a president succeeds or fails in this endeavor are much more deterministic. I discuss 
53 
 
two mechanisms that individually are necessary but insufficient for success. However, when 
considered jointly, these two factors together are necessary and sufficient for success. Thus, I 
argue that one will never observe successful reform via a CA when mobilizational leverage is 
not present. However, the presence of mobilizational leverage alone does not guarantee 
success. The same could be said of institutional leverage. It is only when these two 
mechanisms are jointly present that an attempt will be successful. Lastly, I engage in a 
preliminary assessment of the consequences of this process for democracy with a mind to 
hypothesis generation rather than intensive hypothesis testing.  
There are significant methodological challenges associated with the study of reform 
via a CA. First, and perhaps most centrally, it is a rare occurrence. Secondly, the complexity 
of this innovative process of reform complicates analysis. Constitutional reform via a CA is 
likely to have a large number of potential causes (Lijphart 1971), as well as a significant 
degree of causal complexity. My hypotheses reflect the idea of ―multiple conjunctural 
causation‖ (Ragin 1987): that a combination of preconditions will make a president more 
likely to attempt this process and that the interaction of two mechanisms, mobilizational and 
institutional leverage, will lead to success. A third potential cause for concern is the lack of 
independence of these cases of reform via a CA. Diffusion effects have clearly been at work 
in the region with respect to this type of reform (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 113). 
The original idea grew from the case of Colombia 1991 (Harnecker 2002, 19). Chávez 
attempted this process in Venezuela a full ten years prior to Zelaya in Honduras, and it is 
clear that not only have presidents learned from prior attempts but so has the opposition. 
Hence, diffusion effects are an integral component of my theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon and my discussion of the cases in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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All methods pose trade-offs to the researcher. Here, with only four observations of 
the phenomenon of interest, it would be impossible to establish a centrally quantitative test of 
a theory surrounding this type of reform. Advocating the use of quantitative methods, Gary 
King, Robert O. Koehane, and Sidney Verba (1994) suggest finding ways to increase the N 
of the analysis so that quantitative analysis is possible. However, in the present analysis, I 
would need to subsume reform via a CA under all other forms of constitutional reform, if not 
all reform in general, in order to enlarge the sample size sufficiently for quantitative analysis. 
This would increase the number of cases within the study, but it would also move the 
analysis decidedly away from the phenomenon of interest. Theda Skocpol (1979), in her 
seminal analysis of the causes of revolutions, noted a frustration with the tendency to 
subsume revolution under other concepts that are observed more frequently. "Ironically, 
theoretical approaches that set out to avoid the pitfalls of a too-historical approach to 
revolutions can end up providing little more than pointers toward various factors that case 
analysts might want to take into account, with no valid way to favor certain explanations over 
others" (Skocpol 1979, 34). Giovanni Sartori (1970) likened choosing a broader concept to 
climbing a ‗ladder of abstraction.‘ Choosing a broader concept increases the extension, or set 
of categories to which a concept refers, while reducing its intension, or set of meanings or 
attributes that define the category (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846).  If one truly wants to 
understand this innovative institutional process, it cannot be lumped in with more established 
reform paths but rather requires direct focus. 
Issues like these are typically resolved through a qualitative methodological 
approach, which is better suited in cases of causal complexity. First, unlike statistical 
methods that assume unit homogeneity and that there is only one causal path from 
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independent to dependent variable, qualitative methods are capable of handling both multiple 
conjunctural  causation and equifinality as described above. According to Charles Ragin 
(2004): ―it is difficult to examine multiple conjunctural causation [in quantitative research] 
because researchers lack in depth knowledge of cases and because their most common 
analytic tools cannot cope with complex causal patterns‖ (138). In contrast, qualitative 
designs make use of case knowledge and employ procedures and practices like process 
tracing, which rely on the systematic collection of causal process observations (CPOs), 
"observations about context, process, or mechanism offering insight into the relationships 
among explanatory variables, and between these variables and the dependent variable"  
(Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 12).   
A qualitative approach is well-suited to the goals of the present analysis because it is 
aimed primarily at theory generation over the innovative use of one particular reform 
strategy, the CA, by executives who want to advance an ambitious reform agenda. For all of 
the reasons outlined above, I employ a centrally qualitative design that is supplemented with 
quantitative analysis of public opinion data in Chapter 6. 
Fieldwork in Bolivia and Ecuador 
I conducted eight months of fieldwork conducting elite interviews: five months in 
Bolivia and three in Ecuador. I chose these two countries for fieldwork because they follow 
the Venezuelan case temporally, facilitating an inquiry into the role of diffusion. Moreover, 
these attempts at institutional reform have tended to polarize the population wherever they 
have occurred. However, Bolivia and Ecuador have not yet experienced nearly as much 
polarization as Venezuela. Therefore, it was more likely that I would gain useful information 
in interviews and conversations in these two countries. 
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I carried out more than 85 interviews with five former presidents, former members of 
the Constituent Assemblies, members of Congress, judges, constitutional lawyers, academics, 
and former members of the Representación Ejecutiva para la Asamblea Constituyente 
(REPAC) in Bolivia,
28
 and founding members of the governing party, Alianza País, in 
Ecuador. Through newspaper sources, I identified relevant interviewees based on standard 
positional, decisional and reputational approaches: whether they filled key positions, played a 
role in crucial decisions, or are regarded as important. These interviews allowed me to collect 
key information on several variables central to my argument and were crucial to fully 
understand the mechanisms at work. Some data on presidential approval and mobilization are 
available; yet, secondary sources alone are not rich enough to give a sense of the president‘s 
relationships with non-legislative institutions and the broader population. Formal measures of 
judicial independence are also insufficient for capturing institutional leverage. Thus, 
interviews were crucial to fully understand the mechanisms at work in these processes of 
constitutional reform. 
In addition to the qualitative data that I collected during fieldwork, I also assembled 
quantitative public opinion data before and after the CA process in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Honduras.
29
  Unfortunately, comparable data was unavailable for Venezuela. I use this data 
in Chapter 6 to supplement my central analysis of the consequences of these reform 
processes for democracy. 
The cases central to this analysis are extraordinary; yet, I would like to situate them 
within the region more broadly. Why might reform via CA not happen in other countries, 
especially where the president has high levels of mobilizational or institutional leverage? In 
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 President‘s Representation for the Constituent Assembly 
29 Data comes from The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 
<www.LapopSurveys.org>. 
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some situations, presidents may not have an ambitious reform agenda to advance in the first 
place. In other situations, the president may already have consolidated power, either through 
partisan control of the legislature or the use of decrees. Lastly, it may be that the democratic 
tradition and respect for the rule of law precludes success of a reform process like the one 
examined here. In places where there is no legal mechanism for the complete replacement of 
the constitution, the president may not be willing to bend the institutions of democracy to 
advance his or her agenda. I explore all of these ideas further in Chapter 4.  But first, I turn 
my attention to the body of constitutional theory upon which the CA rests and the tradition of 
the CA within Latin American constitutional history.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The Constituent Assembly (CA) is not, in and of itself, a new concept. More recent 
uses of this reform mechanism have been innovative in the way that executives have used 
them as a tool to advance ambitious reform agendas within a democratic context. However, 
the CA more generally has well-established theoretical underpinnings and a long tradition. 
Popularly-elected constituent (or constitutional) bodies have been convoked in many 
countries around the world (ex. France 1789, India and Pakistan 1947, Namibia 1990, Libya 
2014).
30
  However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to extensively review dynamics 
in other regions, and my focus remains the use of this mechanism within Latin America. 
This chapter provides relevant background from constitutional theory around the 
social contract, popular sovereignty, and the poder constituyente or citizen's power. These 
theories are important to the present analysis because they served as the basis and 
justification for the CA where there was no explicitly legal mechanism for it according to the 
existing constitution. Next, I briefly look at trends in constitution-making in Latin America, 
with particular attention to the evolution of constitutional reform mechanisms and the use of 
the CA. Throughout I draw evidence from several examples of constitutional reform in the 
region, which share characteristics with more recent processes and in some cases may have 
served as inspiration. Lastly, I consider briefly the transition from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution in the United States in 1789. The details of this process are
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 The names of these constitution-writing bodies have been at times used quite loosely but there are non-trivial 
differences between a Constituent and Constitutional Assembly.  
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instructive in light of criticisms about the legality of recent constitutional replacements in 
Latin America and the context of crisis in which they occurred. 
Democracy, the Social Contract, and Constituent Power 
Democracy 
Reform via a CA with "plenos poderes" has proven to be a very polarizing process, 
wrought with institutional conflict, in all countries where it has been attempted. Chávez, 
Morales, and Correa ―have succeeded, to a greater or lesser extent, in capturing popular 
support by offering a radically different view of democratic politics; not the advancement of 
popular interests within the legally constituted political order but the sundering of that order 
through constituent assemblies designed to wrest power from elites and return it to the 
people‖ (Cameron 2010, 341). Perhaps as a result, academics that have approached this topic 
have often held overly simplistic or polarized views on the process.  
One group of scholars considers it intrinsically authoritarian (Colburn and Trejos 
2010; Torres 2009), and some have even gone so far as to consider these reforms with cases 
of coups (Newman 2011) or compare it to fascism (Lechín W. 2011). These scholars focus 
on the lack of legal precedent and detrimental outcomes of reforms, such as the concentration 
of power in the executive branch. However, they fail to recognize the democratic 
mechanisms at work behind the process and the degree of legitimacy retained by executives 
employing this strategy. Luis Fernando Torres (2009) draws comparisons between Correa 
and Chávez, and focusing throughout on the degradation of the rule of law during the process 
of reforming the Constitution: 
Without a Constitution or an Assembly in function, the President remained, in the 
view of the world, with all powers until the date of the referendum [to approve the 
new Constitution]… At that point, about twenty months had passed in total during 
which the president had not been subjected to the previous Constitution and he had no 
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political, institutional checks and balances. The blow to the rule of law came before 
the Ecuadorian people passed the new Constitution (33). 
 
Juan Claudio Lechín (2011) considers Morales and Chávez caudillos, and even goes 
so far as to compare them to the fascist leaders of Europe: Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, 
and Francisco Franco. Lechín refers to the 1999 Constitution in Venezuela and the 2009 
Constitution in Bolivia as custom-made for the caudillo, or ‗executed Constitutions‘ (Lechín 
W. 2011, 66). More specifically, in the case of Bolivia, Lechín (2011) considers the process 
illegal because it failed to follow prescribed norms of approval as established by the existing 
Constitution: 
The adoption of this Constitution was illegal because its articles were sanctioned not 
by two-thirds that the existing law required but with 51% of the political faction of 
Morales. To avoid criticism and obstruction by the opposition, the Government 
designated a military barracks as the headquarters of the CA. Thus, only the members 
of the regime were able to enter the military stronghold and, with the illegal 51%, 
approved the new Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia (61). 
 
However, on the other side, a number of political theorists and legal scholars consider 
this process unquestionably democratic (J. Colón-Ríos 2010; Engler 2010; Hutchinson and 
Colón-Ríos 2011b). They have argued for the legitimacy of participatory reform processes 
unforeseen by the existing constitutional order, based in social contract theory and the idea of 
constituent power. These authors focus on the unbounded sovereignty of the people to 
rewrite the social contract. This leads them to dismiss the lack of legal precedent but, perhaps 
more seriously, they fail to acknowledge the degree of institutional manipulation and failure 
to adhere to existing rules that plagued all of the cases where reform via CA has occurred.
31
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 This is particularly true of the Bolivian case; although there was a legal precedent for reform via Constituent 
Assembly, because of the 2004 constitutional reforms, in many ways the MAS did not follow the procedural 
rules laid out for the process. 
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The writing of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 not only demonstrates how crisis 
sometimes drives constitutional reform but also that, even where the outcome of reform is 
democratic, the process may fail to follow the letter of pre-existing laws. A number of 
political theorists and legal scholars have increasingly made this point, arguing for the 
legitimacy of participatory reform processes unforeseen by the existing constitutional order . 
While I cannot engage in an exhaustive review of the evolution of the concept of popular 
sovereignty as it relates to constitutional reform, I would like to briefly provide some context 
here. Legal scholars and several high profile Latin American Court decisions have 
recognized the legitimacy of CA processes through arguments based in social contract theory 
and the idea of constituent power. 
The idea of people‘s constitution-making power can be traced to the 15th century 
European Renaissance, in Niccolò Machievelli‘s concept of ―the will to power that the 
multitude expresses‖ (Negri 1999, 129). This concept is integrally related to the 
contemporary process of reform via CA in the region.
32
 Latin American leaders have used 
this concept as legal justification for the advancement of ambitious reform agendas through 
participatory process of reform via CA. The Constitution lays out the social contract, and the 
popular outcry for constitutional reform in these Latin American cases grew out of the 
discrediting of the agreement between society and the state. 
The Social Contract 
Social contract theory contends that people enter into contracts, that is they choose to 
live under governments, in order to escape the "state of nature." In Leviathan (1651), Thomas 
Hobbes argued that the central task of these consensual agreements was deciding who would 
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 For an in-depth overview of the historical evolution of the idea of constituent power, see Antonio Negri 
(1999). 
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be sovereign. Whether an individual or group of individuals was chosen, the sovereign would 
have absolute power and the contract was irrevocable. Hobbes is clear that sovereignty lies 
with the leader and not the people, maintaining that "subjects cannot change the form of 
government... [they] cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be 
obedient to any other" (134).  
John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689) shares Hobbes' binding view of 
the social contract, but with one important exception: if the supreme power - the legislative 
branch - violates the trust of the people. He claims that "...there remains still in the people a 
supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary 
to the trust reposed in them..." Still, he qualifies this power when he explains that "this power 
of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved" (78).
33
  In this way, the 
populace has supreme power only after the government has ceased in its function.  
For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, sovereignty clearly lies with the 
people. In The Social Contract (1762), he argues that "...there is not in the state any 
fundamental law which may not be revoked, not even the social pact; for if all the citizens 
assemble to end this pact by a common accord, one cannot doubt that it is very legitimately 
ended" (148). The progression between Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau was toward an 
understanding of the primacy of popular sovereignty in the social contract.  
Rousseau also acknowledged that the social contract may lose credibility at certain 
points in time. For him, the government does not need to dissolve itself, but merely cease to 
function according to the will of the people. Though he was writing nearly 240 years prior to 
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John Rawls (2011) agrees with Locke on this point; only after a government dissolves itself may the 
constituent power be activated, as cited in Colon-Ríos (2011, 368). In contrast with some of the other theorists 
that place no limit on the constituent power, Rawls believes that the principle should be invoked minimally 
(Negri 1999, 6). 
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the processes of reform addressed by the present analysis, his description of how the social 
contract could be undermined fits the Latin American context quite well: 
…when the social tie begins to slacken and the state to weaken, when particular 
interests begin to make themselves felt and sectional societies begin to exert an 
influence over the greater society, the common interest becomes corrupted and meets 
opposition... In the end, when the state, on the brink of ruin, can maintain itself only 
in an empty and illusory form, when the social bond is broken in every heart, when 
the meanest interest imprudently flaunts the sacred name of the public good, then the 
general will is silenced; everyone, animated by secret motives, ceases to speak as a 
citizen any more than if the state had never existed; and the people enacts in the guise 
of laws iniquitous decrees which have private interests as their only end. Does it 
follow from this that the general will is annihilated or corrupted?  No, that is always 
unchanging, incorruptible and pure, but it is subordinated to other wills which prevail 
over it (Rousseau 1968, 150). 
 
Likewise, reformers in Latin America claimed that particular and private interests, in 
this case of elites, had captured the state through traditional parties or partidocracia. They 
also argued that the state was on the brink of socio-political disaster, and this context of crisis 
justified their calls for drastic and, in some cases, unprecedented action. Lastly, they based 
their reliance on the concept of popular sovereignty on the idea of the incorruptible will of 
the majority. Rousseau's idea speak quite directly to the concerns of modern Latin American 
framers. 
The Constituent Power 
From these ideas of the social contract, the French philosopher Emanuel Joseph 
Sieyès developed a theory of constituent power. This theory is highly intertwined in the 
innovative and participatory processes of constitutional reform via CA. In 1789, Sieyès wrote 
a pamphlet, What is the Third Estate, which helped to spark the French Revolution. By the 
Third Estate, he means the working class, as opposed to the clergy and aristocracy that 
composed the First and Second Estates and held all of the political power within the system. 
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For Sieyès, the Third Estate is equivalent to the Nation. "Subtract the privileged order and the 
Nation would not be something less, but something more" (2003, 96). However, he 
acknowledges that in practice it had been ‗nothing‘ in the political order of France to that 
point. More concretely, he means that this class of people lacked authentic representation in 
the Estates-General and thus lacked political rights. This leads Sieyès to his central point: the 
common people of France need to have political representatives chosen from its own ranks, 
in equal number with the representatives of the more privileged classes and, as a necessary 
consequence, with equality of influence through one vote per representative. Sieyès places 
sovereignty in the hands of the working class. Most importantly, he derives what he called 
the ‗pouvoir constituant‘ or constituent power (Schmitt 2008, 127).  This is the constitution-
making power, ―…the source of the production of constitutional norms – that is, the power to 
make a constitution and therefore to dictate the fundamental norms that organize the powers 
of the State‖ (Negri 1999, 1). Sieyès distinguished between this and the constituted powers, 
or in other words the traditional powers of the state to which power is delegated from the 
constituent power, as outlined in the constitution. 
Constituent power is fundamentally about popular sovereignty, that is the idea that 
the will of the people cannot be subsumed by any other power. The constitutions that 
emerged from the American and French revolutions represented the beginning of a new era 
because the constitution-making or constituent power was, for the first time, wielded by the 
people (Schmitt 2008, 126–127).  
Hence, the constituent power is above the constituted powers, such as the 
constitution, the executive, and the legislature. According to Schmitt (2008): ―The 
constitution-making power is not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was exercised 
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once. ...This political will remains alongside and above the constitution‖ (125-126). 
Likewise, a number of additional political theorists consider the constituent power to be 
"boundless" Antonio Negri (1999, 328) or inalienable (Sieyès 2003; Schmitt 2008). 
Rousseau determined that "...there is not in the state any fundamental law which may not be 
revoked, not even the social pact; for if all the citizens assemble to end this pact by a 
common accord, one cannot doubt that it is very legitimately ended" (1968, 148). Building 
upon Rousseau, Schmitt argues that, ―The legitimacy of a constitution does not mean that a 
constitution originated according to previously valid constitutional laws‖ (2008, 136). In a 
very similar vein, Negri (1999) argues that constituent power does not come after the 
political, but rather "constituent power comes first, it is the definition itself of the political, 
and where it is repressed and excluded, the political is reduced to pure mechanical nature, to 
being an enemy, and a despotic power" (334). 
Thus, is this process legal in the juridical sense? Is this process legitimate? These are 
not equivalent questions. Joel I. Colón-Ríos and Allan C. Hutchinson (2011a) are highly 
critical of the rigidity and great barriers to change of the U.S. Constitution. They maintain 
that "a robust democracy will incorporate constitutional means by which to facilitate periodic 
revolutions (Hutchinson and Colón-Ríos 2011a, 593). The social contract was hollowed out 
in Latin America by decades of dictatorship and then also by many years of repression and 
exclusion under the minimally democratic regimes that followed. It was apparent that change 
was necessary. Alienated from their representatives, poor and indigenous groups began to 
organize outside of the system to demand change. In light of these developments, it is 
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unsurprising that the region moved toward participatory constitution-making processes that 
produced longer texts with a larger number of enshrined rights.
34
  
This trend has been called the ―new constitutionalism‖ or neoconstitucionalismo 
(Ávila Santamaría 2011; Dargatz and Zuazo 2012; Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor 2012; 
Wilhelmi et al. 2012). Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor (2012) stress common 
attributes of the "new constitutionalism" such as: longer and more specific texts; the 
recognition of extensive rights and guarantees especially in the area of human rights; 
procedures and institutions to protect rights; and the creation of constitutional tribunals (22).  
Trends in Latin American Constitution-Making 
Long-Range, Historical Trends 
The CA has a long tradition in Latin America. Eighteenth century constitutions in the 
United States and Europe served as the primary examples for the first Latin American 
constitutions, written a century later at independence. As a result, many reflected liberal ideas 
like representative government and a separation of powers. 
However, Latin American constitutions have not endured like their counterparts in the 
United States and Europe. The 1789 U.S. Constitution is an extreme outlier in terms of its 
duration. In most other parts of the world, constitutions are relatively new by comparison. 
Nearly half of the approximately 200 national constitutions in the world today were written 
or rewritten during the second half of the 20
th
 century (Hart 2003, 2). While Latin America 
has relatively high rates of constitutional change overall, there has been significant variation 
within the region in the number of constitutions since independence.  
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 The first Constitutions like this originated in Europe after the Second World War; Latin American leaders 
collected and retained the most innovative attributes of these earlier processes (Ávila Santamaría 2011, 15). The 
result was truly innovative texts with hundreds of articles, moving far beyond the lean liberal constitutions 
existing in Latin America at the time. 
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Table 4: History of Constitutions in Latin America 
Country Independence  
Current 
Constitution 
Number of 
Constitutions 
Original 
Articles 
Argentina 1816 1853 6 107 
Bolivia 1825 2009 17 411 
Brazil 1822 1988 7 250 
Chile 1818 1980 10 120 
Colombia 1810 1991 10 380 
Costa Rica 1821 1949 9 197 
Cuba 1868, 1898 1976 5 141 
Dom. Rep. 1844, 1865 1966 31 120 
Ecuador 1822 2008 20 444 
El Salvador 1821 1983 14 274 
Guatemala 1821 1986 9 280 
Haiti 1804 1987 24 298 
Honduras 1821 1982 14 375 
Mexico 1810 1917 7 136 
Nicaragua 1821 1987 14 202 
Panama 1903 1972 4 311 
Paraguay 1811 1992 6 291 
Peru 1821 1993 12 206 
Uruguay 1828 1997 7 332 
Venezuela 1811 1999 26 351 
Source: Cordeiro (2008, 10), updated by the author 
 
Table 4 above shows this wide range, between countries like Panama with only four 
constitutions and countries like the Dominican Republic with eight times as many.  It is 
worth noting here that there are major challenges in attempts to count Latin American 
constitutions. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton (2009, 55) define cases of 
constitutional replacement as all processes that do not follow the amending procedures of the 
existing constitution. However, in practice, it is often difficult to determine when change is 
merely an amendment or when it is a replacement.
35
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 For example, Cordeiro (2008) considers the 1994 Constitution a new constitution, but this reform really only 
amended the previous Constitution. Likewise, the Dominican Republic substantially amended its constitution 
again in 2010, but it followed the amendment procedures of the existing constitution to do so. Therefore, the 
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Constitutional change and regime change are distinct phenomena, though historically 
the number of constitutions appears to correlate with prolonged periods of autocracy (Hartlyn 
and Valenzuela 1994). By regime change, I mean a transition from autocracy to electoral 
democracy, or vice-versa. Elkins et al. (2009) draw a distinct line between these two 
concepts, emphasizing that regime change ―is not a sufficient condition for constitutional 
change, nor is it a necessary one‖ (59). However, these two phenomena have been more 
intertwined in practice. On the other hand, Colombia has had 10 constitutions since 
independence while experiencing oscillations in regime under the 1886 constitution. 
Therefore, the historical record in Latin America shows that these two concepts tend to be 
correlated. This is of significance in the present case because I look at period of reform under 
regime continuity, during periods of democracy. 
What causes constitutional instability? Why has the Dominican Republic had the 
most constitutions not only in Latin America but in the world? It has had about 31 
constitutions since independence.
36
  It is clear from this case that political instability, more 
generally, has played an important role. By political instability, I mean the tendency of a 
collapse in government, which does not necessarily imply regime change (Alesina et al. 
1996). The Dominican initially gaining independence from Spain in 1821, but subsequently 
fell under Haitian rule. It gained independence from Haiti in 1844, only to become a Spanish 
colony again for a brief period in the 1860s. For the next 100 years, the country experienced 
sometimes prolonged periods of dictatorship, most infamously that of Rafael Trujillo (1930-
61). It also experienced civil war, revolution, and two separate U.S. occupations (Hartlyn 
                                                                                                                                                       
2010 reforms should also be considered an amendment of the Constitution and not a replacement (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). 
 
36
 Some authors claim that there have been up to 37; these discrepancies come from differences between partial 
reforms and replacements, which at time are difficult to discern (Cordeiro 2008, 11). 
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1998). In this case, the instability of political institutions like the Constitution mirrors the 
extreme political volatility since independence. On the basis of an analysis of a full sample of 
Latin American countries between 1946 and 2000, Gabriel Negretto (2008) finds that 
political instability has an important effect on constitutional instability. Therefore, political 
instability is likely to be a key factor underlying the constitutional replacements considered 
by the present analysis. 
Procedures for Amendment and Replacement 
Of all of the constitutions written throughout the world since 1789, more than 90 
percent contain a specific procedure for amending the document (Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton 2009, 74). Historically, reforming the constitution via formal legislative amendments 
has been more common than reform via judicial interpretation, popular initiatives, or 
constitutional assemblies. In Latin America, the procedure for the passage of legislative 
amendments varies to some extent. They typically require a super-majority (three-fifths or 
two-thirds) of the legislature to approve the reform. 
The procedures for partial reforms of an existing constitution are markedly different 
than procedures for replacing the constitution altogether. The 1789 U.S. Constitution 
contains no mechanism for its own replacement. Article 5 merely lays out amendment 
procedures. Likewise, many of the first constitutions in Latin America lacked procedures for 
replacement. More recent constitutions have considered this possibility and many now 
include procedures for their full replacement. For example, Venezuela added a mechanism 
for full replacement in Articles 347-350 of the 1999 Constitution. In 2008 and 2009, 
respectively, Ecuador and Bolivia followed suit. In 2011, Honduras amended its existing 
Constitution to allow for replacement, perhaps in response to the controversy surrounding 
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Manuel Zelaya‘s 2009 attempt to hold a referendum on constitutional replacement. Still, 
several countries in the region lack this mechanism, including: Brazil, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, and Peru (Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor 2012, 6; Altman 2010, 111). 
Of the remaining fourteen countries using mechanisms of direct democracy since 1978, only 
three out of the remaining 14 countries in the region - Argentina, Costa Rica, and Ecuador - 
had no previous experiences with any of these institutions during the twentieth century 
(Altman 2010, 111). 
The most common mechanism for full replacement is a Constitutional or CA, a 
separately elected body with the sole purpose of rewriting the constitution. As explained by 
the overview of political theory above, these bodies vary greatly in terms of the degree of 
power and autonomy that they are given during the revision process. The constituent power 
is boundless, and hence a CA rightly titled would have power over all aspects of the state. No 
branch of government sits above it while it is in office. A Constitutional Assembly may be 
popularly elected, but it fundamentally lacks this power. It is part of the constituted power 
and hence exists alongside other institutions of the state rather than above them. 
It is also possible that the process would begin with a referendum, a top-down 
mechanism of direct democracy. Within Latin America, many of the first constitutions did 
not recognize participatory processes like ballot initiatives, referenda, and plebiscites. 
Likewise, although the mechanism for direct democracy exists, it may not often be used. In 
general, over the last several decades, the trend has been toward the expansion of these 
mechanisms and their use has become more common in Latin America.
37
  Yet, even among 
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 Only seven out of 19 countries in the region have not employed mechanisms of direct democracy since the 
late 1970s: Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay (Altman 
2010, 113). 
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the countries that recognize participatory mechanisms, there is wide variation as to whether 
or not they can be used to reform the constitution. For example, the Argentine Constitution of 
1994 allows for popular initiatives, but not when it comes to constitutional reform. Article 39 
states that ―projects involving constitutional reform, international treaties, taxation, budget, 
and criminal matters will not be subject to popular initiative.‖38 The 1985 Guatemalan 
Constitution states vaguely that ―political decisions of special importance should be subject 
to consultation procedure for all citizens.‖39Article 280 subsequently clarifies that any 
constitutional reform must be submitted to a popular referendum prior to its passage. In all of 
the most recent cases that I consider in this analysis, the constitutionality of popular 
referendums has been called into question. I will devote more attention to this controversy in 
subsequent chapters. 
Table 5 below shows the reform mechanisms provided for by each constitution in 
Latin America as of 2014. Out of 18 constitutions, only 6 contain no provision for their own 
full replacement. On the other hand, 12 provide specific mechanisms to do so. Where 
constitutions have been fully replaced through a CA reform process, the mechanism of the 
CA is often added to the new constitutional text. For example, Venezuela had no mechanism 
for full replacement before 1999, Bolivia lacked one before 2004, and Ecuador also lacked 
such a mechanism before 2008. As of 2014, in addition to these three cases, Colombia and 
Nicaragua also contain provisions for fully empowered CAs. 
In some countries, the separately elected body is more clearly understood as a 
Constitutional Assembly or part of the constituted power. For example, in Costa Rica, the 
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 Art. 39 of Argentina‘s 1994 Constitution, original text: ―No serán objeto de iniciativa popular los proyectos 
referidos a reforma constitucional, tratados internacionales, tributos, presupuesto y materia penal.‖ 
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 Art. 173 of Guatemala‘s 1985 Constitution, original text: ―Las decisiones políticas de especial trascendencia 
deberán ser sometidas a procedimiento consultivo de todos los ciudadanos.‖ 
72 
 
sitting legislature can replace the constitution without the executive's approval. In Argentina, 
the mechanism for full or partial replacement is a Constitutional Convention (therefore, 
without plenos poderes). Likewise, in Panama the "Parallel Constituent Assembly" is 
explicitly restricted from taking supreme power by Article  314, which states that the body 
cannot alter the mandate of elected or designated representatives within the government. In 
Paraguay, the CA is independent of the constituted power and prohibited from adopting the 
powers of replacing, shortening, or extending the mandate of other branches of government 
(Art 289). 
Table 5: Reform Mechanisms in Latin American Constitutions as of 2014 
Country Year 
Approval of 
Amendment/Partial 
Reform 
Mechanism for Full 
Replacement 
Convocation and Powers of 
CA 
Argentina 1853 2/3 of the members of 
Congress; Convocation of a 
Constitutional Convention 
(Art 30) 
2/3 of the members of 
Congress; Convocation 
of a Constitutional 
Convention (Art 30) 
  
Bolivia 2009 popular initiative, with 
signatures of 20% of the 
electorate, or by 2/3 of the 
members present in the 
legislature; ratified by 
referendum (Art 411) 
Constituent Assembly, 
originaria and 
plenipotentiary (Art 
411) 
By citizen initiative, with the 
signature of at least twenty 
percent of the electorate; by an 
absolute majority of the 
members of the Plurinational 
Legislative Assembly; or by the 
President. (Art 411) 
Brazil 1988 3/5 of the members in each 
chamber of the legislature 
(Art 60) 
None   
Chile 1980 3/5 or 2/3 of the members of 
each chamber of the 
legislature, depending on 
the content of reform (Art 
127); ratified by a plebiscite 
(Art 129) 
None   
Colombia 1991 a majority of members of 
both chambers of the 
legislature; ratified by 
referendum with a majority 
of voters and at least 25% of 
registered voters (Art 378); 
certain reforms need to be 
approved by referendum 
(Art 377) 
Constituent Assembly 
(374, 376) 
Majority of members of one or 
the other chambers of the 
legislature may call for a 
referendum to convoke the CA; 
Starting from the election of the 
CA, the ordinary power of 
Congress to amend the 
Constitution will be suspended 
during the period specified for 
the Assembly to perform its 
functions. The Assembly shall 
adopt its own rules.  (Art 376) 
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Country Year 
Approval of 
Amendment/Partial 
Reform 
Mechanism for Full 
Replacement 
Convocation and Powers of 
CA 
Costa 
Rica 
1949 2/3 of all members of the 
legislature; can then be sent 
to a referendum for 
approval if 2/3 of the 
legislature agree that it 
should be (Art 195) 
Constituent Assembly 
(Art 196) 
2/3 of all members of the 
legislature and does not need the 
executive's approval (Art 196) 
Dom. 
Rep. 
1966 National Revising 
Assembly (Art 270); 
decisions made by the 
majority of 2/3 of the 
members (Art 271); certain 
topics must be ratified by 
referendum (Art 272) 
None; explicitly states 
that may only be 
reformed through 
procedures indicated in 
it and can never be 
suspended or annulled 
by any power or 
authority, nor by 
popular acclamation  
(Art 267) 
  
Ecuador 2008 Amendments by 2/3 of 
members of the legislature 
(Art 441); partial reform by  
the legislature and then 
ratified in a referendum by a 
majority of voters and at 
least 30% of registered 
citizens (Art 442) 
Constituent Assembly 
(Art 444) 
may only be convoked by 
popular consultation; ratified by 
a referendum with an absolute 
majority of voters (Art 444) 
El 
Salvador 
1983 2/3 of elected members of 
the legislature (Art 248, also 
specifies articles that cannot 
be modified) 
None   
Guatemala 1986 2/3 of all members of the 
legislature, ratified by a 
referendum (Art 280) 
National Constituent 
Assembly (Art 278 - 
full replacement or 
modification of 
particular articles) 
2/3 majority of representatives 
composing the legislature; the 
National Constituent Assembly 
and the Congress of the Republic 
may function simultaneously 
(Art 278) 
Honduras 1982 2/3 of all members of the 
legislature (Art 373, also 
specifies articles that cannot 
be modified, including this 
one) 
None   
Mexico 1917 (specifically amendments or 
additions) 2/3 of the 
members present in the 
legislature (Art 135) 
None   
Nicaragua 1987 60% of representatives in 
the legislature (Art 194) 
National Constituent 
Assembly (Art 193) 
2/3 majority of representatives 
composing the legislature (Art 
194); the legislature will 
conserve its mandate until the 
installation of the new CA. If the 
CA does not approve the new 
Constitution, the current 
Constitution will remain in force 
(Art 193) 
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Country Year 
Approval of 
Amendment/Partial 
Reform 
Mechanism for Full 
Replacement 
Convocation and Powers of 
CA 
Panama 1972 Absolute majority of the 
legislature (Art 308) 
Parallel Constituent 
Assembly (Art 314) 
By decision of the Executive and 
ratified by absolute majority of 
the Legislature; the affirmative 
vote of two-thirds of the 
legislature; or citizens' initiative 
with the signatures of at least 
twenty percent of registered 
voters; ratified by a referendum; 
composed of 60 members and 
may serve for a period of 6-9 
months; the CA cannot alter the 
period of elected or designated 
officers, that are exercising their 
duties at the moment that the 
new Constitution enters in force 
(Art 314) 
Paraguay 1992 absolute majority in both 
chambers, ratified by 
referendum (Art 290) 
National Constituent 
Convention (Art 289) 
Initiated by absolute majority of 
2/3 of the legislators in each 
house (Art 289); The National 
Constituent Convention is 
independent of the constituted 
powers. During the duration of 
its deliberations, it will be 
limited to their reform efforts, 
with exclusion of any other task. 
The powers of the branches of 
government may not be adopted, 
and it cannot replace those who 
are exercising them, or shorten 
or extend their mandate. 
Peru 1993 Absolute majority of 
members, ratified by 
referendum or with 2/3 
majority in two successive 
regular sessions of Congress 
(Art 206) 
Referendum (Art 32)   
Uruguay 1997 2/3 of the legislature, 
plebiscite must pass with an 
absolute majority and at 
least 35% of registered 
citizens (Art 331) 
National Constituent 
Convention (Art 331) 
  
Venezuela 1999 if the number of affirmative 
votes exceeds the number of 
negative votes (Art 345) 
Constituent Assembly 
(Art 347-350) 
The people of Venezuela are the 
repository of the original 
constituent power. In exercising 
this power, they may convene a 
National Constituent Assembly 
for the purpose of transforming 
the state, creating a new legal 
system and drafting a new 
constitution. (Art 348); The 
constituted powers may in any 
way impede the decisions of the 
Constituent Assembly. (Art 350) 
75 
 
However, some other constitutions are much less clear on the extent to which the 
separately elected body will be empowered.  For example, Uruguay provides for a National 
Constituent Convention but does not detail its powers. The Guatemalan constitution states 
that the CA "may function simultaneously with Congress" (Art 278, emphasis added). Again, 
this leaves to interpretation the extent to which the CA has the power to close or marginalize 
Congress. Lastly, the Peruvian constitution vaguely suggests in Article 32 that it can be 
replaced with a referendum but it does not detail how that process might occur, potentially 
leaving legal leeway for an innovative process of reform in that case. 
Analyzing the choice between the replacement or amendment of constitutions since 
1978, Gabriel Negretto (2012a) finds that constitutional "replacements occur when particular 
political events decrease the value of maintaining existing constitutional structures" (68). 
These political events include regime changes, shifts in the balance of power, and 
constitutional crises. However, partial constitutional reform is much more common than full 
replacement because of the costs, risks, and more stringent requirements to initiate full 
replacement. According to Elkins et al. (2009), replacements are more costly because:  
(1) there may be more issues over which to bargain, requiring more time and energy 
for negotiation; (2) previously settled issues may be raised again, rendering 
bargaining results less predictable; and, (3) the costs of failure may be much more 
severe because in a strict sense, replacement may be illegal (74-75). 
 
Replacing the constitution is also risky business for the group initiating reform. If they are 
unable to control the Constitutional or Constituent Assembly process, they may fail to gain 
the very reforms that they wanted in the first place. The subsequent process of reform is full 
of uncertainty. Often, constitutional redesigns are initiated in a context of crisis, ―in which 
there are great social and political pressures to produce a document in a discrete amount of 
time‖ (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 85). These characteristics make full replacements 
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a high risk procedure. Yet, full replacements also potentially offer significant rewards to the 
group that can control the reform process. There is substantial power in having the ability to 
rewrite the rules of the game. Once a new constitution is in place, a type of lock-in occurs. It 
may be difficult to change the constitution again for some time afterward. 
Trends since the Return to Democracy 
Between 1978 and 2010, Latin American countries passed 350 constitutional 
amendments, and the annual rate of amendments has steadily increased over this time period 
(Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor 2012, 7). Since the return to democratic rule, the highest rates 
of amendment have been in Brazil and Mexico. Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and 
Guatemala, have only rarely reformed their constitutions during this time.  
Table 6: Constituent and Constitutional Assemblies in Latin America (1978-2014) 
Country
40 Title Years 
Trans- 
ition Seats 
Refer- 
endum In Force 
Became 
Legislature 
Peru Constituent 1978-1980 Yes 100 No 28-Jul-80 No 
El Salvador Constituent 1982-1983 Yes 60 No 20-Dec-83 Yes 
Honduras Constituent 1980-1982 Yes 71 No 20-Jan-82 No 
Guatemala Constitutional 1984-1985 Yes 88 No 31-May-85 No 
Nicaragua Constituent 1984-1987 Yes 96 No 9-Jan-87 Yes 
Brazil Constituent 1987-1988 Yes 559 No 5-Oct-88 n/a 
Colombia  Constituent 1990-1991 No 70 Yes 4-Jul-91 No 
Paraguay Constituent 1992 Yes 177 No 20-Jun-92 No 
Peru Constituent 1992-1993 No 80 Yes 29-Dec-93 Yes 
Argentina Constitutional 1994 No 305 No 22-Aug-94 No 
Ecuador Constitutional 1997-1998 No 70 No 10-Aug-98 No 
Venezuela Constituent 1999-2000 No 131 Yes 20-Dec-00 Temporary 
Bolivia Constituent 2006-2009 No 255 Yes 7-Feb-09 No 
Ecuador Constituent 2007-2008 No 130 Yes 20-Oct-08 Temporary 
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A useful resource detailing the history of constitutional processes around the world by reform mechanism is: 
―Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution‖ <https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/country/index.html> 
(Accessed: 2/15/2013). Case studies are available for some, though not all, of the processes listed there. 
However, at the time of access, it does not appear to be kept up-to-date beyond the Venezuelan revision in 
1999. 
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Fourteen Constitutional or Constituent Assembly processes have taken place in Latin 
America since 1978 (Table 6 above). Among those cases, several stand out as being very 
different from the cases at the heart of this dissertation. First, the design of a new constitution 
in Brazil in 1988 was carried out by a body called the ‗Constituent Congress‘ but this was 
actually composed of the sitting members of the upper and lower houses of the legislature. 
As Brazil prepared for the transition to democracy, the military vetoed the use of a CA that 
would be directly popularly elected, fearing that they would sacrifice significant control over 
the process. Thus, the sitting Congress remained in office and both houses came together to 
write the new Constitution as a ‗Constituent Congress‘ (Zaverucha 1998, 107). As a result, 
the Brazilian Constituent Congress is the only body in Table 6 above that was not directly 
popularly elected. A second case that stands out is the Argentine Constitutional Assembly of 
1994. This is the only body elected to engage in partial reform of the existing constitution; all 
others in Table 6 were elected to perform a full replacement of the constitution. Earlier 
processes, from 1978-1988, typically occurred as part of a process of transition to democracy 
after periods of military rule or conflict. After 1988, these processes occurred during periods 
of regime continuity with the exception of the Paraguayan constitution in 1992. This was an 
effort to shed the legacies of the dictatorship that ended in 1989.  Lastly, in Ecuador in 1997, 
the Constitutional Assembly renamed itself a ‗Constituent Assembly‘ after taking office. 
However, it never exercised the power associated with this title, demonstrating how loosely 
the terms have been used in practice.
41
 
In general, whether completely rewritten or amended, modern Latin American 
constitutions are no longer lean documents resembling the U.S. constitution. European 
constitutions written in the wake of World War II have provided inspiration in the region 
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 Interview with Julio Cesar Trujillo, a member of the 1998 CA in Ecuador (7/25/12) 
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more recently. This ―new constitutionalism‖ is primarily focused on preserving rights in the 
text. As a result, Latin American constitutions have grown substantially in length in recent 
years. The new Ecuadorian constitution is one of the longest in the world with 444 articles. 
The emphasis on enumerating rights has emerged with a new view of constitutional 
processes as conciliatory, aimed at the inclusion of previously excluded groups and the 
renovation of a dilapidated social contract.  
The new constitutions that emerged from the processes considered here have been 
aimed toward refounding the social contract and including previously excluded groups, 
particularly poor and indigenous citizens that have been marginalized throughout much of 
modern history. Along these lines, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions both contain 
references to a plurinational state. This tendency is decidedly stronger in Bolivia where the 
name of the state has been changed to reflect the diversity among its citizens (Lupien 2011). 
Moreover, a number of innovative rights in Latin American constitutions are tied to 
indigenous culture and identity. This trend is most notable in the 2008 Ecuadorian and the 
2009 Bolivian Constitutions. Ecuador was the first country in the world to include 
―inalienable rights of nature‖ and Bolivia quickly followed suit. Both documents also include 
the right to ―Buen Vivir‖ in Ecuador and its counterpart in Bolivia, ―Vivir Bien.‖42 Taking the 
basic definition from the Aymaras of Bolivia as a starting point, this concept rejects the 
values of most modern societies in favor of a more minimalist and environmentalist approach 
to life. Fernando Huanacuni Mamani (2010) explains: 
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 Known as ―Sumak Kawsay‖ in Quechua or ―Suma Qamaña‖ in Aymara, these concepts translate loosely to 
―living well.‖ However, the concept is not as vague as the translation would seem to imply. Moreover, it‘s 
important to note that these two concepts are not the same, but differ in subtle ways. For an overview in 
Spanish, see Chapter 5 of Fernando Huanacuni Mamani (2010). 
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The most important thing is neither man nor money; it is harmony with nature and 
life. As the basis for saving humanity and the planet from the dangers that beset a 
highly individualistic and selfish minority, ‗Vivir Bien‘ points to a simple life that 
reduces our addiction to consumption and maintains balanced production without 
ruining the environment (21).
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Community and harmony, among people and also between people and nature, is centrally 
important. This concept underlies a new economic model being advanced in these cases, 
which is fundamentally non-extractive and represents a drastic break with the neoliberal past. 
The inclusion of this concept in the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia represents a triumph 
on the part of organized indigenous groups in both countries. It reflects an unprecedented 
degree of recognition and inclusion in the constitution-making process (Lupien 2011). 
Many recent Latin American constitutions have been criticized in terms of content 
because they contain vague and even contradictory language. There may be some advantage 
to leaders if they can build vagueness into the constitution. Conceptualized as a social 
contract, constitutions are supposed to constrain leaders. Vagueness undermines these 
constraints, leaving the law open to judicial interpretation, and powerful Latin American 
executives may have courts under their control. Elkins et al. (2009) acknowledge that a short 
time horizon for negotiation during full replacements can facilitate consensus, but it can also 
lead to a lack of attention to detail (85). This tendency is only exacerbated by the fact that 
more recent constitutions have grown in length. As previously mentioned, the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution contains 444 articles, but it was written in only 8 months‘ time. 
Correa was adamant about retaining the original timeline even after Alberto Acosta, then 
President of the CA, requested additional time for debate. Acosta believed so deeply that the 
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 Original text: ―Lo más importante no es el hombre ni el dinero, lo más importante es la armonía con la 
naturaleza y la vida. Siendo la base para salvar a la humanidad y el planeta de los peligros que los acosa una 
minoría individualista y sumamente egoísta, el Vivir Bien apunta a una vida sencilla que reduzca nuestra 
adicción al consumo y mantenga una producción equilibrada sin arruinar el entorno.‖ 
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8 month timeline was hurting the democratic nature of the process that he resigned the 
Presidency. Some scholars and constitutional lawyers have criticized the resulting document 
for its vagueness on certain points and for the leeway that it has given Correa. This was also 
a central issue of the recent constitutional reforms in Venezuela and Bolivia. 
However, the central criticism has been over the lack of a valid legal mechanism for 
initiating reform in Venezuela and Ecuador. In Bolivia, there was a clear path to the CA but 
the government still failed to adhere to the institutionalized rules throughout the process of 
reform. Does the bending of rules at such a foundational moment guarantee that the outcome 
will be undemocratic?  I would argue that it does not. Below, I briefly examine the case of 
constitutional reform in the United States to provide insight into these issues. 
Crisis and a New Constitution in the United States 
―What astonishing changes a few years are capable of producing… From the high 
ground we stood upon, from the plain path which invited our footsteps, to be so 
fallen!  So lost!  It is really mortifying‖ (George Washington, 1787)44 
 
Academics, constitutional lawyers, and domestic opposition have criticized recent 
constitutional revisions in Latin America because they violate the institutional rules for 
reform as established in previous constitutions. In the extreme, academics and members of 
the opposition have called this move autocratic (Colburn and Trejos 2010; Torres 2009). In 
light of this, it is interesting to highlight the similarities between recent reforms in Latin 
America and the reform of the Articles of Confederation in the United States, which allowed 
the United States to become one of the most stable democracies in the world.
45
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 As quoted in Wood 1987, 71. 
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 For an overview of the idea of constituent power in the American Revolution and founding of the United 
States, see Chapter 4 of  Negri (1999). 
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Policymakers, in general, seem to have lost sight of the way that United States 
constructed the Constitution. A 2007 report by the Democracy Center opens by relating 
constitution-making in Bolivia and the United States: 
Traditionally, these ‗magna cartas‘ mark the birth of a nation, as a Constitutional 
Assembly elected by the people drafts a document, and then returns it to the people 
for approval by ballot or other means. This is how the United States developed its 
Constitution in 1787 and how many other nations have done so. Less frequent have 
been the use of such Assemblies to rewrite a nation‘s constitution at a later point – 
though several countries have done so in Latin America [sic] (Olivera, Orellana, and 
Whitesell 2007, 4) 
 
Yet, this paints an inaccurate picture of the way that the U.S. Constitution came into being. 
The United States had a governing ‗magna carta‘ in 1787; it was the Articles of 
Confederation. Thus, much like in Bolivia and other cases considered here, the Constitutional 
Convention was supposed to be rewriting the Articles, and the framers of the United States 
Constitution had to navigate the delicate nature of their situation, going above and beyond 
what they were originally called to do. 
Like many of the previous Latin American constitutions, the Articles of 
Confederation had a short tenure and were largely viewed as an ineffectual document. In 
1786, there was a climate of crisis in the United States, with conflict between elites and the 
populous, and also between states. Ultimately, a sense of urgency allowed the framers of the 
US Constitution to justify violating the Articles of Confederation in order to write a new 
Constitution, most importantly with respect to the rules for reforming the Articles. 
The Articles of Confederation were in effect in the United States for only eight years, 
from 1781 to 1789. They were written to establish a confederation of sovereign states and 
lend legitimacy to the United States during the Revolutionary War. However, ―despite the 
achievements of the Confederation Congress under the Articles, the American constitutional 
82 
 
system broke down in the years from 1781 to 1787 at both the national and the local level, 
thus making constitutional reform desirable if not mandatory‖ (Solberg 1990, lxxiii). One of 
the main criticisms of the document was its failure to empower a national government. It 
lacked both an executive and judicial branch.  Moreover, the Congress of the Confederation 
had very few real powers and nine of thirteen states in favor were required for any decision. 
Interstate conflict grew quickly and the Congress was largely ineffectual in settling disputes. 
In 1786, Shays‘ Rebellion proved critical in illuminating the inability of the Congress of the 
Confederation to raise a sufficient army to put down the rebellion seeking to overthrow the 
state of Massachusetts. 
Yet, in addition to these very concrete problems pointing to the need for a reform of 
the Articles, there was also an overall sense of crisis and imminent failure of the union. 
Within the nationalist movement, there emerged cries for ―a hoop to the barrel,‖ or 
something to hold together the states. The Virginia Resolution claimed that a new 
Constitution was necessary ―…to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate 
to the exigencies of the Union;…‖ (Solberg 1990, lxxxvi). Gordon S. Wood (1987) claims 
that the underlying reasons for reforming the Articles of Confederation were not essentially 
the weaknesses of the document, but rather a crisis in society and elites‘ concern with 
popular politics as practiced in state legislatures (70-73). As evidence, Wood points out that 
―the nationalists‘ aims and the Virginia Plan went way beyond what the weaknesses of the 
Articles demanded. Granting Congress the authority to raise revenue, to regulate trade, to pay 
off its debts, and to deal effectively in international affairs did not require the total scrapping 
of the Articles‖ (1987, 72). Nonetheless, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 
delegates decided to completely rewrite the founding document. 
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In 1787, the framers violated the Articles of Confederation in three concrete ways. 
First, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia opted to go well beyond its stated 
purpose, which was only to revise the Articles rather than to write a new Constitution. 
Secondly, the Committee of Style, tasked with polishing the final document, continued to 
revise the document on a single point. ―On August 28, [1787] Rufus King had pressed to bar 
states from interfering with private contracts, but the Convention never voted on his motion.  
Reviving the issue in the committee room, King met greater success. Morris inserted a clause 
that a state may make no law ‗altering or impairing the obligation of contracts‘‖ (Stewart 
2007, 235). Lastly and perhaps most importantly for the comparisons made here, delegates 
concretely violated Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation, concerning rules for 
ratification of the revised document. Revisions were required to first pass in the 
Confederation Congress, and then also pass in the assemblies of all thirteen states.  The 
requirement of unanimity among the states was designed to make the Articles more rigid. 
Revisiting the issue in 1897, Catherine Drinker Bowen (1986) describes the problem this 
rigidity posed to the framers: 
‗The ratifications of the Conventions of __ States shall be sufficient for organizing 
this Constitution.‘  A blank had been left for the number of states.  … suppose all 
thirteen states were required to ratify?  Obviously, Rhode Island would vote against 
the Constitution in Congress; so probably would New York and Maryland, whose 
delegates at the Federal Convention grew daily more hostile. Concerning the number 
thirteen there was moreover a basic difficulty to be got round. Legally, the Federal 
Convention sat to amend the Articles of Confederation, an action which required the 
agreement of every state in the Union. Strategically, the opposition could make much 
of this, in Convention, in Congress, or later when the Constitution went out to the 
states.  To agree upon ratification by less than thirteen states would be to 
acknowledge the new Constitution as a revolution in government, with the old 
Confederation abrogated and overthrown.  Every delegate knew by now that such was 
actually the case…‖ (emphasis added, Drinker Bowen 1986, 226). 
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Had the framers adhered to Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation, the document 
would have been in effect until May 29, 1790, when the last of the thirteen states, Rhode 
Island, ratified the new Constitution. Instead, they wrote ‗9‘ on the abovementioned line in 
Article 21 of the new Constitution. New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify the 
Constitution, just one week before Virginia and New York.  
Thus, the Constitution came into effect in the first eleven states to ratify it, and the 
Articles of Confederation was abolished. This new institutional arrangement left out North 
Carolina and Rhode Island until they later ratified it. Table 7 below details the ratification 
process. Though it may have only been a matter of time before the last two remaining states 
decided to ratify, the deviation is nontrivial. From a legal and technical perspective, the 
ratification process diverged from the mechanism as envisioned in the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Table 7: Ratification of the U.S. Constitution of 1787 
 Order of Ratification Date of 
Ratification 
Vote on Ratification 
   For Against 
1. Delaware Dec 7, 1787 Unanimous  
2. Pennsylvania Dec 12, 1787 46 23 
3. New Jersey Dec 18, 1787 Unanimous  
4. Georgia Jan 2, 1788 Unanimous  
5. Connecticut Jan 9, 1788 128 40 
6. Massachusetts (including 
Maine) 
Feb 7, 1788 187 168 
7. Maryland April 28, 1788 63 11 
8. South Carolina May 23, 1788 149 73 
9. New Hampshire June 21, 1788 57 46 
10. Virginia June 26, 1788 89 79 
11. New York June 26, 1788 30 27 
12. North Carolina Nov 21, 1789 195 77 
13. Rhode Island May 29, 1790 34 32 
Total Vote  1073 576 
Source: Solberg (1990, 375)  
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However, these violations were justified in the minds of the framers on the grounds of 
political expediency, given the pressing crisis within society. In quite similar fashion, modern 
Latin American executives in the cases considered in this dissertation have justified their 
own neglect of the institutionalized rules for reform by invoking the pressing need for change 
in the face of crisis and popular discontent with the existing structures of the political system. 
Many consider the United States to be one of the most democratic countries in the world 
today.
46
 Therefore, the example of the United States reform demonstrates that a reform 
process that begins through a non-institutionalized channel does not necessarily, in the long 
run, have to lead to a breakdown of democracy. 
In the next chapter, I analyze the executive's decision to undertake this legally 
innovative and politically risky strategy of reform. Why might an executive reform via CA 
rather than relying upon one of the many existing institutionalized mechanisms for reform?
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 Though this evaluation is only one side of a contentious debate within American and international politics. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DECISION TO PURSUE A CA 
Introduction 
Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa each campaigned for the presidency 
on the promise of dramatic restructuring of the political system through a Constituent 
Assembly (CA). Winning by overwhelming and historic margins, these executives had a 
strong popular mandate to implement ambitious reform. In Bolivia, the CA was envisioned 
as: ―…the last democratic resort to achieve a social contract resolving the structural 
contradictions present in the state, the institutional crisis caused by the weakening of political 
parties as intermediaries of civil society, [and] the new protagonism of social movements as 
agents of an inevitable change…‖ (Ovando 2008, 181, emphasis added). Still, the process 
through which ambitious reform of the political system would occur was a conscious choice 
on the part of executives who, at least in theory, could choose from a number of different 
strategies. Why did these executives choose to pursue a relatively risky approach to reform, 
in some cases without a clear legal precedent? Under what conditions is an executive more 
likely to pursue reform via CA? 
In this chapter, I examine the decision of Latin American presidents to pursue reform 
through a CA with ―plenos poderes,‖ or supreme power to restructure the political system. 
The goal is to inductively generate a conceptual framework that will clarify executive 
decisions over how to implement ambitious reforms, particularly when that decision is to 
pursue a CA. Placing this choice in context with other potential avenues of reform allows for 
a more complete understanding of the logic and the motivations behind the pursuit of a CA. 
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In order to explore this choice, I also consider seven cases where executives chose a different 
path of reform (―negative‖ cases), as well as four of the cases where an attempt at reform via 
CA was made: Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998-1999, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007-
2008, Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005-2009, and, unsuccessfully, Manuel Zelaya in Honduras 
in 2009. Building on both the case studies and the wider analysis of reform in the region, I 
find five factors that increase the likelihood of reform via a CA: (1) low number of seats in 
Congress for the president and inability to build a sufficient coalitional majority, (2) weak 
presidential decree powers, (3) infeasibility of partial constitutional reform, (4) willingness 
by the president to bend or break existing institutions, and (5) the president‘s perceived high 
chance of success in relation to other strategies. 
Theoretical Model of Presidential Decisions over Policy-Making 
This chapter advances a strategic choice framework of executive attempts to 
implement ambitious policy agendas.
47
 This framework makes the assumption that the 
executive has discretion over policymaking strategies, albeit constrained by history, context, 
and institutions. When examining the executive‘s decision to pursue a CA, it is important to 
contextualize this method of reform as one possible choice among several policymaking 
strategies available to executives (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005, 179) . Therefore, 
although I focus here on reform via CA, I begin from the assumption that presidents make 
choices among several key options for how to influence policymaking and change the status 
quo. When executives have an ambitious reform agenda, they are more likely to employ 
certain policymaking strategies than others. Moreover, policymaking strategies are not 
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 For an overview of strategic choice analysis, specifically as it relates to Latin American politics, see David 
Collier and Deborah L. Norden (1992). 
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mutually exclusive, and so the executive may try to employ multiple strategies during a 
single term. These points will be discussed further below. 
Very few studies have analyzed executives' decisions over how to pursue policy in 
light of the full range of options available to them. I move beyond the model advanced by 
Amorim Neto (2006) by considering two additional constitutionally-prescribed policymaking 
options: partial constitutional reform and accepting failure in the short-run. I also consider 
four quasi- or extra-legal options the executive may seek to employ or rely on: abusing 
decree power, judicial override, establishing a new legal precedent for the CA, and the self-
coup. Therefore, my understanding of the policymaking options available to executives is 
broader than Amorim Neto‘s. In considering additional options, I recognize that executives 
often bend or break the rules of the game, as established by the existing constitution.
48
 My 
framework also recognizes the tendency of executives to attempt multiple strategies within a 
single term.
49
 
In the model of executive policymaking advanced here I make a key starting 
assumption: presidents are concerned with the success and legitimacy of the policy-making 
process. They care about the legitimacy of their reforms because they want to minimize their 
risk of failure or subsequent policy reversal. Therefore, they will prefer to pass reforms 
legally, if possible. It is also important to note that, although the decision tree below presents 
incremental steps in the decision making process, we should not always expect to see the 
same rigid pattern of attempts at reform. While optimal policy may not be self-evident to 
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 In a similar vein, Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2013) recognize that some political actors 
display intransigence in defending or impatience in implementing their policy preferences. This may lead to a 
willingness to subvert democracy in order to achieve policy goals or to prevent others from achieving their 
goals, or in the extreme, to the use of violence (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 36–39). 
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 Amorim Neto (2006) also recognizes this tendency (418) but must keep his model simple for computational 
purposes and so limits himself to explaining executive policymaking behavior under very short time-horizons. 
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executives, they can learn from their predecessors and rule out the possibility of certain 
options based on previous experiences. Instead of always starting with attempts at statutes, 
the president may rule out this path of reform from the beginning, deciding not to even make 
an attempt because of a perceived low probability of success.
50
  They may also attempt one 
strategy at first, and then attempt a different strategy when the first fails or proves insufficient 
for accomplishing the preferred reforms. 
Figure 3: Executive Policymaking Decision Tree 
 
plishing the preferred reforms. 
 Figure 3 above is the same as Figure 2 on page 41, which lays out my framework for 
executive decisions over policymaking. Though I do not formalize my arguments here, the 
image of a game tree allows me to clearly array the executive's options according to their 
perceived legitimacy according to procedural definitions of democracy. The key distinction is 
between those strategies on the left side of the tree (1-4), which involve playing within the 
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 A good example of this might be the decision calculus of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. His immediate 
predecessor, Alfredo Palacio, made many failed attempts to pass a constitutional reform package through 
Congress. 
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rules of the game, and those on the right of the tree (5-8), which involve manipulating if not 
fully breaking those rules. The primary decision made by the executive is whether to bend or 
break the rules or commit to explicitly legal options, even if those prove politically 
infeasible. The executive may develop a future legal path (4 in Figure 2), forgoing reform for 
the time being and leaving reform to be carried out by his or her party or successor in the 
future.  
An analysis of the full range of reform options available to executives illuminates a 
set of factors that increase the likelihood that the President will choose to reform via CA. In 
light of this framework, and considering each of these options in turn, I hypothesize that five 
observable factors make a president with an ambitious reform agenda more likely to attempt 
to reform via a CA: (1) an insufficient number of seats in congress and the inability to build a 
coalition majority necessary to pass the reform; (2) weak decree powers or the likelihood that 
decrees will be overturned; (3) infeasibility of partial constitutional reform; (4) willingness to 
bend or break the institutional rules of the game; and (5) a perceived chance of success in 
relation to other strategies.
51
 On this last point, diffusion also likely plays a role in the 
decision-making process by giving presidents the idea and affecting the perceived likelihood 
of success as leaders gain information about the use of a CA in other countries in the region. 
This type of reform is innovative, often without legal precedent. Though it represents 
a significant risk because it falls outside of institutionalized mechanisms for reform, it often 
also retains democratic legitimacy because of its reliance on electoral processes and 
referenda. Lastly, it offers the potential for dramatic changes affected through a single reform 
process in a relatively short period of time.  
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 Executive decision makers should continually seek information about the likelihood of success and probable 
consequences of different reform paths because any errors may lead to costly political crisis. 
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1. Legislative Process (Statutes) 
One option available to an executive is to reform via the legislative process (statutes). 
In part, this decision depends upon whether the ambitious agenda, as defined above, can be 
accomplished through legislative statutes. For example, if the preferred reforms are aimed at 
the content of the constitution, then this reform path will not be viable. Assuming that it is 
possible to achieve the executive‘s policy goals through the legislative route, then the 
decision will depend on support for the reform agenda within the legislature, generally 
understood as the President‘s partisan powers. Presidential systems in many Latin American 
countries display a number of institutional and partisan features which increase the likelihood 
of executive-legislative conflict and decrease the likelihood of passing a law through a 
congressional majority. These features are multiparty presidentialism, weak party 
institutionalization, and polarization of the party system. 
First, in multiparty systems the president is less likely to have a majority, and this 
may lead to legislative deadlock (Linz 1990; Mainwaring and Schugart 1997). The presence 
of many parties exacerbates the conflict of ‗dual legitimacy‘ inherent to presidential systems. 
Because both the executive and the legislature ―derive their power from the votes of the 
people in a free competition among well-defined alternatives, a conflict is always possible 
and at times may erupt dramatically‖ (Linz 1990, 53). This conflict is more likely to arise 
under divided government, where one party controls the executive and a different party 
controls a legislative majority. Such conflicts are dangerous according to Linz because ―there 
is no democratic principle on the basis of which it can be resolved‖ (1990, 53), potentially 
leading both parties to step outside of legal mechanisms.  
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In this case, if a minority president would like to pass a law via statute, he or she will 
need to form a coalition. While the sheer number of parties determines the executive‘s need 
to form a coalition, the degree of ideological polarization and institutionalization of parties 
may condition the executive‘s ability to form a coalition (Dix 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 
1995; Mainwaring 1998). Polarization refers to the left-right ideological distance between 
relevant parties in the system and tends to be tied closely to the number of parties in the 
system; those countries with only two parties tend to be less polarized (Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995, 32). Overall, significant ideological distance can have a negative effect on the 
president's ability to form of coalitions. At the same time, the degree of party system 
institutionalization may determine the strength of linkages between the executive and the 
legislature. Where institutionalization is high, that is where there are strong and stable parties 
with low electoral volatility, the executive will have a stronger link to the legislature 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 26). By contrast, in party systems with low levels of 
institutionalization, party are more fluid and party affiliations tend not structure the vote 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 22). Under these conditions, the executive may not be able to 
count on legislative support even if his or her party controls a majority of the seats. While 
many Latin American countries have multiparty systems, there is great variation across the 
region in the degree of institutionalization of those systems. 
Likewise, there are challenges to forming coalitions within presidential systems. 
Under multi-party presidentialism, there are fewer incentives for parties to join in coalition 
with the executive's party because of the importance of the president (Altman 2000). The 
president is nearly always the formateur of the coalition, which cannot survive without the 
participation of the president and his or her party. Moreover, coalition partners have trouble 
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claiming credit for good government performance because citizens' evaluations often focus 
on the president (Altman 2000, 260–261). In a large cross-national study, José Antonio 
Cheibub, Adam Przeworski, and Sabastian Saiegh (2004) compare the incentives to form 
coalitions within presidential and parliamentary systems. They find that ―coalitions emerge 
more frequently under parliamentarism, but they are far from exceptional under 
presidentialism‖ (574). They also find little support for the idea that minority presidencies 
lead to legislative deadlock.
52
 In a similar vein, Gabriel Negretto (2006) finds that the idea 
that minority executives will necessarily face deadlock is simplistic. Conflict is most likely 
when the executive‘s party ―lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator‖ and 
cannot form a cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats (87). Moreover, 
minority presidents may face either a divided government situation, in which an opposing 
party controls one or both legislative houses, or a situation where no party has majority 
control over the legislature. By subsetting the data from Cheibub (2007) to 18 Latin 
American countries during periods of democracy between 1976-2002, one finds that the 
particularly dangerous situation of divided government is extremely rare in Latin America.
53
 
Less than 3% of country-years reflect divided government.  
At the same time, the same subset of data shows that presidents lacked a legislative 
majority during 61.8% of country-years. Moreover, a coalition forms only about 39.4% of 
the time, meaning that minority presidents in the region are unable to form a coalition during 
22.4% of country-years. Lastly, majority coalitions only form 16.4% of the time. Thus, 
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 However, it is worth noting that their sample includes not only Latin American presidencies but also Asian 
and African presidencies. 
 
53
All figures here are according to the author‘s own calculations, based on data from Cheibub (2007). His 
original sample includes "3,273 years of democracy in 129 countries between 1946 and 2002" (Cheibub 2007, 
33). I have examined a subset of this data,  focused on periods of democratic governance in Latin America: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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minority presidencies are quite common and coalitional majorities are relatively rare in Latin 
America. This is an important consideration for executives with ambitious reform agendas 
who do not have the necessary partisan support in Congress. 
Thus, returning to the decision tree in Figure 3 above, the decision to enact policy via 
statutes may be constrained in Latin American presidential democracies with certain 
characteristics. Do executives have sufficient support within the legislature or think that they 
can build such support through a coalition? To form coalitions in a presidential system, 
executives can offer payoffs to potential partners. To build a coalition in a presidential 
system, the executive can offer parties cabinet seats (Amorim Neto 2006), the strategy most 
analogous to coalition formation in a parliamentary system. They may offer policy 
concessions or pork (Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). Or in the extreme, they may 
individually buy votes through 'horse-trading' or 'pocketbook' bribes (Saiegh 2011). Are 
executives and their parties willing to make the side-payments necessary to build alliances? 
If yes, executives may attempt the legislative route.  
Even when executives have a partisan majority in the legislature, it may not be 
sufficient to guarantee the passage of the executive‘s preferred reform. There is some cross-
national empirical research to support this claim. Using both simulation and observed data, 
Sabastian Saiegh (2009) examines the legislative success of executives in 39 countries over 
time. He argues that the unpredictability of legislators‘ behavior determines variations in 
legislative success rates. Saiegh operationalizes legislative success through ―box scores‖ 
which measures the number of executive proposals approved in the lower legislative house, 
divided by the total number of proposals introduced by the executive. Ultimately, he finds 
that although legislative success is correlated with partisan control of the legislature, a 
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partisan majority is not sufficient for legislative success. His results indicate that ―there is a 
systematic relationship between a country‘s characteristics and the variation in chief 
executives‘ box scores‖ (Saiegh 2009, 1350). Moreover, he finds that passage rates are lower 
under multiparty coalitions and under electoral systems in which legislators represent a 
―local‖ rather than a ―national‖ constituency (Saiegh 2009, 1350–1351). Therefore, while a 
legislative majority increases the likelihood of legislative success, it is not deterministic. 
While having a majority remains the most likely route to legislative success, executives with 
ambitious reform agendas may decide that they do not want to take the risk associated with 
the legislative route, especially if this will require building a coalition with traditional parties 
that have been discredited or ideologically distant parties. 
2. Partial Constitutional Reform 
Another institutionalized reform mechanism that executives may decide to pursue is 
partial constitutional reform or amendment.  They could include their preferred reforms 
within a package of constitutional amendments passed through prescribed practices, typically 
via the legislature. If the executive‘s preferred policy reforms require altering the 
constitution, then this may be the only option. However, it could also be an attractive strategy 
even if the reforms are not currently in the Constitution. Executives might be able to amass 
more legislative support for a broader package of constitutional reforms than they could for 
their ambitious reform agenda in isolation. Amending the constitution opens up the 
possibility of a wider range of reforms over which the government and the opposition may 
negotiate. Thus, in the context of reforming not only policy but also the rules of the game, an 
executive may be able to offer the opposition something of value in exchange for support of 
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the ambitious agenda.
54
 In this way, a pact may be feasible with respect to amending the 
constitution. 
Additionally, some constitutions stipulate that a separate body, and not the legislature, 
must reform the constitution.
55
 In this case, executives might hope to win greater 
representation for their parties in the constitutional assembly than they hold in the 
legislature.
56
 If the government manages to capitalize on a surge in popularity since the last 
legislative elections, then this could make passing the executive‘s ambitious reform agenda 
more likely through partial constitutional reform.  Still, the support of the legislature would 
be necessary for the initiation of the reform process and, if necessary, elections to the 
constitutional assembly. 
Partisan power plays a significant role here, in both the process and outcome of 
partial constitutional reform (Negretto 2013, 107–108). In most countries, the passage of 
constitutional reforms through the legislature requires a supermajority. Therefore, the stakes 
are even higher in terms of the coalition that the executive will need to cobble together to 
obtain his or her preferred reforms. At this stage, it is possible that the legislature could 
bargain to include some of their preferred reform as well. If the legislature is still likely to be 
hostile to the executive‘s preferred reform, then the executive will likely rule out this route, 
which could be lengthy and induce gridlock.  
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 Drawing on work by William H. Riker (1980), Gabriel Negretto (2013) asserts that ―the difference between 
institutions and policies may indeed be one of degree‖ (43). 
 
55
 See Table 5 on page 71 in the previous chapter. 
 
56
 Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, here I accept a common legal distinction. A 
constitutional assembly differs from a constituent assembly in terms of the scope of its power. Constitutional 
assemblies are endowed with the power to rewrite portions or all of the constitution, but have no power over the 
other institutions of the state. 
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3. Legal Use of Decree Power 
If executives are committed to abiding by the institutionalized rules but do not have a 
majority, cannot construct one, or determine that – even with a majority – they are not likely 
to pass their preferred reforms, executives may choose to attempt reform via decree. This will 
depend on the type of decree powers that are legally available to presidents, which enhance 
their influence on the policy-making process with respect to the legislature or that allow for 
different avenues of policy-making.   
In addition to an executive‘s partisan power – or support within the legislature – 
many Latin American executive have a number of proactive and reactive constitutional 
powers (Shugart and Carey 1992). Within the category of proactive powers, it is important to 
distinguish between delegated decree authority (DDA) and constitutional decree authority 
(CDA), which function quite differently (Carey and Schugart 1998). DDA is granted to the 
president by the legislature and are often limited to certain policy areas for certain lengths of 
time. In contrast, CDA is provided to the president by the constitution and can include either 
emergency powers or standard decree powers. Emergency powers give the president the right 
to act unilaterally only during times of unrest as defined by the legislature. Standard 
constitutional decree powers, on the other hand, endow the president with the uncontested 
power to take policy initiatives without prior legislative consent (Carey and Schugart 1998, 
14). The type of decree power a president holds will determine the relative legitimacy of his 
or her actions and affect the decision of which strategy to undertake.
57
 
Though it was often assumed that legislatures functioned as ‗rubber stamps‘ in the 
face of the proactive powers of Latin American executives, more recent research suggests 
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 For an extensive overview of decree powers (both CDA and DDA) in Latin America, see the Appendix in 
John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1998, 299). 
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that the executive-legislative is far more complex. Unilateral action by the executive does not 
necessarily render the legislature powerless or irrelevant to the executive‘s calculus. As 
Carey and Shugart (1998) note, there are certain conditions under which legislatures will 
accept executive prerogatives, and possibly even prefer them to the legislative route. When a 
legislature shares the executive‘s policy preferences, then the use of decree may be the fastest 
way to change policy. However, the legislature retains influence where it has the power to 
review and potentially veto the executive‘s prerogative. In this case, ―even if one continues to 
view the president as the central actor in the civilian political universe, his anticipation of a 
(possible) legislative veto should in theory condition most of his actions‖ (Cox and 
Morgenstern 2001, 171). Though rare, it is possible that the president's own party might 
invoke a veto against the executive, particularly if the party has internal conflicts.
58
 The 
strategy employed in this veto player game will be affected by whether or not the president 
can issue decrees and under what circumstances they can take this action (Amorim Neto 
2006; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Negretto 2004).
59
 
Even when the president has extensive proactive powers, there are good reasons to 
believe that the legal use of decree powers is the least common of all reform paths for 
executives with an ambitious reform agenda. Most centrally, there is a slippery slope 
between legal use and abuse. First, in the context of an ambitious agenda, decrees would 
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 When an executive faces divisions within his or her own party, passing ambitious reform may be significantly 
more difficult. In Paraguay in 1993, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy was pushing for neoliberal reforms, and 
more specifically the privatization of pensions. A faction of his own party, the Partido Colorado, that was 
resistant to the policy pushed for a popular referendum knowing that it would never pass. Wasmosy was forced 
to drop the proposal to privatize the pension system. Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela faced similar divisions 
within his own party, Acción Democrática, that hindered his ability to implement policy. For more detail on 
these and other cases, see Raúl L. Madrid (2003, 184–190). 
 
59
 It is important to note that reactive powers, including the presidential veto, can be equally influential in 
policymaking. It does not only serve a reactive role to preserve the status quo, but rather the power of an 
amendatory veto gives the executive the ability to set the agenda (Tsebelis and Alemán 2005, 397). However, 
this reactive power is less important for the present analysis, as it might be used to negotiate within the 
legislative process and not to unilaterally pass an ambitious reform agenda. 
99 
 
likely require piecemeal implementation, through a large number of decrees. Secondly, CDA 
is by definition for use under limited circumstances or "emergencies." In practice, these 
situations are not well-defined and this type of decree authority has been prone to abuse 
(Negretto and Rivera 1999, 1798).  Lastly, because DDA is delegated by Congress, 
executives who use DDA legally are often constrained by legislative policy preferences. 
Executives that face an opposition-dominated Congress may be just as unlikely to opt for the 
legal use of decrees as the legislative route.
60
 As in the legislative route, there is a lot of 
uncertainty over the success of issuing executive decrees. Do presidents have decree powers 
which can be legally used to pass the reform agenda and do they expect their decrees not to 
be overturned? If yes, executives may attempt reform via decree. If no, executives may 
choose another strategy. 
4. Commit to a Future Legal Path 
If presidents have exhausted or simply ruled out legal options for reform, they may 
consider options where the legality ranges from unclear to clearly illegal. The decision to 
pursue these options will depend on the president‘s willingness to bend or break legal 
institutions. The costs of choosing not to respect existing institutional rules are related 
primarily to a loss of legitimacy, potentially in both the domestic and international realms. 
However, the consequences are heavily dependent upon the context in which the strategy is 
attempted and the method through which it is pursued. If the bending of institutional rules is 
common-place and was used extensively by predecessors, then it may not lead to as large of 
a loss of legitimacy for the President. At the same time, if the reform agenda is perceived to 
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 Lastly, Cox and Morgenstern (2001) claim that presidents will use their formal constitutional powers to act 
unilaterally less frequently as the president's legislative support increases (175, emphasis added). However, 
DDA by definition requires legislative support because it is given by Congress for limited periods of time. 
Perhaps instead the tendency to use decree authority is curvilinear, low when the executive has a large majority 
or no support at all and higher when the executive has bare majority support in the legislature. 
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be passed in an illegitimate way, then it may theoretically increase the likelihood that the 
opposition will challenge the policy, through democratic or non-democratic means. This 
could lead to policy reversal through the election of a new president with radically different 
ideology or through appeals to the military to carry out a coup. Where a President clearly 
breaks the institutional rules, this will likely hurt the legitimacy of the regime both 
internationally and domestically, and also increase the likelihood of executive-legislative 
conflict. Moreover, the President could find their mandate at risk as a result, from either 
domestic or international threats. Political survival is an important part of the executive‘s 
calculus. Still, all of this must be weighed against the executive's desire to deliver on 
campaign promises, particularly if there is potential for reelection. If an executive strongly 
prefers to implement their preferred agenda without compromise, then bending or breaking 
the institutional rules is valuable because it marginalizes opposition and allows for sweeping 
changes to the status quo. 
Returning to the decision tree, is the president willing to bend or break the 
institutional rules and assume the risks associated with doing so?  If not, then they may 
accept defeat, leading to the status quo outcome. If they have long time horizons, or in other 
words if they can hope to be reelected, then executives may be willing to set the stage for 
gaining a greater majority in the next legislative elections. However, in theory, once the 
President has promised ambitious reforms but failed to achieve them in his or her first term, 
it may be difficult to maintain high levels of support necessary to increase a legislative 
majority. The potential costs of illegitimacy associated with pursuing reform through extra-
legal means may be outweighed by the potential electoral costs of inaction or deadlock. At 
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this point, executives may reconsider legal options and, for example, decide that it is worth 
attempting reform via statutes despite a low probability of success.  
5-8. Bending or Breaking the Rules 
If executives are willing to bend or break the rules, then there are several additional 
options open to them. Conceivably, a President could choose to employ these strategies even 
when they have a majority in Congress. However, they are likely to become more attractive 
under two conditions: (1) when the legislature is hostile toward the executive‘s chosen 
reform and (2) when institutions are not well-respected. In weakly institutionalized contexts, 
the executive is less likely to face the repercussions of bending the institutionalized rules. 
Hence, the costs associated with strategies that bend or break the rules are lower for 
executives where institutions are not well-respected. Figure 4 below shows three-year 
averages of a measure of the consolidation of democracy from Freedom House. Those 
countries with higher scores have less well-consolidated democracies and hence lower levels 
institutionalization. 
Executives in those countries falling into the ―partly free‖ category in Figure 4 below 
might be more likely to consider policymaking strategies that bend or break the 
institutionalized rules. In fact, all of the cases of reform via CA considered in some depth 
here – Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras – fell into the ―partly free‖ category 
during the three years preceding their attempts at reform. Conversely, executives would be 
less likely to bend or break the rules where democracy is relatively consolidated and 
institutionalized, such as in Chile, Costa Rica, or any of the countries falling into the ―free‖ 
category in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Three-Year Averages of Freedom House Democracy Scores 
 
In weakly institutionalized environments, one option that may be available to 
presidents is the abuse of decree powers, using them more frequently than they were intended 
to be used or in situations where they may not do so legally. For example, some decree 
powers are only supposed to be used in emergencies but are routinely used outside of those 
conditions.
61
 
Another option is that the executive could marginalize Congress and work through 
other institutions, by manipulating or overriding the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies. 
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 In Argentina the Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) is supposed to be used only in exceptional cases or 
in emergencies. However, in practice, these decrees were used frequently. Between 1989 and 1994, Carlos 
Menem issued 336 DNUs (Chavez 2004, 70). The frequency increased under Néstor Kirchner. In Brazil, 
medidas provisorias (provisory measures - MPs) are also supposed to be used only in cases of great urgency 
and relevance. Yet, Sarney issued 147 decrees between 1988-1990, Collor issued 160 between 1990-1992, 
Franco issued 505 between 1992-1994, and Cardoso issued 702 between 1995-1996, all while the Brazilian 
legislature was in session (Power 1998, 200). 
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Where judicial independence is low, or where it is possible to stack the judiciary with 
supporters and reduce its independence, the executive may have more influence in the 
judiciary than the legislature, or sufficient influence to gain judicial acquiescence of 
executive decrees. 
A third option is a CA process, centered on citizen participation and reform of the 
Constitution, which may allow the executive to marginalize or even effectively close the 
hostile Congress. This option differs markedly from partial constitutional reform. 
Amendments, like judicial interpretation, maintain constitutional stability in a changing 
environment. Replacement of the existing constitution, on the other hand, implies the 
creation or alteration of basic legal structures of the state (Negretto 2012, 3). Replacement of 
the constitution through a CA may take substantially more time than partial constitutional 
reform. There may not be a legal precedent and so the path to initiate the process may be 
unclear. Perhaps as a result, this happens much less frequently than partial reform. Yet, under 
certain conditions and especially during moments of crisis, it might be possible to generate 
more support for a full replacement of the constitution than for partial reform. For example, 
partial reform almost always involves appeals to Congress, while full replacement involves 
more direct appeal to voters, and judicial acquiescence. At the same time, in comparison to 
the final strategy for implementing reform discussed below, the CA maintains a level of 
democratic legitimacy while allowing for potentially drastic swings in partisan power and 
potentially sweeping reforms. 
The final option is an autogolpe or ‗self-coup,‘ ending democracy and allowing the 
president to rule without legislative or judicial oversight.
62
 An autogolpe occurs ―when a 
president closes the courts and the legislature, suspends the constitution, and rules by decree 
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 The most recent, successful Latin American case was Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1992 (Kenney 2004). 
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until a referendum and new legislative elections are held to approve broader executive 
powers‖ (Cameron 1998, 125). It also typically entails the use of force, military intervention, 
press censorship, the repression of opposition, and the restriction of civil liberties.  This 
option is clearly illegal and thus leads to regime breakdown by definition.   
During the decision-making process, the executive is constantly weighing the chances 
of success of the available reform paths.  One potential outcome of choosing an unsuccessful 
path, especially an unsuccessful extra-legal path, is executive-legislative crisis. Aníbal Pérez-
Liñán (2007) operationalizes executive-legislative crisis as instances where at least one of the 
branches threatens the other with closure or loss of office, whether through constitutional 
means or not. More specifically, he defines it as: 
...any episode in which the chief executive threatens to dissolve Congress or supports 
a constitutional reform having that purpose, attempts a military coup against 
Congress, or ―suspends‖ the term of the legislature (even if no decree proclaims its 
―dissolution‖) until the next election. It also includes any situation in which 
congressional leaders announce a decision to impeach the president, to declare him or 
her incapacitated, or to force his or her resignation; in which at least one of the houses 
of Congress debates any of these alternatives; or in which Congress legitimizes a 
military or civilian uprising against the executive by accepting his ―resignation‖ or by 
appointing a successor (2007, 44-45). 
 
Executive-legislative crisis has been a persistent aspect of Latin American democracies, often 
resulting from the inability to compromise on policy. Therefore, executives know that 
conflict with the legislature has potential to escalate. Legal responses to executive-legislative 
crisis often lead to regime continuity while illegal responses may cause regime breakdown. 
In some cases, this has led to a legal outcome: the impeachment of the president by Congress. 
This strategy was used several times during the late 1980s and the 1990s in Latin America 
(Pérez-Liñán 2007). In other cases, this has led to an illegal outcome: military coup. If 
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executive-legislative crisis was extreme, it might prompt the military to intervene and 
suspend democracy. 
However, more recently, the international context has reduced democratic 
breakdowns and democracies have also been able to better withstand crises in Latin America. 
Jonathan Hartlyn (2002) points out that, ―international forces and governments have all 
supported the rejection of any return to outright authoritarianism, encouraging at least 
minimally electoral democracies‖ (122). In fact, military interventions have decreased 
significantly since the 1970s and not only were coups attempted less often, but attempts more 
often failed (Pérez-Liñán 2007, 43). Although Fujimori was successful in 1992 with a ―self-
coup‖, there are a number of examples where coup attempts have been stymied since that 
time. There were two failed coups in Venezuela in 1992, one led by Hugo Chávez. Jorge 
Serrano in Guatemala attempted an autogolpe very similar to that of Fujimori but failed in 
1993. There were also failed military coups in Paraguay in 1996, in Ecuador in 2000,
63
 in 
Venezuela against Chávez in 2002, and a police rebellion against Correa in Ecuador in 2010. 
As will be discussed in later chapters, Manuel Zelaya was successfully ousted by the military 
- in collaboration with legislative and judicial institutions - in 2009. More and more, these 
events have drawn international condemnation in an era of democracy promotion. 
It is important to note that the decision-making framework in Figure 3 and detailed in 
this section was developed specifically with presidential systems in mind.
64
 This framework 
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 While the military did successfully oust President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador in January of 2000, the military 
junta lasted only a few hours. Under severe international pressure, they restored power to Mahuad's Vice 
President, Gustavo Noboa. 
 
64
 It is plausible to imagine extensions to parliamentary systems, even though the dynamics might work quite 
differently. Most centrally, the Prime Minister is typically not directly elected, but rather the leader of the 
largest party in Parliament. Therefore, in many parliamentary systems, the Prime Minister will find Parliament 
sympathetic to his or her reform agenda.  Yet, when there is no majority party in Parliament and the Prime 
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points to five factors that may increase the likelihood of reform via a CA: (1) a lack of 
partisan power in Congress and the inability to build a sufficient coalitional majority, usually 
due to ideological or differences in policy preferences, (2) a lack of legal decree powers, (3) 
impracticality of partial constitutional reform, either to achieve the agenda or serve as a 
bargaining chip with opposition, (4) a willingness by the executive to bend or break existing 
institutions, and (5) the perceived chances of success in relation to other strategies.   
Case Studies: How to Pursue Ambitious Reform? 
In this section, I briefly analyze eleven case studies. Seven of these are cases where 
alternative policymaking strategies were employed by executives to implement reform. Then 
I move to cases where the CA was attempted: Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Manuel Zelaya in Honduras. All eleven cases were 
chosen from the universe of cases with ambitious reform agendas as typical examples of each 
strategy. However, since the CA is my primary focus in this dissertation, I discuss all four 
relevant attempts at pursuing ambitious reform via CA.  
In each case, I examine the presence of an ambitious agenda and its general scope, the 
executive's partisan and constitutional powers, as well as their willingness to step outside of 
institutionalize channels of reform. Importantly, I consider their calculations about the 
chances for success and any influence of a process of diffusion throughout these case studies. 
Overall, these comparisons allow me to draw out the particular set of conditions that make it 
more likely that an executive will choose to attempt a CA. Figure 5 below is the same 
framework illustrated by Figure 3 above, except now it includes empirical examples of each 
reform path that I explore further below. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Minister is dependent upon a coalition, then there is at least the potential for more bargaining and resistance to 
statutes. However, this extension is beyond the scope of the present analysis, which focuses on presidentialism. 
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Figure 5: Executive Policymaking Decision Tree with Examples 
 
1. Lula and Coalition Building in Brazil, 2002-2011 
Context 
In Brazil, presidentialism can function almost like parliamentarism in that it is nearly 
impossible for executives to gain a partisan majority and so they need to cobble together 
coalitions in order to govern. Local scholars have referred to this phenomenon as 
presidencialismo de coalizão, or coalitional presidentialism (Abranches 1988, as cited in 
Power 2010, 23). However, while legislative majorities are crucial for policymaking in 
Brazil, they are also difficult to assemble because of high party fragmentation, and difficult 
to maintain because of party switching (Hunter 2010).
65
 To compensate for this, Brazilian 
coalitions tend to be ‗disconnected,‘ meaning the parties forming them are often 
ideologically dissimilar, and also ‗oversized,‘ meaning they are typically larger than 
minimum winning coalitions. ―Oversized and disconnected coalitions are thus insurance 
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 Between 1999 and 2002, 154 members (about 30%) of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies changed parties 
(Santos and Grijó Vilarouca 2008, 77).   
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policies: the goal is to protect the president‘s legislative programme via various forms of 
political overcompensation‖ (Power 2010, 26). 
Ambitious Agenda 
The Presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrates how essential the task of 
coalition-building can be for minority presidents with ambitious agendas. It also illustrates 
the difficulty of defining an ambitious reform agenda. I code Lula's reform agenda as 
'ambitious' because he advanced the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) program, which included both 
redistributive policies aimed at creating a safety net through conditional cash transfers as 
well as land reform aimed at structural transformation. Some have argued that Lula's agenda 
actually had a degree of continuity with those of previous executives (Diniz 2011; Morais 
and Saad-Filho 2005). Though this could lead some to question the scale of Lula's reforms as 
a result, it is important to remember that ambitious agendas as defined here do not 
necessarily have to be a complete break with policies of previous executives. 
In 2002, Lula campaigned on an ambitious change from the status quo. As a founding 
member of the left wing Brazilian Workers‘ Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), he 
maintained a close alliance with social movements pushing for dramatic change, such as the 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST - Landless Workers‘ Movement). However, 
Lula had also failed in previous presidential campaigns in 1989, 1994, and 1998 running on a 
more radical platform. So, in 2002, he sought to reassure business interests (Diniz 2011, 65), 
while at the same time maintaining the redistributive social programs and land reform at the 
core of the PT‘s reform agenda. Lula promised ―changes in the economic model, but… that 
the changes would be carefully crafted so as not to upset the progress the country had already 
made, especially in controlling inflation. This meant crafting political compromises‖ 
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(Goertzel 2011, 41). Though the MST continued to support Lula‘s campaign, they were also 
―critical of him for shaping his discourse for the middle class‖ (Tilly, Kennedy, and Ramos 
2010, 17). Overall, the strategy of moderating his campaign message without abandoning his 
base paid off at the polls. In October 2002, Lula obtained 46.4% of the vote in the first round 
and was elected with 61.3% of the vote in the second round of presidential elections (Nohlen 
2005). At Lula‘s inauguration in January 2003, he made his ambitious agenda clear, 
reiterating his commitment to ―pension reform, tax reform, political reform and labor 
legislation, in addition to land reform‖ (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2008, 11). 
Partisan Powers 
The PT had not only failed to win a legislative majority but it managed to secure only 
58 out of 513 seats in the 2002 legislative elections (International Parliamentary Union 
2013). Ten parties formed the governing coalition but together they held less than 50% of the 
bicameral Congress. Party switching remained a common phenomenon. During Lula‘s first 
term in office, 2003-2007, 158 deputies (about 31%) switched parties, some of them twice or 
more in a single term (Santos and Grijó Vilarouca 2008, 77). All of this meant that building a 
solid coalition in support of Fome Zero was essential. 
As mentioned above, presidents may offer payoffs to potential coalition partners, 
including cabinet seats, policy concessions, pork, or - in the extreme - even pocketbook 
bribes. Coalition formation was particularly challenging for Lula because his party had a 
strong ideological vision and did not want to distribute cabinet seats or share power within 
the executive branch. As a result, Lula‘s government had to resort to bribing individual allied 
legislators to vote with the PT (Hunter 2010, 147). 
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At his inauguration in 2003, Lula acknowledged the difficult road ahead with respect 
to achieving his preferred policies and his intention to implement his agenda gradually: 
We are going to change, yes. We are going to change with courage, but carefully. We 
will be humble and daring. We will change, but at the same time we know that it is a 
gradual and continuous process and not just a simple expression of will… Change 
through dialogue and negotiation, without mishap or hastiness, so that the result is 
consistent and enduring (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2008, 8).
66
  
 
Lula‘s incremental policymaking strategy angered some members of the PT, other left 
parties, and social movements, who would have preferred a more drastic break with the past. 
However, a gradual approach was pragmatic given Lula's lack of partisan powers and 
commitment to institutionalized mechanisms of reform. 
Constitutional Powers 
The Brazilian President is endowed by the 1988 Constitution with powers to issue 
medidas provisorias (MPs - provisional measures).
67
 However, these MPs are reviewed by 
Congress and legally require congressional approval in order to remain in force. The 1988 
constitution establishes the following procedure for their use: 
Article 62. In important and urgent cases, the President of the Republic may adopt 
provisional measures with the force of law and shall submit them to the National 
Congress immediately, and if Congress is in recess, a special session shall be called to 
meet within five days. Sole paragraph - Provisional measures shall lose effectiveness 
from the day of their issuance, if they are not converted into law within a period of 
thirty days as from their publication and the National Congress shall regulate the legal 
relations arising therefrom.
68
 
 
Lula introduced the conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família (Family 
Allowance), to Congress on October 21, 2003 through MP 132. The MP passed to the 
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 I am grateful to Russell Bither-Terry for assistance in translating excerpts of Lula‘s speech into English. 
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 Previous constitutions had endowed the Brazilian President with decreto lei (decree law) powers. 
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 Text of the 1988 Constitution, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/brazil/english96.html (accessed: 
2/15/2014). 
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presiding officers of the House of Representatives where it was approved and sent to the 
coordination of standing committees a day later.
69
 The bill was approved first in the Chamber 
of Deputies in December 2003 and two days later in the Senate through a symbolic rather 
than a roll call vote, meaning that the final text faced no significant opposition. Therefore, 
Bolsa Familia was converted into Law 10.836 by the Brazilian Congress in January 2004.
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Since implementation, the program has been a resounding success, reducing poverty and 
inequality in Brazil and serving as a model for other redistributive programs in the region (F. 
V. Soares, Ribas, and Osório 2010, 186). Yet, while Bolsa Familia has been extremely 
successful, structural reforms aimed at land reform stalled (Graziano da Silva 2003, 370). In 
his second term, Lula continued to be constrained by the PT‘s minority in the legislature, 
issues with maintaining a stable coalition, and his commitment to institutionalized routes of 
reform. 
Partial Constitutional Reform 
Constitutional reform was necessary for the implementation of structural land reforms 
laid out in Fome Zero. Chapter III of the 1988 Constitution lays out provisions for 
agricultural and land policy and agrarian reform. Therefore, changes in these provisions 
would require a constitutional amendment. However, Lula and the PT lacked sufficient 
partisan power to pursue constitutional reform, which requires the proposed amendment to be 
discussed and voted on in each house of the National Congress, in two readings, and 
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 MPV 132/2003 [In Portuguese] 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=138604> (Accessed: March 11, 
2014). Hence, Congress responded by approving the MP well within the 30 days allotted to them by Article 62 
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December 9, 2003. 
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approval requires a three-fifths majority vote in both readings (Article 60, Paragraph 2 of the 
1988 Constitution).  By the end of 2003, Lula began negotiating the entrance of an additional 
party that would give them the necessary three-fifths majority for constitutional amendments 
relating to tax and pension reform (Santos and Grijó Vilarouca 2008, 67). However, it was 
easier to garner opposition support around these more moderate proposals than it would be to 
tackle land reform. In the 2006 elections, when Lula was elected to a second term, he 
continued to struggle with a lack of partisan support. The PT won 83 out of 513 seats in the 
lower house and 10 of 81 seats in the upper house. Even in a broad coalition, Lula controlled 
only 281 (54.8%) seats in the lower house and 37 seats (45.7%) in the upper house (Nohlen 
2005).
71
 This was not even close to the supermajority needed to pass constitutional 
amendments related to land reform. 
Summary 
Overall, during Lula's first term, he succeeded only partially in implementing his 
ambitious policy agenda - with the success of Bolsa Familia and the failure of land reform. 
Ultimately, his partisan and constitutional powers were not strong enough to permit the 
passage of the ambitious land reform during two terms in office. Yet, Lula remained 
committed to institutionalized legislative mechanisms for reform throughout his time in 
office. The failure to deliver on his promise of land reform led to a great deal of criticism 
from some of Lula's core supporters, particularly the MST. As a result, the PT calculated that 
in order for their next candidate, Dilma Rousseff, to win the 2010 presidential elections, they 
would need to successfully suppress agrarian reform as an issue in the elections (Welch 
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2013, 6). In a radio interview during the campaign, Rousseff was asked about the MST. 
Instead of talking about land reform, she said, "What we are doing is doing away with the 
real basis for the instabilities of the landless. They are losing reasons to fight."
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2. Caldera (from) the Legal Use (to the Abuse) of Decree Power, 1994  
Context 
The Punto Fijo system in Venezuela began as a pact between Acción Democrática 
(AD - Democratic Action), the Comité de Organización Política Electoral 
Independiente (COPEI  - Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee), and the 
Unión Republicana Democrática (URD-Democratic Republican Union) to share political 
power and oil wealth regardless of which party triumphed in elections (McCoy 1999). 
However, by the mid-1960s, this arrangement meant that the two primary parties, AD and 
COPEI, alternated in power. As a result, Venezuela had an unprecedented period of 
institutional stability during a period when many other Latin American countries experienced 
violence, guerilla war, and military rule. However, oil revenues fell precipitously in the 
1980s and the country accumulated massive foreign debt. In 1989, Venezuela was rocked by 
the Caracazo, a violent expression of discontentment with the corruption of the ruling elite, 
traditional parties, and Carlos Andrés Pérez's package of painful neoliberal reforms. This was 
followed by several unsuccessful coup attempts in 1992, one led by future President Hugo 
Chávez.  
Ambitious Agenda 
In 1993, Rafael Caldera ran for President of Venezuela for the second time on a 
populist platform, promising to fight poverty and reverse the policies of Carlos Andrés Pérez 
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(McCoy 1999, 65). Caldera, now in his 80s, was a founder of COPEI in the 1940s. However, 
before the 1993 elections, he broke from the traditional party and cobbled together 
Convergencia (Convergence), a coalition with support of the Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS), and other small left and center-right parties. The move paid off in the face of 
growing popular outrage over the traditional parties and the neoliberal agenda of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez.
73
 He made specific promises during his campaign to: slow privatization, 
analyze and limit future foreign investment in energy, reduce the budget deficit without 
cutting state payrolls or salaries, improve tax collection and abolish a new national sales tax, 
renegotiate the foreign debt, and keep gasoline prices at 22 cents a gallon.
74
  
Upon taking office in February 1994, his inaugural address reiterated a commitment 
to finding an alternative to neoliberal adjustment policies and social development programs 
(Montero and Rodriguez-Mora 1998, 93). However,  he had inherited a severe governability 
crisis due to the collapse of the Venezuelan banking system and faced widespread social 
protest (Vieira 2004, 140). Throughout his first year in office, Caldera‘s plans to resurrect 
state capitalism and the import substitution model were thwarted by, low state revenues from 
petroleum sales, declining investor confidence and foreign investment, and other constraints 
(Dietz and Myers 2007, 72). Still, in comparison to the tumultuous years under Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, the first year of Caldera‘s term was relatively uneventful. 
Partisan Powers 
Caldera had a very weak popular mandate, having received only 30% of the popular 
vote in an election with a high (48%) abstention rate (Coppedge 1996, 13). Convergencia and 
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its allies were also out-performed in the legislative elections by the traditional parties as well 
as another emerging left-wing party, the Causa R (Radical Cause). Caldera‘s party controlled 
only a plurality of Congress, winning only 26 out of 203 seats (12.8%) in the lower house 
and 6 out of 50 seats (12%) in the upper house. In a broader coalition, Caldera controlled 
only 51 seats (25%) of the lower house and 11 seats (22%) of the upper house (Nohlen 
2005). His situation was made worse by the fact that the Venezuelan Congress was the most 
fragmented that it had been in at least 35 years (Crisp 1998, 152). Recognizing the dilemma 
before taking office, the President-elect actually suggested a constitutional amendment that 
would allow Congress to be dissolved if it should not ‗carry out the will of the people.‘75 
However, he never pursued such a mechanism while in office. 
Constitutional Powers 
Though Congress was dominated by the opposition, they found ways to cooperate 
with Caldera out of necessity and in fear of popular protest. On April 14, 1994, just two 
months into Caldera‘s term, Congress delegated decree authority to the President for the very 
specific purpose of solving economic and financial problems. They also placed a limit of 30 
days on these powers. Caldera had always opposed delegated decree authority on principle, 
believing that the law should not outlast the delegation of power (Caldera 1981, 22-23, as 
cited in Crisp 1998, 151). However, when the initiative was pushed by the opposition in 
Congress, Caldera readily accepted the additional power to act unilaterally. The power could 
be used to enact a general sales tax, a luxury tax and a tax on banking transactions, to reform 
existing tax regulations, and also to ―abolish the extremely controversial value-added or 
wholesale tax‖ (Crisp 1998, 151). It also allowed him to remove laws that prevented 
contracts with private companies to provide public services. Additionally, the day after he 
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was granted decree authority, Caldera announced an adjustment program based on IMF 
demands (Ramonet 1996, 8) - a complete change from his initial promises in the inaugural 
speech just two months earlier. 
The policies that Caldera enacted using legal decree powers reflected an ambitious 
agenda, but it was effectively the reversal of what he had campaigned on. After gaining 
office, Caldera moved from left to right as the economic situation deteriorated and 
international forces put pressure on him. Over the course of 30 days, Caldera adhered closely 
to the stipulations of the power granted to him by Congress. He issued only four decrees, and 
all of them were fully defensible under the enabling legislation (Crisp 1998, 151). In the end, 
these tax reforms were supposed to generate additional revenue to bring the government 
deficit under control, in an effort to comply with the IMF‘s policy recommendations. 
While Caldera followed closely the stipulated uses of his delegated degree authority 
(DDA), he would soon slip into the abuse of constitutional degree authority (CDA) while in 
office. In June 1994, suspecting leftist party leaders, social activists, and the poor sectors of 
Caracas of planning an uprising, Caldera issued Decree # 241 suspending individual rights 
prohibiting arrest without a warrant, inviolability of the home, free transit, as well as 
economic rights to property and liberty. He justified its issuance because of the ‗economic-
financial emergency‘ but this should not ―be confused with the declaration of an official state 
of emergency or the delegation of decree authority in economic and financial matters‖ (Crisp 
1998, 159). Property seized under this decree was sold as part of the bank bailout process. By 
July, Congress had decided that these suspensions violated the intention of CDA and 
reinstated most constitutional guarantees. Caldera quickly issues Decree #285, suspending 
the same guarantees again, brazenly contradicting Congress. ―If he was challenged again, 
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either through another accord or through a challenge in the courts, [Caldera] would appeal 
directly to the people regarding his right to rule by decree. Fearing a Fujimori-like 
autogolpe… the largest legislative delegation [AD], backed down‖ (Crisp 1998, 160). 
Caldera finally reinstated the constitutional guarantees in 1995, only after Congress had 
passed legislation expanding the executive‘s ability to intervene in the economy. In 1996, he 
launched more economic reforms known as the Agenda Venezuela (Corrales 2000, 142). 
Summary 
Perhaps Caldera‘s case is closest one can get to the legal use of unilateral executive 
prerogatives. It demonstrates how easy it is to go down a slippery slope to the abuse of 
decree power, particularly in a context of economic and institutional crisis. Throughout his 
time in office, Caldera had a tenuous grip on governance at best. Negotiations with the 
largest opposition party, AD, allowed him to accomplish moderate reforms, but AD was not 
loyal by any means and often sided with Caldera's enemies when it was convenient for them 
(Corrales 2000, 143). While he adhered closely to the DDA pushed by AD to accomplish tax 
reform, Caldera‘s 1994 suspension of constitutional guarantees is ―less clearly supported by 
[the 1961 Constitution] and his failure to accept Congress‘ reestablishment of guarantees 
seems to violate the intent of the Constitution‖ (Crisp 1998, 163). When the success of his 
agenda was threatened, Caldera resorted to dramatic unilateral action and resistance to 
opposition in Congress. As his perceived chances of success changed, so did Caldera‘s will 
to step outside of the institutionalized mechanisms for reform. 
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3. Menem and Partial Constitutional Reform in Argentina,1994 
Context 
A minority president may find it easier to generate opposition support for 
constitutional reform than for specific legislation. In Argentina, Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-
1995; 1995-1999) pursued an ambitious neoliberal agenda through actions that ―were often 
perceived to violate the spirit – if not the letter – of the constitution‖ (Levitsky 2000, 57). His 
presidency makes clear that these policymaking strategies are not mutually exclusive, as he 
employed multiple strategies during the course of a single term in office. First, he made 
extensive use of so-called ―decrees of necessity and urgency‖ (DNUs) abusing constitutional 
decree power (strategy 5).
76
  He also sent a proposal to Congress to increase the number of 
judges on the Supreme Court from 5 to 9. On the same day the law was approved, he 
appointed 6 of the 9 judges (strategy 6), ensuring an ―automatic majority‖ (Mayer 2012, 
86).
77
  Lastly, nearing the end of his first term, Menem pushed through a constitutional 
reform (strategy 2) that allowed him to run for reelection and continue to implement his 
neoliberal agenda. 
Ambitious Agenda 
Menem was elected in May 1989 with 47.5% of the popular vote in a single round. In light of 
hyperinflation and mass demonstrations, the sitting president, Raúl Alfonsín of the Unión 
Cívica Radical (UCR), decided to hand power over to President-Elect Menem six months 
early. Menem had campaigned on a statist economic platform (Stokes 2001; Lupu 2011), a 
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clear distributionist proposal (Mayer 2012, 74).  Promising to increase wages and restore 
productivity to the country, his inaugural address claimed that one of his main goals was to 
transform Argentina to a system of ―humanized capitalism‖ (Montero and Rodriguez-Mora 
1998, 93).  In a context of severe hyperinflation, Menem quickly abandoned these 
redistributionary campaign promises to pursue a neoliberal transformation (R. Munck 1997, 
8), which centered on privatization. The cruel irony of his campaign slogan – ‗Follow me, I 
am not going to betray you‘ (Manzetti and Blake 1996, 671) – was apparent. 
Partisan Powers 
At the beginning of his first term, Menem‘s party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), held 
only 38.6% of the seats in the lower house of Congress but 54.4% of the upper house. The PJ 
remained the largest party but it never controlled a majority in the lower house during 
Menem‘s first term (Lupu 2011, 171–172).78 President Menem likely realized that pursuing 
his agenda through the legislative route would encounter resistance and require compromise.  
He acted quickly to persuade the divided Congress to pass the Law of Economic Emergency 
and the State Reform Law in his first month in office. This gave him the authority to enact 
certain economic reforms through executive orders (Manzetti and Blake 1996, 672). 
Constitutional Powers 
Menem‘s abuse of decrees of necessity and urgency (DNUs) to marginalize Congress 
was central to his policymaking strategy.
79
 To put it in perspective: ―President Alfonsín used 
this procedure about once a year from 1983 to 1989; Menem used it more than 300 times (an 
average of 4.4 times a month from 1989 to 1999), more than 10 times the number of such 
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measures in Argentina‘s entire previous constitutional history, from 1853 to 1989‖ 
(Lowenthal 2006, 46).  By concentrating executive authority and acting unilaterally through 
initiatives, Menem managed to limit debate over major market-oriented reforms, enacting 
them in a relatively short time frame. At the heart of Menem‘s ambitious neoliberal agenda 
was privatization.  As an innovative policy, privatization ―demanded the approval of new 
legislation. In effect, [it] contradicted the existing legal norms created to protect the previous 
statist development model‖ (Llanos 2001, 74).  Though the executive could initiate the 
process unilaterally, a number of additional veto points including Congress and the courts 
needed to confirm the policy to put it into action.  During his first term, Menem amended the 
State Reform Law ten times to take privatization even further.  However, Menem needed to 
introduce constitutional reforms if he wanted to remain in office and continue to advance 
privatizations and his ambitious neoliberal agenda. 
Partial Constitutional Reform 
Partial reform of the constitution would require support of a two-thirds legislative 
majority. Despite gaining seats in the 1993 midterm elections, the PJ only held 49.4% of the 
seats in the lower house. The UCR was the largest opposition party with 84 seats (32.7%) in 
the lower house (Nohlen 2005). This led Menem to pressure Alfonsín and the UCR to 
negotiate over constitutional reform. To counter their hesitance, Menem‘s first threat was to 
hold a non-binding plebiscite on the topic (Podesta 1993). At the same time, Menem also 
suggested that the 2/3 vote in the House could be calculated on the members present, rather 
than on the total membership (Acuña 1995; De Riz & Sabsay 1998; Negretto 1998 as cited in 
Giraudy 2007, 6). Alfonsín decided to negotiate because of ―the likelihood that Menem 
would win the [plebiscite] vote and the real possibility that such an outcome would provoke 
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an institutional crisis‖ (Levitsky 2000, 58). In November of 1993, Menem and Alfonsín 
signed the Olivos Pact, in which they agreed on some key agenda items for the constitutional 
assembly. In exchange for reelection, Menem made a number of concessions, including: the 
shortening of the executive‘s term, direct election through a two-round system, the 
elimination of the electoral college, the election of three senators per district, the creation of a 
Judicial Council, the appointment of a Chief of Staff, and autonomy for the city of Buenos 
Aires (Powers 2001, 225; Lago 2013). 
In December 1993, the Olivos Pact was formalized by Law No. 24.309, which 
declared the necessity for constitutional reform and laid out the scope of the constitutional 
convention with respect to specific reforms. US media outlets reported that the constitutional 
reform would ―increase the odds that the country‘s economic stabilization program – a 
watershed in the history of the often chaotic Argentine economy – will be consolidated‖ and 
it led to a rise in stocks in the Buenos Aires exchange (Podesta 1993, A33). In elections to 
the Constitutional Assembly, the PJ won 134 out of 305 seats, shy of an absolute majority. 
However, because of the pact with the UCR, which won an additional74 seats, they 
effectively controlled a majority (Mayer 2012, 95). 
The Constitutional Assembly met in Santa Fe and Paraná over a period of 3 months to 
debate reforms to particular articles as established by the framework of the Constitutional 
Assembly.
80
 On August 22, 1994, the Assembly approved the final reforms of the 
Constitution, an outcome which conformed to the expectations laid out by the pact. Success 
in this case was achieved through the presence of two conditions that are quite rare in 
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Argentine politics (Negretto 1998, 2). First, Menem and Alfonsín were relatively equally 
matched in that neither had a sufficient majority to impose reform on their own. At the same 
time, they had different institutional preferences that could be exchanged consensually in 
negotiations.   
Despite criticism of the pact from some within the UCR, the outcome was a stable 
institutional compromise embodied in the constitutional reforms of 1994. Menem ―argued 
that he needed 10 years to consolidate the economic changes, under which Argentina has 
opened to international investment and trade, sold off large money-losing state enterprises 
and brought inflation under control by pegging the currency to the U.S. dollar‖ (Podesta 
1993, A33). In May 1995, Menem stood for reelection and won with 44.9% of the vote in a 
single round.  At the start of his second term, the PJ finally controlled a majority in both 
houses: 131 of 257 (51.0%) seats in the lower house and 39 of 72 (54%) in the upper house. 
Over the course of both terms, Menem privatized nearly all public services and businesses 
(Mayer 2012, 79). The privatization program in Argentina was unmatched in both scope and 
speed of reform because of Menem‘s ability to concentrate power and extend his time in 
office.  The 1994 constitutional reforms were crucial for the continued implementation of his 
ambitious neoliberal policy.  
Summary 
In this case, decree powers and partial constitutional reform worked together to allow 
Menem to continue to pursue his ambitious neoliberal agenda during a second term in office. 
The UCR acceded to this path of reform ultimately fearing that Menem would either follow a 
quasi-legal plebiscite to reform the constitution or pass the bill in a fraudulent manner 
(Giraudy 2007).  If that happened, they would not have had leverage to negotiate or an 
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opportunity to obtain policy concessions in return. As many left-leaning executives with 
ambitious reforms (Chávez, Correa, and Morales) have argued in recent years, consolidation 
of a new economic model requires a significant investment in reforms over time. Menem 
wanted to pursue the consolidation of the neoliberal model and the process of privatization 
by continuing reform in a second term. His dual use of decree powers (to enact privatization) 
and constitutional reform (to gain reelection) allowed him to accomplish these goals.  
4. Palacio and a Future Legal Path in Ecuador, 2005-2007 
Context 
Sometimes, when rulers are frustrated in their policy aims they are willing to bend the 
institutionalized rules to achieve their policy goals. However, in other cases, they may have a 
strong commitment to legality, to the point where policy aims are unachievable. In these 
cases, presidents may be willing to accept defeat and the status quo, or they may believe that 
they can achieve these goals in the longer run, with reelection and the election of a new 
Congress, or they may believe that they can set the stage for their successor. Thrust into the 
position of President after a coup deposed Lucio Gutiérrez, Alfredo Palacio had an ambitious 
reform agenda, centered on constitutional reform and increased social programs, but he 
remained committed to taking action through explicitly legal mechanisms of policy-making. 
Between the return to democracy and Correa‘s election in 2006, Ecuador‘s executives 
were never able to secure partisan majorities in the legislature and so had to count on 
coalitions to govern. After a 1996 constitutional reform, coalitions became much more costly 
to maintain and so coalitions were much more unstable and prone to breaking apart (A. M. 
Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich 2011). In 2004, a former Colonel and coup organizer, 
Gutiérrez was elected in 2002 as the candidate of his own party, the center-left Partido 
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Sociedad Patriótica (PSP).
81
 His Vice President, Palacio, was a cardiologist by profession 
and unaffiliated with a political party. 
Though Gutiérrez entered office in 2003 with the support of the leftist Movimiento 
Popular Democrático (MPD) and the Pachacutik movement, a left-wing indigenous party, 
he later alienated them with his economic policies and the coalition lasted only the first three 
months of his tenure in office. Once obtaining office, Gutierrez switched policies, beginning 
to pursue elite-empowering economic reforms. He joined forces with the conservative 
Partido Social Cristiano (PSC). However, this arrangement was also short-lived. The PSC, 
MPD, and Pachacutik movement joined forces to try to impeach Gutierrez in November of 
2004, but failed to secure the majority necessary to begin proceedings. Gutierrez then joined 
with other parties, including the right-wing Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción 
Nacional (PRIAN), to remove adversaries on the Supreme Court and replace them with more 
sympathetic justices. A crisis of governability ensued. People in Quito took to the streets in 
increasing numbers between February and April of 2005, in what became known as the 
Rebelión de los Forajidos (Rebellion of Outlaws) because this was how Gutiérrez publicly 
referred to protesters. Eventually, the movement gathered such strength that Gutiérrez was 
forced to resign and flee the country.
82
 Alfredo Palacio assumed the presidency in late April 
2005 to finish out the remainder of Gutiérrez‘s term through January 2007.  
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Ambitious Agenda 
During the last months of Gutierrez‘s time in office, Palacio was highly critical of the 
direction the country was taking, expressing concern at the extreme institutional and civil 
instability. He described the legislature as an ―institutional guillotine‖ destroying Ecuador‘s 
incipient democracy and claimed that the executive, Gutiérrez, was not governing but rather 
further damaging his credibility ―in diabolical pacts with whomever (inside or outside of 
Congress) could offer him an additional day of survival‖ (Palacio 2007, 21). Palacio‘s 
message of change – especially relating to increased spending on social programs and 
institutional change – was popular.83 
Partisan Powers 
Since he was only elected as a Vice President, Palacio‘s mandate was potentially 
weak. Like Gutiérrez, Palacio also had insufficient support in Congress. In fact, as an 
independent, he had no official support from political parties or social movements, a 
condition with potentially debilitating consequences for policymaking. Yet, Palacio 
considered this an asset: ―I was sure that this apparent weakness was my biggest strength… 
[I was] a free man, without any type of ties, so I could call for a grand national agreement 
beyond the parties, that then were already being questioned‖ (Palacio 2007, 31). As a 
political outsider, Palacio felt that he was on neutral ground and thus the perfect person to 
rebuild and strengthen the institutions of democracy in Ecuador, without ulterior motives. 
Correspondingly, he did not attempt to build a coalition to push through legislation but he 
                                                 
83
 Though he was not popularly elected, Palacio‘s approval numbers reflected an immediate improvement upon 
Gutiérrez‘s before him. ―…after completing his first unnerving month in office, a nationwide poll showed that 
62 percent of Ecuadorians rated the leader‘s performance as ‗good or very good,‘ over twenty percentage points 
higher than a similar poll on Gutiérrez staged in February. Palacio has retained this popularity perhaps because 
he demonstrated early in his tenure that he intends to fulfill his inaugural promises‖ (Asper 2005) to push 
universal healthcare and constitutional reform empowering popular sectors. 
126 
 
sought unified support from all of the traditional parties. Palacio‘s first act as President was 
to call for a popular referendum to establish a CA. ―The 20th of April 2005 left it clear that 
the mandate expressed by the Ecuadorian people was to advance toward a profound political 
reform of the state, that would deliver to the country an instrument suitable for transition to 
the 21
st
 century‖ (Palacio 2007, 47). This mechanism was allowed by the 1998 Constitution, 
provided that it was to write an entirely new constitution and obtained prior approval of 
either Congress or the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE). In Palacio‘s case, both institutions 
refused to allow the people to convoke a CA.  
Constitutional Reform 
Despite his desire for a CA, Palacio remained committed to pursuing this sweeping 
reform through explicitly legal means. Over the course of 20 months in office, Palacio 
submitted seven distinct proposals for constitutional reform. The first six attempts came 
during the first year he was in office. Palacio went back and forth with Congress; while the 
traditional parties accepted certain aspects of his proposal, they denied the bulk of them, and 
most importantly they continued to reject the key question of a CA. After being frustrated in 
Congress, he turned to the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE). Once, he got close and was 
likely going to win, having the support of four out of seven judges on the TSE. Congress, 
knowing this, removed two of the four judges from the TSE to stop Palacio once again.
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Despite the fact that Congress used what Palacio viewed as unethical tactics, he ―had 
resolved that all of the referenda posed to citizens should follow established legal avenues; it 
was decided to respect the institutions, to strengthen them, even though they should also 
change. These same institutions, principally the National Congress, were those called upon to 
allow the required changes‖ (Palacio 2007, 50).  
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Future Legal Path 
Palacio‘s seventh and final attempt at reform was strikingly different than previous 
attempts and it reflected a desire to give future reforms a legal foundation. Within 15 days of 
the end of Palacio‘s mandate, in January 2005, he convoked a special session of Congress 
around a particular topic – in this case, the CA. Article 171 of the 1998 Constitution gave the 
President this ability. Palacio knew that Congress would not approve the CA in the special 
session; in fact, Congress delayed a decision by passing the proposal on to a Commission. 
Palacio knew that there would soon be a new president (Correa) who could pursue these 
reforms and capitalize on the groundwork that Palacio was laying.  He described his strategy: 
But I knew they would [pass it on to a Commission], and if I knew it, why did I do 
this? Because… one of the last articles of [the 1998] Constitution said that if the 
President convoked a special session of Congress about a proposal, and this Congress 
does not decide on it, that is to say does not approve or reject it… in 180 days, the 
President can act on the proposal… So, I did it knowing that… Congress was not 
going to reject it; they weren‘t familiar with this article... Then, the President in 180 
days, which was in May because this was January, could convoke a CA. I couldn‘t do 
it [because by May] there was a new President [Correa]. But when I met with the new 
President to hand over authority, we had some sessions before the official ceremony, 
and I told him some things, about health policy and other things I considered 
important, and this – ―you can convoke a CA in May, here it is, I did it.‖ But he 
didn‘t do it this way. He moved it forward; [Correa] did it in April. He did it before, 
taking other paths. But this was the reason that I went to Congress: because I was 
supported by the article that I just mentioned.
85
 
 
Summary 
 Palacio remained committed to legal reform, despite defeat. He demonstrated that he 
did not have the capacity to achieve reform via institutionalized mechanisms and he did not 
have the will to step outside of these institutionalized mechanisms. He refused to circumvent 
traditional parties in Congress even though they blocked him; instead, he laid the 
groundwork for his successor to legally pursue reform. Speaking about his failure to achieve 
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policy reform, he said: ―I believe that these initiatives…were seeds planted for the people 
now, in the majority, tired and weary, to say: ―We want constitutional reform and you have 
shown that you cannot do it, we do not want promises that you will do it, we want a CA.‖ 
Such is the historical process (Palacio 2007, 50). At the root of Palacio‘s actions and his 
inclination to defer to his successor was an unwillingness to bend the institutionalized rules 
of constitutional reform. He had a strong commitment to the idea that important reforms 
needed to occur through means that were both legitimate and legal. 
5. Collor de Mello and the Abuse of Decree Power in Brazil, 1990-1992 
Context 
The Presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil is an often cited case of the 
abuse of decree power. He made use of emergency decree powers for extended periods of 
time and beyond the scope of their intended use. As is nearly always the case in Brazil, 
Collor did not have a partisan majority in Congress. If Collor had decided to pursue the 
legislative route, he would have needed to form a legislative coalition. He preferred instead 
to act unilaterally. This is not to say that presidents will only resort to abuse of decree power 
when they are blocked in Congress. Decrees offer a relatively quick avenue to policy with a 
more minimal need for negotiation, even within the governing party. For example, Latin 
American presidents like Carlos Menem in Argentina have abused decree power even when 
their party controlled a majority in Congress. In fact, the legislative majority of the Partido 
Justicialista (PJ) and a sympathetic Supreme Court shored up Menem‘s ability to get away 
with a gross abuse of executive action. In the case of Collor, his repeated abuse of unilateral 
action, coupled with a lack of support in other institutions like Congress and the Supreme 
Court, eventually led to his downfall. 
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Collor was the governor of a small northeastern state in Brazil, prior to running for 
the Presidency in 1989. He created his own party, the Partido de Renovação Nacional (PRN 
– Party of National Renovation), prior to the elections. Collor remained ideologically 
ambiguous in his campaign; he distanced himself from other candidates by highlighting how 
young he was, targeting corruption, and pledging clean government (Weyland 1993, 5). His 
vague slogan was ‗whoever steals goes to jail‘ but this ideologically neutral message 
resonated with Brazilians.
86
 ―As one observer pointed out prior to Collor's election, ‗people 
are not interested in ideologies, what they really want is something which promises to change 
everything, government parties, politicians, the source of their suffering‘‖ (Brazil Report, 6 
July 1989, p. 2 as cited in Manzetti and Blake 1996, 762). Collor won the presidency with 
49.94% of the vote in the second round, narrowly edging out Lula (Political Database of the 
Americas 2013). He became the first democratically-elected president after the return to 
democracy in Brazil. 
Partisan Powers  
On his first day in office in March 1990, Collor faced hyperinflation and an 
adversarial Congress where he had very little partisan support. In the 1990 legislative 
election, the PRN only won 40 seats out of 503 in the Chamber of Deputies and only 2 out of 
31 seats in the Senate (Political Database of the Americas 2013).  Nevertheless, ―on his 
inauguration day, he made his policy making strategy clear: he decided to face the hyper-
inflation crisis in which Brazil was enmeshed since 1987 exclusively by means of decrees‖ 
(Amorim Neto 2002, 76). He introduced an ambitious economic plan, known as the Plan 
Collor. His neoliberal policies were not only aimed at stabilization or lowering inflation, but 
also the liberalization of trade, fiscal reform, and privatization. Collor decided that it would 
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have been very difficult for him to form a coalition. ―Had he wanted to form a stable 
legislative majority, he would have had to make an enormous number of concessions to the 
largest parties‖ (Amorim Neto 2002, 76). Therefore, instead of trying to gain legislative 
support through the appointment of members of other parties to his cabinet, Collor‘s cabinet 
was comprised mostly of non-partisan technocrats with whom he would not have to 
compromise on policy. 
Constitutional Powers 
Collor quickly resorted to the abuse of emergency executive decree power, as laid out 
in Article 62 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. He signed approximately 36 decrees, known 
as medidas provisorias (MPs - provisional measures) during his first 15 days in office and 
then issued another 163 MPs during 1990 (Amorim Neto 2002, 76). MPs were never 
intended to be used for everyday legislation but rather only under exceptional circumstances; 
article 62 states that ―in the case of relevance and urgency, the President may take 
provisional measures with the force of law.‖ Although one might potentially argue that MPs 
were justified in an attempt to combat the ‗economic emergency‘ posed by hyperinflation, 
Collor went far beyond this. He used MPs ―to implement an ambitious plan of structural 
change, including an extensive scheme for privatizations, fiscal reform, economic 
deregulation, and public administration reform‖ (Negretto 2004, 549). Instead of engaging in 
negotiation and compromise with the opposition, Collor opted to impose the many 
components of his economic plan unilaterally. 
Summary 
The process of neoliberal reform in Brazil initiated by Collor ended up being  quite 
protracted. The Plan Collor was largely a failure, as hyperinflation returned, and many of its 
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ambitious goals such as privatization were only implemented by Collor‘s successors after he 
was removed from office. One reason for the relative lack of executive policymaking success 
under Collor is that he did not have a large partisan base of support in Congress as Menem 
did in Argentina. Collor was also unwilling or unable to create a coalition to support his 
reform efforts, in comparison with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who succeeded him. A 
second reason was his inability to sustain his abuse of decree power the way that Menem did 
in Argentina. By 1991, Collor‘s strategy was unraveling. ―Congress… resented being left out 
of major decisions. In late 1990, the Brazilian Supreme Court, which Collor had not been 
able to 'pack', ruled it unconstitutional to reissue medidas provisorias once they had expired‖ 
(Manzetti and Blake 1996, 674). This significantly cut down on Collor‘s ability to push 
through reform unilaterally, and it was reflected in a significant drop in the number of MPs 
issued in 1991 (Amorim Neto 2002, 76).  Eventually, corruption charges were leveled against 
Collor and impeachment proceedings were initiated. As they moved forward, he was 
suspended from the Presidency and replaced by his Vice President, Itamar Franco.  In the 
face of his likely impeachment by Congress, Collor chose instead to resign on December 29, 
1992 – the final day of the impeachment proceedings. 
6. Ortega and Judicial Override in Nicaragua, 2009 
Context 
Daniel Ortega‘s most recent presidency (2007-present) demonstrates how control 
over the judiciary can be an effective tool to pass an ambitious reform agenda. Here, as in the 
cases above, various mechanisms were used throughout Ortega‘s most recent presidential 
term. Though he also formed a coalition (strategy 1) and abused his decree power (strategy 
5), I focus on his use of judicial override (strategy 6) to gain reelection and continue to 
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advance his ambitious reform agenda to empower popular sectors. Ortega proved willing to 
employ questionably or openly illegal mechanisms to accomplish his agenda when 
institutionalized mechanisms of reform failed. 
Ortega was a leader within the left-wing Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 
(FSLN) during the Revolution, the ―first among equals‖ in an FSLN Junta of National 
Reconciliation from 1979-1985,
87
 and elected President, serving in office from 1985-1990. 
Since that time, ―when the Sandinista revolutionary experiment ended, Nicaragua has lived 
through an electoral democracy without social consensus that has kept the country in a 
situation of permanent institutional crisis‖ (Pérez-Baltodano 2006, 14–15). After leaving 
office, Ortega remained deeply involved in politics. He ran for the presidency unsuccessfully 
for three elections in a row in 1990, 1996, and 2001, and he remained the leader of the FSLN.  
Between 1997 and 2002, Arnoldo Alemán served as President of Nicaragua as the 
corrupt leader of the right-wing Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and a coalition of 
several other conservative parties. In 1999, Ortega, as leader of FSLN, formed an 
opportunistic political alliance with Alemán, known simply as ‗the Pact.‘ Together Ortega 
and Alemán effectively dominated about 90% of the unicameral legislature (Sarria 2009). 
Early on, Ortega used the Pact to lay the groundwork for his return to the presidency. He was 
able to change electoral rules so that a candidate could win in the first round with a plurality 
(only 35% with a five point lead) of votes; previously, candidates needed a minimum of 45% 
in order to win in the first round and avoid a runoff.
88
 This move was motivated by Ortega's 
concern that he might not be able to win office in a runoff against one right-leaning 
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candidate, and opinion polls consistently gave him around 35% support in the general 
population. Lastly, the Pact allowed Ortega to appoint many politically sympathetic judges.  
However, there were moments when the Pact looked like it might crumble.  For 
example, Alemán‘s successor, President Enrique Bolaños, pursued Alemán‘s prosecution for 
embezzlement and corruption in 2003. It was rumored that Ortega had a hand in convincing 
sympathetic judges to revoke Alemán‘s immunity (Telleria 2011, 40). When Alemán was 
placed under house arrest, Ortega was left in a very powerful position. However, after 
Bolaños broke with the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC - Liberal Constitutionalist 
Party), the Pact managed to remain together to put pressure on Bolaños through the end of 
his term in 2007. 
Ambitious Agenda 
In order to win election in 2006, Ortega needed to make major concessions to the 
right. Thus, his ambitious agenda reflected a significantly toned-down version of the policy 
goals from his first presidency. At that time, Ortega and the FSLN had an overtly Marxist 
orientation. Over a decade later Ortega insisted that he was more pragmatic than he had been 
previously, while still promising to empower the poor.
89
 He promised to alleviate poverty, 
redistribute wealth, and provide free education, health care, and medicine. He was harshly 
criticized by the ring-wing opposition for harkening back to the policies of the revolution. 
But Ortega refused to engage his opponents publically. As a result, many voters saw him as a 
changed man with a new approach to the Sandinista mission: ―Today we can see a Daniel 
who is different from the one at the time of the triumph of the revolution .... He showed it 
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throughout the campaign, he was attacked so hard but he did not respond to those offenses. 
Instead he spoke of peace, of reconciliation‖ (Orlando, interview, December 2, 2006 as cited 
in Kampwirth 2008, 3).
90
 
   President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela openly backed Ortega, providing Nicaragua 
with subsidized oil in the lead up to the 2006 elections and promising substantial investment 
in the country if the FSLN won those elections (Martí i Puig 2008, 97).
91
 Likewise, U.S. 
intervention in support of Eduardo Montealegre, a ring-wing candidate, drove an anti-
interventionist vote to Ortega (Martí i Puig 2008, 96). At his inauguration Ortega reiterated a 
promise that his government would advance "the second stage of the Sandinista revolution." 
In office, he followed through with "policies and programs that seemed to be derived from 
his Sandinista years" (Sarria 2009).  
Partisan Powers 
Sergio Ramirez, Vice President from 1985-1990, perhaps put it best when he 
described Ortega as ―a political animal who skillfully uses his patronage and back-room 
deals to secure support among voters and clout inside government‖ (Ramirez, personal 
communication with Carlos R. Chamorro, 1995, as cited in Telleria 2011, 36). In the 2006 
elections, Ortega was able to capitalize on the recent change in electoral rules, winning the 
Presidency with only 38% of the vote (International Parliamentary Union 2013).  This left 
him with a relatively weak mandate. Likewise, the FSLN gained the largest number of seats 
in the legislature but still only controlled a plurality (42%) of seats (Martí i Puig 2008). The 
                                                 
90
 Ortega also made a significant pact with the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, leading to a significant shift in his 
own discourse about the church and issues of concern to the institution, such as abortion.Ortega aligned himself 
much more closely with the Catholic Church during his second term of office. 
 
91
 Lacey, Marc. 2006. "Ortega Dominates Nicaragua Campaign." The New York Times. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/06/world/americas/06nicaragua.html?fta=y&_r=1&>  November 6, 2006. 
(Accessed 3/17/14). 
 
135 
 
Pact between Ortega and Alemán had always been somewhat tenuous and it began to unravel 
again when the PLC objected to the FSLN‘s use of fraud to fix the outcome of municipal 
elections in 2008. Alemán‘s supporters protested in the streets and resisted Ortega‘s policy 
agenda in Congress.
92
 Facing institutional opposition within Congress, the legislative route 
became very difficult for Ortega. Still, he was determined to pursue the ambitious reform 
agenda espoused in his campaign, including securing his own reelection. Over the course of 
Ortega's term, tensions between the executive and the legislature mounted. 
Judicial Override 
Ortega demonstrated his competency in manipulating institutions to achieve his 
policy aims and proved willing to employ questionably or openly illegal mechanisms to 
pursue his reform agenda. This reflected a dramatic break from his predecessors' methods of 
enacting reform and the extent to which institutions had been manipulated previously. Ortega 
refused to accept defeat in the legislature. Instead, he laid the groundwork to achieve his 
preferred policies by blatantly packing and then dominating the Supreme Court. In a similar 
manner,  the decisions of the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) increasingly favored Ortega 
over the course of his term. For example, he raised no objections when the CSE used a 
technical justification to ban two moderate parties from competing in the 2008 municipal 
elections (Anderson and Dodd 2009, 158). 
In 2009, Ortega began openly talking about his desire to stand for reelection in 2011. 
At the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution in July 2009, 
Ortega openly declared his intentions to hold a referendum to change the constitution to 
allow for his reelection, just as Zelaya had attempted a month earlier in Honduras. "At the 
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time, it was thought constitutional change would have to be approved by the National 
Assembly... or be backed in a public referendum."
93
 However, observing Zelaya's removal 
from the presidency caused Ortega to hesitate. He began claiming more frequently that there 
was a plot to overthrow him, but he was also quick to point out that there was no real 
possibility of military coup because "the army and policy were born with the revolution and 
formed by it.
94
 
Making a calculated decision over his chances for success, Ortega ultimately decided 
to approach the Supreme Court directly with a petition signed by 100 mayors. On October 
20, 2009, all six justices in the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, supporters of 
Ortega's Sandinista party, ruled that the ban on reelection was "unenforceable."
95
 The 
opposition maintained that the Supreme Court's ruling openly contradicts the Constitution.  
Constitutional Powers 
In 2010, Congress became gridlocked over the election of Supreme Court justices, 
members of the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE), and other officials despite the expiration 
of their terms. No party had the number of votes necessary in Congress to elect new officials 
unilaterally and the PLC and the FSLN reached a standoff over the FSLN's desire to reelect 
the Chief Justice of the CSE.
96
 Ortega decided to issue Decree No. 3-2010, effectively 
overriding Congress. It stated that, because the Congress has not been able to name officials 
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to these posts in a timely manner, all officials that previously held these posts will be 
renewed, effective immediately, so as to avoid a power vacuum.
97
 The move prompted 
violence in April, as Ortega's supporters prevented legislators from entering Congress and set 
their vehicles on fire in the street. In September, still lacking legislative support, Ortega used 
a decree to declare a public holiday and then in a bizarre move his administration reprinted 
new copies of the Constitution on that same day. These new copies included an old transitory 
law that had expired 20 years earlier: "the resurrected second paragraph of Law 201, supreme 
court judges, electoral magistrates, and other public officials can remain in office beyond 
their term limits until new officials are appointed."
98
 All of this was geared toward 
fabricating legal justification for Ortega's potential reelection. 
Facing institutional opposition and divided government, Ortega walked a very narrow 
line between democracy and autocracy. In comparison with other 'delegative' presidents like 
Menem and Fujimori, Ortega faced even greater institutionalized opposition, legislative 
hostility from his own ideological base, a mobilized electorate, and a contentious elite - all of 
which presented a challenge to his ability to effectively centralize power through unilateral 
executive prerogatives (Anderson and Dodd 2009, 157).  His use of decree power was, if 
anything, a secondary mechanism to the use of judicial override. 
Summary 
Ortega was repeatedly frustrated when trying to enact ambitious reform via the 
legislative route, especially given his tumultuous relationship with Alemán of the PLC. 
Moreover, without a supermajority - let alone a majority - reforming the constitution to allow 
                                                 
97
 Ortega, Daniel. 2010."Decreto No 3-2010.". Official Decree issued on January 11, 2010. pp5. 
 
98
 Rogers. Tim. 2010. "Nicaragua wakes up to Daniel Ortega's new 'Sandinista Constitution'" The Christian 
Science Monitor. September 21, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/0921/Nicaragua-
wakes-up-to-Daniel-Ortega-s-new-Sandinista-Constitution (Accessed: 3/17/14). 
138 
 
for presidential reelection would have been impossible. Though he contemplated imitating 
Zelaya and calling for a referendum to change the constitution to allow his reelection, Ortega 
judged that he likely lacked the popular support necessary to win. Appealing to a sympathetic 
judiciary for support proved to be the most effective option in this scenario. Moreover, with 
effective control over the judiciary, the Nicaraguan executive was free to violate the 
Constitution without fear of the consequences of judicial review. Ortega's use of executive 
decrees was largely a secondary mechanism. The decrees he issued in 2010 allowed him to 
extend the mandate of those officials of the CSE who had supported allowing him to run for 
reelection. Though I do not consider more recent developments here, in January 2014 Ortega 
won legislative approval of a reform of the constitution that allows him to run for a third 
consecutive term of office. It also scraps the 35% threshold needed to win in those elections 
so that simply the candidate with the most votes wins.
99
 
7. Serrano and the Autogolpe in Guatemala, 1993 
Context 
Only one year after Alberto Fujimori‘s successful autogolpe in Peru in 1992, Jorge 
Serrano Elías attempted to replicate the move in Guatemala. However, unlike Fujimori, 
Serrano was defeated and exiled from the country. Why did he pursue an autogolpe?  In the 
years leading up to his attempt, Serrano gained only 18 seats in Congress and attempted to 
form a coalition but it eventually fell apart. He passed certain laws by decree when 
necessary, before finally resorting to the autogolpe. This is an interesting case because it 
demonstrates the progression through several policymaking options and the eventual 
escalation to a clearly extra-legal option. 
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In 1990, Jorge Serrano entered the race for the presidency as the candidate for the 
conservative Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS), which he founded in 1987 for the 
purpose of running for the presidency (McCleary 1999, 21). He initially had very low levels 
of popular support and was a political outsider, having never held a publicly elected office. 
However, Serrano employed a very popular campaign message, ―Los mismos NO‖ (Camacho 
2004, 241), implying that it was time for a break with the status quo, traditional parties, and 
politics as usual. Through attacks on corruption and the political establishment, his support 
grew precipitously throughout the race (Cameron 1998, 222). In the first round, Serrano 
came in second place with 24.1% of the vote, while Jorge Carpio was first with 25.7%. 
However, in the runoff in January 1991, Serrano defeated Carpio with 68% of the vote and 
became President of Guatemala (Nohlen 2005). 
Partisan Powers 
Guatemala's party system is traditionally one of the least institutionalized in the 
region, with extremely high electoral volatility, partisan dealignment, and parties subsumed 
to the interests of their leaders (Sánchez 2008).
100
 Serrano's party, the conservative 
Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS), won only 18 of 103 seats in Congress (Dunkerley 
1994, 84). Economic policy issues were central from the beginning of Serrano‘s presidency, 
given Guatemala‘s continuing economic problems and the need for macroeconomic 
stabilization. Under international pressure, Serrano knew that he would need to come to 
agreement with the IMF in an effort to restructure Guatemala‘s debt. However, the IMF 
made it clear that any structural adjustment agreement would need to include the 
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restructuring of the tax system and Serrano was having very little success in securing support 
from Congress (McCleary 1999, 95).
101
 In an effort to build partisan power within the 
legislature, the MAS entered into a tentative coalition with two other parties, the center-left 
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) and the center-right Unión del Cambio Nacional 
(UCN). In exchange for their support, Serrano and the MAS had to cede control of the 
Supreme Court to an ex-UCN member and the presidency of Congress to a DCG deputy 
(Dunkerley 1994, 85).  Even with efforts to cooperate with other parties, the tax package was 
difficult to pass through Congress, requiring significant debate and negotiation and several 
attempts at passing it. Only a year into his presidency, Serrano needed to rely upon bribes 
and privileges to secure his desired legislation (McCleary 1999). 
Constitutional Powers 
Article 183 of the Guatemalan constitution granted Serrano with executive decree 
power, reactive veto power, and proactive emergency powers, though only to be used in 
"cases of grave emergency or public calamity." These unilateral constitutional powers 
became crucial when Serrano found himself facing substantial legislative opposition to his 
economic austerity measures, most importantly resistance to privatization and an associated 
increase in electricity rates (Bologna 1996, 7). In the context of an energy crisis, Congress 
passed a bill to restructure the state-owned electrical company, the Instituto Nacional de 
Electrificación (INDE).  However, the bill took away the executive‘s ability to appoint the 
president of the company. Without solid support from his coalition, Serrano had very little 
room for negotiation with the legislature. He made the decision to act unilaterally, vetoing 
the bill approved by Congress and creating his own privatization law by executive decree 
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(McCleary 1999, 99).  Institutional tension came to a head with proposed increases in 
electricity rates as a result of this privatization.
102
  Seeing an opportunity to exploit the 
legislative impasse, members of Serrano's own coalition - including the President of the 
Supreme Court and the president of Congress - refused to allow the removal of subsidies on 
electricity unless Serrano granted them ownership of economic resources.
103
 Acting 
unilaterally had failed to fully accomplish Serrano's goals and had further exacerbated 
tensions between the executive and the legislature. The already debilitated MAS-DCG-UCN 
coalition fell apart completely in May 1993 when the MAS overwhelmed the other two 
parties in municipal elections, so much so that they alleged electoral fraud and withdrew 
from the coalition.  
Autogolpe 
By late May, Serrano realized the severity of the situation: a lack of legislative 
support, hostility from the Supreme Court, and his complete inability to advance reform 
within the current institutional context. He decided to suspend the constitution and other 
branches of government, justifying the move because of rampant corruption and claiming 
that he was being blackmailed by members of Congress and the Supreme Court. Serrano 
appeared on television to announce the suspension of 59 articles of the Constitution and call 
for the dissolution of Congress, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and several other 
offices. He also called on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to hold elections for a National CA 
to amend the Constitution. The coup was immediately and broadly condemned by 
Guatemalan society: civilian opposition groups and movements, unions, a state university, 
the Guatemalan Bar Association, prominent leftist leaders including Rigoberta Menchú, 
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members of the political opposition, as well as the umbrella organization of the guerillas. The 
international response was also highly unfavorable. The United States and Mexico demanded 
a return to constitutional order while several Central American countries condemned the 
move. Just several days later, the US moved to imposed sanctions, including cutting the 
credit from the international financial institutions (McCleary 1999, 130). The autogolpe 
proved unsustainable when the Supreme Electoral Tribunal refused to call national elections 
while the constitution was suspended. Realizing that his only recourse now was to try to 
reestablish constitutional order, Serrano tried to negotiate with Congress in an effort to 
receive amnesty. Instead, the Constitutional Court and the military acted in concert to remove 
Serrano from office and exile him from the country.
104
  However, the coup likely would have 
succeeded if not for the intense pressure from the international system (Torres-Rivas 1996, as 
cited in Sánchez 2008) 
Summary 
Serrano lacked partisan and constitutional powers, being frustrated in attempts at both 
the legislative path and the use of decrees before resorting to a much more drastic option, the 
autogolpe. As these earlier attempts at reform indicate, bending the institutionalized rules 
was necessary if Serrano wanted to implement his preferred reforms without negotiating.  He 
demonstrated a willingness to bend the rules, believing that the chances of success were high.  
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 In contrast with the situation in Peru a year earlier, Serrano‘s autogolpe was unsuccessful because he 
miscalculated the degree of support he had within the population. Serrano‘s was elected largely by ‗negative 
voting‘ when another popular presidential candidate dropped out of the race (Dunkerley 1994, 85; Cameron 
1998, 222). Although the MAS performed well in the municipal election, rates of abstention were very high 
(Bologna 1996, 8). In May 1993, Serrano had less than 30 percent approval while Fujimori had over 60 percent 
approval in Peru at the time of his autogolpe (McCleary 1999, 115). Moreover, the perceived threat of rebel 
groups was much higher in Peru than it was in Guatemala at the time. While the Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path) still represented a significant danger to stability in Peru, the Guatemalan rebels no longer posed much of a 
threat (Cameron 1998, 220). Lastly, although the US did not oppose the autogolpe in Peru, there were important 
changes in foreign policy and deteriorating relations with Guatemala that led the US to oppose the Serrano 
autogolpe (McCleary 1999). 
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He could draw upon the successful example of Fujimori in Peru just one year prior to his 
own attempt. The purpose of the present analysis is only to examine the factors leading to the 
executive's decision over how to implement ambitious reform. Though I cannot do so here, it 
would be interesting to consider Serrano's miscalculation in greater depth. 
8. The Constituent Assembly with Plenos Poderes 
Context 
Why did Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Manuel Zelaya decide to 
attempt reform via CA? As demonstrated to this point, there were several other ways that 
they could have enacted ambitious agendas, but instead they chose an innovative and, in 
some cases, unprecedented mechanism for doing so.  
The CA was an innovative and relatively risky strategy.  However, it offered a 
potentially large reward: a blank slate for executives who would have the opportunity to lead 
a process of redefining the rules of the game. I argue that the institutional context, which 
already suffered from frequent abuses of the rule of law, permitted the bending of the 
institutionalized rules with a perceived chance of success. Furthermore, institutionalized 
mechanisms for reform had a relatively low chance of success. Executives were constrained 
in terms of their partisan power and ability to form a coalition. Likewise, their ambitious 
agendas were not well suited to decrees, in general, because of the breadth of the agenda and 
the sacrifice in legitimacy associated with abusing decree power. Partial constitutional reform 
would have been insufficient for two reasons.  In some cases the scope of the agendas were 
simply too broad to be implemented without a full replacement of the constitution. Even 
where the agenda could have feasibly been implemented through partial constitutional 
reform, the mechanisms for doing so would have required compromising with opposition in 
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Congress and the executives displayed an unwillingness or inability to do so. And, with 
regard to pursuing a strategy involving an autogolpe, executives were concerned with the 
democratic legitimacy of the process, as perceived by their own citizens but particularly the 
international community. Because of the emphasis on popular participation, the CA reform 
process offered the potential to maintain more democratic legitimacy than other options. 
Given all of these considerations, the CA emerged as the most attractive reform path.  
Ambitious Agendas 
Hugo Chávez's candidacy represented a left-wing alternative to the Washington 
Consensus.  The redistribution of wealth and land reform were two of the central tenets of his 
proposed economic policy. He campaigned on "drastic changes that would overturn the 
Venezuelan status quo, calling for a national constitutional assembly, the wholesale redesign 
of the judicial system, and the slowing of economic reform" (Canache 2002, 74). In Ecuador, 
Correa became the young and charismatic minister of economy in Palacios's administration 
in 2005. He developed his ambitious agenda early on, gaining national attention by using his 
office as "a bully pulpit for denouncing neoliberalism and... the International Monetary 
Fund" (de la Torre 2010, 179). In late 2005, Correa resigned to prepare his campaign for the 
2006 presidential elections. In Bolivia, Morales' ambitious agenda included: "programs to 
significantly redistribute the nation's wealth, including increased pension and social security 
payments for the elderly and expanding feeding programs for school children... [as well as] 
the radical rewriting of the nation's constitution, including redistributing power to the 
indigenous populations and opening the door for widespread land reform;" (Farah 2009, 5). 
In Honduras, Zelaya is the first case in Latin America since the return to democracy where an 
executive campaigned on a right-of-center platform and then tried to implement an agenda of 
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left-wing policies after obtaining office. Rather than campaigning on an ambitious agenda, 
Zelaya only began to develop one much later, near the end of his term. Though the reasons 
behind this shift are not apparent, as more countries in the region elected left-leaning 
presidents, Zelaya began taking more progressive stances and openly speaking out against 
US foreign policy. As a member of the business and social elite, Zelaya campaigned on a 
center-right platform, a central component of which was his promise to eliminate corruption 
(Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013, 522) Zelaya drifted leftward over the course of 
his time in office, advancing a restructuring of the energy sector in January 2007. When 
Esso, Texaco, and Shell allegedly obstructed the restructuring, Zelaya ordered intervention at 
their facilities. After receiving a formal letter of protest from the US Embassy, he called off 
the intervention (Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013, 527). In December 2008, 
Zelaya decreed a controversial and significant increase in minimum wage, bringing him into 
conflict with business elites who ardently opposed the measure.  
Partisan Powers 
In all four of these countries, presidents faced important constraints on their partisan 
powers, which meant that the legislative route was unlikely to be successful without 
significant compromise. Table 8 below details the executive‘s partisan control of the 
legislature upon taking office. Three of the four executives – Chávez, Correa, and Morales – 
were initially elected without a comfortable majority in both houses of the legislature. 
Table 8: Legislative Representation of Governing Parties 
    Lower House Upper House 
  Legislative Term # Seats % Seats % 
Venezuela (MVR) 1998-2003 49/189 25.93% 12/48 25.00% 
Ecuador (AP) 2006-2010 0/100 0.00%     
Bolivia (MAS) 2005-2009 72/130 55.38% 12/27 44.44% 
Honduras (PLH) 2005-2010 62/128 48.44%     
Source: (International Parliamentary Union 2013)  
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Morales‘ political movement, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism 
- MAS), won a slight majority of the seats in the lower chamber. Yet, in the Senate, the MAS 
lacked a simple majority, with only 44.44% of the seats. Poder Democrático y Social (Social 
and Democratic Power - PODEMOS) controlled 13 seats in the upper house, one more seat 
than the MAS. PODEMOS is a right-wing and pro-business party that evolved from a 
traditional party led by former president/dictator Hugo Banzer, the Acción Democrática 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action - ADN). The Frente de Unidad Nacional 
(National Unity Front - UN), a center-right party, held one seat in the upper house.  The 
single remaining seat was held by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(Reolutionary Nationalist Movement - MNR) a traditional centrist political party co-founded 
by former presidents Paz Estenssoro and Siles. Therefore, given its strong leftist ideological 
convictions, the MAS did not have suitable coalition partners in the upper house. It is 
important to note that the MAS, itself, is a coalition though not in the traditional sense. It 
brings together diverse social forces - a conglomeration of unions, indigenous groups, social 
movements.  
Likewise, in Honduras, Zelaya fell just short of a simple majority of seats controlled 
by his party, the Partido Liberal de Honduras (Honduran Liberal Party - PLH). However, as 
Zelaya‘s message evolved over time, he actually began to lose the support of his own party. 
By the time he was deciding the best way to implement his agenda his support within the 
legislature had dropped dramatically. The party system in Honduras differs significantly from 
the other cases mentioned here because it has traditionally had two main parties that alternate 
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in power.
105
 While Zelaya's PLH controlled 62 seats in the legislature, the ring-wing Partido 
Nacional de Honduras (Honduran National Party - PNH) controlled 55 seats. Smaller left-
wing and center-left parties held five or fewer seats. At the point when Zelaya developed his 
ambitious agenda, forming a coalitional majority would have been nearly impossible. 
Although adding the seats of leftist or center-left parties would have given him the support he 
needed, members of his own party were disillusioned with his policy switching. Therefore, 
without the support of his own party in the legislature, Zelaya could not hope to cobble 
together a coalition. 
In Venezuela, Chávez controlled only about 25% of seats in the lower and upper 
houses. Typically, elections are held concurrently. However, in 1998, Chávez‘s opposition 
sought to break the momentum he was building through his campaign by holding legislative 
elections one month in advance of presidential elections. Judging from the way that Chávez 
easily won presidential elections a month later, it is likely that the performance of his brand 
new party, the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR), was significantly diminished as 
compared to what it might have been if elections were held concurrently. As a result, this left 
the majority of control to more traditional parties ardently opposed to his radical agenda. 
Moreover, forming a coalition broad enough to control a majority of legislative seats would 
have been difficult for Chávez. He had promised a new way of doing politics, which 
resonated with voters, and the Punto Fijo system (particularly its reinforcement of a broad 
coalition) was thoroughly discredited. Chávez also remained ideologically committed to 
significant political change and refused to compromise with the existing political elite from 
traditional parties. 
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 This has only begun to change very recently; in 2011, there were changes to the rules for political party 
registration that opened up space for new parties, including Xiomara Castro's Partido Libertad y Refundación 
(Liberty and Re-foundation Party - LIBRE), to enter the political arena. 
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In the most extreme case, Correa effectively had no representation from his party, 
Alianza PAIS, because of a deliberate decision to not allow candidates to run in the 
legislative elections the year Correa was elected president. According to Alberto Acosta, a 
founding member of Alianza PAIS, the party leadership thought it through carefully, with 
both a symbolic and pragmatic purpose to their decision.  The Ecuadorian party system has 
very low levels of institutionalization. Though Alianza PAIS considered forming a broader 
coalition with supportive parties in the legislature, they ultimately decided against it. The 
pragmatic concern was avoiding coalition with other parties: 
We were convinced that we would not have a sufficient majority in Congress to 
introduce constitutional reform… For that reason, we proposed not to nominate 
candidates as a political gesture of great ethical strength. But for me, from a 
pragmatic view, PAIS began as and still was a very small movement and we did not 
have enough names for nominations… I am not saying that we couldn‘t have had 
them, but it was difficult to arrive at a list. So we had to make some alliances. We 
made several alliances, especially with the Socialist Party, and the idea was to move 
forward with these groups to have an Assembly. But again, we made the decision, 
that we would not have people of trust (gente de confianza). We will not have a 
sufficient number of legislators. It is preferable if we go to the CA by giving a very 
strong and rigorous signal to the Ecuadorian people that we mean business. And this 
had a positive outcome (interview with Alberto Acosta, 6/11/12). 
 
Thus, the legislative route for reform was infeasible in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Honduras because presidents were constrained in terms of partisan powers. They faced 
legislatures that were hostile to their reform agendas and, especially in the first three cases, 
and that were full of members of the traditional parties targeted by the presidents‘ rhetoric. 
This precluded the idea of passing ambitious – and often contentious – reform through the 
legislature or forming a coalition that would have required compromise on their agendas. 
Constitutional Powers 
These executives also faced constraints on the legal use of decree powers. DDA in all 
four cases is subject to the approval of Congress. Moreover, with the exception of Honduras, 
149 
 
the executive was constrained by an explicitly limited timeframe for the use of delegated 
authority. In Ecuador and Honduras, Congress also had oversight over the executive‘s use of 
CDA. In Venezuela and Bolivia, Congress did not have clear oversight power, but CDA was 
limited to economic and financial matters in Venezuela and could not abrogate or define 
rights in Bolivia.  
Table 9: Decree Power in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Venezuela 
Constitution Delegated Decree Authority Constitutional Decree Authority 
Bolivia 
(1967) 
Art 111-115: in the case of a 
national emergency, Congress 
may authorize the president to 
issue decrees that carry the full 
force of law, for a maximum of 
90 days. 
Art 96: can issue decrees and 
orders, without solely defining 
rights, altering those clearly defined 
by law or contradicting provisions, 
and keeping within the restrictions 
contained in the Constitution 
Ecuador 
(1998) 
Art 180-182: can declare a state 
of emergency under certain 
conditions, approved by 
Congress, for a maximum of 60 
days 
Art. 155: can send urgent bills on 
matters of the economy; Congress 
must respond in 30 days 
Honduras 
(1982) 
Art 245: can restrict or suspend 
the exercise of rights in 
agreement with the Council of 
Ministers subject to that 
established in this Constitution 
Art 205: Congress can ratify, 
modify, or disapprove the 
restriction or suspension dictated 
by the executive in agreement 
with the law. 
Art 245: can issue directives, 
decrees, regulations, resolutions 
according to the  
Law; 
Art 208: Congress receives 
executive decrees issued in the last 
ten session days of Congress to be 
properly approved; 
Venezuela 
(1961) 
Art 240-244: can declare a state 
of emergency, with the approval 
of Congress within 10 days, and 
for a maximum of 90 days; can 
be revoked by Congress at any 
time. 
Art 190: can dictate extraordinary 
measures in economic or financial 
matters when required by the public 
interest and as authorized by a 
special law 
Source: Political Database of the Americas, 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/constudies.html (accessed: 12/1/13) 
 
As can be seen in Table 9 above, all four were endowed with broad delegated and 
constitutional decree powers by the existing constitutions. However, there were important 
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limits placed on these powers that prevented their legal use, especially given the extent of 
their ambitious reform agendas. 
Constitutional Reform 
In all cases, the scope of the executive's reform agenda required constitutional reform. 
However, partial constitutional reform, like the legislative route, was an equally unlikely 
scenario for passing their agendas. In the case of Chávez, Morales, and Correa, the scope of 
their reform agendas was simply too broad to be implemented without a full replacement of 
the constitution. Moreover, even where the agenda could have plausibly been implemented 
through partial constitutional reform, as in Honduras, this would have required building two-
thirds majority support within the Congress. Here executives were highly constrained. As 
shown in Table 1, the lack of partisan support in the legislature also meant that it was 
extremely difficult if not impossible to accomplish partial constitutional reform in most of 
these cases. Even though Morales controlled a bare majority in the lower house, his lack of 
an amenable two-thirds majority made partial constitutional reforms impossible. 
Bending the Institutionalized Rules 
All three presidents previously displayed some willingness to bend or break the 
institutionalized rules. In Venezuela, Chávez entered the political scene with a failed coup 
against Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992. He and other coup leaders "seriously misjudged the 
international environment and citizen attitudes. They appeared to have confused popular 
discontent toward President Pérez and the existing party system... with lack of support for 
democracy" (Baburkin et al. 1999, 149 as cited in Sylvia and Danopoulos 2003, 66).  In some 
sense, it was surprising that Chávez decided later to play by the rules of the game and run for 
office. However, he carefully crafted a base of popular support that would allow him to have 
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more success in that arena. The outcome of the 1998 elections was somewhat paradoxical 
with "the selection of a former antidemocratic leader by democratic means" (Canache 2002, 
71).  
Though Correa did not have Chávez's military or coup-leader background, his 
campaign was equally aggressive in tone and threatened the political establishment. His 
campaign slogans were "supposed to evoke how Correa would smack down the traditional 
political elite," including 'Se viene el correazo' (Here comes a whipping) - a play on Correa's 
name - and 'Dale, Correa' (Hit 'em, Correa) (de la Torre 2010, 181). During the campaign, 
Correa referred to the Ecuadorean Congress as a 'sewer' and, refusing to run candidates for 
legislative office, he vowed to close the institution in the process of rewriting the 
constitution.
106
 Correa could look to the experience of Alfredo Palacio, who tried to push 
partial constitutional reform through the legislature, following the procedure in the existing 
1998 Constitution. However, time and time again, Palacio found himself blocked by the 
dominant opposition parties. Thus, even before the elections, Correa calculated that his 
chances for legislative success were very low. If he failed to win a two-thirds majority in the 
elections - a likely scenario - then he could anticipate a very difficult path to reform via the 
legislature. Thus, he opted to not even run candidates, strengthening his image as the outsider 
politician who would break with the corrupt practices of the partidocracia, or traditional 
party establishment. 
In Bolivia, Morales did not need a willingness to bend or break existing institutions in 
order to initiate reform via CA, but this was an important part of seeing the process through 
to completion. A legal mechanism for convoking the CA had been added to the Constitution 
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 Hayes, Monte. "Correa Favored in Ecuadorian Elections." The Associated Press. October 14, 2006. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/14/AR2006101400300.html (Accessed: 
3/17/14). 
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in 2004, prior to Morales' run for office. Still, early on during the CA process itself, Morales 
and the MAS proved both willing and able to bend existing institutions in order to 
accomplish their reform goals. Like Correa, Morales lacked Chávez's military and coup-
leader background; he was a cocalero activist and union leader who had risen through the 
ranks of the MAS. Yet, in 2003, he helped organize a blockade of La Paz, the capital of 
Bolivia, which prevented the delivery of supplies of basic goods and food  (Farah 2009) and 
helped provoke the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.  
Lastly, Zelaya also proved willing to bend or break existing institutions when he 
refused to heed a number of warnings presented to him by other institutions at the initiation 
of the referendum process. Having the successful example of previous cases of institutional 
innovation in pursuit of a CA probably skewed his own perspective on his chances for 
success. Still he proceeded with plans to hold the referendum having been warned that the 
current constitution laid out no such mechanism. Zelaya showed his concern for the 
legitimacy of the process by revising what would initially be a binding referendum 
(convoked by decree on March 23) into a "national poll" (with a decree revising the previous 
one on May 26). This small but important change in language, just a month before he was 
removed from office, demonstrates that Zelaya was concerned with finding a way to bend 
existing institutions while retaining legitimacy. 
In all of these cases, the architects of these processes of reform believed that their 
actions were justifiable within a democratic context, even if there was no institutionalized 
legal mechanism to support the CA. They grounded themselves on the concept of popular 
sovereignty, reiterating that the people are the highest power and no institutional barrier 
would be placed ahead of the popular clamor for reform. Juan Montaña explained the 
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strategy surrounding the initiation of the process, from the perspective of his involvement in 
Ecuador: ―…a discourse was developed that the CA is not an institutional or legal issue, it is 
an issue of the powers that be, a political issue. Therefore, there cannot be a legal limit to the 
desire or the will of the political expression of the people. This was articulated ... and the 
convocation of the CA was achieved.‖107 Moreover, this view was backed up by legal and 
political theory to which foreign advisors and, subsequently, executives regularly referred. 
For example, Hugo Chávez was heavily influenced by the French Revolution and associated 
political thinkers: "In this way the idea of a CA, which as an idea was just a seedling on 
February 4[, 1992 - the day of the failed coup], grew tall and strong in prison. We deepened 
our analysis of the French Revolution's original concept of a revolutionary constituent power 
- the power of the people" (Guevara 2005, 11–12). And, as discussed below, Colombia over 
1990-91 served as an important precedent. 
When faced with challenges from institutionalized opposition, leaders demonstrated 
concern over preserving legitimacy as much as possible. In Ecuador, Alberto Acosta 
admitted, ―It is true that at some point we were considering dissolving Congress. But this 
would have generated a lot of noise, especially internationally; they would have said it was a 
coup.‖108 Instead, the Ecuadorian Congress was put in an indefinite recess. In practice, it had 
the same effect as closing Congress outright, but there were important nuances that helped 
retain a level of legitimacy. Likewise, Gustavo Larrea explained: ―Dismissing them indicated 
‗Go home, you do not exist;‘ putting them in recess was saying ‗you exist, you are respected, 
but you are legislative recess until... the country decides whether it wants the new 
Constitution or not.‖  If the new Constitution failed to be ratified, then presumably legislators 
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would have returned to their positions. If the new Constitution was ratified, then new 
legislative elections would be held. 
Their concerns were not only for domestic legitimacy but rather about international 
legitimacy in an era of democracy promotion: 
The act of dismissing [Congress] - in terms of having supreme power and a large 
majority of the country in favor of the Assembly - would not have had any domestic 
political effect. The effect it would have had is international. …Congressmen could 
complain – and rightly so - that they were dissolved by a recently installed assembly, 
without a new constitutional-legal framework in force. They were elected 
constitutionally. We are entering into a complex and also unnecessary ‗litmus test.‘ 
Lawyers love this, but politicians do not, because we want to solve problems not to 
create them. This was the reason… so that when [the congressmen] went to complain 
to the OAS or the United Nations, they said ‗Gentlemen, you are on legislative recess. 
Go home and do not cause trouble‘ (Interview with Gustavo Larrea, 6/8/12). 
 
This level of attention to domestic and international perceptions of the process 
demonstrates that executives had no interest in overtly breaking the rules, as they would have 
to do to implement an autogolpe. In fact, they went to great lengths to retain a level of 
democratic legitimacy at the initiation of the CA. 
Diffusion and Chances for Success 
Lastly, a process of regional diffusion clearly influenced the executive‘s calculation 
of the perceived chance that reform via CA would succeed. The case of Colombia in 1991 
stood out as an example of the complete replacement of the constitution through a separately 
elected CA, even though it was not driven directly by the executive. Likewise, a similar 
process took place in Ecuador in 1998, but through a highly constrained constitutional, rather 
than constituent, assembly. Leaders looked to these prior examples in the region, particularly 
Colombia, when planning the implementation of their ambitious agendas. In an interview 
with Marta Harnecker (2002), Hugo Chávez described the influence that the Colombian case 
had on his decision to employ a CA: 
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We discussed how to break with the past, how to overcome this type of democracy 
that only responds to the interests of the oligarchy; how to leave behind corruption. 
We always outright rejected the idea of a traditional military coup or a military 
dictatorship or a military junta. We had very present in our minds what had happened 
in Colombia in the years 1990-1991 when they realized a CA, of course!  It was very 
limited because at the end it was subordinated to the constituted power. It was the 
constituted power that designed the Colombian CA and that set it in motion and, 
because of that, it would not transform the situation because it was prisoner to the 
constituted power (19). 
 
In interviews in Bolivia and Ecuador, those closest to the process from the beginning 
reiterated this. The case of Colombia was a particularly important example for them.
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Groups of international advisers served as a vehicle for transmitting ideas about how to 
overcome the institutional challenges to the process.  They were admittedly from a great 
number of countries, but those who understood the Colombian experience and could advise 
Presidents and members of the CA on the process were particularly important. 
As a result, some of the most influential advisers in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador 
had gotten their start either through participation in Colombia or by following the process 
―with much interest from afar.‖110 Juan Montaña Pinto, now a constitutional lawyer and a 
director in the Centro de Estudios y Difusión del Derecho Constitucional (Center for the 
Study and Diffusion of Constitutional Law) within the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court. The 
story of his professional trajectory illustrates the links between all of these cases and the 
network of legal scholars that was involved in all three cases of constitutional reform. 
Montaña is originally from Colombia and was active in the student movement there, pushing 
for the Colombian constitutional reform in 1990-91. During his post-graduate work in Spain, 
the Venezuelan constitutional reform occurred. When Chávez put out a call to leftist parties 
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and NGOs around the world, asking for assistance and consultants, Montaña was chosen as 
an international advisers to the Chávez government. Montaña described his move to 
Venezuela: ―As I had the double condition of being a lawyer that has experience in public 
administration, was Colombian and more close to the Spanish [legal] world, they brought me 
on to the team that would implement this project.‖111 He spent 2000-2002 in Venezuela 
working on a redesign of the public administration before returning to Colombia. Four years 
later, in early 2006, Montaña came to La Paz, Bolivia to work with President Morales. While 
in La Paz, Rafael Correa visited with a delegation. He was still Minster of Economy at the 
time. Montaña described his interaction with the future President: 
There was a series of lunches, reunions, dinners… during which the Ecuadorian 
delegation suggested… the strategy of launching Correa‘s candidacy for President… 
to generate a CA. My name appeared as someone who had worked on these issues, 
along with the group of Spanish consultants. We returned, all of us, to what we were 
doing and months later, after [Correa] won the presidential elections… in November 
2006, I received a phone call at home inviting me to join the team of the government 
in the construction or design of the CA…  I worked in the government from when 
[Correa] took up the presidency until the moment that the CA started. After this I 
converted into an adviser to the assembly. And when it finished [in 2008], I didn‘t 
return to the presidency but I came here to the [Ecuadorian Constitutional] Court.
112
 
 
Moreover, the team from Spain included legal scholars like Roberto Viciano Pastor 
and Rubén Martínez Dalmau, both professors of Constitutional Law at the University of 
Valencia.  Viciano was active in an advisory role in Bolivia before Morales‘ election, as the 
MAS began to plan how to implement a CA. In Bolivia, Albert Noguera Fernández, a lawyer 
educated in Spain and Cuba, served as an advisor to the Vice Presidency and the CA in 
Bolivia. 
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The presence of international advisors in general, but particularly the team from 
Spain, generated a great deal of public controversy. Roberto Viciano describe the role of the 
media: ―For political reasons… some media outlets tried to present it as if we were making 
the constitution …[This was] an insult to the intelligence of the members of the CA, and this 
also showed the valorization that the media had of their own countrymen… it was something 
absolutely incredible.‖113  
There was also concern in both Ecuador and Bolivia about the influence of 
Venezuela, with some even implying that a pre-written constitution had been brought from 
Venezuela for the CA members to approve. In June 2006, in the lead-up to the CA, the 
Bolivian opposition party PODEMOS ran a radio ad playing on this fear: ―Hugo Chávez is a 
soldier. He came to Bolivia to tell us how to run our CA. He showed a map in 
which Bolivia will form part of his confederation. Now Chávez is sending soldiers to 
Bolivia.‖114 Throughout the process of the CA, these rumors persisted, advanced by 
important members of the opposition. Branko Marinkovic, the President of the Comité Cívico 
de Santa Cruz (Civic Committee of Santa Cruz), maintained that Chávez ―controls the 
Bolivian government and leads it to impose an authoritarian regime similar to that of 
Chávez… [Bolivia has ended up] an appendix of Chávez‘s foreign policy.‖115  
Similarly, in Ecuador, the discourse of the opposition was that Venezuela was 
controlling the process of change in the country. For example, ex-President Lucio Gutiérrez 
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holds Chávez personally responsible for the coup against his government in 2005. Gutiérrez 
has claimed that the forajidos (outlaws) movement that ousted him was not really a 
movement at all, but rather ―an international ideological conspiracy‖ financed by Hugo 
Chávez.  In his own words: ―President Chávez wanted to have a disciple in Ecuador to 
implement a regime like Castro‘s… the socialist model. So I started distancing myself from 
President Chávez because we had two totally different points of view… with Cuban activists 
and members of the FARC, [Chávez] prepared the climate for a coup against the government 
of Lucio Gutierrez.‖116 Once Correa was in office, Gutiérrez publically criticized the 
President‘s ―total devotion‖ to Chávez. While sovereignty was a large part of Correa‘s 
discourse, Gutiérrez claimed that in practice ―…here comes President Chávez and he gives 
orders, he gives provisions in Ecuador, he speaks of what he wants, he meddles in internal 
politics and no one in this government says absolutely anything.‖117  
Venezuela‘s influence in Honduras began in 2008 when Zelaya joined Petrocaribe.  
Facing significant inflation, Zelaya began talks with the IMF in early 2008, but never had to 
sign an agreement because of Venezuelan aid (Corrales 2009, 101). At first the move to join 
Petrocaribe was popular but soon controversy erupted ―when it became clearer that Zelaya 
was using the funds to illegally build a political base, and more gravely, to fund a campaign 
to change the constitution to allow for reelection‖ (Corrales 2009, 108).  Moreover, 
Venezuela played a very concrete and integral role in the fated attempt at holding a 
referendum – printing and delivering the illegal ballots. 
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While those closest to the MAS and Alianza PAIS insisted that the connection to 
Venezuela was overblown,
118
 there were clear ties between the governments that served as a 
mechanism of diffusion of the idea to embark on the CA. For example, several people 
aligned with Alianza PAIS said they had learned important lessons from the early stages of 
the CA in Bolivia, which began before theirs and quickly became bogged down, not finishing 
until after Ecuador‘s new constitution was ratified.119 This convinced leaders in Ecuador that 
suspending Congress was a crucial step in order to avoid compromising the process. 
Moreover, outside of the connections between governing parties, there were grassroots 
interactions as well. Leaders of the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia had 
maintained ties across the region and were in conversation through the lead up to the CA and 
during the CA process itself.
120
 In sum, it is clear that these lines of communication in the 
region made it easier for executives to view the reform path as plausible, even in Ecuador 
and Honduras, where there was no legal precedent, even as they also helped inform specific 
tactics. 
Summary 
For executives in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, the CA was the most 
attractive reform path among all of the available options for pursuing their ambitious 
agendas. All four executives had weak partisan powers, and all with the exception of Zelaya 
had a strong electoral mandate. They were also limited in terms of their constitutional 
powers.  Their agendas, particularly in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, were very 
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ambitious and required significant reforms to the constitution.  In all four cases, the 
institutional context was sufficiently in flux so that it was plausible that executives could 
successfully bend institutionalized rules and get away with it.  However, they also faced a 
democratic imperative and so the outright breaking of rules was out of the question. 
Although it came with great risk where there was no legal precedent, the strategy was 
attractive for two reasons. It offered executives a route to implement agendas with potentially 
little interference from the opposition. They could also retain a basic level of democratic 
legitimacy at the same time. Lastly, a process of diffusion clearly played a role in each 
executive's calculations of their chances for success. The successful example of Venezuela, 
the role of advisors in transmitting technical ideas for achieving reform via CA, as well as the 
Venezuelan financial support offered to Correa, Morales, and Zelaya contributed to the 
decision to pursue a CA.  
Conclusion 
Reviewing cases from Latin America since the return to democracy, it is clear that 
executives with ambitious reform agendas have a number of important considerations when 
choosing a reform path. This chapter has proceeded inductively in an attempt to generate a 
clear conceptual framework that will clarify executive decisions over how to implement 
ambitious reforms. My main focus has been the decision is to pursue a CA; however, this 
framework can potentially be extended in the future to illuminate decisions over other 
innovative strategies for reform. Making a series of comparisons to other paths of reform has 
allowed me to draw out the constraints and motivations faced by executives with an 
ambitious agenda. Their decision is generally driven by: the strength of their partisan and 
constitutional powers, especially as compared to their electoral mandate; the scope of their 
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ambitious agenda and whether it requires reform of the constitution; the institutional context 
and their will to bend existing institutional rules; and the diffusion of new ideas about 
mechanisms for reform. 
Table 10: Case Studies of Executives with Ambitious Reform Agendas 
Reform Path Country President Time Period 
Legislative Route Brazil Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 2002-2011 
Legal Decrees Venezuela Rafael Caldera  1994-1996 
Partial Constitutional Reform Argentina Carlos Menem 1994 
Future Legal Path Ecuador Alfredo Palacio 2005-2007 
Abuse of Decrees Brazil Fernando Collor de Mello 1990-1992 
Judicial Override Nicaragua Daniel Ortega 2009 
Constituent Assembly 
Venezuela Hugo Chávez 1998-1999 
Ecuador Rafael Correa 2007-2008 
Bolivia Evo Morales 2006-2009 
Honduras Manuel Zelaya 2009 
Autogolpe Guatemala Jorge Serrano Elías 1993 
 
Considering the cases discussed above and summarized in Table 10, executives who 
were unwilling to bend the institutional democratic rules chose the legislative route, legal 
decrees, partial constitutional reform, or laying the groundwork for a future legal path. It is 
not only will, but also capacity, that enters the equation. Executives prefer to enact reform 
through established legal mechanisms when possible because of their concern with 
legitimacy. In the case of Menem, he was willing to bend the rules - and proved so through 
the rampant abuse of decrees - but when it came to partial constitutional reform he had 
sufficient leverage over the UCR so that he did not need to step outside of institutionalized 
mechanisms for reform. Others clearly recognized bending the institutionalized rules as 
necessary for achieving their preferred reforms but refused to do so, preferring instead to lay 
the groundwork for future executives.  
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Those executives who deemed it necessary and were also willing to bend the rules 
have additional options: abusing decrees, overriding the judiciary, pursuing a CA. These 
strategies for reform allow for greater marginalization of any opposition to the reform agenda 
and, in certain cases, allow the executive to act unilaterally or to capitalize off of widespread 
popular support for their reforms. They also walk a fine line between democratic and non-
democratic mechanisms for reform, depending upon the severity of the abuse of decrees, the 
amount of pressure placed on the judiciary, and the extent to which there is a legal precedent 
for the CA. These options may allow the executive to retain a degree of democratic 
legitimacy, both domestically as well as internationally, than implementing an outright coup. 
However, the last option, closing other institutions in an autogolpe, is very clearly autocratic 
and necessarily results in a loss of legitimacy both domestically and abroad. Since 1978, but 
particularly after the end of the cold war, the international political system has had concrete 
effects on regime change (Levitsky and Way 2006). Historically, Latin American executives 
have been linked closely with the west - economically, politically, diplomatically and 
socially. Likewise, the leverage of the United States has also been high in this region. Even 
in the cases considered here, where executives have increasingly oriented their foreign policy 
toward trying to distance themselves from the United States, they remain tied in important 
ways. The executives considered here face a democratic imperative and thus are highly 
concerned with perceptions of legitimacy; therefore, they are less likely to engage in 
strategies that are perceived as autocratic (such as the autogolpe). 
At the same time, these executives are not risk-adverse. As shown above, their 
calculation regarding their own chances for success clearly enters in their decision to pursue 
a CA but they are willing to take some risk to advance an ambitious agenda. Even where they 
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perceive a good chance of success, in a process with many moving parts, executives are 
certainly capable of miscalculation. They may be overly confident in their ability to achieve 
success through reform via CA. The next chapter moves beyond the decision to undertake 
this innovative strategy for reform to examine the specific factors that determine the success 
of the CA process, where success is defined as the executive's ability to retain control over 
the process and hence the outcome of reform. 
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CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS OF CA REFORMS 
Chávez wants a constitutional congress referendum on the December ballot.  
Responding to charges that his desire to dissolve the Congress and establish a 
Constitutional Assembly to rewrite the Constitution is ‗anti-democratic,‘ former 
coupster Hugo Chávez says, ‗let the people decide.‘ He noted, ‗If the people say yes 
to the Constitutional Assembly, there is no need to elect a Congress; instead we 
would be able to begin the new government calling for elections for the Constituyente 
[sic].‘ Chávez knows his suggestion will not prosper.  The Venezuelan Constitution 
makes no allowance for referenda – either binding or non-binding – and Congress 
would not agree to its own demise. Nevertheless, Chávez wants to underscore what 
has become his central campaign message: he represents dramatic and systemic 
change. (American Embassy in Caracas 1998) 
Introduction 
Attempts at reform via Constituent Assembly (CA) reflect major shifts in state-
society relations and have dramatic consequences everywhere they occur, even when they 
fail. Successful reforms may have the potential to generate massive change but also 
considerable opposition and conflict. In recent years, popular ‗outsider‘ politicians such as 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador have 
advanced an ambitious reform agenda through a CA, opening new avenues for the continued 
implementation of reform. Yet, when President Manuel Zelaya proposed a similar reform 
process in Honduras in 2009, the Supreme Court and Congress removed him from office and 
the military exiled him. Across these cases, crucial differences in the relations between the 
executive, the broader population, and other institutions of the state have determined the 
extent to which each project has been effective. 
Most broadly, how do presidents with ambitious reform agendas successfully 
implement them in a democratic context? Scholars have identified a menu of options 
available to executives (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005; Amorim Neto 2006). They can 
make use of a legislative majority to enact reform through standard legislative channels. Or, 
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in the absence of a majority, presidents have three major options. They can moderate and 
build a coalition with other parties in Congress (Brazil under Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, 2003-
2011). They can live with stalemate and bypass Congress through other institutions, by using 
executive decree power or forging alliances with the judiciary (Nicaragua under Daniel 
Ortega, 2007-present). Or, they can marginalize Congress in a process centered on citizen 
participation and reform of the Constitution, with the aim of producing a new Congress with 
a supportive majority (Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, 1998-2013, Ecuador under Rafael 
Correa, 2007-present, and Bolivia under Evo Morales, 2006-present). I focus on this last 
strategy because, when these dramatic processes of reform are successful, they drastically 
alter the landscape of political power within contemporary democracy.
121
 
The central question that I examine here is: when a president with an ambitious 
reform agenda chooses to reform via a CA, what factors will determine the success of such 
an attempt? A reform agenda is ‗ambitious‘ if it aims to redistribute power in the political 
system between elites and masses. I define ‗success‘ as the degree to which the president can 
control the CA process and hence the outcome of reform. I focus on the process of reforming 
the constitution rather than the outcome.
122
 In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, reform via 
CA has unfolded through a similar sequence of events and, as will be discussed below, 
within comparable sociopolitical contexts. Presidents campaigning on sweeping 
constitutional reform were elected without the comfortable majority in Congress necessary to 
carry out their promises. These presidents called a referendum and encouraged citizens to 
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menu of options available.  For now, I take this choice as a given, focusing on the internal dynamics of the 
reform process. 
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 For an example of process-oriented analysis of earlier constitutional reforms in the Andean region, see 
Renato Segura and Ana María Bejarano (2004). 
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vote ‗yes‘ to establish a CA to rewrite the Constitution, even though this action was not 
explicitly allowed under the current Constitution. These presidents then pressured the 
Supreme Court or Electoral Council to allow this line of action and to entrust the CA with 
supreme powers (plenos poderes) to change the political system.
123
 In contrast with their 
party‘s performance in previously-held congressional elections, presidents were able to gain 
a majority of seats in the CA. Eventually, the CA temporarily closed or marginalized the 
Congress, where the president lacked a majority, and held early legislative elections. 
I hypothesize that two factors jointly determine success. A president must have 
mobilizational leverage, or the ability to rally popular support behind the reform agenda, and 
institutional leverage. The latter is the capacity to persuade the judiciary or electoral council 
to allow a referendum to form a CA, and the ability to keep the Congress or, in extreme 
cases, the military from intervening in the process. Executives weigh the options for reform, 
taking into account the relative chances of success and the degree of risk worth taking before 
pursuing a CA. In the beginning stage, the outcome of a CA process is highly uncertain. As I 
will discuss later, presidents may be able to take certain actions to increase their 
mobilizational and institutional leverage, thus improving their chances of success. 
By tracing the variations in executive strategy and strength across four cases, I 
provide an analysis of the crucial moments in executive-driven processes of ambitious 
reform. Moreover, the conclusions that emerge from this analysis have the potential to 
resonate across other countries in the region as well as beyond Latin America in other 
presidential systems. By identifying the key political actors and observable outcomes of this 
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167 
 
type of reform, I highlight the interplay of leadership, popular mobilization, and institutions 
in flux. In a world where constructing a democratic image has become an imperative for 
leaders, we need to understand these reform processes, which may enhance one of 
democracy‘s pillars (citizen participation and popular legitimacy) while undermining another 
(the elected Congress and other institutional checks on executive power). The successful 
cases analyzed here have been followed by continued attempts at dramatic socio-political and 
institutional change in Latin America. In 2013, calls for a CA were made in three separate 
Latin American cases.  In Honduras, Xiomara Castro narrowly lost the November elections 
with a CA as the cornerstone of her campaign. In Chile, Marco Enríquez-Ominami based his 
campaign on reform of the constitution via CA, though he came in third place with only 
10.99% of the vote in the first round.
124
 Lastly, several legislators in Guatemala made similar 
calls for reform. 
This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I describe the theoretical importance of 
mobilizational and institutional leverage for the success of the CA process and the 
conceptualization and measurement of these factors. The next section supports my 
hypotheses about mobilizational and institutional leverage with case evidence from: 
Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2007), Bolivia (2008), and Honduras (2009). I demonstrate how 
these factors are jointly necessary and sufficient for success. The final section concludes by 
considering an alternate explanation for success and suggesting avenues for future research. 
Conceptual Framework & Measurement 
What factors ultimately determine the success of a CA process? Is there anything that 
a president can do to improve the chances of success? I define success as the degree to which 
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a president can control the CA process, the reform outcome, and future reforms. Ambitious 
reforms will need to be implemented over time, in drawn out processes of change. The new 
constitutions were envisioned by their promoters as only the beginning of a process of 
structural reform of the state in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
125
  The definition of 
success that I employ here takes this into account while also recognizing key moments when 
the process of reform could have gotten ―stuck‖ or derailed. It is based on the President‘s 
prospects for continuing to implement his or her desired reforms in the future. Hence, I 
operationalize success through the President‘s ability to: maintain office through the 
ratification of the new constitution and through the end of his or her term; secure a legislative 
majority in the next legislative elections; and win reelection in the next presidential elections 
if he or she is running.  Complete success would be a president who had complete control of 
the process, did not have to compromise on any of the components of reform, and was able to 
consolidate sufficient power to continue reforms in the future. I conceptualize success as 
continuous, and so I consider the degree to which presidents need to negotiate during the 
process and the extent of powers consolidated after it. Complete failure would involve early 
removal from office through either legal or extra-legal means. Presidents are only likely to 
pursue reform via CA if they believe they might succeed at implementing their ambitious 
reform agenda through this process.  Given this, is failure even possible? It is, because 
presidents may either miscalculate their odds of success or they may be so committed to 
implementing their agenda that they are willing to take an extreme risk. Especially where no 
legal precedent exists, reform via CA can be a very high risk strategy, but it also offers a 
potentially large reward.  
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who insisted that the Revolution was still in progress, three or four years after the passage of the new 
constitution (2008 in Ecuador and 2009 in Bolivia). 
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Figure 6: Conceptual Framework for Success of the CA 
 
My argument about the determinants of success is laid out in Figure 6 above. I 
hypothesize that the executive needs both mobilizational and institutional leverage for 
success. The first factor, mobilizational leverage, is a sufficient degree of popular support 
among citizens and the ability to mobilize popular sectors or civil society groups in support 
of the president‘s ambitious reform agenda. This is important for several reasons. First, 
reform via a CA is typically initiated through a referendum.
126
 If there is insufficient popular 
support for the president‘s agenda, that being anything less than a majority of voters, the 
referendum will fail and the reform process will never begin. Should the referendum pass, the 
president will need to retain sufficient levels of popular support for the agenda to fill the CA 
with the president‘s party, alliance, or movement in popular elections. Depending on voting 
rules within the assembly, the president‘s party or movement must control a simple or two-
thirds majority of seats within the CA to ensure a favorable outcome. 
Yet, as Figure 6 above demonstrates, mobilizational leverage is insufficient for 
success. The president also needs institutional leverage, or the ability to convince Congress, 
the judiciary, and/or an electoral council to allow the formation of a CA and to allow the 
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170 
 
process to move forward to completion. This is true regardless of whether or not there is a 
legal precedent in the existing constitution to convoke a CA. Executives without an explicitly 
legal path to the CA have typically overcome the issue by invoking the constituent power 
through a referendum.  Such action requires the support of the Electoral Council, in allowing 
the referendum to take place, and also the support of the judiciary if the process is questioned 
in court.  Moreover, where there is an explicitly legal path to the CA, the legally-prescribed 
mechanism for its convocation is often the approval of a supermajority in Congress. In these 
cases, institutional conflict might occur, especially if presidents lack a significant legislative 
majority (Linz 1990; O‘Donnell 1998; Pérez-Liñán 2007).   The path to initiate the CA may 
be quite fraught with complications, as in Ecuador for example.  
However, beyond initiation of the CA, institutional threats may present themselves 
throughout the process of drafting a new constitution and threaten its successful completion. 
If the military is not in agreement or at least tolerance of reform, it may choose to intervene 
in an effort to prevent success.  Military intervention is theoretically a threat, even though it 
has become less common as the international community condemns such actions (Pérez-
Liñán 2005). Likewise, even where the path to the CA was straightforward (Bolivia), the 
actual process of reforming the constitution may prove much more difficult if opposition 
institutions (like the Congress) operate simultaneously alongside of the CA. Therefore, 
institutional leverage is necessary throughout the reform process. Executives in all three 
successful cases have demonstrated an incredible degree of ingenuity in overcoming such 
potential roadblocks to these reform processes. 
As with mobilizational leverage, institutional leverage is also insufficient for success 
but these two variables jointly determine success. They are not independent but rather 
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crucially interrelated. Mobilizational leverage may be used to bolster institutional leverage, 
and vice versa. If the president can demonstrate to existing institutions that there is a high 
degree of popular support for his or her agenda, then institutions may be more likely to ―get 
on board‖ rather than oppose the president. Likewise, if the president has substantial 
institutional leverage and can demonstrate this to the public, then people may be more likely 
to mobilize in support of his or her agenda because it seems plausible and realistic. 
Institutional support also lends legitimacy, in that it gives the public, and perhaps even more 
importantly the international community, the impression that the process will preserve the 
democratic nature of the state.
127
 
I operationalize the two distinct types of leverage by examining a number of factors 
that jointly compose each one (Table 11 below). I measure mobilizational leverage in each of 
these cases through the presence of: presidential popularity, formal electoral mobilization, 
and informal protest mobilization. I measure institutional leverage, or control of other 
institutions of the state, through factors which are exogenous to the outcome, success of the 
reform. I consider the independence of the judiciary and electoral council, the number of 
seats the executive controls in congress, and the military‘s relationship with both the 
executive and the opposition, as well as its tendency to intervene in politics over time. 
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 While natural resource wealth may give presidents room to maneuver (Weyland 2009, 146), and make them 
less concerned with negative reputational costs (Campello 2011, 186), it is unclear that natural resource wealth 
is driving the success of the phenomenon considered here. Hugo Chávez was elected in 1998, when the price of 
a barrel of crude oil was at a 25-year low, and the price remained low throughout the CA process (BP 2010). It 
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process in Venezuela missed the oil boom by about four years. While other cases of constitutional reform via 
CA in Ecuador and Bolivia may have benefitted from the insulation of high oil prices, Venezuela did not. 
Hence, oil wealth is not necessary for success. 
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Table 11: Component Measures of High Mobilizational and Institutional Leverage 
MOBILIZATIONAL LEVERAGE 
Presidential Popularity President elected with over 50% of the vote; 
maintains over 50% approval ratings 
Formal Mobilization Referenda to establish a CA and to ratify the 
Constitution pass with over 50% of the vote; simple 
or 2/3 partisan majority won in election for the 
CA
128 
Informal Mobilization Protests and rallies; top-down vs. bottom up 
organization of civil society 
INSTITUTIONAL LEVERAGE 
Judiciary/Electoral Council Independence  Score less than 0.5, from 0 (low) to 1 (high) 
Partisan Control of Congress  Simple majority/coalitional majority 
Military’s Relationship with the Executive 
 Progressive vs. conservative historically and 
whether deferential to civilian executive authority 
 
I also consider three contextual variables that help determine the initial levels of 
mobilizational and institutional leverage: a context of crisis, respect for institutions, and the 
nature of civil society organization. They are structural variables outside of the control of the 
executive.
129
 First, Presidents may have mobilizational leverage and institutional leverage 
around the topic of reform in contexts of socio-economic and political-institutional crisis. 
Where it has occurred, the CA was born out of decades of socioeconomic conflict and 
political crisis which led to widespread disillusionment, the hollowing out of the social 
contract, the weakening if not collapse of leading political parties, and calls for meaningful 
reform in these countries (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro 2006). 
In addition to a context of crisis, the level of democracy and the extent to which 
existing institutions of democracy are respected may also condition initial levels of 
mobilizational and institutional leverage. If there is a high level of democracy and its 
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society, change in any of these areas would be time-consuming and slow. In the short-term they are relatively 
fixed. 
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institutions are well-respected, then it will be difficult to mobilize support around an 
ambitious agenda that requires the bending of institutionalized rules. Likewise, existing 
institutions will be more likely to pose a counterpoint to the executive. The executive does 
not necessarily control respect for democracy, but he or she can alter the ambitious agenda 
accordingly. In a context of political or economic crisis, a stridently anti-institutional agenda 
may help the president to mobilize popular support (Doyle 2011).
130
 For example, a president 
who runs on a platform of protecting the status quo would have a hard time subsequently 
generating popular support for a transformative project.
131
 An anti-institutional agenda may 
also help bolster institutional leverage by communicating concrete threats and intimidating 
existing institutions. The timing of the development of an anti-institutional agenda is also 
important. Those who campaign on such an agenda may see an increase in their perceived 
credibility and commitment to the reform process. At the same time, those who try to 
develop such an agenda later, once in office, may find that they are viewed as opportunistic 
or insincere. Thus, there are certain contexts in which mobilizational and institutional 
leverage are very low to begin with and strategies for increasing these factors may be less 
viable for some presidents. 
Related to the level of democracy, another important contextual variable is the 
strength and degree of independence of civil society. If civil society is weak, then it should 
have little impact (positive or negative) on the president‘s mobilizational leverage; social 
movements and civil society will only be useful for the executive in mobilizing the 
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 Take, for example, the experiences of presidents who campaigned against implementing the IMF‗s policies 
and then, once in office, were forced to change course and implement these very same policies. With a few 
important exceptions (see Stokes 2001), this typically resulted in a dramatic loss of popular support for the 
president. 
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population to the extent that they are well-organized and either dependent/co-opted. If civil 
society is strong then it has the potential to affect the success of the CA process. When civil 
society is independent, there can be ‗societal accountability;‖ these mechanisms of control 
―can activate the operation of horizontal mechanisms. Social mobilization around particular 
demands, media coverage and investigations, and the initiation of proceedings in oversight or 
judicial agencies put corrupt politicians at risk of losing their reputations or even of being 
taken to court‖ (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti 2000, 152).  This will reduce both the executive‘s 
mobilizational and institutional leverage. Independent social movements might even mobilize 
against the executive‘s agenda, if they are unsatisfied.  
Nevertheless, when social movements are not independent, social mobilization in 
support of the president‘s agenda may put pressure on existing institutions to allow reform 
processes to move forward, even if they are not explicitly allowable according to the law. 
Therefore, a co-opted but extensive civil society will increase both the executive‘s 
mobilizational and institutional leverage, as he or she is able to count on the support of loyal 
social movements and use this to pressure institutions. 
Methodology & Case Selection 
Reform via CA is an institutional innovation that reflects important shifts in relations 
between civil society and the state, as well as within the state. It has had dramatic 
consequences in all of the political systems where it has been attempted, even where it has 
failed. In Peru, candidate Ollanta Humala campaigned in the 2006 presidential elections on 
the idea of establishing a CA. He subsequently lost, with many considering him too closely 
aligned with Chávez and worrying that he might proceed with a similar process (McClintock 
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2006, 104).
132
 In Honduras, President Manuel Zelaya insisted on holding a referendum to 
initiate this process, which resulted in his dramatic removal from office. Where it has 
succeeded, reform via a CA has had important consequences for democracy impacting both 
participation and contestation. 
Reform via CA is a rare occurrence. With only a very small number of observations 
of the phenomenon of interest, it would be impossible to establish a primarily quantitative 
test of a theory about this type of reform. However, as in other rare events such as 
revolutions, wars, or coups, it is still important to understand the causes and consequences of 
reform through a CA. Likewise, observations are not likely to be entirely independent. 
Diffusion effects have clearly been at work in the region with respect to this type of reform 
as previous literature (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009, 113) and my own interviews in 
Ecuador and Bolivia confirmed. The original idea for this strategy of circumventing 
Congress emerged from observation of the case of Colombia in 1991 (Harnecker 2002, 19). 
Chávez attempted this process in Venezuela a full ten years prior to Zelaya in Honduras, and 
it is clear that not only have presidents learned from prior attempts but so has the opposition. 
Hence, diffusion effects are an integral component of my theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon.  
In terms of scope conditions, as I am interested in how presidents pursue an ambitious 
reform agenda, I only consider actual CA processes that: (1) were initiated by a president, 
through at least the scheduling of a referendum to consider the establishment of a CA or 
taking any subsequent step toward the election of CA members; (2) occurring during periods 
of regime continuity; and (3) have supreme power to change the political system. Within 
Latin America, three successful cases of reform via a CA fall within the scope of these 
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 Andrés Manuel López Obrador had a similar experience, losing the 2006 presidential elections in Mexico. 
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conditions: Venezuela in 1999, Ecuador in 2007, and Bolivia in 2008. Moreover, I consider 
Honduras (2009) as a negative case. First, the referendum to initiate the CA process was 
proposed by the executive, Manuel Zelaya. Secondly, Honduras was not undergoing a regime 
transition at the time of the attempt.  Lastly, although the attempt to reform via CA failed 
before it could ever be granted supreme power, the opposition in Honduras felt that Zelaya‘s 
intention was to ―repeat in Honduras what had taken place in other countries, such as 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, greatly influenced by Hugo Chávez‖ (Freitas 2010, 157). 
Case Evidence 
In this section, I trace the influence of the disaggregated components of 
mobilizational and institutional leverage in the CA processes of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Honduras. I consider the effect of these two variables on success at four crucial points in 
the CA process: (1) the election of the president; (2) the referendum to establish a CA and 
elections to fill the body; (3) the drafting of the Constitution; and (4) the ratification of the 
Constitution.
133
 These are distinct phases of the legal process of reform during which 
executives face different threats to their ambitious reform agendas. Each of these phases 
poses the potential for failure. Following the process chronologically allows me to emphasize 
within-case variation, identifying the crucial moments where mobilizational and institutional 
leverage, individually or in conjunction, affected the overall success of reform. I also make 
comparisons across cases at similar points in the process, drawing out important cross-
sectional variation. Table 12 below displays the variation on these two independent variables 
(and each of their component parts) across cases. It also displays variation on the outcome 
variable. 
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 In the case of Honduras, the process failed during the second phase, when Zelaya tried to hold a referendum 
to establish a Constituent Assembly. Therefore, I only trace that case through its failure in the second phase. 
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Table 12: Case Evidence of the Determinants of Success 
  Venezuela 
(1999) 
Ecuador 
(2008) 
Bolivia 
(2009) 
Honduras 
(2009) 
Mobilizational Leverage High High Mixed Low 
Presidential Popularity High High High Mixed 
Formal Mobilization High High High Low 
Informal Mobilization 
CS weak but 
coopted 
CS independent 
but weak 
CS strong but 
independent 
Low 
Institutional Leverage High High Mixed Low 
Control over 
Judiciary/Electoral Council 
High High Legal path Low 
Partisan Control of 
Congress, and whether 
closed? 
Low, closed Low, closed Mixed, open Mixed, open 
Military’s Relationship with 
Executive, passive/active 
orientation 
Close, 
Passive 
Close, 
Passive 
Close, 
Passive 
Not close, 
Active 
Success Yes Yes Yes, with 
limitations 
No 
 
In Venezuela and Ecuador, reform was highly successful because executives used 
their institutional and mobilization leverage to advance promised reforms, remain in office, 
control the reform process, and consolidate the power necessary for continuing reform in the 
future. In Bolivia, the success of reform was limited in key ways. Though Evo Morales was 
capable of advancing proposed reforms and remaining in office, there were important ways 
that he failed to control the CA process itself. This was largely linked to the fact that he faced 
a strong and relatively independent civil society that made demands about the outcomes of 
the CA reform. Likewise, he faced institutionalized opposition because Congress remained 
open and functioning alongside of the CA throughout the process. Honduras is a case of 
complete and dramatic failure. Manuel Zelaya failed to initiate the CA process and was 
removed from office as a result of the attempt.  He was limited along a number of 
dimensions, as illustrated in Table 12 above and as shall be demonstrated in more detail 
below. 
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Presidential and Legislative Elections 
The first step toward advancing an ambitious agenda is for the prospective executive 
to win presidential elections. Without obtaining office, it would be impossible to affect 
sweeping institutional change through non-violent and democratic means.
134
 In Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador, executives campaigned specifically on establishing a CA to drastically 
restructure the political system and dynamics of power within these countries, making a 
credible commitment to reform. All four countries had relatively low levels of democracy 
and support for democratic institutions at the executive‘s election to office. Three-year 
averages of political rights and civil liberties scores before the process was initiated indicate 
that all of these countries were ―partly free‖ (Freedom House 2013).135  In light of this, an 
anti-institutional agenda could function better than if the country had a well-institutionalized 
democracy. In practice, Chávez, Morales, and Correa were able to use an anti-institutional 
agenda to mobilize voters to obtain office with a majority of the vote, as can be seen in  
 
Table 13 below. In Honduras, by contrast, Zelaya was much slower to develop an 
ambitious reform agenda; it was not until his last year in office that he began calling for 
reform via CA (Ruhl 2010; Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013). This dramatically 
hindered his ability to mobilize popular support and, as will be discussed in the subsequent 
section, it limited his influence on opposition-dominated institutions. 
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 The 2006 presidential candidacies of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico and Ollanta Humala in Peru 
are examples of failed campaigns on this type of reform. 
 
135
 Political rights ratings are composed of: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and 
functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are composed of: freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. These two 
ratings are averaged to produce an overall status of: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0-5.0) or Not Free (5.5 to 
7.0). For more details, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2013/methodology#.UtbfffRDvXs (accessed: 10/1/13). 
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Table 13: Presidential Election Results 
President Country Date Round % Vote 
Hugo Chávez Venezuela 6-Dec-98 1 56.20 
Rafael Correa Ecuador 26-Nov-06 2 56.67 
Evo Morales Bolivia 18-Dec-05 1 53.70 
Manuel Zelaya Honduras 27-Nov-05 1 49.90 
Sources: IPU Parline, except in the case of Venezuela: www.cne.gov.ve 
 
To win office with a majority was most extraordinary in Bolivia. In 2002 and 1997, 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Hugo Banzer were respectively elected with only about 
23% of the vote (Nohlen 2005). In Venezuela, Rafael Caldera was elected in 1993 with only 
30.5% of the vote, although Carlos Andrés Pérez and Jaime Lusinchi were elected in 1988 
and 1983 respectively with over 50% over the vote in the first round (Nohlen 2005). In 
Ecuador and Honduras, executives routinely win election with a majority.  In Honduras, the 
party system has two strong parties that tend to generate these results, with presidents in 1997 
and 2001 winning with over 50% of the vote (Nohlen 2005). In light of this, it is even more 
significant that Zelaya was shy of a majority.  In Ecuador, the electoral rules stipulate a 
second round run-off if a large enough portion of the vote is not gained in the first round.
136
 
Correa ultimately won a majority because of the second round run-off; he had only 22.8% of 
the vote in the first round. 
Hugo Chávez, a political outsider, won Venezuela‘s 1998 elections with 56.20% of 
the vote in a single round.
137
  Three conditions set the stage for his dramatic victory: an 
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 In Venezuela and Honduras, electoral rules for the presidency stipulate that the winner will have the most 
votes, even if this is only a plurality. In Bolivia and Ecuador, the executive must win a minimum of 40% of the 
valid votes with a minimum margin of 10% with respect to the second place candidate. In the events where no 
candidate achieves this, Bolivia defers selection to Congress while Ecuador holds a second round runoff 
between the two candidates with most votes (Political Database of the Americas 2013). 
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 Miguel Carreras (forthcoming ) defines outsiders as ―candidates who (a) have not had a previous career in 
politics or public administration when the campaign starts and/or (b) participate in the elections as political 
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economic crisis, an ideological backlash against neoliberalism, and the discrediting of 
traditional parties. In the 1980s and 1990s, the country experienced a marked economic 
downturn. Oil revenues plummeted and Venezuela accumulated a substantial foreign debt 
(McCoy 1999, 64). Poverty grew dramatically, leading to the growth of shantytowns 
surrounding the capital city, Caracas. In 1996, inflation had reached 8% per month (Weyland 
2003, 826). Two years later, the average price of a barrel of oil had slid to a 30-year low, 
approximately $15 USD (BP 2010). A second development leading to Chávez‘s 1998 
electoral success was growing ideological opposition to neoliberal stabilization plans. In 
1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez‘s Gran Viraje (Great Turn) and painful shock therapy program 
elicited widespread popular outrage. His attempt to raise gas prices precipitated the 
Caracazo, violent popular protests that began in the capital and rippled throughout the 
country. As a result, Rafael Caldera‘s reforms were much more cautious, but equally 
ineffective. The third factor contributing to Chávez‘s electoral success was the collapse of 
support for traditional parties. As a result of economic crisis and backlash against 
neoliberalism, the established political regime had been discredited. Between the Pact of 
Punto Fijo in 1958 and elections in 1993, traditional parties Acción Democrática (AD) and 
the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) had alternated in 
power. In the early 1990s, voters became progressively more disillusioned with established 
parties (Morgan 2007; Morgan 2011). 
At the start of his campaign, Hugo Chávez was best known as the army officer who 
led a failed but high-profile 1992 coup attempt. When he was released from prison in 1994, a 
journalist asked him, ―Where are you going now, Comandante?‖ Chávez‘s response was ―To 
                                                                                                                                                       
independents or in association with new parties‖ (6).  He goes on to delineate different types of outsiders, 
including full outsiders, mavericks and amateurs, where Chávez, Correa, and Morales are all considered full 
outsiders. 
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power‖ (Guevara 2005, 18). Over the next several years, Chávez constructed the Movimiento 
Quinta República (MVR), the vehicle that would bring him to office in 1998, and a deeply 
anti-institutional agenda aimed at a radical break with the past through the refounding of the 
Venezuelan republic. The MVR‘s name conveyed Chávez‘s agenda quite directly: to bring 
down the fourth republic and install a fifth. On the campaign trail, he used his ‗outsider‘ 
status to his advantage, pledging to combat the corruption associated with the Punto Fijo 
political system and neoliberalism. He campaigned under the slogan: ‗Con Chávez manda el 
pueblo‘ (With Chávez, the people rule).138  
Chávez‘s anti-institutional agenda resonated with the political groups and sectors of 
the population that were traditionally excluded from the Punto Fijo power-sharing agreement 
that had dominated Venezuelan politics for decades. He also had the support of military 
hardliners, those who participated in the 1992 coup (Cameron and Major 2001, 262). 
Furthermore, socioeconomic class played a critical role in Chávez‘s first election in 1998. 
The citizens who voted for him were disproportionately poor (López Maya 2003; Lupu 2010; 
Molina 2002).
139
 They were most attracted to Chávez‘s antiestablishment orientation, 
rhetoric, charisma and optimism (Márquez 2003; Roberts 2003; Weyland 2003; Zúquete 
2008). In Venezuela, civil society was traditionally weak because the partidocracia was so 
strong. This allowed Chávez to coopt and mobilize civil society, organized labor, and social 
movements. 
Nearly a decade later, Correa won 56.67% of the vote in the second round runoff of 
Ecuador‘s 2006 presidential elections. Like Chávez, Correa was able to obtain office because 
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 Maxwell A. Cameron and Flavie Major (2001) point out that this slogan was ―deliciously ambiguous, 
invoking either direct democracy or the subordination of popular sovereignty to executive power‖ (262). 
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 The middle class was more likely to vote for Chávez than the wealthy (Lupu 2010, 9)  
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of three important dynamics in the 1990s and early 2000s: a context of political crisis, deep 
economic crisis, and a weak party system. First, Ecuador has witnessed more presidential 
crises than any other country in Latin America (Pérez-Liñán 2007). Scandal and massive 
protest led to the early removal of three presidents since 1996: Abdalá Bucaram, Jamil 
Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez. Second, between 1998 and 2000, a confluence of events led to 
the worst economic crisis in a century (Lucero 2001, 60). The market simultaneously lost 
confidence in both the banking system and the domestic currency, the Sucre.
140
 El Niño 
produced detrimental climatic effects for Ecuador‘s agricultural production.  The country 
also faced the same declining oil prices that troubled Venezuela. Eventually, Ecuador 
defaulted on its debt and hovered on the brink of hyperinflation as a deep macro-financial 
crisis developed (Jacome 2004, 5). In late 1999, Jamil Mahuad proposed a plan to dollarize 
Ecuador but met with violent protests and was removed from office by an alliance between 
the military and indigenous groups shortly thereafter.
141
 The painful economic effects of the 
crisis and dollarization were felt most  among the poorest sectors of Ecuadorian society 
(Lucero 2001). Moreover, Ecuador's party system is very weak. Traditional parties were 
thoroughly discredited, as they had been in Venezuela. The growth of outsider candidates 
since the early- to mid-nineties has led to exponential growth in the number of candidates in 
any one election, often ranging from 6 to 12.  
                                                 
140 In an effort to bail out the banks, Mahuad transferred approximately $6 billion, 23% of annual GNP. 
Ecuador became the third most unequal society in Latin America(Lucero 2001, 62). 
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 President Gustavo Noboa continued with his predecessor‘s plan, implementing dollarization in the spring of 
2000. 
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Correa founded his own party, Alianza PAIS (AP), in the run up to the 2006 
elections.
142
 His main opponent was Álvaro Noboa, the wealthiest man in Ecuador and a 
member of the right-wing Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN). 
Noboa ran on a ‗bread and butter‘ platform that was business as usual; it focused on creating 
jobs, building houses and increasing wages. In contrast, Correa campaigned on an anti-
institutional and anti-imperialist platform; the core components were the rewriting the 
Constitution, the restructuring of Congress, closing the U.S. military post in Manta, and not 
joining the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  
Correa and AP also benefitted from the political support of important social 
movements in Ecuador. Correa‘s anti-institutional agenda resonated with multiple civil 
society organizations, allowing him to bring them under the umbrella of his project for 
reform. This included indigenous and campesino organizations. These sectors initially 
supported the project of reforming the Constitution and played a crucial role in electing 
Correa, even though they would later become disenchanted with the president and his 
movement.
143
 Ecuadorian civil society is perhaps the most independent of all of the cases 
considered here. At the same time, it is not nearly as strong (in terms of organization and 
mobilization) as groups in Bolivia. As a result of their continued independence, Correa 
maintained somewhat tense relationships with civil society actors throughout the process, and 
this tension grew after the reform process concluded. 
In Bolivia, Evo Morales became the first indigenous president by winning the 2005 
elections in the first round with 53.70% of the vote. As in Venezuela and Ecuador, a 
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 PAIS stands for Patria Altiva y Soberana (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland). 
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 Interview with Monica Chuji (7/3/12) 
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combination of economic and political crisis had plagued Bolivia in the years leading up to 
Morales‘ campaign. Traditional parties had also suffered a loss of credibility. These factors 
set the stage for the mobilization of previously excluded groups that favored Morales‘ anti-
institutional agenda. In 1984-1985, Bolivia experienced the highest rates of hyperinflation in 
Latin American history.
144
 As a result, the country implemented a shock therapy stabilization 
plan and signed an IMF standby agreement in 1986 (Sachs 1987, 281).  
During his first term as President in 1993, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) introduced the Plan de Todos (Plan for 
All). This was aimed at restructuring both the economy and the political system, and included 
the Law of Popular Participation, an effort to decentralize government by shifting resources 
and responsibilities to municipalities and rural communities (Kohl 2003). However, these 
reforms failed to adequately pacify growing demands for autonomy among indigenous 
groups. By the early 2000s, violent mass protest had exploded in Bolivia with the 
Cochabamba Water War and the Gas Wars in 2003 and 2005 (Webber 2010, 51). The MAS 
and Morales played an important mobilizational role during these popular protests, resisting 
price increases in important commodities. As a result of prolonged conflict, Sanchez de 
Lozada and Carlos Mesa were both forced to resign in turn. 
Unlike Chávez and Correa, this was not Morales‘ first campaign. He had run 
unsuccessfully in the 2002 elections against Sanchez de Lozada. Also in contrast to Chávez 
and Correa, Morales did not found his own party. Instead, he rose through the ranks of the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), a popular left-wing party. The MAS was formed by rural 
social movements in the Chapare region in the 1990s. Morales had a long history as a 
cocalero activist, and over time he took on increasingly important leadership roles within the 
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 Between May-August 1985, inflation reached an annualized rate of 60,000% (Sachs 1987, 279). 
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coca growers‘ union and the MAS. This party is most centrally distinguished from the MVR 
in Venezuela and AP in Ecuador by its grassroots origin or bottom-up formation (Anria 
2013; Van Cott 2007). Still, Morales is considered an outsider because he never held political 
office prior to his election as president (Carreras forthcoming). 
In the 2005 elections, Morales‘ main opponent was Jorge Tuto Quiroga of the right-
wing Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS). Morales campaigned on issues like land 
reform, redistributing wealth, and ending the U.S.-supported program to eradicate coca crops. 
He also pledged to reform the political system through a CA to rewrite the Constitution, 
echoing the calls for such reform which began nearly 10 years early among low-land 
indigenous groups.
145
  Morales‘ campaign had resonated with civil society groups, especially 
coca growers and indigenous groups, who identified with Morales as the first president of 
Aymara descent (Morales 2011). These groups were powerful, well-organized and politically 
mobilized, and served as important allies to the Morales government throughout the process 
of reform. They also carried their own demands for the constitutional reform, and thus 
Morales needed to consider the concerns of the indigenous groups and cocaleros throughout 
the reform process.   
The situation in Honduras displays some important differences. Manuel Zelaya won 
the 2005 elections in the first round with just shy of 50% of the vote. As the country‘s crime 
rate skyrocketed and corruption ran rampant, there was growing dissatisfaction with the 
traditional parties and organized civil society increasingly used protest as means of putting 
pressure on political elites (Ruhl 2010, 97). The two traditional parties in Honduras, the 
Partido Liberal (PLH) and Partido Nacional (PNH), have roots in the 19
th
 century and are 
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 In 1990, indigenous groups marching from Beni to Las Paz in the ―March for Territory and Dignity‖ made 
the first demands for a Constituent Assembly. 
186 
 
both ideologically right-wing parties. Above all, these parties have served as vehicles for 
securing patronage and resources (Ruhl 2010, 98). These two parties alternated in power, 
resolving elite conflicts; however, they excluded a substantial portion of the population 
whose interests were not adequately represented.  Political elites responded to growing 
popular dissatisfaction and protest with insufficient mechanisms for incorporation that were 
highly dependent on existing parties.
146
 This failed to produce any transformation in the 
traditional party system. 
Unlike the other executives considered here, Zelaya was not an outsider. He was an 
experienced politician, a landowner and member of the socio-economic elite, and candidate 
of the PLH. Between 1985 and 1998, he served as a deputy in Congress and he also served as 
the Minister of Investment. In 2005, his main opponent was Porfirio Pepe Lobo of the PNH. 
Both candidates‘ campaigns were very similar; the central focus were issues of security and 
curbing gang violence. In contrast to Chávez, Correa, and Morales, Zelaya did not campaign 
on the issue of a CA and reform of the Constitution.  His platform was traditional and right-
leaning. It was only later that he would drift leftward and begin to advance leftist and popular 
policy.  
These illustrations demonstrate important differences in structural preconditions and 
the executive‘s decision to employ an anti-institutional agenda. In turn, these factors led to 
differences in presidential popularity at the moment of election that would contribute to the 
subsequent success or failure of the reform process. Three presidents – Chávez, Morales, and 
Correa – entered office with strong electoral mandates after advancing anti-institutional 
agendas that resonated with the population. Having been elected with over 50% of the vote 
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 One example is the Ley de Participación Ciudadana (Citizen‘s Participation Law) enacted just before Zelaya 
took office (Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013, 522). 
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put them each in a strong position to advance their preferred reforms in terms of 
mobilizational leverage. Zelaya, on the other hand, was elected with only a plurality, winning 
the close election with slightly less than 50% of the vote. Chávez and Morales obtained their 
majority in the first round of elections, while Correa had to enter a second round run-off.  
Though popular at the polls, these executives came into office with legislatures where 
the opposition held a significant portion of the seats.
147
 In Venezuela, legislative elections 
were held in October, a month before the executive elections in November.
148
 Likely as a 
result of this timing, a traditional party, Acción Democrática (AD), won the largest number 
of seats in both houses while Chávez‘s MVR won only around 25% of the seats in each 
house. In Bolivia, Morales actually managed to obtain a small majority of the seats in the 
lower house, but he failed to gain majority control within the upper house. In Honduras, the 
PLH had just shy of a majority of seats in the unicameral legislature leaving Zelaya without 
partisan control of the legislature. By far, Correa was the most limited in terms of partisan 
representation.
149
 He aggressively decided to refuse to allow members of the AP to run for 
Congress. This was a huge risk. Yet, at the same time, it lent credibility to his campaign 
promise of a CA that would close and replace Congress, completely reforming the 
institutions of the state.  According to Alberto Acosta:  
We were convinced that we would not have a sufficient majority in Congress to 
introduce constitutional reform… For that reason, we proposed not to nominate 
candidates as a political gesture of great ethical strength… we made the decision, that 
we would not have people we can trust (gente de confianza). We would not have a 
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 The details of their partisan power within the legislature can be found in Table 8 on page 148. 
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 This was a calculated move on the part of the traditional parties in an effort to stifle the performance of 
Chávez‘s MVR, as the movement had been gaining momentum. Non-concurrent elections had two effects, 
eliminating the coat-tails effect of the presidential elections on the legislative vote and fragmenting the 
legislative vote, so that the effective number of parties was 7.6 (Molina 2002, 225–227). 
 
149
 Nevertheless, he still found that, following his election, some parties were sympathetic to the idea of 
constitutional reform. 
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sufficient number of legislators. It is preferable if we go to the CA by giving a very 
strong and rigorous signal to the Ecuadorian people that we mean business. And this 
had a positive outcome (interview with Alberto Acosta, 6/11/12) . 
 
In sum, mobilizational leverage was key for success at the first stage of the process, 
presidential election. In order to advance reform via CA, presidential candidates needed to 
gain executive office, an institutionalized position of power within the political system. Thus, 
they needed the ability to mobilize the population formally, to turn out and vote for in 
support of their ambitious reform agendas. Moreover, the margin of victory was important. If 
executives were elected with a mandate, that is over 50% of the vote, this laid the 
groundwork for them to pressure other institutions for reform. Although institutional leverage 
played a very small role at this early stage, it would prove vital to the success of reform at 
subsequent stages of the process. 
Constituent Assembly Referendum & Elections 
Once these executives gained office, they next focused on how to establish a CA.
150
 
Initiating the process was risky and often legally controversial. Examining Honduras in 
comparative perspective demonstrates how the executive‘s performance at this stage of the 
reform process determined success. Institutional leverage was crucial during this phase, 
especially where there was no explicit, legal precedent for the initiation of the CA. 
Mobilizational leverage also had a direct effect on success through electoral mobilization.  
In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Honduras, existing constitutions were not explicit in 
allowing for the constitution to be completely re-written by a CA. As a result, there was 
controversy over the legal mechanisms for initiating such a reform. The executive needed to 
rely upon relationships with other institutions, such as the congress, the electoral council, the 
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, executives arrived at the decision to pursue a Constituent Assembly 
because of a variety of factors that constrained the likelihood of successful reform through other mechanisms 
. 
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judiciary, and even the military in order to secure the unencumbered advancement of the 
reform process. The ability to influence institutions with the power to decide on such issues 
played a critical role in allowing the reforms to move forward. The judiciary was important 
because the opposition could bring complaints over illegality at the initiation of the process. 
Latin American judges may have competing priorities; they want to rule based on their views 
of the law, influence public policy and remain in office. Disagreement with other popularly-
elected institutions, including the executive, may put their positions in jeopardy.
151
  
If the judiciary resists an executive, then the success of the process depends upon the 
executive‘s ability to neutralize the threat posed by recalcitrant justices. Similarly, the 
military‘s political leanings (conservative or progressive), whether it is unified or split, and 
its attitude toward intervention may be important in determining its institutional reaction to 
the executive‘s agenda. If elites are threatened by the process of reform and the military 
opposes it, the executive risks the failure of his or her agenda or – worse – premature 
removal from office. In all of the countries examined here, the military was structurally 
poised to challenge the executive if it had wanted to do so.
152
 In the end, the military was 
relatively passive in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela but it played a key, active role in 
Honduras. As I will show, this is due to important variation in executive-military relations 
across these four countries. 
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 It has been argued that, under conditions of institutional instability, judges principally want to avoid 
punishment or removal (Helmke 2002). Santiago Basabe Serrano (2012) finds that under both low and high 
levels of institutional stability, judges vote according to their convictions, while at intermediate levels of 
stability judges vote strategically in order to retain their seats (134-135). 
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 For a detailed overview of the ways that vagueness and contradictions in Latin American constitutions 
invites the intervention of the military in politics, see Howard J. Wiarda & Hilary Collins (2011, 194–196). 
Also, according to David Pion-Berlin‘s (2009) structural typology of civil-military relations in Latin America, 
all of the cases considered in the present analysis fit his ‗dual command structure‘ model, which empowers the 
military by weakening the Ministry of Defense, increasing vertical authority, and concentrating military power 
(580). 
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Figure 7: Latent Judicial Independence 
 
Source: Linzer and Staton (2012) 
De facto judicial independence has declined in all four cases since 1990 (Figure 7 
above). Though many different measures of judicial independence exist, few have adequately 
captured the underlying behavioral concept. Linzer and Staton (2012) develop a quantitative 
measure of the latent, or not directly observable, concept of judicial independence by 
combining eight different indicators commonly used in the literature.
153
 This behavioral 
indicator seeks to measure the level of independence in practice rather than on paper. It is 
continuous and bounded between 0 and 1. Here, I consider 0.5 to be the threshold for 
independence. Those cases scoring above 0.5 have relatively independent courts, while those 
scoring below 0.5 have relatively dependent courts. By this measure, judicial independence is 
highest overall in Bolivia. At the time of the CA, Bolivia scores just above 0.5, the threshold 
for independence. The other cases score below the threshold at the initiation of the process. 
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 For details on the composition of this measure, see: 
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~jkstato/page3/index.html (accessed: 7/20/12). For comparative purposes, 
the United States scores approximately 0.96 on this scale while China scores 0.02. 
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In Honduras at the time of Zelaya‘s attempt at a referendum, judicial independence has the 
lowest score of all at the time of an attempt, less than 0.35.
154
 
In Venezuela, the 1961 Constitution provided no mechanism for convening a CA. 
Therefore, Chávez‘s proposal for reform required the bypassing of standard amendment 
procedures. In an interview with Aleida Guevara (2005), Hugo Chávez stated: 
I had said so many times, we will go to Miraflores Palace, go to government, and 
convene a CA… ‗I‘ll call a referendum.‘ Many people said this was anti-
constitutional and that it couldn‘t be done. Nevertheless, I said we should try, we 
must try. On constitutional grounds and according to the law of suffrage, referendums 
could be called. Of course, no one had ever done it before and it didn‘t appear 
explicitly in the constitution. People therefore said it couldn‘t be done. But there was 
an article regarding referendums buried in a law, and I clung to that.
155
 I also pointed 
to article 4 of the old constitution, which stated ‗Sovereignty lies with the people, 
who exercise it through their suffrage of the organs of public power‘ (22). 
 
When Chávez called for a referendum at his inauguration, members of the opposition 
and a Human Rights organization, Fundahumanos, appealed to the Venezuelan Corte 
Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court, CSJ) on the grounds of unconstitutionality. According 
to Chávez, the opposition brought 25 challenges before the CSJ in an attempt to annul his 
decree calling for a CA (Guevara 2005, 23). The CSJ was divided on the issue, but ultimately 
it decided in favor of the referendum to convoke a CA. Written by Justice Humberto J. La 
Roche, the decision states: ―We note that the fact that the constituent power is framed 
historically in constitutional law is not sufficient to understand it as permanently subjugated 
to the constituted power‖ (1998, 10). Therefore, the justices ruled that the constituent power 
remains at all moments above the other powers of the state. Their decision in favor of a 
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 In Honduras, the judiciary was clearly not subordinated to President Zelaya, but rather to entrenched elite 
interests in the legislative branch. Therefore, an analysis of judicial independence cannot end here. Moving 
forward, I analyze the role of the judiciary in each case, especially as relates to the institutional conflict 
surrounding the Constituent Assembly process. 
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 This was Article 181 of the Organic Law of Suffrage and Participation, which gave the executive, the 
legislature, and citizens the power to call a referendum on issues of national importance through the collection 
of the signatures of 10% of the electorate (J. I. Colón-Ríos 2011, 370). 
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popular referendum to establish a CA was based on the idea that even the existing 
Constitution cannot limit the constituent power, finding in it a legal justification for the 
exercise of political power Chávez was requesting, something not explicitly allowed by the 
existing constitution. 
Though the argument was ideologically based and grounded in constitutional theory, 
this example also shows that the court may have been influenced by mobilizational leverage 
as well. For example, Joel I. Colón-Ríos (2011, 369–370) describes the dilemma faced by the 
CSJ in this ruling as the risk that the restructuring of government could get rid of the CSJ, but 
declaring it unconstitutional with the high popularity that Chávez enjoyed could have 
challenged the legitimacy of institutions. The CSJ faced an impossible decision. Speaking 
about the ruling, Chávez stated ―The court took a historic decision and assumed great 
responsibility. If they had ruled out the constitutional option we would have been left with no 
choice but to use violence. There would have been no other way‖ (Guevara 2005, 23). 
Likewise, Chávez‘s relationship with the military facilitated the advancement of his 
ambitious reform agenda and the initiation of a CA. Venezuela had almost no experience 
with democracy until 1945, and then a military coup in 1948 brought ten more years of 
military dictatorship. However, between 1958 and the present period, Venezuela has 
maintained civilian rule. This differs significantly from the repeated military interventions 
and repressive military dictatorships in other Latin American countries during the 1960s and 
70s (David Pion-Berlin 2000, 10). Chávez was a military officer, had risen through the ranks, 
and thus had a natural affinity to the institution. In an interview in 2000, he expressed his 
vision for the military: ―I think that it is important to try to incorporate a sector that for some 
time has been withdrawn. …just like civilians have the necessity to learn to coexist with the 
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military, the military also should learn to coexist with us, so that they feel that there is only 
one project and only one manner of expressing the responsibility of governing the country‖ 
(El Nacional 3/10/2000, as cited in J. E. Romero 2002).  Chávez hoped to incorporate the 
military into his vision for a new Bolivarian Republic as a means of neutralizing potential 
opposition to it. Astutely, he realized that he could insulate himself from any backlash 
against his agenda by securing a broad coalition of popular and military support. 
In Ecuador, the 1998 Constitution did not explicitly provide for the convocation of a 
CA via a popular referendum. In Ecuador, although Correa‘s predecessor, Alfredo Palacio, 
had tried to open a legal loophole for a CA, Correa made this irrelevant by initiating the 
process one month early.
156
 After encountering opposition to this attempt in Congress, Correa 
convinced the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) in March 2007 to allow a popular 
referendum to consult the people about establishing a CA. The referendum was scheduled for 
mid-April.  
In the days following the TSE‘s decision, members of the opposition‘s legislative 
majority appealed to the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court, TC) on the ground of 
unconstitutionality of the TSE‘s decision. Congress had been provoked by Correa‘s failure to 
follow the stipulated process for approval of the consultation and they argued that he was 
side-stepping their legislative authority.
157
  They also suggested that members of the TSE 
who authorized the decision should be impeached.  
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 In January 2005, within 15 days of the end of his mandate, Palacio drew on Article 171 of the 1998 
Constitution to convoke a special session of Congress around the topic of initiating a Constituent Assembly. He 
knew that Congress would not approve the Constituent Assembly in the special session; they delayed a decision 
by passing the proposal on to a Commission. However, he also knew that, if Congress did not approve or reject 
the proposal within 180 days, then the President could act on the proposal. He laid the groundwork for his 
successor, Correa, to act on this proposal in May (Interview with Alfredo Palacio, 6/29/12). Instead, Correa held 
the referendum in mid-April. 
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 Interview with a former justice of the TC, Jorge G. Alvear Macías (6/27/12). 
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However, the TSE quickly responded to this with four out of seven votes in favor of 
removing these 57 opposition members of Congress, who had signed and supported the 
legislative resolution to prosecute and remove members of the TSE (Basabe Serrano 2012, 
141). These Congressmen were replaced by their alternates. These alternates became known 
as the ‗diputados de los manteles‘ (tablecloth congressmen) because they covered themselves 
with tablecloths to escape the press on their way out of an informal meeting with 
representatives of the executive to negotiate their support to allow the CA to move forward. 
The TSE officially justified the removal of the members of congress because, during the lead 
up and implementation of elections, the TSE becomes the highest power in the land with the 
authority to remove anyone from office who tries to interfere with or prevent electoral 
processes.
158
 However, others, including dissenting members of the TC, maintained that 
these actions were unconstitutional.
159
 The institutional conflict that unfolded led to the 
removal of the justices of the TC who opposed the government‘s actions. Jorge G. Alvear 
Macías described the ensuing institutional chaos: 
When the court proceedings arrived to us… we decided that the removal of the 
congressmen was unconstitutional and the deputies should be reinstated in their 
seats… As a consequence of this, because the whole country was expecting the 
decision, the TC suffered an attack of a revolting crowd, of people sympathizing with 
the government, and they assaulted us, the members of the TC. We had to take refuge 
inside a spare room for close to four hours. But we managed to sign the resolution 
and to notify Congress of it… Regardless, the President of Congress installed the 
session with the alternates, who now were no longer acting because the principals had 
been reinstated… And [yet] it was these alternates… that voted to remove us 
(Interview, Jorge Alvear, 6/27/12).
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 Interview with Gustavo Larrea (6/8/12). 
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 According to the Ley Orgánica Electoral (interviews with Jorge Alvear, 6/27/12 and his advisor within the 
TC, Elizabeth Ell, 7/16/12). 
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The alternate congressmen had negotiated an agreement with Correa‘s 
representatives, supporting his aspirations for reform in exchange for benefits and side 
payments. With the support of this group, a legislative majority resolved to remove the 
justices of the TC after only a year in office.
160
 The justices, who were elected for 4 year 
terms, were not replaced by their alternates but rather with new candidates in new elections. 
This was the crucial institutional moment in the Ecuadorian process. Without support of 
certain key institutions, namely the TSE and alternate members of congress, and the 
neutralization of threats from other institutions, namely the TC and opposition congressmen, 
the process of constitutional reform would not have advanced. Correa and his allies bent the 
institutional rules, as he bargained with existing institutions in defense of his agenda and 
relied on allied institutions to remove threats from hostile institutions. 
Correa also had the implicit support of the military, which maintained its distance 
from the process. In Ecuador, since the return to democracy in 1979, the military has 
intervened in politics on several occasions. However, it has tended to follow public opinion 
and popular mobilization.
161
 Throughout the democratic period, the military has remained 
one of the most popular institutions in the country: in a survey administered two weeks 
before Mahuad‘s removal from office, a majority – 61% – of Ecuadorians responded ‗yes‘ 
when asked whether they would support a military dictatorship (Fitch 2001, 64). Part of 
Correa‘s insulation against military intervention was his ability to harness public opinion. 
However, another key factor was discord within the military. By the early 2000s, deep 
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 In addition to the alternate deputies (‗diputados de los manteles’), this majority was composed of the ID, 
PRE, MPD, Nuevo País (NP), Partido Socialista–Frente Amplio (PS-FA), Pachakutik, Red Ética y Democrática 
(RED) and other smaller groups (Basabe Serrano 2012, 141). 
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 The military, in cooperation with social movement, overtly removed several presidents: Bucaram in 1996 
and Mahuad in 2000. Moreover, by withdrawing their support for Gutiérrez in 2005, they effectively caused his 
downfall. Only once mobilization became widespread did the military step in. 
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divisions had emerged between different branches of the military – the army and the navy – 
and also within branches between ideological factions (Fitch 2001, 67). Freedom House has 
also reported that Correa purchased the conditional support of the military with ―increased 
salary and benefits packages… [and] control of key economic assets such as Petroecuador, 
the state-owned oil company that was controlled by the Navy from 2007 to early 2010‖ 
(Bowen 2011, 10). 
In Bolivia, the mechanism for implementing a CA was much clearer and had a strong 
legal foundation. Though the 1967 Bolivian Constitution explicitly prohibited reform via CA, 
the legal groundwork was laid by both the administrations of Carlos Mesa and Eduardo 
Rodríguez Veltzé. At the height of the 2003 Gas Wars in Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada offered protestors a referendum on hydrocarbons in an attempt to negotiate an end to 
demonstrations. However, continued widespread protests forced him to resign. His successor, 
Carlos Mesa, felt the need to address popular expectations for a referendum and so he 
introduced constitutional reforms in 2004, which included mechanisms for referenda, 
citizens‘ legislative initiatives, and a constitutional assembly (Mesa Gisbert 2008). In 
February of that year, majorities in both houses of the legislature voted to amend Article 4 of 
the 1967 Constitution to allow popular deliberation by a CA, citizens‘ legislative initiatives, 
and the referendum (Breuer 2008, 16; Law #2631). Mesa was later removed from office by 
widespread protest and replaced by Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, serving as interim President. 
He signed Law 2091, which called for elections to the CA on the first Sunday in July 2006. 
Therefore, Morales was legally empowered to pursue a CA upon his election. This made it 
much easier for him to initiate the process, as compared to the other cases considered here. 
Even so, a great deal of institutional conflict surrounded the process. However, as a result of 
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an existing mechanism in the constitution, there was no referendum held at the initiation of 
this process. This deprived Morales of an opportunity to demonstrate the high levels of 
public approval that he currently had.
162
  
The opposition, though it resisted many aspects of the reform process, did not directly 
appeal to the judiciary to stop it. Instead, their policy throughout the process was to negotiate 
with the MAS when they felt empowered to do so, and to hinder the process as much as 
possible when their position was weak. This included boycotting, when necessary, to reduce 
the democratic legitimacy of reforms.
163
 It is possible that the opposition had witnessed the 
futility of attempts to appeal to the Judiciary to arrest the process in Venezuela and, given the 
low levels of judicial activism, figured that appealing would do little good. However, the 
opposition in Bolivia also did not necessarily disagree with the idea of a CA or constitutional 
reform. Francisco Javier Limpias Chávez, a member of the CA for PODEMOS, the largest 
opposition party, agreed that a new Constitution was necessary, but disagreed with the 
process through which it was created and implemented. He said: ―Clearly, we needed a new 
social pact, a new Constitution... It was necessary. And I still think that it is necessary, 
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 Perhaps, as a result, he would later hold a pseudo recall referendum (a plebiscite in which he put his mandate 
up for a vote) during the period when the constitutional reform process had stalled (Altman 2010, 129–131). 
The thought was that Morales would be able to demonstrate his high levels of popular support and regain some 
legitimacy that was lost through the prolonged nature of the reform process. However, Morales originally 
suggested holding a recall referendum in December of 2007, but the opposition-controlled senate refused. After 
the opposition's perceived victory in 2008 in a referendum on autonomy for Santa Cruz, the opposition agreed 
to holding the recall. The outcome was actually that "both sides could claim a renewed and strengthened 
popular mandate on the basis of their respective votes, [and so] the consultation served only to further deepen 
the conflict rather than resolve it" (Altman 2010, 131). 
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 Interviews with Gamal Serhan Jaldín (3/20/12) and Javier Limpias (4/13/12). 
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because for me, this process has not finished. A new ‗social pact‘ was necessary but not of 
the form in which it was imposed and was accepted.‖164 
As in Venezuela and Ecuador, in Bolivia judicial institutions were not traditionally 
independent. The Bolivian Supreme Court has been subjected to frequent reshuffles since 
1900. Until 2009, the tenure of justices was officially 10 years but they served on  average 
only 3.6 years and only 8 percent completed their terms (Castagnola and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 
284). The threat of losing a position on the court was very real in Bolivia and the Supreme 
Court did not take a very activist position. Yet, with the creation of the Tribunal 
Constitucional (TC) in 1995 and its full empowerment by 1999, the judiciary began 
challenging the executive and even the legislature in earnest. This trend was short lived. By 
2008, the judicial activism of the TC had virtually collapsed as the institution was dismantled 
by the Morales government. The new model of judicial review was undermined by weak 
public support, the TC‘s ﬂedgling activism, and legislative deadlocks preventing judicial 
appointments of justices (Castagnola and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 293).
165
 The trend of 
intervention to remove justices or pack the court continued throughout the CA process, 
though it is worth noting that Morales came into conflict with the Judiciary over other issues 
and not over the CA. Because of this, the judiciary posed little threat to the CA process. 
Morales, like Chávez and Correa, had the support of the military. While Bolivia had 
experienced prolonged military rule that perpetuated conservative elite interests, the 
dictatorships were less repressive in comparison with those in the Southern Cone (Fitch 
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 Interview with Javier Limpias (4/13/12). For him and many other members of PODEMOS, the issue 
revolved around the exclusion of the minority within this project of a new Constitution once the Constituent 
Assembly was underway. 
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 For a discussion of the removal of justices under Evo Morales, see Castagnola & Pérez-Liñán (2011, 296–
297). 
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2001). As Morales prepared for a radical reform of the Bolivian state, he needed to ensure 
that the military would not intervene. Historically, elites in the region of the media luna 
("half-moon") and especially Santa Cruz had appealed to the military whenever national 
policy did not reflect their economic interests.
166
 The interests of Cruceña elites changed over 
time; instead of appealing to the military to prevent the incorporation of competing 
indigenous interests in politics, elites there began developing  a strong push for autonomy 
(Eaton 2007). The Agenda de Enero (January Agenda) for regional autonomy ran in direct 
opposition to the nationalist impulses of the military, and provoked a negative response from 
the institution (Eaton 2007, 84). Thus, elite demands for autonomy were at odds with the 
military‘s vision and Morales found support within the institution because he shared their 
―deep nationalist objections to foreigners‘ primarily benefiting from Bolivia‘s resource 
wealth‖ (Kohl 2010, 211). Beyond symbolic links, Morales also found ways to monetarily 
appease the military, offering them salary increases and equipment in an effort to galvanize 
their support (Kohl 2010, 211). 
In Honduras, constitutional revisions had previously taken place through constituent 
assemblies, but these bodies had never been convened through a referendum. Furthermore, 
the 1982 Constitution permitted only legislative reforms and did not allow for any kind of 
citizen action (Article 373).  Zelaya lacked both institutional and mobilizational leverage, as 
he tried to hold a referendum to form a CA during the last year of his term of office. The 
Judiciary and Congress were opposed to the idea, and the military demonstrated a willingness 
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 The media luna includes the low-lying departments of: Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando. In this region, 
indigenous groups are not a majority as they are in the highlands. During the twentieth century, the traditionally 
right-leaning military had accommodated both elite and U.S. interests to prevent the incorporation of labor 
(Eaton 2007). After the return to democracy, the military continued to intervene in politics in protection of elite 
interests and against popular responses to neoliberal reform. The military violently repressed protesters at the 
request of presidents Banzer and Sanchez de Lozada, responding to the Water War and the Gas War 
respectively. During Black October in 2003, the military shot  over 100 protesters and injured many others as 
they eliminated roadblocks in El Alto and La Paz on Sanchez de Lozada‘s orders (Rochlin 2007, 1329). 
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to intervene in the situation. This was a recipe for disaster. In March 2009, Zelaya called for 
a non-binding referendum to ask citizens whether or not to include a ballot item to initiate a 
CA in the November general elections. Zelaya asked the National Statistical Institute (INE) 
of Honduras to carry out the poll.
167
 ―Over the next three months, the Liberal attorney-
general, the [Tribunal Supremo Electoral], the National Congress, and the Supreme Court of 
Justice (the country‘s highest judicial body, comprising eight Liberal and seven National 
appointees) all ruled that the proposed referendum was illegal and unconstitutional‖ (Ruhl 
2010, 100). Zelaya moved forward anyway. Faced with such insistence, the military refused 
to distribute the controversial referendum ballots or to provide security for the vote. President 
Zelaya responded by firing the leader of the armed forces. In fact, he was so determined to 
hold the referendum that he procured the illegal ballots by seizing them from an Air Force 
base (US House of Representatives 2009, 6). In the end, the Judiciary was adamant about 
denying Zelaya the right to hold a referendum; the military's arrest orders came directly from 
the Supreme Court. The military complied with the orders, going above and beyond. In the 
early hours of June 28, officers forcibly seized Zelaya in his pajamas at his home (Cassel 
2009, 1). They then exiled him, placing him on a plane to Costa Rica. 
The Honduran military has a history of intervening in politics and, with the exception 
of a brief experiment with reformism in the 1970s, their stance has been conservative.
168
  In 
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 Zelaya claimed that the referendum he pursed was non-binding, or merely a poll of public opinion, in 
contrast to referenda in Venezuela and Ecuador. However, the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court worried 
that Zelaya was being disingenuous, planning to use the referendum to directly implement reform as in 
Venezuela and Ecuador. ―According to Honduran law, only Congress may call a referendum and only the TSE 
(not the INE) can conduct it… Zelaya‘s intransigence in the face of such strong institutional opposition made 
conservatives suspicious that he was planning to use a referendum win as grounds for postponing general 
elections and ordering the rapid convocation of a constituent assembly‖ (Ruhl 2010, 100). 
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 The military dictatorship of Oswaldo López Arellano was, in many ways more open to popular demands 
supporting the poor rural majority in its efforts for agrarian and land reform. Yet, this was short-lived and the 
military took a much more conservative stance after that (Sieder 1995, 21). 
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1980, Honduras transitioned away from military rule to democracy with a new constitution 
and elections; however, the military not only retained power but actually increased its 
political influence and institutional independence (Ruhl 1996, 34; Sieder 1996, 23). When 
the Contras War broke out in Nicaragua, Honduras became the center of U.S. operations in 
the region. By 1984, the Honduran armed forces had doubled in size and were receiving 
nearly 20 times more military aid from the U.S. (Sieder 1996, 23). After the war ended, the 
military‘s resources waned but its tendency to intervene in politics remained strong.169 The 
military still effectively exercised veto power over policy affecting its interests (Taylor-
Robinson and Diaz 1999, 593). Though the military in Honduras had several important 
factions, none visibly showed support for Zelaya during his presidency. 
Once executives had successfully scheduled a referendum, they needed it to pass. 
This is when the direct effect of mobilizational leverage came into play. The process relied 
on voter turnout and a majority support among the population.  Table 14 below shows the 
results of the referendum to convoke a CA in each case. 
 
Table 14: Electoral Processes Initiating Reform via Constituent Assembly 
    Venezuela Ecuador Bolivia 
Referendum – Initiation 
Date 25-Apr-99 15-Apr-07 
  
%Yes 87.75% 81.70% 
Turnout 37.47% 71.77% 
Constituent Assembly 
Date 25-Jul-99 30-Sep-07 2-Jul-06 
% Vote 62.00% 69.47% 50.72% 
# Seats 122/131 80/130 137/255 
% Seats 93.13% 61.54% 53.73% 
Turnout 46.20% 55.88% 84.50% 
Sources: (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2013; Consejo Nacional 
Electoral de Venezuela 2013; International Parliamentary Union 2013; European Union 
Election Observation Mission 2006; Neuman and Mccoy 2000) 
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 In the 1990s, there was a rapid decline of military aid from the U.S., forced military recruitment was 
abolished in 1994, the infamous Departmento Nacional de Investigaciones (DNI) was closed, and the police 
force was reassigned to civilian control in 1995 (Sieder 1996, 34–35). 
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Again, the process was not necessary in Bolivia because of 2004 revision of the 
Constitution. Assuming success of the referendum, presidents then needed to hold elections 
for the CA and win a voting majority of seats. Table 14 shows the results of the elections to 
the CA as well.
170
 In Venezuela, under a majoritarian electoral system, Chávez won 87.75% 
of the seats with only 62% of the vote. His control of the CA was complete. The opposition 
was not only marginalized but highly fragmented and therefore posed no threat to his agenda. 
In Ecuador, Rafael Correa also controlled a majority 61.54% of the seats in the CA. In 
Bolivia, while the MAS won 53.73% of the seats in the CA, this was not a controlling 
majority according to the voting rules of the assembly, which stipulated that decisions would 
be made by a two-thirds majority. 
Mobilizational and institutional leverage had independent and interactive effects on 
success at the initiation of the referendum. Executives with a strong mandate, having been 
elected with a majority of votes, had more influence over the judiciary and electoral 
institutions and they were also more inclined assert pressure on institutions to allow the 
process to move forward. Moreover, the maintenance of high levels of presidential approval 
at initiation strengthened the executive vis-à-vis other less popular, opposition-dominated 
institutions, like Congress and the Judiciary (C. Conaghan and de la Torre 2008). The reverse 
is also true; institutional leverage increased mobilizational leverage. The willingness to apply 
pressure and push forward with promised reforms in the face of institutional opposition 
increased popular support for these presidents. Data indicates that executives in Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador had historically high levels of presidential approval upon initiation of 
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In Venezuela, and Ecuador, the referendum passed with over 80% of the valid votes, but with only 37% 
turnout in the former and over 71% in the latter. It should also be noted that voting is compulsory in Ecaudor for 
literate citizens between 18 and 65 years of age. This is enforced with fines. In contrast, voting is entirely 
voluntary in Venezuela. In both Honduras and Bolivia, voting is compulsory but this is not enforced. 
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the process (Carlin, Hartlyn, and Martinez-Gallardo 2009).
171
 In Honduras, levels were 
significantly lower at initiation. 
Process of Drafting the Constitution 
During the process of drafting the constitution, executives needed to rely on their 
institutional leverage in two ways.  First, they had to neutralize threats to derail the process 
from opposition-dominated institutions, such as Congress. In both Venezuela and Ecuador, 
Congress was effectively closed by the CA. In Bolivia, on the other hand, Congress operated 
alongside the separately elected CA. Secondly, they had to retain control over the CA and 
push the body to work within existing time constraints. When institutional conflict arose, 
executives relied upon informal protest mobilization of supporters in defense of their agenda 
to keep the process under their control. 
In Venezuela, the institutional conflict around constitutional reform centered on 
whether the CA had supreme power to reorganize other existing institutions of the state. 
Although the Supreme Court ruled to allow the formation of a CA in January 1999, it 
claimed that ―the functioning of the CA does not mean that it can supplant the powers of the 
State or to assume the roles of the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches‖ (Brewer-
Carías 1999, 17). Still, the CA directly challenged the Congress and other institutions 
through the degree of legitimacy it could claim, having been directly elected. In September 
1999, a month after it convened for the first time, the CA declared ‗judicial and legislative 
emergencies,‘ suspending both the judicial and legislative branches in turn.  
By the end of December 1999, Congress, the Judiciary, and the National Electoral 
Council were closed and replaced with individuals associated with the governing coalition. 
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 More importantly, Chávez and Correa were able to maintain these levels throughout the reform process, a 
point discussed in the next section. 
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The opposition, viewing this move as undemocratic, took to the streets of Caracas. They 
were met by the civil defense wing of the National Armed Forces, the Guardia Nacional, as 
well as thousands of the president‘s supporters. Effectively, the CA had claimed the supreme 
power denied it by the Supreme Court‘s ruling. In December 1999, Congress was replaced  
with the Congresillo, a group of CA members chosen by Chávez to act as a legislative body 
in the interim (García-Guadilla 2003, 188). In this way, Chávez wielded a great deal of 
institutional leverage through his extraordinary partisan control of the CA, and the 
dominance of this institution over others. The military continued to support him throughout 
the process.  Lastly, Chávez also had a significant ability to mobilize supporters informally in 
the streets to defend his agenda at critical moments of conflict with the opposition. 
Likewise, in Ecuador, Correa was able to isolate and temporarily suspend Congress. 
If Correa had any doubts about the threat an opposition-dominated Congress posed for his 
ambitious reform agenda, he could look to the experience of the previous president, Alfredo 
Palacio, who was perpetually blocked by the institution. Mandato Constituyente N 1, the 
first ―constituent decree‖ of the CA, was issued on November 30, 2007. With 110 out of 130 
votes in favor, it declared the Congress in recess.
172
 Correa navigated the issue of the CA 
closing Congress very astutely, with a mind to how it would be received by the international 
community. The CA did not dismiss members of Congress outright but rather sent them 
home ‗temporarily,‘ declaring it in recess until a new constitution was approved.173 Had the 
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 Interview with Fanny Zamudio and Alfredo Espinoza (5/22/12). Several opposition CA members asserted in 
interviews that there was no legal basis for the CA to issue decrees; it was not meant to issue laws or decrees, 
rather the body was supposed to focus exclusively on writing a new constitutional text. 
 
173
Gustavo Larrea emphasized that while the result was effectively the same, the technical difference was 
crucial for legitimacy: ―when [the congressmen] went to complain to the OAS or the United Nations, they said 
‗Gentlemen, you are on legislative recess. Go home and do not cause trouble‘‖ (interview with Gustavo Larrea, 
6/8/12). 
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constitution not been approved, presumably the Congressmen would have reassumed their 
positions. 
In Ecuador, protests and demonstrations in defense of the Assembly were not nearly 
as central of a part of the process as it was in other cases considered here. The Assembly was 
held in Montecristi, a small, remote town along the coast. However, many social movements 
traveled there to sit outside in solidarity and keep a vigilant eye on the proceedings.
174
 Most 
of the conflict occurred within the CA itself, and even more specifically within members of 
the AP bloc. Social and religious issues, like abortion, divided Correa‘s supporters within the 
Assembly; Correa often determined the outcome of these conflicts himself during reunions of 
the bloc.
175
  Moreover, Correa‘s interests increasingly conflicted with those of the major 
indigenous organizations in Ecuador, including CONAIE and CONFENAIE (Becker 2011; 
Jameson 2010).
176
 Protests and demonstrations peaked at certain key moments in the process, 
though existing data does not indicate whether these mobilizations were in support of Correa 
or against him.
177
 In March 2007, just before the referendum to initiate the process was held 
in mid-April, protests and demonstrations spiked. In November of the same year, conflicts 
peaked again just after the September elections to the CA and as the body was convening for 
the first time. Lastly, conflict peaked in May 2008 just before Alberto Acosta, President of 
the CA, stepped down in June and the draft Constitution was approved in July. 
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 Interview with Rocio Rosero Garces, activist and Director of the Consejo Nacional de las Mujeres del 
Ecuador  (National Council of Ecuadorian Women - CONAMU) from 2003 to 2007 (7/10/12). 
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 Interview with Rosa Elena de la Torre (5/28/12) 
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 Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE). 
 
177
 Data collected by the author from Ecuador Debate, and supplemented with data from Polga-Hecimovich 
(2013). 
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The Bolivian case differed from the other two cases in that the CA and the Congress 
operated side-by-side throughout the reform process, and the MAS had significant levels of 
partisan representation within Congress.  For someone with an anti-institutional agenda, like 
Morales, this actually diminished institutional leverage. Even if Morales had wanted to 
sidestep or replace Congress, academics, observers, and former members of the CA in Boliva 
agree that he would likely not have been able to with such a large portion of Congress allied 
to him.
178
 Yet, just because they were allies did not preclude having to answer to them for 
going around the formal rules. Morales faced an exceptional predicament.  
The process of convening a CA was initiated by the legislature, and not by a 
referendum as in other cases. Morales had a small majority in the lower house, but did not 
control the upper house. In this way, the opposition in Congress retained bargaining power 
via-a-vis Morales during the process of establishing the CA. On March 3, 2006, Congress 
approved Law 3364 convoking the CA.
179
 This law stipulated that the final text had to be 
approved by two-thirds of the CA members present, followed by a popular referendum 
(Valeria, Alurralde, and Albó 2009). The opposition was initially satisfied with the 
compromise that Law 3364 represented because requiring a supermajority theoretically 
ensured that the new constitutional text would reflect consensus. However, once the CA was 
formed, the internal voting rules of the CA for the passage of each individual article became 
a sticking point. The opposition argued that a two-thirds majority was necessary to approve 
each article and the MAS argued that a simple majority was sufficient. The opposition 
                                                 
178
 Interviews with Franco Gamboa Rocabado (1/31/12), Fernando Mayorga (3/22/12), Gamal Serhán Jaldín 
(3/20/12). 
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 On the same day that Congress approved the convocation of the CA, they also approved Law 3365 
establishing a national referendum on departmental autonomy, an issue of great importance to the opposition 
(Valeria, Alurralde, and Albó 2009, 102). 
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quickly determined that Morales and the MAS were not interested in consensus. Javier 
Limpias, a member of PODEMOS in the CA, points out that: 
[The MAS] insisted in approving everything, or at least everything that they worked 
on in the reports of the commissions, with a simple majority… and not with what was 
called for by the law. And on the other side, we the opposition were concentrated in a 
political project that never consolidated, that is called PODEMOS – Poder 
Democrático y Social. We realized that the only way to stop the MAS was – and this 
is a confession – was to make the CA fail. Because if we left the MAS an open road 
to achieve the Constitution that they wanted, then we would be accomplices 
(Interview with Javier Limpias, 4/13/12). 
 
In the end, so much time had been expended on the internal voting rules of the 
Assembly that only five months were left for debate of more substantive issues, which 
proved to be even more riddled with conflict. Some sessions turned violent. In August of 
2007, the Assembly was paralyzed by conflict over potentially returning the location of the 
capital to Sucre, an idea advanced by opponents of Morales. Frustrated by gridlock, 
thousands of MAS supporters arrived in Sucre from all around the country ―to organize 
‗resistance from the streets‘‖ (Ibaibarriaga 2007). The President of the CA, Silvia Lazarte, 
requested that the military provide the body a safer place to hold sessions – the Lieutenant 
Edmundo Andrade Military Academy.
180
  Morales‘ supporters continued to hold sessions 
there, but the opposition refused. They felt that this move, convening the assembly in a 
closed military space, compromised the democratic nature of the process.
181
 Law 3364 
convening the CA set a specific timeline for the CA process. Article 24 stipulated the CA 
would be in session for ―no less than 6 months but no more than 1 calendar year.‖182 This 
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 Initially, the Assembly had been meeting in the Gran Mariscal Theater in Sucre. However, other meetings 
without the opposition took place in Oruro (Larson et al. 2008). 
 
181
 Morales maintained that the opposition‘s refusal to participate was ―just a ploy and a boycott of a few who 
are not interested in ending poverty and inequality in Bolivia, trying to prevent the necessary structural reforms, 
that is the fundamental issue‖ (Ibaibarriaga 2007). 
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 Law 3364, http://www.legislacionmunicipal.fam.bo/Archivo/Docs/Leyes/Ley_3364.pdf (accessed: 7/12/12). 
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meant that the CA should be concluded in August 2007. Running out of time because of 
prolonged gridlock, the Assembly was forced to request an extension from Congress. This 
once again gave the opposition controlling the upper house of Congress a degree of 
bargaining power. Morales was also facing pressure to complete the process, not only by the 
opposition, but also by allied social movements, including indigenous groups who wanted a 
resolution to reforms (Gamboa Rocabado 2009, 265).  The CA did not conclude until 3 
months later, in November 2007. 
Even though they did not face the same procedural constraints on initiating the CA 
process, Morales and the MAS displayed a willingness to work around the formal rules 
within the CA. They failed to conform to the two-thirds stipulation for approving the final 
text (Gamboa Rocabado 2009, 269). In a secret session with no opposition presence, MAS 
deputies voted to allow a simple (rather than a two-thirds) majority to approve a draft 
constitution (Lehoucq 2008, 118). The streets of Sucre erupted in violent protests and the 
opposition publically denounced these issues in the media, but the judiciary including the 
now impotent and marginalized TC remained silent on the issue. The congressional 
opposition, who had to approve the extension of the Assembly‘s timeline, gained a small 
window and some leverage for negotiation (Gamboa Rocabado 2009, 265). The result was 
the alteration of the text approved by the CA, leading to several areas where the text now has 
contradictions (Gamboa Rocabado 2009; Lupien 2011; C. Romero, Börth, and Peñaranda 
2009). What is clear in examining the case of Bolivia in comparative perspective is that 
executives who stuck to a more stringent and limited timeline clearly fared better in their 
ability to control the process.
183
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 Alberto Acosta told Correa that more time was needed to complete the Constitution. When he refused to 
allow it, Acosta resigned over the conflict. Correa told him that he was ‗too much of a democrat‘ and the 
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Figure 8: Variation in Presidential Approval during Reform 
  
  
Data Source: (Carlin, Hartlyn, and Martinez-Gallardo 2009) 
 
Presidential popularity, or the ability to maintain high levels of public approval, 
remained a crucial component of success throughout the drafting the Constitution. Correa 
and Chávez had historically high levels of approval over the entire period, from initiation to 
ratification.
 184
 Figure 8 above shows quarterly public approval data for all four presidents 
over time, where the black box in each subfigure demonstrates the reform period, between 
initiation of the process through a referendum or elections to the CA and the conclusion with 
                                                                                                                                                       
Constituent Assembly pressed on without Acosta to complete the reform on time (interviews with Alberto 
Acosta, 6/11/12, and Esperanza Martinez, 7/17/12). 
 
184
 For a detailed discussion of how Chávez built popular support, see Canache (2002). For more on how Correa 
cultivated popularity through a ‗permanent campaign,‘ see Conaghan and de la Torre (2008). 
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ratification via referendum. These graphs do not do justice to the historic nature of these 
levels of approval. However, for comparative purposes, presidential approval reached as low 
as 20% in Ecuador in the 1990s (Carlin, Hartlyn, and Martinez-Gallardo 2009). Zelaya had 
comparatively much lower levels of approval overall. 
These graphs also demonstrate the importance of several aspects of the timing of an 
attempt at reform. Attempts made early on in an executive‘s tenure in office occur during the 
honeymoon period and tend to benefit from higher levels of approval. As can be seen by the 
dark box in Figure 8-D, Zelaya‘s attempt at reform came when his approval had just reached 
an all-time low. In addition, attempts at reform that dragged out over longer periods of time 
increased the potential for falling levels of presidential popularity. In Bolivia, the process of 
revising the Constitution, from inauguration of the CA to the referendum to approve the text, 
took 28 months. This was much longer than initially expected and was 18 months longer than 
in Ecuador and 24 months longer than in Venezuela. During that time, Morales‘ approval 
slipped (Figure 8-C).
185
 Gridlock led to a loss of public support, as people began to question 
whether Morales would be able to follow through on his promises surrounding the CA and 
the new constitution.  
In Bolivia, Morales had not benefited from a referendum at initiation, which would 
have served as a direct display of popular support for his agenda in the beginning, but he was 
subjected to a recall referendum during the height of the conflict within the CA. This process 
was initiated by the opposition-dominated Senate. If fewer people voted to retain Morales 
than had initially elected him to office (53.7%), then he would lose his position as President 
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 Though the Bolivian process began before the process in Ecuador, it actually finished after. Correa was 
extremely adamant about finishing on the pre-established timeline, in fact so much so that Alberto Acosta 
resigned as President of the Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly because he maintained that the body needed 
more time. 
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before the end of his term. On August 10, 2008, the President was confirmed in office with 
67.41% of voters voting ―yes‖ and with a turnout of 83.28% (International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems 2013). The process was not an unqualified success, however, as powerful 
opposition governors in the lowlands also survived the recall referendum (Forero 2008). 
Since both sides could claim victory, it served to further intensify conflict in Bolivia (Altman 
2010). 
Ratification 
In all three cases where the process moved forward, a referendum was held in order 
for citizens to approve the text of the new Constitution approved by the CA. Though by no 
means a formality, this seemed the least likely moment in which the process would fail in 
any of these cases. Once significant time and resources were invested into the new text, the 
broader population was eager to see the process come to fruition. Moreover, by this point, 
any institutionalized opposition had either been eliminated as a viable counterpoint to the 
executive‘s agenda (Venezuela and Ecuador) or had been incorporated in some way through 
negotiations over the final text of the Constitution (Bolivia). As a result, when the population 
went to the polls, the majority of voters voted in favor of the new text. 
Table 15: Referenda to Approve the Constitution 
  Venezuela Ecuador Bolivia 
Date 15-Dec-99 28-Sep-08 25-Jan-09 
% Yes 71.78% 69.46% 61.43% 
Turnout 44.38% 75.72% 90.24% 
Source: (International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems 2013) 
 
As demonstrated in Table 15, above, new constitutions were ratified by large 
percentages of voters. Turnout varied significantly and was lowest in Venezuela. Regardless, 
once they were approved by the public in highly publicized referenda, other institutions had 
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weak ground from which to challenge new Constitutions. Referenda legitimized the 
processes in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  There was no turning back.  
Though all three CA processes came to a close once constitutions were ratified, 
executives controlled the outcome of reform to varying degrees. The next section analyses 
the overall success of the process in each case. 
Success 
In both Venezuela and Ecuador, Chávez and Correa were able to dominate the CA 
process and direct reforms. They used their mobilizational leverage to influence the CA 
through partisan control, and their institutional leverage to manage the tensions that existed 
with other institutions. In Ecuador, Correa and AP set up the commissions within the CA so 
that each had a majority from their party and a minority of the opposition. Former CA 
members across party lines openly admitted – some lamenting – the fact that the only real 
debate took place not within the plenary sessions, but within the meetings of the AP block.
186
 
Others justified the dominance of the government in the CA process expressing that it was 
unreasonable for the opposition to expect that they would be able to define the process of 
reform once it had begun.
187
 For instance, Rosana Alvarado, a CA member for AP, felt that 
the President, with the support of a broad portion of the population, had every right to 
dominate the reform process because it was his vision that initially brought reform to the 
table. In Venezuela, the dominance of Chávez and the MVR was similar throughout the 
process. The opposition was fragmented and had entered the CA in such small numbers that 
it was rendered effectively powerless. 
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 Interviews with Rosana Alvarado (7/10/12), Monica Chuji (7/3/12), Pablo Lucio Paredes (7/30/12), Rosa 
Elena de la Torre (5/28/12) 
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 Interview with Rosana Alvarado (7/10/12). 
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Bolivia is an example of mixed success in terms of Morales‘ ability to control the 
reform process and the outcome of reform. While demonstrating high mobilizational and 
institutional leverage, both of these factors were limited in key ways. First, the high degree of 
autonomy of organized and powerful indigenous movements in Bolivia meant that Morales 
continually had to negotiate with them throughout the process. The indigenous groups 
brought well-formed proposals for the Constitution to the bargaining table.
188
 In the end, they 
succeeded in enshrining important checks on government power, such as the mechanism of 
binding consultation, brought to the forefront during the TIPNIS conflict.
189
 Meanwhile, 
Morales was also limited in terms of his institutional leverage. Despite controlling a simple 
majority in Congress, allowing the institution to function alongside of the CA left the 
opposition with an opportunity to influence the process.  Ultimately, the opposition in 
Congress was able to negotiate and revise parts of the constitutional text approved by the CA 
before it was sent to a referendum. In this manner, Morales‘ reform via CA cannot be 
considered as sweeping of a success as in the cases of Chávez and Correa.  
In Honduras, Zelaya‘s attempt to reform the Constitution via CA ended in stark 
failure with his removal from office. Without institutional leverage, including the support of 
the military and the Supreme Court, Zelaya‘s attempt was doomed to failure. Yet, Zelaya 
also lacked mobilizational leverage in comparison with the rest of the cases considered here. 
This preventing him from being able to force the complacency of the military and other 
institutions through a demonstration of widespread popular support. Likewise, his lack of 
institutional leverage also probably fed into his inability to develop sufficient mobilizational 
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 Interview with Fernando Garces (3/22/13). 
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 Between August and October 2011, Morales came into conflict with two indigenous organizations, CIDOB 
and CONAMAQ, over a proposal to build a road through the park and indigenous territory, Territorio Indígena 
y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS). 
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leverage. When Zelaya met with early resistance from the Supreme Court, the Military, and 
even representatives of the United States, he should have known better than to persist in his 
attempts. His failure did not come as much of a surprise, even if the dramatic form of his 
removal did. 
Where presidents were able to control the process completely, as in Venezuela and 
Ecuador, this led to tight control over the outcome. In both of these cases, the new 
Constitution reflected the ideas of Chávez and the MVR and Correa and AP respectively. 
Moreover, it allowed presidents to regain office in subsequent years and to continue their 
dramatic processes of institutional change (Table 16). In Bolivia, the executive did not have 
as much success in controlling the outcome of constitutional text, but Morales and the MAS 
still retained popularity, gained re-election, and the continued ability to implement reform. In 
part, retaining control over the process allowed executives to more directly impact the rules 
of the game as defined in the constitution, leading to a concentration of power. At the same 
time, successfully seeing the process through to completion was not a small feat and it 
demonstrated significant executive political skill. This may have led to a bump in support for 
these executives and their agendas. 
Table 16: Results of Subsequent Presidential Elections 
President Country Date 
Months Since 
Ratification Round % Vote 
Hugo Chávez Venezuela 
30-July-00 7 1 59.76 
3-Dec-06 83 1 62.84 
7-Oct-12 153 1 55.07 
Rafael Correa Ecuador 
26-Apr-09 6 1 51.99 
17-Feb-13 52 1 57.17 
Evo Morales Bolivia 9-Dec-09 10 1 64.22 
Sources: IPU Parline, except in the case of Venezuela: www.cne.gov.ve 
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Likewise, although all three presidents were blocked in Congress before the process, 
they were able to capitalize on the success of the CA process to consolidate power by gaining 
legislative majorities in subsequent elections (Table 17). Many scholars argue that Venezuela 
has become less democratic since the CA reforms, some going so far as to call it a ‗hybrid‘ or 
‗competitive authoritarian‘ regime (Corrales and Penfold 2011; Mainwaring 2012). Others 
have gone further to argue that this slide into competitive authoritarianism was a direct result 
of success the constitutional reform processes in all three cases (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). 
For now, I leave aside the highly polarized debate in the literature about whether Venezuela 
is democratic or not. Instead, my argument here is limited to the assertion that success in the 
CA reform process allows for the consolidation of power, regardless of whether that occurs 
through democratic or non-democratic means. The success of the CA process allowed 
Chávez to consolidate a grip on power and policymaking in Venezuela for the next 12 years. 
Table 17: Partisan Power in the Legislature after Reform 
    Lower House Upper House 
  Legislative Term # Seats % Seats % 
Venezuela 
2000-2005 99/165 60.00%   
2005-2010 161/167 96.40%   
2010-2015 95/165 57.57%   
Ecuador 
2009-2013 59/124 47.58%     
2013-2017 100/137 52.30%   
Bolivia 2009-2014 88/130 67.69% 26/36 72.22% 
Source: (International Parliamentary Union 2013); Note: Ecuador remained 
unicameral while Venezuela became unicameral with the 1999 Constitution. In 
Venezuela, opposition parties boycotted the 2005 elections. 
 
Correa‘s relative dominance of the CA process led to widespread disillusionment 
among many allies within social movements. The opposition, indigenous groups, unions, and 
many women‘s groups ultimately felt coopted and shut out of the process.190 This could 
                                                 
190
 Interviews with Pablo Lucio Paredes (7/30/12), Monica Chuji (7/3/12), Rocio Rosero Garces (7/10/12), 
Diego Cano (7/25/12). 
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explain the loss of electoral support for Correa‘s party in subsequent legislative elections. 
However, Correa had consolidated sufficient executive powers through the new constitution 
so that his policymaking ability was not limited by his lack of a legislative majority between 
2009 and 2013. Then, in the February 2013 elections, Alianza PAIS was able to regain a 
majority of seats in Congress. This has served to only further consolidate Correa‘s grip on 
power and policymaking in the post-CA period. 
Conclusion 
When presidents want to pursue an ambitious reform agenda through a CA, the 
success of the process hinges on mobilizational and institutional leverage. There are some 
conditions under which these two forms of leverage may exist organically – such as within a 
context of crisis – and yet the president may also cultivate them through strategies – such as 
developing an anti-institutional agenda or coopting organized social movements. At the 
earliest stage, mobilizational leverage, or the ability to mobilize popular support among 
citizens, ensures that the executive is elected with a mandate. Upon initiation of the CA 
process, the executive needs sufficient popular support to pass referenda and fill the CA with 
the president‘s supporters in popular elections. During the process of drafting the 
constitution, the executives sometimes relies on informal protest mobilization to engage civil 
society groups in defense of the process, filling the streets surrounding the CA with 
supporters. At the final stage of ratification through referenda, electoral mobilization once 
again becomes central to success. Yet, mobilizational leverage alone is insufficient; 
executives also rely upon institutional leverage at several crucial moments. The executive 
needs the ability to convince Congress, the judiciary, and/or an electoral council to allow a 
referendum to form a CA in the first place, especially where there is no legal precedent for it. 
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Institutional leverage remains important at subsequent stages of the process as well; during 
the drafting of constitutions, presidents need to maintain a close relationship with CA and 
eliminate threats from other institutions to allow the process to continue. 
This analysis raises a number of additional questions. Is reform via CA likely to be a 
passing phenomenon, or something that will continue in the future? In 2013, it continued to 
be a salient topic for politicians campaigning for president. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro, 
Zelaya‘s wife, campaigned for the presidency on the promise of a CA and constitutional 
reform. While the official results of the November 2013 elections showed Castro in second 
place with 28.78% of the vote, she quickly challenged the results, citing discrepancies 
between tally sheets and electronic results.
191
 In Chile, a political ‗outsider,‘ Marco Enriquez-
Omanami ran for President in 2013, proposing constitutional reform via CA. He came in a 
distant third place in the first round of elections with only 10.99% of the vote.  Following the 
logic presented above, it is unsurprising that Enrique-Ominami had low mobilizational 
leverage in Chile because he lacked several of the preconditions that aid in the success of this 
reform strategy. First, an anti-institutional agenda is not likely to resonate with the population 
because Chilean democracy is relatively well-consolidated (Freedom House 2013). Secondly, 
it is also unclear whether there was a sufficient context of crisis in Chile in 2013.  
My research shows this process of reform is most likely to occur and succeed in a 
context of crisis, where there is a lack of respect for democratic institutions and the leader 
employs an anti-institutional agenda, and where civil society is strong but coopted. Most 
Latin American countries are not currently in crisis, economic or otherwise. Moreover, the 
failure of Zelaya‘s attempt in Honduras, as well as the unsuccessful candidacies of a number 
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November 2013 election results are available at the Tribunal Supremo Electoral of Honduras: 
http://siede.tse.hn/escrutinio/index.php. The justification of Castro‘s challenge made international news: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/world/americas/honduras-election-results-challenged.html 
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of presidential candidates campaigning on reform via CA in Chile, Honduras, Mexico and 
Peru suggests that the opposition is learning to identify this process and is working to derail 
its success early-on. Therefore, there are several reasons why this strategy may be less likely 
in short term.  
Second, what is the effect of this reform process on democracy? The same question 
has been asked recently in relation to other outcomes of executive-legislative conflict, 
especially the inability of Latin American presidents to complete their terms (Hochstetler and 
Samuels 2011). However, consensus has not been reached and the literature is divided 
between pessimists, who feel that institutional crises resulting in the removal of presidents 
have lasting detrimental effects on democracy (Pérez-Liñán 2007; Valenzuela 2004) and 
optimists, who believe that these effects are merely temporary if they exist at all (Hochstetler 
2006; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011). Elsewhere, I explore the effects of the CA in greater 
detail, analyzing the short-term effects of such reform on democracy along the two principal 
dimensions: contestation and participation (Dahl 1971). 
Though the question of the effects of this process merits a separate analysis, the 
present discussion contributes to our understanding of the consequences of these processes 
for democracy by tracing the ensuing institutional conflict. It is important to acknowledge the 
role of these reform processes in opening new avenues for the participation of previously-
excluded sectors of society. Reform has also led to a dramatic expansion of the legal rights 
afforded to aggrieved groups, which will be explored further in the next chapter. At the same 
time, where executives were successful in consolidating their control over the reform 
process, they have also been able to consolidate power more generally in the political system. 
The opposition, especially in Venezuela and Ecuador, has been unable to pose an 
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institutional check on the executive‘s power since the CA process. The CA process clearly 
laid the groundwork for the executive‘s consolidation of power, or hiperpresidencialismo 
(hyper-presidentialism). Where this process failed in Honduras, the institutional conflict 
resulting in Zelaya‘s removal has had an equally, if not more, detrimental effect on 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM VIA CA FOR DEMOCRACY 
Some say that we have the power, false, we are not in power, we only have the 
government, the executive branch. What can be done by decree, we are doing, what can 
be done with statutes we cannot do. In the elections of December of this year (2009), the 
power that the people have means that we'll get the executive branch, the legislative 
branch, and the judicial branch. Then the Bolivian people will have the power to do 
justice to workers (Evo Morales on the campaign trail)
192
 
 
Introduction 
   Thus far, this dissertation has examined the dynamics of executive attempts to pass 
ambitious reform via Constituent Assembly (CA). In this chapter, I turn to an examination of 
short-term outcomes. In Bolivia and Honduras, only five years have passed since the reform 
process or attempt under analysis here. In Ecuador, it has been six years, while in Venezuela 
fifteen years have elapsed. With these differences in time horizons in mind, I ask: what appear to 
be the primary consequences for democracy of implementing (or, in the case of Honduras, 
attempting to implement) ambitious reforms in this way?  
In all cases where reform via CA has been attempted, a primary consequence has been 
polarization of opinions over the process, which, in turn, has had  significant impacts for the 
political system and the party system. In successful cases, the reform process has had two 
primary effects:  it has allowed executives to consolidate policymaking power and it has 
incorporated previously-excluded groups into the political system as well as new movements into 
the party system. In unsuccessful cases, candidates proposing reform have either lost their 
campaigns or been removed from power. Opinions expressed by the media and even in academic 
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 As cited in Mayorga (2012, 53–54). 
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circles have commonly also been polarized, with some perceiving attempts at reform via CA as 
intrinsically authoritarian (Newman 2011) and others as unquestionably democratic (Colón-Rios 
2009; J. Colón-Ríos 2010). My aim here is to move beyond broad characterizations to provide 
more nuanced analysis of the outcomes for democracy.
193
 To do so, I disaggregate the concept of 
democracy into its two key components, participation and contestation (Dahl 1971). To assess 
participation, I focus here on formal voting participation and the inclusion of previously-
excluded and minority voices in the political process. By contestation, I mean the presence and 
effectiveness of horizontal and vertical mechanisms of accountability. I examine the ways that 
both the process of implementing ambitious reform and the content of new constitutions (ex. 
concentration of power in the executive, mechanisms of participation) has led to changes along 
these two dimensions of democracy.  
My central argument is that the polarized views regarding the consequences of  CA-
enacted  reforms are due to the fact that these reforms have enhanced the first dimension of 
democracy – participation – while they have undermined the second dimension – contestation. 
On one hand, those advancing reform have claimed that they are working to incorporate those 
formally marginalized by the partidocracia; the extent to which this incorporation has been 
meaningful and not just rhetorical is an empirical question that will be addressed below. On the 
other hand, these reforms have also allowed for the consolidation of power in the executive 
branch, which has reduced the effectiveness of democratic ‗checks and balances.‘ With this in 
mind, it is important to consider the tension between divergent conceptions of democracy: 
majoritarian or participatory vs. liberal or representative models. 
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 For another more balanced account of the consequences of these reform processes in Venezuela and Bolivia, see: 
Maxwell A. Cameron and Kenneth E. Sharpe (2010). 
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It is plausible that ambitious reform will lead to shifts in both inter-governmental 
relations and state-society relations. It is even more plausible when executives attempt reform via 
CA for the following reasons. The CA process in Venezuela (1998-1999), Bolivia (2006-2009), 
and Ecuador (2007-2008) attempted to drastically reorganize the political system and the balance 
of power among government institutions and groups within society. Moreover, the CA process 
itself was highly participatory. In Honduras, the process of reform never actually came to fruition 
but rather came to an abrupt halt with Zelaya's (2009) removal from office. This event generated 
much controversy over issues of constitutionality (Trithart 2013), and the consequences for 
democracy.
194
 Some consider Zelaya's removal a coup and a breakdown of democracy while 
others consider it a highly democratic defense of the constitution. As of 2012, Honduras has the 
highest levels of popular dissatisfaction with democracy in Latin America (Hinton, Smith, and 
Zechmeister 2013). Thus, I would expect to negative impacts on contestation and participation, 
particularly because the process was stopped abruptly through a highly controversial mechanism. 
I would also expect low levels of political tolerance as a result of post-coup polarization. 
It would be imprudent to attempt to discuss the effects of these reform processes on 
democracy without first considering the baseline for comparison. Comparisons could be made to 
an ideal-type of democracy. However, it would also be possible to compare the political system 
after reform to the system that was in place prior to reform. The latter comparison may be more 
relevant because this is also likely what many citizens are doing when they evaluate the impact 
of reform on their own lives. With this in mind, I opt for the latter comparison, acknowledging 
the shortcomings of the political system before reform began. In all of these cases, there were 
                                                 
194
 Opinion polling during the four months after the coup showed that: 41% of respondents believed his removal was 
justified, while 28% did not; a plurality of respondents opposed exiling Zelaya; and the portion of respondents 
holding a favorable opinion of Zelaya actually increased with respect to data from before the coup (Trithart 2013, 
114–115). 
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major issues with democracy prior to reform, including issues for contestation (institutional 
conflict, a lack of respect for political institutions) and participation (politically marginalized 
groups within society).  
These concrete problems with democracy in practice translated into the discourse of 
leaders, as well as citizens' evaluations of the political system and opinions over democracy more 
broadly (Canache and Allison 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Argentina's La Nación interviewed 
Hugo Chávez in September of 1999. When asked about whether he had too much control over 
other institutions, the CA and the likely majority he would win in Congress, Chávez said: "I am 
not collecting power. The power was concentrated before. Here, upstairs (he looks up toward the 
ceiling) they built a suite for the mistress of President Pérez. His wife lived in the mansion. The 
Venezuelan process was a culture of two parties that, basically, was a complicit society. Now, I 
will start the devolution of power. It's false that the Assembly obeys me."
195
 Citizens were also 
fed up with the politics of the partidocracia. As can be seen in Figure 9 below, about 35% of 
Ecuadorians surveyed in 2004 said that they would "strongly approve" of suspending Congress 
and prohibiting political parties. Another 20% responded that they would "somewhat approve," 
meaning that a majority (55%) demonstrated some approval of the CA strategy ultimately 
implemented by President Correa just three years later (Latin American Public Opinion Project 
2014).
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 "No soy golpista", dice Chávez" 1999. La Nación. September 9, 1999. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/152817-no-
soy-un-golpista-dice-chavez> (Accessed: 5/2/13). 
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 Among the cases in my sample, this question was only asked in surveys in Ecuador in 2004. 
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Figure 9: Lack of Support for Congress and Political Parties in Ecuador, 2004 
 
 
In the context of widespread popular discontent with traditional political parties, the 
reforms to the constitution in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia aimed to move the countries 
toward a more participatory model of democracy. For example, the 1999 Constitution in 
Venezuela does not even include the term "political party" (McCoy 2010, 91). Instead, these 
constitutions focused on given the people the power to hold leaders accountable directly, through 
mechanisms of direct democracy, such as plebiscites and recall referenda. The goal behind these 
reforms was eliminating the mediation of corrupt and bankrupt representative institutions, 
particularly the legislature. 
This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I discuss the relevant literature and my 
theoretical approach to assessing impacts on democracy along the two key dimensions of 
contestation and participation, as these have been conceptualized by Robert A. Dahl (1971). 
Next, I operationalize the two dimensions of democracy. To evaluate contestation, I consider 
indicators of horizontal and vertical accountability. To evaluate participation, I examine 
indicators of both formal and informal mechanisms of participation. Lastly, I consider one 
35% 
20% 
18% 
18% 
9% 
If the Congress was suspended and political parties were 
prohibited, would you…? 
Strongly approve
Somewhat approve
Somewhat disapprove
Definitely disapprove
Don't know
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2004) 
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indicator, political tolerance, which addresses aspects both of these concepts in unison. The third 
section examines contestation in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Honduras. The fourth section 
analyzes participation in the latter three cases using survey data from the Americas Barometer by 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The fifth section presents my analysis and 
findings. I discover that successful cases of reform via CA may, to varying extents, privilege 
inclusive participation over rights to contestation. Moreover, Bolivia stands out as having fewer 
issues overall, particularly with vertical accountability and formal participation. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that a more deliberative process will lead to more inclusive outcomes. Where 
the CA process was tightly controlled by executives (ie. Ecuador), I find that these process 
translated into reductions in contestation and participation after reform. Where the reform 
process failed dramatically, I find the most significant restrictions of contestation and 
participation in the short-term. However, this could potentially be a short-term shock and the 
2013 elections in Honduras may indicate a rebounding on these dimensions.  Lastly, I conclude 
by summarizing my assessments of the short-term impact of implementing ambitious reform via 
CA in Latin America. I also consider briefly the potential future path of Honduras. 
Polyarchy & Conceptions of Democracy 
For Robert A. Dahl (1971), democratic regimes should be responsive to the demands of 
their citizens.  To qualify as a political democracy, a regime must demonstrate the most basic 
institutional requirements: free and fair elections; suffrage; open eligibility for public office; 
political competition; accountability; as well as the freedoms of association, expression, and 
information (Dahl 1971, 3). However, responding to the demands of all citizens is close to 
impossible in practice, so Dahl proposes the use of the term 'polyarchy' instead to identify 
countries that approximate the unrealizable ideal of having the political preferences of all 
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citizens weigh equally. Polyarchy measures the degree to which countries meet the minimum 
institutional requirements for political democracy as enumerated above (Coppedge and Reinicke 
1990, 52). 
Democracy is a multifaceted concept. As such, there are at least two dimensions along 
which the process of democratization may occur: public contestation and participation (Dahl 
1971, 7). The former refers to the opportunities available to express opposition, in other words 
the degree of liberalization or competition of the political system.  The latter refers to the right to 
participate in elections, public office, and otherwise seek to influence public policy. Dahl's basic 
model appears in Figure 10 below. Some academics and politicians have made claims that the 
CA process either improves democracy or it reflects a breakdown of democracy. These 
hypotheses are shown with dashed black arrows in the figure below. 
Figure 10: Reform via CA and Trajectories of Democratization 
 
Note: Adapted from Dahl (1971, 7) 
 
In contrast, I hypothesize that successful processes of reform via CA have generated a 
movement within the realm of polyarchy, deepening participation but reducing contestation. The 
solid black arrow in the figure above demonstrates this trajectory. Conversely, the results of 
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failed processes of reform via CA may differ significantly. Depending upon institutional 
responses, it may simply result in the status quo for a political regime. For example, if a 
candidate merely loses elections and accepts this loss, then there may not be repercussions for 
democracy. In the extreme, institutional responses as there were in Honduras,  may impose 
significant restrictions on polyarchy in the short-term, leading to democratic backsliding (the 
solid red arrow in Figure 1 above). It is also possible that with time, there will be a rebound 
toward or to polyarchy, as restrictions are lifted and there is a return to normalcy. In Honduras, 
Zelaya's removal led to an immediate and dramatic restriction along both dimensions of 
polyarchy, as will be discussed below. However, by the 2013 elections, some restrictions had 
been lifted and the opposition performed well in elections, with Xiomara Castro nearly winning. 
Even so, as of 2013, Freedom House describes the country as "not an electoral democracy."
197
 
While a consensus has emerged in the literature around a minimal procedural definition 
of democracy, two dichotomous conceptions of democracy produce tension within modern Latin 
American democracies (Roberts 1998, 19). The first is a liberal representative conception 
emphasizing effective institutions of horizontal accountability (O'Donnell 1998) or contestation.  
In this view, elected officials should be constrained by a constitution; independent institutions, 
parties and branches of government are necessary in order to enforce the constitution and 
constrain leaders.  The second conception focuses on popular sovereignty or, more simply, the 
idea that ―a government should do what most of its citizens want it to do‖ (O'Donnell 1998, 166).  
This conceptualization stresses the participation of all citizens in the decision making process 
and the importance of majority rule. This leads to a reliance on referenda, plebicites, recall, and 
popular initiatives, which may either complement or potentially bypass existing processes of 
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 "Freedom in the World: Honduras." 2013. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/honduras#.U1JaV1fKkwE> (Accessed: 4/19/2014). 
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representative democracy, depending on the context (Dalton, Scarrow and Cain 2004, 126).  This 
tension is quite palpable among Latin American policymakers and analysts today.  As a Bolivian 
political analyst noted in a UNDP (2010) report: 
There are two perspectives of democracy: on the one hand, a conception of democracy in 
institutional terms, based in theory of the separation of powers and balance of power – 
the conception of liberal democracy -; and what we are living in practice is a conception 
of democracy from society, a conception of social democracy that makes decisions to 
solve its own set of problems (45).  
 
The present analysis directly addresses these divergent conceptions by emphasizing the 
tradeoff between majority rule and the protection of minority rights (Schmitter and Karl 1991; 
O‘Donnell 1998; Coppedge 2003). While moving toward a more participatory form of 
democracy potentially creates new opportunities for participation and increases vertical 
accountability, it may sacrifice contestation through limitations on horizontal accountability 
(Barczak 2001; McCoy 2010). At the same time, increases in polarization as a result of this 
process could exacerbate issues of political intolerance, which would have important 
consequences for both participation and contestation.  
Conceptualization & Measurement 
Many scholars have drawn from Dahl's work on polyarchy in an attempt to establish 
concrete measures of the dimensions he theorized. However, all of the existing measures present 
issues and tradeoffs for the study of democracy in general and this study specifically.
198
  Because 
I am interested in a relatively recent process, there are issues with availability of some preferred 
measures. One example are the indicators of contestation and participation developed by Michael 
Coppege, Angel Alvarez, and Claudio Maldonado (2008); however, this data only runs through 
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democracy, see: Coppedge (2012, 11–48), Norris (2012, 51–58), and Munck (2009, 13–37). 
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2000 and hence does not capture the process of interest here in the bulk of the cases of interest 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras).  
In thinking about the effort to measure polyarchy, Gerardo L. Munck (2009) refers to 
contestation and participation as "attributes" of the broader concept of democracy (32). Likewise, 
he recognizes that these attributes are composed by a series of components (ex. freedom of the 
press, the right to vote, etc). Thus, the measurement of contestation or participation involves a 
process of aggregation across multiple components; likewise, the measurement of democracy lies 
at an even higher level of analysis, requiring the combination of these two attributes. Moreover, 
Coppege, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008) provide convincing evidence that the majority of the 
variation captured by common aggregated measures of democracy (such as Freedom House or 
Polity) is aligned with the two dimensions of democracy proposed by Dahl (1971). 
Instead of choosing a single aggregated measure, I employ multiple data sources and both 
qualitative and quantitative observations to capture key aspects of both contestation and 
participation. Below, I detail my approach to the measurement of these attributes of democracy, 
as well as an important concept touching on both attributes: political tolerance. 
Contestation 
The main theoretical premise behind contestation is that citizens should be able to 
formulate and signify their preferences, and that government should weigh those preferences 
equally (Dahl 1971 2). It implies governmental accountability, both to the broader population 
(vertical accountability) and also among democratic institutions (horizontal accountability). 
When Dahl considers opportunities for public opposition, he takes into account the autonomy 
and allocation of power to the legislative and judicial institutions (1971, 240). 
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Therefore, the mechanisms ensuring adequate public contestation fall into two categories.  
First, there are those that ensure that elections are free and fair, and hence that the opposition has 
unrestricted opportunity to express their preferences to the government. This category broadly 
includes the provision and effective protection of civil liberties and freedom of the press. Civil 
liberties are integral to the protection of "societal accountability," social mobilization that may 
trigger mechanisms of horizontal accountability (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti 2000, 152).  Secondly, 
there are mechanisms that ensure effective "checks and balances" within the government, 
providing the opposition representation within the government. These mechanisms go beyond 
the partisan composition of Congress, to include also the effectiveness of judicial oversight and 
oversight by other auditing agencies as well (ex. electoral councils, controller generals, 
ombudsman, etc.). Without effective oversight, legislative checks on executive power may be 
incapable of constraining the executive. 
Table 18: Operationalization of Contestation 
Dimension  Indicators Measures 
Vertical  
Accountability 
Freedom of association Freedom of association subcategory 
score (Freedom House) 2006-2014
199
 
Freedom of expression 
and the press 
Freedom of expression subcategory 
score (Freedom House) 2006-2014; 
Press Freedom (Freedom House) 
Horizontal  
Accountability 
Legislative oversight Partisan control; reactive powers 
Judicial oversight Independence of the judiciary 
Other oversight agencies Independence of Electoral Councils, etc. 
 
Vertical accountability implies that the leader must answer to citizens. This cannot be 
true without the protection of key civil liberties.
200
 Of course, civil liberties are a broad category 
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 The specific components of each Freedom House measure included in the analysis of vertical accountability are 
detailed in Appendix C. 
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 While Dahl (1971) never uses the terms "vertical" or "horizontal accountability," the factors he considers largely 
fall within these categories and overlap significantly with the ones I consider above. His "opposition opportunity" 
measure takes into account: "Freedom to form or join organizations," "Freedom of expression," and "Alternative 
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and arguably there are a number of additional freedoms that factor into the extent to which 
citizens can contest the government's actions. However, I consider two vital freedoms as 
examples here: freedom of association as well as freedom of expression/freedom of the press. I 
hypothesize that executives willing to bend the rules to marginalize opposition during the CA 
process are likely going to continue these practices after reform. Therefore, they may be likely to 
find ways to stifle opposition by restricting freedoms contained within the very constitutions that 
they helped to design. In terms of horizontal accountability, I consider the ability of multiple 
agencies to check the power of the executive, including the media, independent courts, the 
legislature, and electoral councils. Again, these indicators are not meant to be comprehensive but 
rather key examples of mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability. Through these 
reforms, I hypothesize that executive power has been consolidated vis-à-vis other branches of 
government, leading to a reduction in horizontal accountability. 
Restrictions on these mechanisms of accountability have been common within Latin 
American democracies. For example, contestation might be restricted by executives who pursue 
―national‖ priorities at the expense of citizens‘ rights or who marginalize or close other 
institutions of democracy, such as the legislature and/or judiciary (Carlin and Singer 2011, 1504) 
as both Chávez and Correa did during the process of reforming the constitution. O'Donnell 
(1994; 1998) posited a conception of ‗delegative democracy‘ within which a powerful executive 
is chosen to protect the will of the majority. This often results in a lack of horizontal 
accountability and the weakening of other institutions and agencies of the state. "In the short 
term, delegative executives tend to ignore [other institutions], while elimination, cooptation, or 
neutralization are the preferred longer-term strategies" (O‘Donnell 1998, 120). This is closely 
                                                                                                                                                             
sources of information." He also includes the "Horizontal power distribution" among the legislature, executive, and 
judicial organs (235-241). 
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linked to the concept of plebiscitary presidencies, where citizens are willing to give executives 
immense power because they expect the executive to act in exceptional ways to solve their 
problems (C. M. Conaghan 2008, 56). An increased emphasis on the mechanisms of direct 
democracy - like citizens‘ initiatives and referenda - does not necessarily limit the powers of 
executives. These may enhance participation but also weaken other political institutions by 
circumventing them (Barczak 2001) and allowing the leader to concentrate power, as justified 
through a more direct link to the citizenry (McCoy 2010).  
To assess freedoms of association and expression, I draw upon subcategory scores from 
the Freedom in the World dataset from Freedom House. There are two principal drawbacks with 
this data.  First, it is unavailable before 2006. This prevents the inclusion of the Venezuelan case, 
as the process occurred much earlier in that country. Moreover, there are a number of issues with 
transparency, biases, and methodology of this data (Norris 2012, 53–54). The methodological 
concerns are primarily associated with the methods of aggregation and the fact that the index 
aggregates so many different indicators (G. L. Munck 2009, 33). Moving down a level to the 
subcategory scores, allows me to remove concerns over the final aggregation process. I also 
employ a measure of press freedom developed by Freedom House. However, I also supplement 
these quantitative measures with narratives of recent events. 
Political Participation 
Democratic regimes permit and even encourage citizens to participate in politics by 
making demands upon their government. Furthermore, democratic participation should be 
inclusive, so that citizens can participate equally in controlling and contesting government 
conduct (Dahl 1971, 4). It is, of course, possible to have high contestation but only for a select 
group within society. Inclusive participation is about making sure that all groups within society 
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broadly have access to mechanisms of participation, regardless of their political views or other 
defining characteristics. 
Political participation is typically understood as a multifaceted concept (Booth and 
Seligson 1978; Booth and Seligson 2009; Davies and Falleti 2012; Norris 2002). When citizens 
wish to express demands to their government, they may do so formally through mechanisms 
such as voting, partisan campaigning, and contacting public officials.
201
  
Table 19: Factors Determining Inclusiveness of Participation 
Dimension Indicators Measures 
Formal Participation 
Forms of direct participation 
(Elections/MDDs) 
Constitutions, 
Altman (2010) 
Inclusion of women, ethnic, 
and minority groups 
Constitutions, IPU 
Parline Databse 
Rules for electoral 
participation 
Birch (2009) 
Voter turnout LAPOP, IFES 
 
To analyze formal participation, I explore the de jure mechanisms of participation, 
including opportunities for direct participation, through both elections and more participatory 
mechanisms such as budgeting, recall elections, and popular initiatives called from below (versus 
referenda called from above). I also consider mechanisms for the inclusion of women, ethnic, 
and minority groups, including parity laws and reserved seats, as well as electoral rules about 
voting participation.  
Lastly, I consider measures of de facto formal participation, including voter turnout, 
analyzed through public opinion data by LAPOP in comparison with official turnout data. The 
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 Alternatively, they may do so informally through mechanisms such as local community activism, civic 
engagement, and protest. Though there was a great deal of informal mobilization during these reform processes, I 
chose not to examine protest here because the relationship between protest and inclusive participation is less clear. 
Both regime supporters and regime opponents may use protests and demonstrations (Booth and Seligson 2009), so 
the act of engaging in protest in and of itself does not tell us much about whether this enhances democracy. Notably, 
protests serve an important function within hybrid regimes as well, and the data from LAPOP tells us nothing about 
the kind of protests occurring or the extent to which they are managed by elites (Robertson 2011). Thus, I focus here 
on formal participation and leave aside mechanisms for informal participation. 
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dependent variable is a single question from the LAPOP surveys: "Did you vote in the last 
presidential elections of [YEAR]?" The election to which the question refers differs  across 
countries, but is always the most recent. Responses were "Yes, I voted" or "No, I didn't vote" 
across all countries and years of the survey, with only two exceptions. In Bolivia (2004), 
responses include "Yes," "I was registered but I didn't vote," "I am not registered," and "I am 
underage." In Bolivia (2006), responses include "Yes, I voted," "No, I didn't," and "Does not 
apply." For consistency, I dichotomize responses to so that only individuals who responded 
affirmatively, "Yes," receive a 1 in my coding.  
The available evidence seems to suggest that reform via CA may bolster participation in 
various ways.  First, the process itself is highly participatory, employing both formal and 
informal mechanisms of public engagement with broad sectors of the population.  The process of 
constitutional reform was initiated and concluded with popular referenda, a formal mechanism. 
Secondly, there are strong links between political legitimacy and political participation. It's 
possible that the process of reforming the constitution through a CA may lead to increases or 
decreases in political legitimacy, and hence important shifts in political participation. Booth and 
Seligson (2009) find a U-shaped relationship between political legitimacy and political 
participation, where "both the most supportive and the most disaffected citizens are more active 
than citizens holding middling legitimacy norms" (14). As polarization has been on the rise in all 
of the cases where reform via CA has been attempted, the middle group of citizens is likely 
shrinking. This trend could drive up both formal participation of supporters and opponents of the 
process of reform. 
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Political Tolerance 
Lastly, political tolerance is closely linked to both contestation and participation.  By 
political tolerance, I mean the degree to which people are willing to grant key constitutional 
rights to all citizens, regardless of their political views.  In essence, tolerance reflects support for 
inclusiveness in the exercise of democracy, in terms of both contestation and participation. 
For the consolidation of democracy to occur, citizens must generally agree that political 
rights should be extended universally, without regard for political views (Dahl 1971; Diamond 
1999; Linz and Stepan 1996). The level of political tolerance among citizens has consequences 
for political stability and democracy more generally (Carlin and Singer 2011). Moreover, there 
are good reasons to believe that political tolerance will be tied closely to the processes of 
constitutional reform via CA under consideration here. Indigenous and ethnic mobilization 
around constitutional reform can turn the focus toward tolerance of previously-excluded groups, 
minorities, and respect for minority rights during the phase of drafting the constitution (Van Cott 
2000, 28).
202
 Additionally, indigenous and ethnic representation in the CA, and subsequently in 
Congress after the reforms, may serve as an important symbolic display of tolerance and 
pluralism (Cepeda 1995, 105 as cited in Van Cott 2000, 72).  
To measure political tolerance, I use an additive index of four survey questions. 
Responses to each of these questions are arrayed along a 10 point scale from "strongly 
disapprove" to "strongly approve." The questions are geared toward capturing respondents 
opinions over regime opponents. The first asks: "There are people who always speak badly of the 
form of government in [Bolivia/Ecuador/Honduras], not only the incumbent government, but 
rather the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of their right to 
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 In Ecuador, indigenous citizens are a minority of the population, but in Bolivia they are the majority. Still, 
historically, they have been an excluded majority. 
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vote?" This item addresses formal participation. The second asks: "How strongly do you approve 
or disapprove of these people realizing peaceful demonstrations with the goal of expressing their 
points of view?" This addresses informal participation and contestation. The third asks: 
"Continuing to think about those who speak badly of the form of government in 
[Bolivia/Ecuador/Honduras], how strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people being 
allowed to run for public office?" This speaks to a different mechanism of formal participation.  
Lastly, the fourth asks: "How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people go on TV 
to give a speech?"  This gets at contestation again.  Therefore, this index combines into one 
measure opinions over several aspects of the two dimensions of polyarchy. 
This index of political tolerance is advantageous for two reasons. First, it conforms to 
previous cross-national studies of tolerance (Edwards et al. 2011; Hiskey, Moseley, and 
Rodríguez 2013) and thus is beneficial for comparative purposes. Secondly, as these questions 
do not ask about particular identifiable groups within society, responses are unlikely to be biased 
by personal opinions over specific socio-political groups.  Still, there is one primary concern 
with this index. Even though the questions make it clear that responses should not be tied to the 
incumbent government (see the prefacing statement to question 1 above, for example) it is likely 
that respondents who are supportive of the incumbent government will be less tolerant by this 
measure. Therefore, studies that use this index incorporate a measure of support for the executive 
as a control. I follow suit in my analysis of tolerance below.  Higher values of the index indicate 
more tolerance. 
LAPOP Survey Data 
To analyze changes in participation and political toleration, I take a quantitative approach 
and utilize public opinion data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I 
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include five datasets for each country over an eight year period (2004-2012) at two-year 
intervals. I have selected these time points because, for country cases of successful CA 
processes, they encompass part of the previous president's term in office (2004), the campaigns 
of the presidents who were instrumental in these processes of reform (2006), the reform process 
itself (2008), and the political process after implementation of the new constitution (2010, 2012). 
This is important because I am not assuming that simply approving the constitution would have 
led to changes in public opinion, but rather that the discourse and debate surrounding the 
process, including even presidential campaigns on the topic, could start to produce these 
changes. Thus, I view this debate and discourse as part of the process of institutional change 
which may have effects on society.  
There are four drawbacks of the LAPOP data for the present analysis.  First, there is only 
one year's worth of data prior to the process in Bolivia and Ecuador.
203
 This could pose an issue 
particularly in Bolivia, where Evo Morales rose up through the ranks of the MAS and was 
integral in organizing and mobilizing indigenous groups and cocaleros prior to entering office. 
Secondly, the ten-year gap that separates processes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras from the 
reform in Venezuela frustrates this analysis. As there is no comparable data available from a time 
point prior to the initiation of the CA process, I cannot gain purchase over the question of the 
effects on participation and tolerance.
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 Earlier surveys, including those conducted by 
Latinobarometro, lack components of the dependent variables. For this reason, I use only 
LAPOP data and focus here on a comparison of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras. A third 
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 Ideally, I would have also included data from 2002, but the addition of an earlier survey to cover a ten-year 
period cut down significantly on the number of comparable questions across surveys. 
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 LAPOP conducted its first survey in Venezuela in 1995; however, the questions were markedly different from 
later waves of the survey.  The next LAPOP survey completed in Venezuela was in 2000, a year after the CA 
process concluded.   
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drawback is that using five surveys in each country has led to some issues of availability and 
compatibility of questions. In many cases I was able to collapse continuous variables into 
categorical variables, or categorical variables into dummy variables in order to make the 
responses compatible. Appendix C details all of this work, and contains descriptive statistics for 
all surveys as well. Nevertheless, some variables are missing from the analysis for reasons of 
data availability.
205
  
Lastly, with respect to demographic data, and especially ethnicity, the raw composition of 
respondents in each dataset may not reflect the actual proportions of people in the population.
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On average, over the five years of data considered here, only 18% of respondents in Bolivia 
identified as indigenous. In contrast, official sources indicate around 55% of the population is 
indigenous.
207
 There is likely significant overrepresentation of mestizos in the data for Bolivia 
and Ecuador, as well as whites in Honduras. As an alternative, I considered adding a variable to 
capture whether an indigenous language was spoken by the individual, but this does not solve the 
issue of the underrepresentation of indigenous respondents. In general, this problem may be 
solved statistically through the use of sampling weights to obtain a representative national 
sample, or in other words, to adjust the sample to match the characteristics of the true 
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 Ideally, I would have included a measure of partisanship; however, questions relating to partisanship were not 
asked on the 2004 and 2006 surveys. Moreover, other studies have pointed to the impact of terrorist threats on 
tolerance (Edwards et al. 2011; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), however a question assessing perceptions of 
terrorist threats was only asked on the 2010 survey. 
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 However, even national census data may be inaccurate. The census has a contentious history among indigenous 
populations, linked to its use by colonial governments. Significant distrust of census takers remains today, 
particularly among rural and indigenous populations. As a result, it is typically assumed that the population of 
indigenous people is under-represented in official data.  For example, organized indigenous groups in Bolivia and 
Ecuador have long claimed that official data grossly underestimates indigenous populations. According to Monica 
Chuji, a leader within CONAIE and political activist, the Ecuadorian indigenous population may be more like 30% 
of the population, as opposed to the 7% reported in the national census, which she considers a political manipulation 
(Interview with Monica Chuji, 7/3/12).  
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For more on this point, see Appendix C. "The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. < 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> Accessed: 4/19/14. 
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population.
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 Technical information for each dataset employed here is available in Appendix C. 
When necessary, regressions were run using Stata 12's 'pweights' command with the designated 
weight variable. 
Analysis and Findings 
Contestation 
In this section, I analyze the evolution of contestation in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras. 
To assess vertical accountability, I consider Freedom House data and discuss several high-profile 
events since the passage of new Constitutions. To assess horizontal accountability, I rely on 
insights gained through fieldwork and elite interviews in both Bolivia and Ecuador, as well as 
secondary sources. 
Vertical Accountability 
 The freedom of association (or assembly) is of great importance to contestation because it 
permits an independent civil society and collective action. By freedom of association, I mean a 
citizen's right to join together in groups of their choosing, to peacefully advance and defend 
collective interests. It is important that this right exists not just for some groups within society 
but particularly for those who are in opposition to the government. Typically, governments 
abusing this right place legal barriers to organization, such as lengthy registration processes or 
specific requirements. In some ways, this right is a logical precursor to other rights like the 
freedom of expression. Groups must be able to freely organize in order to express themselves to 
the government. 
In all four cases, this right exists on paper. In additional to providing general freedoms of 
association and assembly, the Bolivian constitution also underscores this right for groups who 
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previously faced institutional barriers to organization, such as indigenous-campesino 
organizations and citizen associations (Art. 210) (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 10). Yet, in practice 
there are many restrictions on the exercise of these rights. In comparison to the three cases of 
successful reform, restrictions on freedom of association are not nearly as severe or 
institutionalized in Honduras. 
Figure 11: Freedom of Association, 2006-2014 
 
Source: Freedom in the World Dataset, Freedom House 2014; higher 
scores imply more freedom. Details of this measure are available in 
Appendix C. 
 
Bolivia has the second highest levels of freedom of association of the cases considered 
here. As Morales is closely aligned with important social movements, and those groups have 
remained relatively independent, they have been able to hold him accountable. Conflict emerged 
in 2011 over a proposal by the government to build a highway through the Territorio Indígena 
Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS - Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous 
Territory). Powerful indigenous groups organized protests in response. Though there were some 
reports of repression and violence, the government ultimately capitulated to these groups, held a 
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binding consultation, and put the plans for the highway on hold.  This incident demonstrates the 
ability of civil society groups to organize and hold the Bolivian leader accountable. 
Venezuelan civil society is organized in a largely top-down fashion, and the government 
take a more active role in is organization. However, before 2007, protests occurred frequently in 
Venezuela and were not subject to substantial repression. As the student movement began 
organizing itself in advance of the December 2007 constitutional referendum, it clashed with the 
government more frequently, leading to an increase in the number of arrests and incidents of 
repression. This is likely the reason for the decrease in the freedom of association in Figure 14 
above. Since Chávez's death, protest has resurfaced and the government's response has been very 
repressive.
209
 
Ecuador scores the lowest of all four cases in Figure 14 above. Protest has been 
criminalized in Ecuador under Correa.  This has affected the ability of civil society and social 
movements to organize in opposition to the government (Programa Andina de Derechos 
Humanos 2012). Grievances principally surround hypocrisies in Correa's policies, privileging 
transnational extractive industries over the preservation of natural resources. In December 2007, 
Correa sent the military to quell a protest against transnational oil companies drilling in the 
province of Orellana; interactions between the military and protesters in the town of Dayuma 
turned violent.
210
 In 2008, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE - Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) and other indigenous 
organizations held a massive demonstration against a law that would potentially privatize water 
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 Since Chávez's death, Nicolás Maduro has faced massive protests (starting in February 2014). His government's 
violent and repressive response went far beyond the repression seen under Chávez. Middle-class student protesters 
faced off with the military in the streets. Significant violence ensued and people have died. This has generated 
international attention and the proliferation of protest around the country. 
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 Ultimately, the government's response to this incident was part of Monica Chuji's decision to break with the 
governing movement of Alianza PAIS (Interview with Monica Chuji, 7/3/12). 
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provision in Chimborazo. Correa's stance toward protesters has become increasingly repressive. 
More than 200 indigenous and union leaders were prosecuted under charges of "terrorism" and 
"sabotage," including the former leader of CONAIE.
211
 In June 2013, Correa placed further 
restrictions on freedom of assembly when he issued an executive decree requiring non-
governmental associations to register to obtain legal standing.  This would allow the government 
to dismantle groups that "compromise the public peace."
212
      
Figure 12: Freedom of Expression, 2006-2014 
 
Source: Freedom in the World Dataset, Freedom House; higher scores 
indicate more freedom. Details of this measure are available in 
Appendix C. 
 
As with the right to assembly, the de jure right to speak freely exists in all four cases.  
This freedom is closely tied to freedom of the press and hence I discuss them together here. The 
Ecuadorian constitution mentions the right to "voice one‘s opinion and express one‘s thinking 
freely and in all of its forms and manifestations" (Art. 66). However, there are also major issues 
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 Interview with Esperanza Martínez, (7/17/12) . 
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 Greco-Stoner, Ashley. 2013. "Muzzling Dissent on Ecuador's Yasuní Oil-Drilling Plan." Freedom at Issue. 
November 12, 2013. < http://freedomhouse.org/blog/muzzling-dissent-ecuador%E2%80%99s-yasun%C3%AD-oil-
drilling-plan#.U1htUFfKkwE> (Accessed: 11/30/13). 
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with the exercise of this right. It is surprising that Ecuador receives such a high score on the 
freedom of expression measure by Freedom House, as seen in Figure 12 above. 
In 2011, the Ecuadorian Supreme Court found senior members of the newspaper, El 
Universo, as well as the authors of the book El Gran Hermano¸ guilty of libel for criticizing 
President Correa and his government. The indigenous activist, Monica Chuji, was also found 
guilty of libel for criticizing Vinicio Alvarado, at the time the National Secretary of Public 
Administriation. All of these sentences carried jail time and extensive fines/damages.
213
 
However, international pressure led Correa to pardoned the defendants of the first two cases and 
Alvarado pardoned Chuji as well.  In a sense, the damage was done because it established a legal 
precedent and served as a warning to others that Correa and his administration may not be freely 
criticized. 
Though there have been serious attempts to restrict freedom of speech in Bolivia, the 
situation is not nearly as dire as in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Honduras. For example, in 2012 the 
penal code introduced restrictions against criticizing incumbent government officials (Art 162 of 
the penal code); however, the Tribunal Constitutional Plurinacional (TCP - Plurinational 
Constitutional Court) ruled that this article was unconstitutional.
214
 
Closely related to declining freedom of speech and expression, press freedom has 
declined significantly in all cases in recent years. Freedom House classifies the Venezuelan, 
Honduran, and Ecuadorian press as "not free," while the Bolivian press is still considered "partly 
free" (Figure 13 below). 
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 The suit against El Universo resulted in $40 million in damages.  For more, see: Green-Barber, Lindsay. 2012. 
"After Correa's Pardon, Ecuador Should Forgive but Must Not Forget." Americas Quarterly. 
<http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3374> (accessed:4/20/14). 
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<http://www.tcpbolivia.bo/tcp/sites/all/modulostcp/normas_reguladoras/normas/tcp/Consultas_normas_inconstitu
cionales_tcp.pdf> (Accessed: 6/1/13). 
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Figure 13: Press Freedom, 2002-2013 
 
Source: Freedom of the Press, Freedom House; higher values indicate 
less freedom. Details of this measure are available in Appendix C. 
 
 
Freedom House considers the Venezuelan press to be "not free." The Chávez 
administration took control over or closed many independent forms of media in the country, 
beginning in the mid-2000s (precipitating a significant jump in the press freedom score in 2003). 
Between 2000 and 2010, the number of state-run TV stations grew from one to six (Lupien 2013, 
227). In 2004, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a law allowing the government 
further control over control over the content of private media (radio and television).  
In Honduras, in the immediate wake of the coup, the interim government shut down 
several private radio and television stations for several months during the political crisis.
215
 
However, self-censorship is a one of the biggest concerns with respect to the media in Honduras. 
Journalists who feel threatened by high levels of violence may avoid controversial topics or 
viewpoints. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, murders of journalists were 
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 "Honduras: Freedom in the World 2010." < http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2010/honduras#.U10GxVfKkwE>. (Accessed: 4/20/14). 
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relatively rare before 2010. Between 1993 and 2010 only five journalists were killed and only 
two had confirmed motives related to their work. However, in 2010 this number increased to 
nine deaths, three with confirmed motives. Seven more have been killed between 2011 and 2013. 
Moreover, 60% of those killed were covering topics of corruption and 40% covering topics 
related to politics, suggesting that this trend may be linked to the political instability after the 
coup.
216
   In other cases considered here self-censorship is also a concern but, rather than 
violence against journalists, it is typically caused by the threat of prosecution under sufficiently 
vague laws. 
In Ecuador, Correa has had a conflict-ridden relationship with non-state media, often 
tearing up papers publically and encouraging his supporters to boycott certain papers. He has 
taken an aggressive stance toward journalists, publically calling them "imbeciles," "stupid," "ink-
stained hitmen,"  or  "mafia men" on his Saturday morning radio show (World Association of 
Newspapers and News Publishers 2011, 4).  There have been steady declines in press freedom 
over the course of his time in office, but a precipitous decline since 2011 (Figure 13 above). This 
is related partially to the case against El Universo discussed above. But he has also placed further 
restrictions on the media. Most notably, the Nation Assembly approved a very controversial Ley 
de Comunicación (Communications Law) in June 2013. The government claimed that this law 
was supposed to break up conglomerates and ensure access a diversity of viewpoints in the 
media. However, the law prohibits "linchamiento mediático" (media lynching), that is the 
dissemination of any "discrediting" information repeatedly published through multiple media 
sources meant to cause a loss of public credibility. The image conjured by the concept of 
                                                 
216
 Journalists Killed in Honduras. 2014. < http://cpj.org/killed/americas/honduras/>. (Accessed: 4/21/14). The rate 
of journalist murders is much lower in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The highest incidence in any year since 
1992 was the murder of two journalists in Venezuela in 2006, and only one of these murders had a confirmed motive 
linked to reporting. 
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lynching implies the imposition of a mob-driven and violent punishment without access to due 
process. The language of the law is sufficiently vague that this could be applied quite liberally 
against any media that dares to criticize the government. 
Though perhaps less so, the media in Bolivia also feels threatened by government 
control. Antonio Vargas, the President of the Asociación de Perodistas de La Paz (APLP - La 
Paz Journalists Association), has criticized the restrictive laws and hostile climate toward 
journalists under the Morales government. He referred to the Ley de Lucha Contra el Racismo y 
Toda Forma de Discriminación (Law Fighting Racism and All Forms of Discrimination) passed 
in October 2010, as a ley mordaza or "gag law." It established sanctions, including prison time, 
for journalists convicted of making racist or discriminatory statements. In Vargas' opinion, the 
law was sufficiently vague as to lead to media censorship.
217
 
As a final point, it is worth noting that there are very polarized views over the role of the 
media in Latin America more broadly, but particularly in these cases. Examining Venezuela and 
Bolivia, Lupien Pascal (2013) has argued that greater government control was a response to (and 
perhaps even, justified by) the concentrated media ownership and elite efforts to destabilize 
governments through the media. Increased government control over the media has thus been a 
response to "distortions" in coverage of events and a denial of citizens' right to pluralistic 
information (Lupien 2013, 237). For the author, the solution lies in the proliferations of 
community-based media, which has grown particularly in Bolivia since Morales entered office. 
Horizontal Accountability 
Legislative and judicial oversight has been greatly reduced in all three cases where 
successful reform occurred, and in key ways where reform failed.  In Venezuela, between the 
completion of the CA in 1999 and the mega-elections of 2000, Chávez issued 67 decrees to enact 
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 Interview with Antonio Vargas, 8/5/12. 
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reforms that had not been included in the new constitution (Cartaya and Gianforchetta 2012, 
164).  The new constitution also eliminated the upper house. This served to weaken federalism 
(Cameron and Sharpe 2010, 66), and removed an additional potential check on presidential 
power. In 2005, the MVR won a supermajority in the legislature because of an opposition 
boycott of the elections. Hence, the legislature posed no check on the authority of Chávez.   
At the same time, judicial and other oversight bodies, such as the Electoral Council, were 
significantly weakened in Venezuela by as early as 2000.  During the transitory period of 
implementing the 1999 Constitution, Chávez made new appointments to the Supreme Court and 
Electoral Council that substantially increased his influence over these bodies (McCoy 2010, 88). 
Moreover, most judges and many of the officials within the Poder Ciudadano now hold 
provisional positions, meaning they are dependent on the government to remain in office 
(Cartaya and Gianforchetta 2012, 164–165).218 
In Ecuador, Correa faces very few horizontal checks on his power. According to 
Catherine Conaghan, he has "actively and systematically built [a plebiscitary] presidency, 
methodically accruing ever-greater powers as he projects the image of an indefatigable, 
audacious leader" (2008, 56). Similarly, Ramírez Gallegos acknowledges that while the 
constitution opened up new spaces for political participation, this "participatory promise" has 
been mediated by "the weight that the constitution gives the executive branch in the political 
process" (2012, 149).  There are many examples of Correa's power over the legislature, judiciary, 
and other oversight bodies.  First, he controls a broad majority in the legislature as of 2013 and 
uses his reactive powers to exert himself on the policymaking process. In 2009 and 2010, Correa 
partially vetoed the Ley de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social (Law of Citizens' 
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 The Poder Ciudadano includes: the Treasury Inspector's Office, the District Attorney's Office, and the 
Ombudsman's Office. 
248 
 
Participation and Social Control).
219
 He objected to the law as formulated by his own party 
because of a stipulation that sitting members of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE - National 
Electoral Council) could not participate in elections to create the new Consejo de Participación 
Ciudadana y Control Social (CPCCS - Council of Citizens' Participation and Social Control). 
Many speculated that Correa's veto was an attempt to return a political favor to members of the 
CNE.
220
 Later, in March 2010, Correa vetoed Article 88 of the law, introducing a stipulation that 
the CPCCS should oversee and enforce the accountability of the news media.
221
 Correa has 
continued to exert pressure on the Judiciary, Electoral Council and other oversight bodies since 
the CA process. A Justice on the Supreme Court, Mónica Encalada, recently raised allegations 
that Correa compelled the court to rule in his favor in the aforementioned El Universo case.
222
 
Lastly, although the new constitution establishes a so-called "Quinta Poder" or "Fifth Branch" of 
government, Correa has secure partisan control over all five branches of power, meaning that a 
separation of powers does not pose checks on his presidency.
223
 
Like Chávez in Venezuela, Morales and the MAS gained a super-majority within the 
Bolivian legislature in the 2009 elections. However, as Santiago Anria (2010) points out, 
Morales faces more significant accountability structures within the MAS and especially among 
the independent social organizations, who are integrated with the movement and brought 
Morales and the MAS to power (112-113). For this reason, it would be wrong to equate these 
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 "AP rechaza veto a ley de Participación." Diario Hoy. 18 de Agosto 2009. < http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-
ecuador/ap-rechaza-veto-a-ley-de-participacion-363569.html> Accessed: 4/1/2014. 
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 Green-Barber, Lindsay. 2012. "After Correa's Pardon, Ecuador Should Forgive but Must Not Forget." Americas 
Quarterly. <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3374> (accessed:4/20/14). 
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two cases and the degree of legislative oversight is significantly less in Venezuela overall. 
However, judicial oversight was substantially limited by elections to the highest courts in 2011. 
The new Bolivian constitution included this mechanism, which may appear at first to be a highly 
democratic mechanism.  However, in practice, the judicial elections of 2011 were flawed in ways 
that promoted Morales' partisan control of the courts. First, the lists of candidates were proposed 
by Congress, where the MAS controlled a two-thirds majority and hence could unilaterally make 
decisions. Observers of the process commented that candidates appeared to be chosen not for 
their qualifications but rather their connections to the movement in power.
224
 The opposition was 
very dissatisfied with the lists produced before the election and hence began a campaign 
encouraging citizens to vote "null" in order to delegitimize the elections. The winner of the 
elections was the null vote, which astoundingly constituted more than 50% of votes submitted.
225
 
These dynamics have substantially limited horizontal accountability in Bolivia. 
In Honduras, the results of the most recent elections suggest that the coup may have led 
to interesting changes in the party system. When the 2009 elections were held, they occurred 
relatively peacefully and without complication. While the National Party gained a slight majority 
that year, currently no party holds a majority as of 2013. The National Party is still the largest in 
Congress, but it only controls approximately 33% of seats. It seems possible that partisan shifts 
among voters as a result of the coup, and hence the entrance of new parties in the legislature, 
could lead to a dramatic shift in legislative oversight, but it is too soon to tell. Judicial oversight 
was significantly limited in 2013 when President Porfirio Lobo unconstitutionally removed four 
Supreme Court justices with support of the legislature. They were replaced with justices 
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 Informal conversations in La Paz, 2011. 
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 Moreover, turnout dipped dramatically during this election. See Figure 15 on  page 43. 
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sympathetic to Lobo's Partido Nacional (PN - National Party).
226
 At the same time, the extent to 
which violence plays a role in limiting judicial oversight in Honduras stands in stark contrast 
with other cases. Many issues of judicial independence are caused by rising politically-motivated 
violence. Between 2010 and 2013, 64 legal professionals, including judges, were killed in 
Honduras. According to Freedom House reports, Honduran business elites exert unwarranted 
influence over decisions issued by the Supreme Court.
227
 
  On the whole, the most substantial declines in vertical and horizontal accountability 
have occurred in Venezuela and Ecuador, where executives have concentrated power and 
infringed on civil liberties, limiting contestation. Honduras has also experienced disturbing 
trends, not least of which includes a rise in politically motivated violence and crime in general, in 
the wake of the coup.  This has served to limit mechanisms of accountability and contestation 
there. Bolivia presents the least pessimistic outlook for contestation, particularly in terms of 
vertical accountability.  Next, I move to an analysis of the second dimension of polyarchy, 
participation, to analyze how the CA reform process has impacted both formal and informal 
mechanisms for inclusive participation. 
Formal Participation 
The process of reform via CA itself has led to a number of additional elections associated 
with the process. First, there are typically referenda to initiate the process, followed by elections 
to the CA, referenda to ratify the constitution, and lastly new elections to the legislature where it 
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 Sobalvarro, Luis Arturo. 2013. "After Coup, Honduras Faces Hurdles before National Elections." International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems. <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2013/After-Coup-Honduras-
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was previously closed. These elections are largely particular to the reform process and not 
necessarily going to translated into more opportunities for formal participation in the future. 
Mechanisms of direct democracy existed in previous constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador but they have been expanded in the new constitutions.
228 
 For example, the 1999 
Venezuelan Constitution added the mechanism of recall referendum (Cameron and Sharpe 2010, 
69). Likewise, though the 1998 Constitution in Ecuador  allowed for recall, it could only be used 
to revoke the mandate of mayors, heads of municipalities, and congressmen (Art. 109).
229
  The 
2008 Constitution further expands the recall initiative to include any elected official (Art 105), 
meaning the executive's mandate could also potentially be revoked. Additionally, there is now a 
mechanisms for the consulta previa (prior consultation - Art. 57) whereby the government must 
poll local populations when it wants to pursue "the exploration, exploitation or marketing of non-
renewable resources" on  lands belonging to cultural groups in society.
230
 However, in Honduras, 
Zelaya's attempted use of a referendum actually generated the coup. Participatory mechanisms 
are not a central part of the Honduran legal framework as they are in the other cases considered 
here. Likewise, as there was no reform process, the status quo prevailed. 
These constitutions technically include both citizens initiatives activated from below by a 
certain number of signatures, as well as plebiscites/referenda called from above. In practice 
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 David Altman (2010) develops a measure of experience with direct democracy. It multiplies the number of times 
citizens have voted in referenda at the national level by the number of questions decided on those ballots. Binding 
referenda are weighted more than purely consultative questions (116). By this measure, Ecuador is second only to 
Uruguay in its extent of experience with direct democracy since 1978. Referenda were voted on 8 times between 
1978 and 2008, but some included a large number of issues on a single ballot. Venezuela sits in third place and 
Bolivia in fourth place. In contrast, Honduras never held a popular consultation between 1978 and 2008. 
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 The 1998 Constitution also allowed executives to call for a popular consultation on issues of partial constitutional 
reform (Art. 283) or on issues of "transcendental importance" to the country (Art. 104). This was the justification 
used by Correa for the initiative to form a CA (Interview with Elizabeth Ell, Quito, 7/12/12). Citizens also had the 
right to initiate a popular consultation on issues of "transcendental importance" that would not require constitutional 
reform (Art 105).   
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 This mechanism is non-binding in Ecuador, but it was also added to the 2009 Constitution in Bolivia, where it is 
binding. 
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within the region as a whole, the latter has been much more common. Some argue that, 
generally, mechanisms of direct democracy have served to further empower Latin American 
executives (Barczak 2001; Altman 2010). Within the cases considered here, there were only two 
citizen-initiated popular consultations in recent years. In Venezuela, citizens generated the 
presidential recall referendum in 2004. Likewise, in Bolivia, a citizen's initiative triggered the 
referendum on autonomy in 2006 (Altman 2010, 116). 
Inclusion of Women, Ethnic and Minority Groups 
The inclusion of women, ethnic, and minority groups has occurred through two general 
mechanisms in the CA process: symbolic inclusion through language used and rights enshrined 
in the constitutions, as well as descriptive representation of groups within the CA itself and in 
subsequent legislatures. In Honduras, there was no process of reform and hence the status quo 
prevailed in terms of legal mechanisms for the inclusion of women, ethnic, and minority groups. 
However, new constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador stressed the equality of women, 
indigenous and other ethnic groups before the law, sometimes for the first time. Though 
symbolic, these changes were also historic.  
The new constitutions, particularly in Bolivia and to a somewhat lesser extent in Ecuador, 
have prioritized a greater degree of inclusion (Lupien 2011). The 1999 Venezuelan constitution 
is also regarded as a more inclusionary document in some respects. For example, it includes both 
the masculine and feminine version of the words for 'president,' 'politicians,' 'lawyers,' and every 
other role included in the text. Though symbolic this was a significant change. The 1998 
Ecuadorian constitution was already relatively progressive in terms of protecting equal rights of 
women and indigenous groups.
231
 However, the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution made significant 
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 At least, symbolically; however, in practice there was little change beyond the text of the constitution (Interview 
with Monica Chuji, 7/3/12. 
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changes by recognizing indigenous languages and certain minority groups, such as the 
montubios, for the first time (Art 56-60).
232
 The Bolivian constitution extends a number of rights 
to indigenous groups and the Afro-Bolivian minority that increase their participation through 
formal and informal channels.
233
 Moreover, both Ecuador and Bolivia include language 
recognizing their plurinational character in their respective constitutions; Bolivia even changed 
the name of the state (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and the legislature (Plurinational Legislative 
Assembly) to reflect this.  These constitutions also include traditional indigenous concepts of 
participation, community democracy, and Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir (translated literally as "living 
well"), as well as the recognition of indigenous languages. Symbolic and somewhat abstract 
advances - such as an emphasis on interculturality, decolonization, and the indigenous worldview 
- have been linked to more concrete public policies - like the reform of the health system in 
Bolivia (Johnson 2010). 
Ecuador introduced a gender parity law in the 1998 Constitution.  Because of this, 
women needed to be at least 50% of the candidates on electoral lists for the CA. Nevertheless, 
women's representation in the CA was substantially increased by the introduction of a "zipper 
system" by the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE - Supreme Electoral Tribunal) in May 2007. 
This stipulated that women should alternate with men on the lists (European Union Election 
Observation Mission 2007, 45), ensuring that they would not all be placed at the bottom in 
unwinnable positions. As a result, Ecuador's CA was about 35% women. 
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 Montubios are an ethnic minority along the coast of Ecuador, in Guayas and many surrounding provinces. Their 
traditions have developed from the influence of several cultures: indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, and Spanish. 
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 It creates indigenous-campesino autonomies (Art 289-296, 304) devolving power within traditionally indigenous 
lands, guarantees proportional participation of indigenous-campesino people with quotas for indigenous 
representation in the legislature (Art 147) – a formal participatory mechanism (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 10). 
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Table 20: Percentage of Women in the Legislature 
    1993 1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 
Venezuela 
Lower/Only House 5.91% 13.11% 
 
9.70% 17.37% 16.97% 
Upper House 8.00% 8.77% 
   
  
Constituent Assembly     unavailable       
    2002 2005 2006 2010     
Bolivia 
Lower House 18.46% 16.92% 16.92% 25.38% 
 
  
Upper House 14.81% 3.70% 3.70% 47.22% 
 
  
Constituent Assembly     34.51%       
    2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2013 
Ecuador 
Only House 16.00% 25.00% 
  
32.26% 41.61% 
Constituent Assembly 
  
34.62% 
  
  
Legislative Oversight       27.63%     
    2001 2005 2009  2013     
Honduras National Congress 5.47% 23.44% 17.97%       
Source: IPU Parline Database 
Bolivia added a gender parity law with the 2009 constitution. Yet, as seen from Table 20 
above, the shift in women's representation in Bolivia started with the CA process, where 
women's representation nearly doubled compared to what it had been in the lower house of 
Congress elected the year before. Increases were not nearly as dramatic in Venezuela. A 
substantial increase in women's representation occurred in Honduras in 2005, but it is difficult to 
know whether the coup has had any effect on women's representation because a new Congress 
has yet to be elected since then. 
Beyond sheer numbers, women also held symbolically and substantively important roles 
in the CA and legislatures after reform. Most notably, the MAS chose a Quechua indigenous 
woman, Silvia Lazarte, to be the president of the CA. Lazarte was born in Cochabamba and rose 
through the ranks of the cocalero (coca growers) movement. Social movements pushed for an 
indigenous woman to lead the assembly specifically, and Evo Morales explained the choice by 
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saying that the CA should be led by someone who had been ―doubly excluded.‖234 In Ecuador, 
Alianza PAIS chose Monica Chuji, an indigenous activist and leader within CONAIE, to serve as 
the head of the commission on natural resources and biodiversity, a consequential position.
235
 In 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, women have subsequently held important leadership positions 
within the legislature.
236
  
Bolivian women were actually much more successful at gaining representation through 
the CA reforms than indigenous groups. While the former gained the gender parity law, the latter 
failed to secure 36 reserved seats, as requested - one for each indigenous group. Instead, they 
gained merely seven seats (Htun and Ossa 2013, 5). This was due in part to internal divisions 
within the indigenous movement, principally between the lowland indigenous groups and those 
from the altiplano, who were more closely aligned with the MAS (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 8). 
Additionally, the Morales' government was less receptive to reserved seats or quotas than they 
were to parity on party lists (Htun and Ossa 2013, 6). Moreover, only one seat in the legislature 
is held currently by an Afro-Bolivian.  In the end, the small number of seats gained by 
indigenous groups reflects a failure to integrate marginalized indigenous populations in Bolivia, 
and these discrepancies have carried over to the extent to which these groups are incorporated 
now. In Ecuador, there are no reserved seats for indigenous groups; the Pachacutik Movement, 
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 Stefanoni, Pablo. 2006. ―BOLIVIA: Indigenous Woman to Lead Constituent Assembly.‖ Green Left Weekly. 
August 9, 2006. <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/34940>. (Accessed: 3/1/2012). 
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 And yet, Chuji felt overrun by the government's preferences throughout the process of drafting the constitution. 
She broke with Correa and Alianza PAIS shortly after the conclusion of the CA process, in September 2008 
(Interview with Monica Chuji, 7/3/12). 
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 In Ecuador, Gabriela Rivadeneira became the first female President of the National Assembly in 2013. Bolivia 
has a longer history of women in leadership roles. Mirtha Quevedo (MNR) was the speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies in 2002. Since 2010, Ana María Romero de Campero (MAS) has been the president of the Bolivian Senate, 
where women hold over 47% of the seats. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, succeeded her 
husband as the speaker of the National Assembly from 2006-2011. 
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the political wing of CONAIE, currently holds five seats in the legislature.
237
 Reforms do not 
grant nearly as much autonomy and power to indigenous groups as they did in Bolivia. For 
example, during the CA process there was a significant dispute between Alianza PAIS and the 
indigenous organizations CONAIE and CONFENAIE over Correa's rejection of the idea of the 
"consulta previa."
238
 As a result, the new Ecuadorian constitution puts in place a non-binding 
consultation; though the executive must consult indigenous groups over projects within their own 
territories, the government is not legally bound to abide by the results of that consultation, as 
they are in Bolivia. Indigenous groups were relatively divided in Ecuador at the time of the CA 
and so CONAIE found itself in a politically weak position and unable to generate its preferred 
reforms. In Venezuela, indigenous groups have three reserved seats out of 165 seats in the 
legislature. 
While Bolivia and Ecuador have made substantial strides toward symbolic equality and 
descriptive representation of women, indigenous, and minority groups, seats in the legislature do 
not ensure adequate substantive representation. Moreover, in both Bolivia and Ecuador, many 
indigenous and women's organizations openly criticized the governing party's domination of 
reforms. In Ecuador, Rocio Rosero expressed her frustration in negotiations with Alianza PAIS, 
saying that the executive clearly wanted to reduce the influence of social movements like the 
women's movement; at the time of the CA she was the leader of the Consejo Nacional de las 
Mujeres del Ecuador (CONAMU - Ecuadorian National Council of Women). She said it was a 
paradox that the women's movement actually gained more of a space in the process of reform 
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 Ecuador has six reserved seats for expatriates. 
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 Interview with Monica Chuji, 7/3/12. 
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during the neoliberal period.
239
 In Bolivia, Loyola Guzman is a well-known human rights and 
political activist who represented the MAS in the CA.
240
 She was one of only 3 MAS delegates 
that voted against the final Constitution approved by the assembly. Guzman ultimately decided 
to vote against it, not because she was opposed to the content of the text, but because she was 
opposed to the process through which it had been written and approved.
241
 She particularly 
lamented the dominance of the MAS, the large amount of time wasted determining the voting 
rules, as well as the violence associated with the assembly over the issue of the capital.  
Voting 
Though formal participation may take several forms, I focus here on one example: 
participation in elections. Throughout the process of reform, Chávez, Correa, and Morales 
claimed to be mobilizing previously-excluded sectors of the population, particularly the poor and 
indigenous groups. An analysis of voter turnout will demonstrate whether shifts occurred 
between different groups in society turning out to vote. It should also show whether prior 
demographic trends in voting became less salient after the process, indicating that voters are now 
equally likely to vote. 
All countries in Latin America have moved beyond formal restrictions to suffrage contained 
within the letter of the law. Gender, property ownership, and race have all been removed as 
criteria for voter eligibility. Yet, in much of the region, there are still key differences in voter 
participation across socio-demographic groups.  When analyzing formal participation, it is 
important to keep in mind that voting is currently compulsory in several cases considered here. 
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 Interview with Rocio Rosero, 7/10/12. 
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 She was also a member of the Bolivian National Liberation Army, working closely with Che Guevara during his 
time in Bolivia. 
 
241
 Interview with Loyola Guzman, La Paz, 8/4/11. 
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At the same time, the sanctions stipulated by law and the extent to which such laws are enforced 
varies greatly.
242
 These differences are summarized in  below. 
Table 21 below. 
Table 21: Compulsory Voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Venezuela 
Country Voting Age Compulsory Voting Age Range Penalty/Enforcement 
Bolivia 18 if 
married, 21 
if single 
Yes (Since 1924) 18-70 fine of 200 bolivianos 
(approximately $29 as 
of April 2014), need 
proof to process 
transactions in public 
offices or private 
banks.   
Ecuador 16 Yes (since 1929) 18-65 fine (equivalent to 10% 
of the monthly 
minimum wage), need 
proof to process 
transactions in public 
offices or private 
banks. 
Honduras 18 Yes (since 1894) 18+ None 
Venezuela 18 No (but it was from 
1958-1993) 
N/A N/A 
 
In Venezuela, the voting age has been voluntary since 1993. In Honduras,  Articles 40 
and 44 of the existing Constitution imply that voting is compulsory, but the Electoral Law of 
2004 (Decreto 44-2004) lists no penalty for failing to vote and none has ever been enforced.
243
  
In Bolivia, voting has officially been compulsory since 1924 (Birch 2009), and yet the extent to 
which these penalties are enforced is disputed. Lastly, in Ecuador, voting has been compulsory 
since 1929 (Birch 2009) and the penalties are strictly enforced there.  Even where voting is 
compulsory and enforced, citizens may choose to pay the fine rather than vote, or to vote but to 
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 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. "Compulsory Voting." 
<http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm#sanction_types> Accessed: 4/1/2014. 
243
 Ley Electoral de Honduras, Decreto 44-2004, May 15, 2004, 
<http://www.iaip.gob.hn/transparencia/pdf/Regulacion/exoneraciones > Accessed: 4/1/2014. 
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submit a null ballot in protest or as a method of abstaining without paying the fine. Taken 
together, enforcement of compulsory voting and a lower minimum age in Ecuador mean that 
levels of voting participation will likely be higher there than in the other countries considered 
here. 
Another interesting trend in voting rules in Latin America is the inclusion of mechanisms 
for citizens living abroad to participate in elections. Venezuela added this right in its 1999 
Constitution and Venezuelans abroad participated for the first time in 2003. In Bolivia, the 1984 
electoral code included a legal framework for expatriate voting but it never actually took place.  
The new Constitution and transitional electoral law (2009) laid the groundwork for voting abroad 
to happen for the first time in December 2009. Morales even campaigned in Spain, where a 
relatively high concentration of Bolivian expatriates resides. In Ecuador and Honduras, these 
measures pre-dated the reform and attempted reform of the constitutions. Ecuador passed a law 
enabling expatriate voting in 2002 and it first occurred in the 2006 elections that brought Correa 
to power. Citizens living abroad also voted in the referenda associated with the CA process. In 
Honduras, a law enabling expatriate voting has existed since 1979 but it was not until the 
passage of a second law in 2000 that these changes went into effect. The first election with 
voting abroad was held in 2001.
244
 
What have been the general trends in voter participation before, during, and after the 
process of reform? Figure 14 below shows mean voting participation according to the LAPOP 
measure across the surveys in my sample. 
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 Glickhouse, Rachel and Mark Keller. 2012. "Explainer: Expatriate Voting Laws in Latin America." Americas 
Society/Council of the Americas. May 10, 2012. < http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-expatriate-voting-laws-
latin-america> (Accessed: 4/20/2014). 
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Figure 14: Mean Voting Participation in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, 2004-2012 
 
Source: LAPOP 
 
In line with my expectations, this data shows that voting participation is highest overall in 
Ecuador. Despite enforced penalties, a small portion of respondents has opted not to vote each 
year. Bolivia has the next highest levels of voting participation and they increased substantially 
between 2008 and 2010, during the period of ratifying the new constitution. Lastly, in Honduras, 
self-reported voting participation was at similar levels to Bolivia and Ecuador in 2004 and 2006, 
but has been steadily falling since that time. I would expect to find lower levels of participation 
in Honduras because voting is voluntary there. However, the downward trend may indicate that 
citizens are increasingly resorting to informal mechanisms of participation, or perhaps just 
becoming disaffected as a result of recent political dynamics in the country. 
Previous analyses of self-reported voting have acknowledged discrepancies with actual 
turnout data, more specifically the tendency to over report turnout (Maldonado 2011, 2). There is 
some evidence that this is the case here as well. For comparison, Figure 15 below displays 
official turnout data from all elections and referenda between 2001 - 2014 in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
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and Honduras.
245
 This official data suggests that turnout has increased slightly overall in Bolivia 
and Ecuador during and after the process of reform. Likewise, turnout increased slightly in 
Honduras in the wake of Zelaya's removal. The discrepancy with Figure 14 is due to the different 
nature of these two sources of data: one is self-reported survey data while the other is composed 
of official government reports of turnout. 
Figure 15: Turnout & Invalid Votes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, 2001-2014 
 
 
Source: IFES Election Guide, Ecuadorian CNE, and Direct Democracy
246
; Type of Election: CA 
- Constituent Assembly, J - Judicial, L - Legislative, P - Presidential, R - Referendum 
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 A similar chart of turnout trends in Venezuela is included in Appendix C for comparative purposes, but given the 
difference in time period, I do not include it on the same graph with the other cases. 
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 "Ecuador, April 15, 2007: Election of a Constitutional Council." Direct Democracy. 
<http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=de&id=ec012007>. (Accessed: 3/3/2013). 
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Taking account of the invalid votes cast is also informative. While Bolivia and Ecuador 
generally have the highest levels of voter turnout, invalid votes have been cast in a sign of protest 
at key moments in recent years. Most notably, null votes were used as a protest mechanism in 
Bolivia's judicial elections in 2011. The opposition launched a 'voto nulo' (null vote) campaign, 
in an attempt to delegitimize the outcome.
247
 In official results, invalid votes outnumbered valid 
votes in those elections. 
More generally, even as reform via CA has generated additional opportunities for formal 
participation, through referenda, recall elections, and in Bolivia, elections for the highest bodies 
within the judiciary, the number of invalid votes has been on the rise. More citizens are 
participating in elections, but the opposition may be using formal elections as an opportunity to 
voice their discontent or outright rejection of the incumbent government and its agenda. 
Turning back to trends in the LAPOP data, I examine participation by some of the salient socio-
demographic groups within society. This reveals some interesting results (Table 22 below). In 
the table below, white indicates a non-significant difference. Red denotes that the mean for group 
members is lower than the mean for non-group members. Green indicates that the mean for 
group members is higher than for non-group members. The darker colors are significant at the 
99% level while the lighter colors are significant at 95%. 
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 The opposition believed that the election was inherent undemocratic because there was not a transparent process 
of selecting lists of judicial candidates. The MAS-dominated legislature composed the lists for the Plurinational 
Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the Agro-Environmental Tribunal, and the Judiciary 
Council. Members of the opposition argued that these lists reflected partisan alignments more than experience. 
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Table 22: Voting Participation Mean Significance Tests 
    White Mestizo Indig. Other Low SES High SES Women 
Bolivia 2004 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.78 0.74 
 
2006 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.87 0.74 
 
2008 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.62 0.78 0.71 
 
2010 0.82 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.86 0.92 0.88 
 
2012 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.84 
Ecuador 2004 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.88 
 
2006 0.81 0.86 0.78 0.80 0.86 0.84 0.84 
 
2008 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.90 
 
2010 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.93 
 
2012 0.83 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 
Honduras 2004 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.74 0.72 0.70 
 
2006 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.81 0.75 
 
2008 0.59 0.67 0.68 0.54 0.64 0.68 0.63 
 
2010 0.58 0.62 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.67 0.57 
 
2012 0.50 0.52 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.50 
  Higher 95% Higher 99% Lower 95% Lower 99% 
 
In Bolivia, voter turnout has generally increased among all ethnic groups between 2004 
and 2012, and especially among indigenous and respondents who identify as "other".
248
 
However, very few of these differences are statistically significant. In 2004, indigenous and other 
respondents were significantly less likely to have voted in the last presidential elections, while 
mestizos were significantly more likely. In 2010, white Bolivians were significantly less likely to 
have voted.  The trends for mean voting participation by socioeconomic status are interesting and 
more highly significant. The "low socioeconomic status" category was created by coding 
respondents who fall at least one standard deviation below the mean of socioeconomic status. 
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 These are mostly Afro-Bolivian respondents. This population is relatively small and primarily concentrated in the 
region north of La Paz, called Las Yungas. Some estimate that there are approximately 35,000 Afro-Bolivians in 
Bolivia today but since they are not counted in the official government census this is an imperfect approximation 
("Solidarity in Saya." 2014. http://www.solidarityinsaya.com/ Accessed: 4/21/2014). Afro-Bolivian organizations 
like the Movimiento Cultural Saya Afroboliviano (MOCUSABOL - Saya Afro-Bolivian Cultural Movement) were 
mobilized around the Constituent Assembly process. The new constitution recognizes Afro-Bolivians as a legitimate 
ethnic minority group and underscores their rights. 
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Likewise, the "high" category consists of respondents at least one standard deviation above the 
mean. More wealthy voters are significantly more likely to vote and less wealthy voters are 
significantly less likely to vote, but the effect dissipates after the completion of the reform 
process. In 2010, wealthy voters were not statistically significantly different from the rest of the 
sample in terms of turnout.  In 2012, neither the wealthiest nor the poorest voters were more or 
less likely to vote than the rest of the sample. Likewise, mean voter turnout generally increases 
across both of these groups over time.  The trend among women is more disconcerting.  Women 
were significantly less likely than men to vote throughout the process, from 2006 - 2010. 
In Ecuador, the picture is a largely static and much less optimistic in terms of the effect of 
reform on inclusive participation. Levels of turnout by ethnic group have remained fairly 
constant between 2004 and 2012. Mestizos remained, both before and after the process of 
reform, significantly more likely to participate in elections. Moreover, after the CA process, 
whites are actually significantly less likely to vote. This is a concerning trend indicating that 
political polarization may exist along ethnic lines. The minority that identifies as white in 
Ecuador may be dropping out of formal participation in the wake of the CA process because of 
their discontent with reform and Correa's broader political project. In comparing these results 
with those from Bolivia, this is preliminary evidence to suggest that a more deliberative reform 
process (Bolivia) is likely to lead to a more inclusive outcome in terms of formal participation in 
the political system. In Ecuador, on the other hand, where the executive's movement 
hegemonically controlled the CA process and hence the outcome of reform, this served to further 
entrench existing divisions and polarization with respect to voting participation. 
Trends in mean differences in voter turnout in Honduras are quite different than in the 
other two cases. Turnout drops off for all ethnic groups, but this is most dramatic for those 
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respondent who identify as indigenous (from a high of 77.59% in 2006 to 39.44% in 2012) and 
those who identify as "other," which is primarily composed of Afro-Honduran respondents (from 
a high of 76.09% in 2006 to 42.86% in 2012).
249
 Socioeconomic status shows a picture of 
relative continuity in voter turnout with only small changes among the poorest percentiles of 
respondents in certain years. Women are significantly less likely to vote in 2004 and 2010. 
I now turn from analyzing mean levels of voter turnout to regression analysis of the 
factors that best explain voting participation. If formal participation through voting has become 
more inclusive, I would expect that demographic characteristics should cease to matter in 
determining turnout. To assess the impact of socio-demographic factors such as gender, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, and education, I begin by running a pared down regression 
that leaves aside political and attitudinal variables known to determine patterns of voting 
participation. These variables are likely to overpower some of the patterns of variation among 
socio-demographic variables. While these trim models are unlikely to be well-fitting or the ideal 
specification, they are important given the theoretical aims of the present analysis. Results are 
presented in Appendix C. I also run models with political and attitudinal variables to see how 
adding attitudinal variables affects the relationship between demographics and voter turnout.
250
 
 Tables 23-25 below present models of voting participation in each country. I use logistic 
regression to analyze a dichotomous dependent variable. Independent variables include both 
demographic variables as well as political/attitudinal variables, such as: presidential approval, 
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 In Honduras, the Afro-Honduran, Garifuna, and Creole population is also relatively small, approximately 1% of 
the population (CIA Worldfactbook). Garifunas are largely concentrated along the Atlantic north coast. 
 
250
 I proceed with this same methodological strategy of first running a trim model and then a fully-specified model in 
analyses of civic engagement and political tolerance as well. 
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institutional trust, civic engagement, support for democracy, and political interest.
251
 In 
comparison with the reduced demographic models contained in Appendix C, the sample size in 
these models drops non-trivially because of missingness in some of the attitudinal variables (see 
the table of summary statistics in Appendix C). For now, missingness is dealt with simply 
through case-wise deletion, an imperfect method that leads to differences in the sample between 
reduced and full models. Consequently, some results are currently unstable across these two 
types of models. In the future, I may use multiple imputation so that the sample is the same in 
both the reduced and full models.
252
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 Ideally, I would have included a measure of partisanship; however, questions relating to partisanship were not 
asked on the 2004 and 2006 surveys. In models not reported here, I included political ideology but it was not 
statistically significant and so I removed it from the models for parsimony. 
 
252
 Multiple imputation is one strategy for overcoming issues of bias, inefficiency and incorrect standard errors that 
typically result from case-wise deletion. This method requires a central assumption, which is that it is possible to 
assign values to missing data using observed data. One approach to ensure that this assumption is reasonable is to 
include a very large number of variables in the imputation, to draw from as much observed information as possible 
(King et al. 2001). Thus, if I proceed with imputation, I would impute using the majority of variable in each survey 
dataset for each country. 
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Table 23: Determinants of Voting Participation in Bolivia 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status 0.02 (0.02)   0.04 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01)   0.04 (0.02) ** 0.02 (0.02)   
Female -0.01 (0.22) 
 
-0.50 (0.15) *** -0.10 (0.13) 
 
-0.15 (0.20) 
 
0.03 (0.16)   
Age 1.24 (0.15) *** 0.53 (0.07) *** 0.84 (0.08) *** 0.38 (0.09) *** 0.80 (0.11) *** 
Education 0.25 (0.08) *** 0.33 (0.05) *** 0.28 (0.04) *** 0.17 (0.06) *** 0.23 (0.05) *** 
Rural 0.14 (0.28) 
 
0.24 (0.18) 
 
0.13 (0.16) 
 
-0.31 (0.24) 
 
0.30 (0.19)   
Media Luna -0.26 (0.22) 
 
-0.39 (0.15) ** -0.14 (0.15) 
 
-0.41 (0.20) ** -0.19 (0.17)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous -0.49 (0.40) 
 
0.35 (0.28) 
 
0.69 (0.28) ** 0.56 (0.40) 
 
0.01 (0.37)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo -0.10 (0.34) 
 
0.01 (0.21) 
 
0.23 (0.22) 
 
0.27 (0.30) 
 
0.04 (0.29)   
Ethnicity: Other -0.63 (0.55) 
 
0.13 (0.58) 
 
0.84 (0.51) 
 
1.16 (0.81) 
 
1.55 (0.81) * 
Presidential Approval -0.16 (0.16) 
 
0.02 (0.12) 
 
0.02 (0.08) 
 
0.01 (0.13) 
 
0.08 (0.10)   
Institutional Trust 0.002 (0.03) 
 
0.01 (0.02) 
 
-0.01 (0.01) 
 
-0.01 (0.03) 
 
-0.005 (0.02)   
Civic Engagement 0.12 (0.04) *** 0.17 (0.04) *** 0.08 (0.03) ** 0.17 (0.05) *** 0.13 (0.04) *** 
Support for Democracy -0.02 (0.08) 
 
-0.15 (0.06) *** 0.07 (0.04) 
 
-0.03 (0.08) 
 
0.09 (0.05) * 
Political Interest 0.06 (0.12) 
 
0.05 (0.08) 
 
0.14 (0.06) ** 0.05 (0.15) 
 
0.21 (0.10) ** 
Constant -2.54 (0.76) *** -1.69 (0.56) *** -2.98 (0.50) *** -0.15 (0.79)   -2.58 (0.58) *** 
N 1265 2059 2242 2248 2259 
Wald Ch2 (k) 95.98 (14) 144.64 (14) 178.01 (14) 60.57 (14) 119.81 (14) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.28 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.16 
Note: Logit regressions with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 24: Determinants of Voting Participation in Ecuador 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status 0.01 (0.02)   -0.04 (0.02) ** -0.001 (0.02)   -0.002 (0.02)   -0.02 (0.02)   
Female 0.34 (0.17) ** -0.09 (0.15) 
 
0.01 (0.20) 
 
0.30 (0.21) 
 
0.28 (0.22)   
Age 0.24 (0.08) *** 0.56 (0.08) *** -0.10 (0.08) 
 
0.01 (0.08) 
 
0.16 (0.08) ** 
Education 0.24 (0.06) *** 0.31 (0.05) *** 0.23 (0.07) *** 0.20 (0.08) *** 0.24 (0.07) *** 
Rural 0.41 (0.23) * -0.02 (0.17) 
 
0.41 (0.26) 
 
0.29 (0.26) 
 
-0.42 (0.24) * 
Guayaquil 0.17 (0.18) 
 
0.16 (0.15) 
 
0.33 (0.21) 
 
0.38 (0.22) * 0.20 (0.23)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous 0.05 (0.47) 
 
-0.40 (0.45) 
 
-0.72 (0.52) 
 
0.44 (0.84) 
 
0.59 (0.60)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo 0.32 (0.25) 
 
0.34 (0.20) * -0.02 (0.30) 
 
0.48 (0.31) 
 
0.75 (0.33) ** 
Ethnicity: Other 0.06 (0.33) 
 
-0.21 (0.35) 
 
0.23 (0.53) 
 
-0.46 (0.45) 
 
0.33 (0.44)   
Presidential Approval 0.05 (0.10) 
 
-0.18 (0.09) ** 0.25 (0.10) *** 0.30 (0.13) ** 0.14 (0.12)   
Institutional Trust -0.02 (0.02) 
 
-0.01 (0.02) 
 
-0.06 (0.02) *** -0.001 (0.02) 
 
0.01 (0.02)   
Civic Engagement 0.15 (0.05) *** 0.27 (0.04) *** 0.18 (0.04) *** 0.08 (0.06) 
 
0.08 (0.05)   
Support for Democracy -0.04 (0.05) 
 
-0.06 (0.04) 
 
-0.06 (0.06) 
 
0.04 (0.06) 
 
0.02 (0.06)   
Political Interest 0.06 (0.09) 
 
0.09 (0.08) 
 
0.18 (0.10) * 0.14 (0.14) 
 
-0.05 (0.14)   
Constant -0.41 (0.57)   -0.74 (0.53)   1.07 (0.75)   -0.14 (0.71)   -0.10 (0.77)   
N 2361 2371 2353 2262 1047 
Wald Ch2 (k) 49.61 (14) 144.07 (14) 58.95 (14) 38.76 (14) 29.62 (14) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Pseudo R
2
 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Note: Logit regressions, all but 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 25: Determinants of Voting Participation in Honduras 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status -0.10 (0.01)   0.005 (0.01)   -0.01 (0.01)   0.03 (0.01) *** 0.001 (0.01)   
Female -0.27 (0.14) * -0.19 (0.14) 
 
-0.24 (0.15) 
 
-0.35 (0.12) *** -0.05 (0.12)   
Age 0.55 (0.06) *** 0.35 (0.06) *** 0.67 (0.07) *** 0.22 (0.05) *** 0.32 (0.04) *** 
Education 0.16 (0.06) *** 0.14 (0.06) ** 0.14 (0.07) ** 0.02 (0.05) 
 
0.07 (0.04) * 
Rural 0.07 (0.16) 
 
0.05 (0.16) 
 
-0.31 (0.17) * 0.38 (0.14) *** 0.002 (0.13)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous -0.56 (0.29) * 0.37 (0.41) 
 
0.22 (0.41) 
 
-0.38 (0.49) 
 
-0.53 (0.37)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo -0.25 (0.16) 
 
-0.01 (0.15) 
 
0.002 (0.16) 
 
0.13 (0.13) 
 
0.11 (0.13)   
Ethnicity: Other -0.36 (0.34) 
 
0.18 (0.52) 
 
-0.69 (0.39) * 0.51 (0.29) * -0.46 (0.28) * 
Presidential Approval 0.13 (0.07) * 0.09 (0.09) 
 
-0.04 (0.10) 
 
0.19 (0.08) ** -0.06 (0.07)   
Institutional Trust 0.01 (0.01) 
 
-0.001 (0.02) 
 
-0.01 (0.02) 
 
0.08 (0.02) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 
Civic Engagement 0.09 (0.03) *** 0.14 (0.03) *** 0.17 (0.04) *** 0.03 (0.03) 
 
0.13 (0.02) *** 
Support for Democracy 0.03 (0.04) 
 
0.06 (0.04) 
 
0.10 (0.04) ** 0.11 (0.04) *** 0.05 (0.03) * 
Political Interest 0.04 (0.06) 
 
0.05 (0.07) 
 
0.29 (0.07) *** 0.23 (0.07) *** 0.01 (0.06)   
Constant -1.36 (0.39) *** -1.00 (0.42) ** -1.97 (0.46) *** -3.23 (0.44) *** -1.90 (0.31) *** 
N 1185 1295 1077 1314 1341 
Wald Ch2 (k) 159.00 (13) 83.72 (13) 246.76 (13) 117.90 (14) 115.77 (14) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.08 
Note: Logit regressions, 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Even given shifts in the sample across these models in tables 5-7 above, some 
demographic results are particularly robust. I focus on those results here, since they are of most 
consequence to understanding the inclusiveness of formal participation. The two most robust and 
highly significant findings are for age and education, both of which have a positive effect on 
voting participation in nearly every year in all three cases. This finding meets expectations: older 
people are more likely to vote and so are more highly educated people. Age has a relatively large 
effect on voting in Bolivia in 2004. Moving up one age cohort (generally entering the next 
decade of your life) led to no more than a 32% increase in the probability of voting, controlling 
for all other variables in the model.
253
 However, by 2010, moving up one age cohort in Bolivia 
led to no more than an 8.5% increase in the probability of voting, suggesting that the effect of 
age on voting dissipated somewhat during the process of reform. The magnitude of the effect of 
education is relatively stable across country-years. The smallest and least significant effect is in 
Honduras in 2012; graduating from an additional level of schooling led to no more than a 1.8% 
increase in the probability of voting, controlling for other demographic and attitudinal variables. 
On the other hand, the largest effect is in Ecuador in 2006. An additional level of education led 
to a 7.8% increase in the probability of voting. Importantly, other than shifts in the magnitude of 
effects, these relationships remained relatively unchanged by both the process of constitutional 
reform in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the removal of Zelaya in Honduras. 
Other key demographic variables have significant effects in certain years within certain 
cases and potentially demonstrate the effect of successful or failed attempts at reform. In Bolivia 
there are important shifts in voting participation before and immediately after the process of CA 
                                                 
253
 These changes in the probability of voting are calculated by dividing the regression coefficient by 4 to obtain the 
upper bound of the predictive difference of a one unit increase in the dependent variable. Probabilities are close 0.5 
at the midpoint of the logistic curve (where it is steepest and where the derivative is maximized) and the upper 
bound is approximately at this midpoint. For more information on this method of interpretation, see Gelman and Hill 
(2006, 82). 
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reform (Table 23). First, in 2006 and 2010 (but not in 2008), wealthier individuals were more 
likely to vote.
254
 During the CA process, wealthy and poorer individuals were equally likely to 
vote.  In the same two years before and after reform, those respondents living in the Media Luna 
were significantly less likely to vote. Living in the Media Luna as opposed to the rest of the 
country led to no more than an 11% decrease in the probability of voting in 2006 and a 10.25% 
decrease in 2010. However, during the CA process there was no statistically significant effect of 
living this in this part of the country.  Mostly notably, indigenous participation increased relative 
to white participation in 2008, a key year in the reform process. This demonstrates concretely the 
mobilizational effect that Morales had on indigenous groups. In 2008, there was a 17.3% 
increase in the probability of voting if the respondent was indigenous rather than white. Lastly, 
women were significantly less likely to vote than men in 2006, but not in any other year. 
In Ecuador, rural residents were actually more likely to vote in 2004, but this effect goes 
away in all subsequent years. Correa's base of support is decidedly more urban and middle class, 
and so this finding is consistent with expectations given the mobilization of his supporters. In 
2006, poorer individuals were significantly more likely to vote than wealthy individuals, 
controlling for other demographic and attitudinal variables. In 2010, respondents living in 
Guayaquil or provinces bordering Guayas were much more likely to vote. Living in or near 
Guayas led to no more than a 9.5% increase in the probability of voting, but this effect is washed 
out by attitudinal variables in 2012. In a disconcerting sign for inclusive participation, mestizos 
were significantly more likely to vote in 2012, controlling for other socio-demographic and 
attitudinal variables. Being mestizo led to a 18.8% increase in the probability of voting as 
compared to the baseline group, whites. As this is the last year included in the data, it is unclear 
                                                 
254
 Though the magnitude of this effect appears small in comparison to other variables, the coding of socioeconomic 
status means that a one unit increase is a very small change. Thus, the magnitude of its effect should not be 
compared to other variables in the model. 
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whether this reflects a pernicious new trend in voter apathy among the white minority in Ecuador 
or an isolated effect particular to participation in 2012.  
In Honduras, all of the socio-demographic effects are robust to the inclusion of attitudinal 
variables. Moreover, the picture is one of relative continuity across years in terms of the effect or 
lack of effect of socio-demographic variable. The only exception is 2010, which is 
unsurprisingly given the tumultuous political dynamics of the previous year. In 2010, 
immediately following the coup against Zelaya, wealthier individuals were significantly more 
likely to vote, women were significantly less likely to vote, and rural residents were more likely 
to vote. By 2012, all of these effects have disappeared again. The only other significant finding, 
aside from age and education as previously discussed, is for indigenous respondents in 2004, 
who were significantly less likely to vote than whites. 
Turning briefly to attitudinal effects, there are some interesting shifts that are likely 
related to the processes under consideration here. The most robust finding is the relationship 
between civic engagement and voting, which is positive and statistically significant across cases 
and in nearly every year in this analysis. This finding underscores Putnam's (1993) argument 
about the importance of civic participation for democracy. Interestingly, the relationship is not 
significant in Ecuador after the reform process (2010, 2012), or in Honduras immediately 
following the coup (2010). Moreover, in Ecuador, there are no significant attitudinal effects on 
voting participation after the process, only demographic effects. This is a bad sign for inclusive 
participation; in fact, it suggests that the process made socio-demographic differences more 
salient in determining voter turnout. In Honduras, before and after the coup (2008-2012), support 
for democracy and political interest became significant and positive predictors of voting 
participation. Perhaps most interestingly, trust in institutions became significantly positively 
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associated with voting participation in the wake of Zelaya's removal (2010 and 2012). These 
findings accord with the events occurring before, during and after the political crisis that 
unfolded in 2009. 
 Considering the results from the differences of means testing and the regression analysis, 
there is some evidence in support of the hypothesis that these processes would lead to shifts in 
formal participation across different socio-demographic groups. While age and education have 
robust and consistent effects on voting, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and regional/urban-rural 
variables have more particularistic effects that align with expectations given the timing and 
dynamics of reform via CA in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the failed attempt in Honduras. 
Likewise, though attitudinal effects were included as a control, shifts in these variables, most 
notably in Honduras, suggest that the events surrounding reform via CA had concrete effects on 
the determinants of voting participation. The outlook for inclusive participation is most favorable 
in Bolivia, especially given the results of the difference of means comparisons in Table 22 
above. The case of Ecuador, on the other hand, displays some worrisome trends in voting 
participation, further entrenching the divide between white and mestizo voters. Honduras seems 
to have witnessed short-term shocks to voting participation along both socio-demographic and 
attitudinal predictors immediately following the coup in 2010. However, to further evaluate the 
durability of these effects I would need additional and more recent data. 
Political Tolerance 
Political tolerance captures elements of both contestation and participation. It measures 
respondents' willingness to extent these rights to regime opponents. More specifically, it 
considers their right to vote, peacefully demonstrate, run for public office, and give a speech on 
TV.  The measure is likely to be closely related to individual's support for the government. For 
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this reason, I recognize that groups supporting the government are likely to be less tolerant of 
regime opponents, and I also control for presidential approval in regression analysis. Any 
demographic effects that survive the inclusion of presidential approval matter above and beyond 
the individual's support for the incumbent president. 
Figure 16: Mean Tolerance in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, 2004-2012 
 
Source: LAPOP 
There is a small bump in tolerance in Bolivia and Ecuador in the time point after the 
ratification of their new constitutions (2010).  However, the next time point (2012) shows a 
slight drop in tolerance again.  In Honduras, on the other hand, there has been a relatively 
consistent drop in tolerance.  In 2004, it had the highest levels of tolerance but by 2012 it has the 
lowest levels. This conforms with other studies of tolerance and my own expectations. Though 
the effect is not seen immediately after the coup (in 2010), it is possible that this drop in 
tolerance was due to post-coup polarization. It is worth noting that even where levels of tolerance 
are steady there might still be important changes among different populations of citizens that an 
overall mean will not capture. 
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For this reason, I again break out mean levels of the variable of interest by different 
demographic groups in society. Table 26 below displays mean significance tests. It presents 
important shifts in tolerance within cases where reform was successful (Bolivia and Ecuador). 
However, the changes in tolerance across ethnic and socioeconomic groups is disturbing and 
reflects growing polarization of the political system along socioeconomic and ethnic lines. In 
Honduras, on the other hand, there is relatively little significant change across groups within 
society. This does not mean that the Honduran lacks political polarization, but rather that, to the 
extent that it exists, it is not split as clearly along socioeconomic or ethnic lines. 
Table 26: Political Tolerance Mean Significance Tests 
    White Mestizo Indig. Other Low SES High SES Women 
Bolivia 2004 15.00 15.05 15.02 15.88 16.09 14.95 14.70 
 
2006 16.12 15.37 15.52 14.93 15.63 15.69 15.02 
 
2008 15.57 15.92 14.11 16.32 15.07 16.99 14.97 
 
2010 17.81 17.53 16.08 17.94 17.65 18.43 17.13 
 
2012 16.75 16.33 14.70 14.88 14.94 16.99 16.08 
Ecuador 2004 17.03 16.51 15.56 16.47 15.88 16.56 16.10 
 
2006 16.32 16.56 17.33 17.11 15.74 16.87 15.95 
 
2008 15.89 16.74 13.94 15.22 16.26 16.18 16.07 
 
2010 16.54 18.48 15.45 18.30 16.90 19.63 17.81 
 
2012 13.90 15.94 15.03 15.76 16.13 16.96 15.62 
Honduras 2004 19.20 20.69 21.02 19.95 20.18 20.11 19.70 
 
2006 16.92 16.31 17.07 18.16 16.89 16.69 16.41 
 
2008 16.85 17.42 12.45 17.17 16.71 17.10 16.92 
 
2010 17.19 17.04 15.35 16.91 17.13 16.82 17.10 
 
2012 13.90 12.84 14.71 10.26 12.53 14.45 13.22 
  Higher 95% Higher 99% Lower 95% Lower 99% 
 
In Bolivia, mestizos have become significantly more tolerant since the initiation of reform 
(2008-2012). However, correspondingly, indigenous citizens have become significant less 
tolerant. Likewise, while wealthier citizens have become significantly more tolerant since 2008, 
the poorest citizens were significantly less tolerant as of 2012. Women were significantly less 
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tolerant until 2010. After the ratification of the new constitution, there are no significant 
differences in tolerance between women and men in Bolivia. As the mean level of tolerance 
among women rises after the CA process, we can assume this is due to women becoming more 
tolerant overall. 
In Ecuador before 2008, there were no significant differences in mean tolerance across 
ethnic groups. However, from 2008 onward, mestizos were significantly more tolerant while 
whites and indigenous citizens were significantly less tolerant. Though mean levels of tolerance 
among the poorest citizens were indistinguishable from the rest of the population after 2004, 
since 2010 the wealthiest citizens are significantly more tolerant.  The fact that there was not a 
corresponding significant drop in tolerance among the poorest citizens is somewhat encouraging. 
In terms of tolerance among women the trend is the same as in Bolivia, with no significant 
difference between men and women as of 2012. However, in this case, the mean level of 
tolerance among women is lower in 2012 than in any other year. Hence, it's likely that the shift 
in significance is due to men becoming slightly less tolerant and not improvements among 
women, as it was in Bolivia. 
In Honduras, the difference of means tests suggest that socio-demographic variables may 
not explain low levels of tolerance. Rather, there are very few significant differences across 
ethnicities, socioeconomic classes, or gender. In 2004, mestizos were significantly more tolerant 
than other ethnicities, but became significantly less tolerant than others in 2008. Whites were 
significantly less tolerant in 2004, indigenous Hondurans were significantly less tolerant in 2008, 
and those who identified as "other" were significantly less tolerant in 2012. The only other 
significant difference is that wealthier Hondurans were more likely to be politically tolerant of 
regime opponents in 2012, after the coup. Patterns of political tolerance in Honduras stand in 
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stark contrast to Bolivia and Ecuador. Now I turn to a multivariate regression to test the effect of 
these demographic variables on political tolerance all together. 
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Table 27: Determinants of Political Tolerance in Bolivia 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status 0.004 (0.07)   -0.01 (0.04)   0.07 (0.04)   0.09 (0.05) ** -0.07 (0.04) * 
Female -0.37 (0.67) 
 
-0.52 (0.43) 
 
-0.74 (0.43) * -0.29 (0.42) 
 
0.3 (0.68)   
Age 0.003 (0.27) 
 
-0.31 (0.16) * -0.12 (0.15) 
 
-0.49 (0.16) *** -0.28 (0.13) ** 
Education -0.07 (0.21) 
 
0.25 (0.13) ** 0.24 (0.14) * 0.23 (0.14) * 0.39 (0.12) *** 
Rural 0.15 (0.77) 
 
0.10 (0.53) 
 
-0.87 (0.55) 
 
-0.14 (0.54) 
 
0.21 (0.47)   
Media Luna 0.93 (0.71) 
 
0.58 (0.43) 
 
0.81 (0.48) * 1.00 (0.47) ** 0.28 (0.38)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous -2.07 (1.19) * -1.35 (0.78) * -0.02 (0.89) 
 
2.01 (0.98) ** 0.11 (0.92)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo -1.06 (1.03) 
 
-1.67 (0.63) *** -0.20 (0.74) 
 
0.90 (0.74) 
 
0.48 (0.63)   
Ethnicity: Other 1.83 (1.88) 
 
-3.27 (3.57) 
 
-1.71 (1.37) 
 
-0.14 (1.58) 
 
-2.04 (1.42)   
Presidential Approval -0.64 (0.52) 
 
1.08 (0.32) *** -1.46 (0.26) *** -1.41 (0.32) *** -1.76 (0.28) *** 
Ideology -0.29 (0.17) * 0.01 (0.11) 
 
0.18 (0.12) 
 
0.14 (0.13) 
 
0.25 (0.10) ** 
Institutional Trust 0.25 (0.09) *** 0.23 (0.05) *** 0.11 (0.05) ** 0.13 (0.06) ** 0.27 (0.05) *** 
Interpersonal Trust -0.25 (0.37) 
 
-0.30 (0.25) 
 
0.62 (0.26) ** 0.74 (0.27) *** 0.21 (0.24)   
Support for Democracy 0.04 (0.28) 
 
0.41 (0.18) ** 0.81 (0.16) *** 0.40 (0.16) ** 0.24 (0.14) * 
Political Interest 0.36 (0.41) 
 
0.30 (0.26) 
 
0.17 (0.22) 
 
0.13 (0.34) 
 
0.001 (0.23)   
Constant 15.62 (2.57) *** 9.78 (1.76) *** 10.55 (1.75) *** 12.89 (2.08) *** 14.72 (1.67) *** 
N 1046 1591 1823 1858 1727 
F (k, df) 1.40 (15, 1030) 4.71 (15, 1575) 9.73 (15, 1807) 6.23 (15, 1842) 6.77 (15, 1711) 
Prob > F 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Note: OLS regressions with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 28: Determinants of Political Tolerance in Ecuador 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status -0.03 (0.05)   -0.01 (0.07)   -0.13 (0.06) ** 0.04 (0.05)   -0.01 (0.06)   
Female -1.83 (0.51) *** -0.50 (0.54) 
 
-0.58 (0.51) 
 
-0.64 (0.52) 
 
-0.21 (0.57)   
Age -0.31 (0.18) * -0.30 (0.20) 
 
-0.28 (0.19) 
 
0.42 (0.18) ** -0.17 (0.21)   
Education 0.29 (0.17) * 0.15 (0.19) 
 
0.18 (0.18) 
 
0.56 (0.17) *** 0.15 (0.18)   
Rural -0.21 (0.17) 
 
0.44 (0.67) 
 
-1.01 (0.64) 
 
0.69 (0.61) 
 
0.98 (0.67)   
Guayaquil 0.57 (0.57) 
 
1.32 (0.57) ** -1.67 (0.54) *** 0.47 (0.55) 
 
-0.97 (0.62)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous -2.56 (1.59) 
 
-2.98 (1.42) ** -4.58 (1.61) *** 1.34 (1.94) 
 
-0.21 (1.91)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo -1.03 (0.54) 
 
-0.88 (0.91) 
 
0.15 (0.89) 
 
2.28 (0.87) *** 1.93 (1.06) * 
Ethnicity: Other -1.30 (1.19) 
 
0.39 (1.46) 
 
-1.33 (1.55) 
 
2.41 (1.53) 
 
2.01 (1.37)   
Presidential Approval -0.77 (0.29) ** -0.56 (0.35) 
 
-1.04 (0.30) *** -1.30 (0.32) *** -2.12 (0.34) *** 
Ideology -0.11 (0.10) 
 
-0.28 (0.13) ** -0.03 (0.12) 
 
0.09 (0.12) 
 
-0.20 (0.12)   
Institutional Trust 0.07 (0.06) 
 
-0.09 (0.06) 
 
0.03 (0.06) 
 
-0.04 (0.06) 
 
0.12 (0.06) ** 
Interpersonal Trust 0.25 (0.26) 
 
0.04 (0.33) 
 
0.49 (0.29) * 0.91 (0.28) *** -0.22 (0.35)   
Support for Democracy 0.74 (0.13) *** 0.48 (0.16) *** 1.04 (0.17) *** 0.84 (0.18) *** 0.65 (0.17) *** 
Political Interest -0.69 (0.24) ** 0.02 (0.36) 
 
0.04 (0.29) 
 
0.14 (0.37) 
 
0.28 (0.37)   
Constant 18.99 (1.34) *** 18.55 (2.25) *** 18.36 (2.20) *** 9.59 (1.97) *** 16.93 (2.22) *** 
N 1652 1590 1607 1588 849 
F (k, df) 4.79 (15, 1636) 2.22 (15, 1574) 6.30 (15, 1591) 7.16 (15, 1572) 5.19 (15, 833) 
Prob > F 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Note: OLS regressions, all but 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 29: Determinants of Political Tolerance in Honduras 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status 0.03 (0.07)   -0.12 (0.04) *** 0.04 (0.04)   0.00 (0.03)   -0.03 (0.05)   
Female -0.28 (0.67) 
 
-0.58 (0.51) 
 
0.17 (0.42) 
 
-0.14 (0.40) 
 
-0.04 (0.51)   
Age -0.26 (0.27) 
 
0.21 (0.19) 
 
-0.16 (0.17) 
 
-0.20 (0.15) 
 
0.07 (0.18)   
Education -0.08 (0.21) 
 
0.73 (0.20) *** -0.09 (0.17) 
 
-0.11 (0.16) 
 
0.19 (0.17)   
Rural -1.32 (0.79) * -0.71 (0.59) 
 
-0.14 (0.50) 
 
0.59 (0.45) 
 
0.36 (0.57)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous 2.34 (0.80) * -0.28 (1.44) 
 
-2.65 (1.33) ** -1.13 (1.72) 
 
1.87 (1.59)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo 1.59 (2.37) ** -0.97 (0.56) * -0.07 (0.47) 
 
-0.18 (0.44) 
 
-0.81 (0.54)   
Ethnicity: Other 0.93 (1.19) 
 
1.84 (1.73) 
 
-1.15 (1.10) 
 
0.69 (0.93) 
 
-3.91 (1.19) *** 
Presidential Approval -0.15 (0.45) 
 
-0.11 (0.34) 
 
-0.47 (0.28) * -0.40 (0.25) 
 
-0.80 (0.29) *** 
Ideology 0.18 (0.17) 
 
-0.10 (0.10) 
 
0.37 (0.10) *** 0.33 (0.09) *** 0.20 (0.10) ** 
Institutional Trust 0.02 (0.10) 
 
0.10 (0.06) 
 
0.34 (0.05) *** 0.02 (0.05) 
 
0.18 (0.06) *** 
Interpersonal Trust 0.21 (0.38) 
 
0.92 (0.28) *** 0.55 (0.25) ** 0.19 (0.23) 
 
0.70 (0.26) *** 
Support for Democracy 1.23 (0.29) *** 0.54 (0.16) *** 1.08 (0.13) *** 0.68 (0.13 *** 0.90 (0.13) *** 
Political Interest 0.30 (0.41) 
 
-0.07 (0.27) 
 
0.001 (0.22) 
 
0.47 (0.26) * 0.69 (0.24) *** 
Constant 11.58 (2.37) *** 12.87 (1.61) *** 7.88 (1.33) *** 12.55 (1.40) *** 6.74 (1.34) *** 
N 853 1115 942 1173 1004 
F (k, df) 5.03 (14, 838) 4.28 (14, 1100) 15.78 (14, 927) 4.73 (14, 1158) 9.61 (14, 989) 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.12 
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As in the case of formal voting, there are fewer significant effects of socio-
demographic variables in the analysis of political tolerance. Moreover, relationships between 
socio-demographic variables and political tolerance seem more fleeting and dependent on 
political context than formal and informal participation. Perhaps this is due to the inclusion 
of aspects of contestation in this measure. Among socio-demographic characteristics, 
education has the most consistent and significant effect on tolerance. Unsurprisingly, 
everywhere that this relationship is significant (Bolivia 2008-2012, Ecuador 2010, and 
Honduras 2006), citizens with higher levels of education also tend to have higher levels of 
tolerance. 
In Bolivia, the patterns among socio-demographic variables make sense given the 
political dynamics surrounding the reform process. In 2008 and 2010, respondents from the 
Media Luna are more tolerant of the right to contestation and participation of regime 
opponents, controlling for all other variables in the model. Age has a significant and negative 
effect on political tolerance in 2006, 2010, and 2012, indicating that older individuals are less 
likely to be tolerant of regime opponents.  In 2008, toward the end of the reform process, 
women were significantly less tolerant of regime opponents. As the 2009 constitutions made 
some advances in women's representation and rights, this might have generated intolerance 
among women in advance of the new constitution's ratification. In 2010, after ratification, 
wealthier Bolivians were more likely to be tolerant of the right to contestation and 
participation of regime opponents. Lastly, indigenous Bolivians are significantly less 
politically tolerant than whites at the beginning of the reform process (2006); however, by 
2010, this group is significantly more tolerant and the effect is quite large. Moving from a 
white to an indigenous individual leads to a 2% increase on the index of political tolerance.  
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This could reflect growing tensions between the government and important 
indigenous organizations, specifically the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente 
Boliviano (CIDOB) and the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ).  These groups had been aligned with Morales through the CA reforms but 
came into conflict over the TIPNIS conflict. Though the project was not approved until 2011, 
indigenous groups issued a public statement rejecting the planned highway through their 
territory in May of 2010.
255
 
In Ecuador, the effect of age on tolerance was negative, as in Bolivia, and weakly 
significant in 2004. However, by 2010, this effect was positive and significant. Correa is one 
of Ecuador's youngest presidents and his movement is also relatively young overall; it is 
possible that younger politicians participating in the CA process and subsequent legislature 
helped to shift the relationship between age and tolerance after reforms. A number of 
additional results are not stable across the trim models reported in Appendix C and the fully-
specified model in Table 28.
256
 Large drops in sample size between these models may be to 
blame and so in the future I will need to use multiple imputation to overcome these issues. 
In Honduras, wealthier citizens were less tolerant of regime opponents in 2004, but in 
no other year was socioeconomic status a significant predictor of political tolerance. 
Indigenous Hondurans were significantly more tolerant than whites in 2004, but in 2008 they 
                                                 
255
 "Indígenas del TIPNIS rechazan la construcción de la carretera Villa Tunari – San Ignacio de Moxos y sacan 
dos resoluciones." Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarollo. May 28, 2010. 
<http://www.fobomade.org.bo/art-817> (Accessed: 4/21/14). This conflict also had direct links to the consulta 
previa in the new Constitution. Morales was supposed to hold a binding consultation of local indigenous groups 
prior to approval of the project but he failed to do so. By October 2011, after significant conflict, Morales 
reversed his position and supported  
 
256
 Guayaquileños are more tolerant of regime opponents in 2006 but less tolerant of regime opponents in 2008. 
This finding is counter-intuitive.  It is possible that it reflects issues associated with shifts in the sample size 
between the fully specified and trim models. Likewise, indigenous groups are significantly less tolerant just 
before and during the reform process (in 2006 and 2008) and poorer individuals were less tolerant in 2008, 
however these relationships were not present in the trim model reported in Appendix C. 
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were significantly less tolerant. In 2004, the administration of Ricardo Maduro and the ring-
wing Partido Nacional de Honduras (PNH - National Party of Honduras) were in office. By 
2008, Zelaya had begun moving sharply left in terms of policy. These dynamics could 
explain the shift in the sign of the effect of indigenous ethnicity on tolerance over this period. 
Additionally, mestizos were more likely to tolerate regime opponents in 2004. 
Attitudinal variables like support for democracy, trust in institutions, and presidential 
approval generally have significant and consistent effects on tolerance. Support for 
democracy is positively correlated with political tolerance in nearly every year across cases. 
The one exception is Bolivia in 2004.
257
 Institutional trust is also positively correlated with 
political tolerance; those who trust institutions such as Congress, the courts, and the National 
Electoral Council are more likely to tolerate contestation and participation of those who 
speak badly of the regime. Lastly, as predicted, those who think that the incumbent president 
is doing a good job are less likely to tolerate those who speak badly of the regime.  
Other effects are less consistent over time. For example, the effect of political interest 
on political tolerance varies a lot. In Bolivia it is never a significant predictor. In Ecuador, the 
relationship is negative and significant in 2004, meaning people who are more interested in 
politics are less likely to tolerate those who speak badly of the regime. However, in Honduras 
in the wake of the coup (2010, 2012), the relationship is positive. Those Hondurans who 
were more interested in politics were more likely to tolerate regime opponents in the wake of 
the coup. This demonstrates that the effect of this variable may be highly dependent on the 
political context. Lastly, the effect of ideology is also highly changeable and dependent on 
context. In Bolivia, the left was more likely to tolerate regime opponents in 2004, under the 
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 The very low F-statistic on this regression indicates poor model fit and is likely generating insignificance in 
this variable in Bolivia 2004. This could also be an artifact of the structure of missing data.  I will need to 
explore this issue further. 
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presidency of Carlos Mesa and in the wake of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada's resignation in 
2003. However, by 2012 this relationship is positive, meaning that the right was more likely 
to tolerate regime opponents under Evo Morales' presidency. In Ecuador, the left was more 
likely to tolerate regime opponents in 2006, during Alfredo Palacio's presidency and after the 
early exit of Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005. This also corresponded to Correa's campaign, which 
was highly critical of the existing regime. Lastly, right ideology correlates with higher 
tolerance of regime opponents beginning in 2008. This corresponded with Zelaya's leftward 
shift in policy. However, surprisingly, this effect does not go away but remains significant 
through 2012. 
Considering the analysis of political tolerance as whole, influences on tolerance seem 
much more changeable over time. However, there are a number of socio-demographic effects 
that survive the inclusion of presidential approval and reflect contemporary dynamics 
associated with successful and failed reform processes. Again, Bolivia seems to demonstrate 
the least pessimistic outlook for political tolerance. 
Discussion of Results 
Taken as a whole, the results of the multiple analyses included in this chapter indicate 
that the nature as well as the content of CA reforms may determine outcomes for democracy. 
The dynamics of contestation and participation that unfolded throughout the CA reform 
process and following the ratification of new constitutions can be directly traced to the level 
of control each executive exerted throughout the CA reform process and the degree to which 
there was deliberation over reforms. A crucially related factor was the presence of a strong 
civil society, including independent and strong social movements that could participate in the 
process. 
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Executives who exerted very high levels of control over the process (Chávez in 
Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador) ensured themselves success, or their preferred outcome 
and the consolidation of significant amounts of power. This has led to substantial and 
worrying restrictions in both horizontal and vertical mechanisms of accountability. In both of 
these cases, this trend began within the CA as executives actively sought to eliminate and 
marginalize opposition. The act of closing the opposition-dominated congresses in each of 
these cases was significant, in that the individuals within these institutions had also been 
popularly elected to serve out their terms. The act of sending them home was not only a 
practical one but symbolic. Chávez and Correa made clear that the opposition was now 
irrelevant to the process of rewriting the constitution and devising new institutions. In the 
case of Ecuador, the only debate that occurred was within meetings of Correa‘s own party 
bloc and not in the broader plenary. On each of the commissions within the CA, Correa‘s 
party controlled a majority and hence dominated the writing of each of the proposed articles 
of the Constitution. Moreover, civil society organizations and social movements were weaker 
and largely coopted by the executives in these cases. As a result, the inclusionary effect of 
the reform process has been dampened as well. Throughout the process, previously-excluded 
groups have not participated to the same extent that they have in Bolivia, for example. 
The executive who could not exert any control over the reform process (Zelaya in 
Honduras) resulted in absolute failure, with his removal from office before the process could 
even begin. Here, the outcome for democracy was largely determined by the institutional 
conflict that ensued and the dramatic response employed by opposition-dominated 
institutions. After Zelaya was exiled from the country, there were significant reductions in 
the freedoms considered essential for the healthy operation of vertical mechanisms of 
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control, particularly press freedom. There are equally worrying downward trends in 
participation, particularly among previously-excluded groups, and also in political tolerance. 
Citizens are less likely now to extend basic rights to regime opponents, demonstrating the 
high level of distrust among those who supported Zelaya and those who supported his 
removal from office.  
The most positive outcome for democracy along the lines of contestation and 
participation actually occurred where the executive exerted an intermediate amount of 
control over the process (Morales in Bolivia). The Bolivian CA reform was largely 
successful, in that the process resulted in a new constitution even if it required non-trivial 
negotiations with both the opposition and powerful social movements. In comparison with 
Venezuela and Ecuador, the Bolivian CA had much more significant levels of deliberation 
throughout the process, particularly because Morales‘ party failed to control a voting 
majority within the body. This deliberation was not always highly democratic in nature; it 
actually became violent at key moments. However, these types of conflicts also led to 
moments where both the opposition and civil society groups could insert themselves into the 
reform process. In order to achieve a new constitution, Morales needed to consider the input 
of strong and independent social movements, particularly indigenous groups, who could 
easily derail the process. He also needed to negotiate with the opposition at key moments in 
ways that gave them some leverage to achieve their own preferences for the new constitution, 
including the referendum on autonomies. Hence, there was a higher level of debate overall 
surrounding the Bolivian CA process in comparison with the others considered here.  
In the wake of the Bolivian reforms, mechanisms of vertical accountability have 
continued to function to a greater extent than in the case of Venezuela or Ecuador. Horizontal 
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accountability has been significantly reduced by Morales‘ ability to gain partisan control over 
all branches of government, including now the judiciary with the addition of elections to the 
high courts in 2011. Yet, outcomes for participation are, like vertical accountability, much 
more positive. The analysis of voting participation shows that previously-excluded groups 
had a significant spike in participation throughout the process. This is a short-term effect, and 
only time will tell whether it is sustained. 
This evidence all points to the fact that where a CA process occurs, the degree of 
deliberation associated with the reform of the constitution is important for outcomes. Where 
deliberation was actively restricted by executive control over the process, this trend has 
tended to continue after the implementation of new constitutions. It has led to significant 
limits on vertical and horizontal accountability. Therefore, it should not be surprising then 
that citizens appear to have reacted to this dynamic. There are overall lower levels of 
participation of previously-excluded groups where executives exerted tight control over the 
reform process and subsequent institutions. In Bolivia, where the executive exerted less 
control over the process of reform, the outcome appears to be a spike in participation among 
previously-excluded groups, at least in the very short-term. In Ecuador, on the other hand, the 
executive exerted a substantial amount of control over the reform process as a whole. Even 
those who once were ardent supporters of President Correa and the reform process, such as 
indigenous groups, have now expressed their sense that the CA reflects a missed opportunity 
to generate a new social contract and include previously excluded groups in the political 
system. This disillusionment is to some extent visible in the trends in voting participation. 
The results for political tolerance have remained somewhat stable across both of these reform 
processes, as evidenced by the analysis presented here. 
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All of these analyses are really preliminary. Particularly in Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Honduras, the longer term effects of the CA reform processes are still unfolding. In 
Honduras, the worrying trends across both contestation and participation may lead to 
disillusionment with the two traditionally strong parties. For example, Xiomara Castro 
participated in the 2013 presidential election under the banner of a new party and just 
narrowly lost. Only time will tell whether these trends continue, producing more enduring 
changes in democracy. The analysis presented here has been simply a first-attempt at 
assessing the short-term consequences for contestation and participation. It has found some 
evidence that these reforms, not only in terms of content but also the degree of deliberation in 
the process, have affected contestation and participation in the short-term. 
Conclusion 
Successful processes of reform via CA in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have 
generated significant consequences for contestation and participation, and ultimately for the 
strength of democracy. Likewise, dramatic failure of reform, as in Honduras, rather than 
leading to a continuation of the status quo, also produces some important changes. The CA is 
a transformative process, a moment when leaders can exert influence over the future of the 
institutional landscape. The degree to which the leaders in these three countries were 
successful in controlling the process and the outcome seems to correspond to important shifts 
in patterns of contestation. At the same time, the CA is predicated upon a high level of 
popular support and participation. As such, it leads to significant changes in how sectors of 
society relate to the political process. Where the CA process fails, but moreover fails 
dramatically, the ensuing political crisis may cause detrimental effects on both dimensions of 
democracy. 
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This chapter has presented preliminary evidence that successful cases of reform via 
CA may, to varying extents, privilege inclusive participation over rights to contestation. This 
evidence also supports an argument that a more deliberative reform process (Bolivia) is 
likely to lead to a more inclusive outcome overall. The presence of strong and independent 
social movements in Bolivia was crucial not only to the success of the process, but also later 
helped to determine the outcome of these reforms for democracy. Morales had to contend 
with powerful and independent social movements, particularly indigenous groups, he had to 
contend with his partisans in Congress and he was also unable to marginalize the opposition-
controlled Senate. This meant that there was a higher degree of deliberation and negotiation 
during the reform process. As a result, the Bolivian constitution retains a number of features 
that reflecting this compromise (Cameron and Sharpe 2010, 72–73; C. Romero, Börth, and 
Peñaranda 2009). It has also led to more inclusive participation, particularly in terms of 
formal participation and the attenuation of differences in formal participation along the lines 
of socioeconomic class, ethnicity, and gender.  
In contrast, where the executive's movement hegemonically controls the CA process 
and hence the outcome of reform (as in Venezuela and Ecuador), this may further entrench 
existing divisions and polarization with respect to voting participation and political tolerance. 
Likewise, these executive are better able to concentrate power, reducing contestation, and 
continuing to marginalize the opposition long after the completion of reforms. 
Differences in the deliberative nature of the process determined the degree of 
contestation after reform. Where the opposition was marginalized completely during the 
process (Venezuela and Ecuador), the outcome was an extreme concentration of power in the 
executive and the continued abuse of this power to limit horizontal and vertical mechanisms 
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of accountability. In Bolivia, restrictions on contestation have occurred, but they have not 
been as significant as in other cases considered here.   
In Honduras, the political crisis ensuing after Zelaya's removal led to sharp reductions 
in both horizontal and vertical accountability in the short run. Overall levels of political 
tolerance are the lowest in Honduras, and are not clearly linked to socio-demographic groups 
as much as they are political and attitudinal features, corresponding with the dynamics of the 
coup.  Yet, the 2013 elections demonstrated that the opposition is still actively engaging in 
contestation. In the longer run, the coup could be an impetus to begin breaking up the 
traditional two party system in Honduras and generating a more inclusive political process 
and party system there. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation analyzes the dynamics of one particular avenue for pursuing 
ambitious reform agendas: the Constituent Assembly with supreme power to rewrite the 
constitution. By ambitious reform agenda, I mean the executive's underlying intentions to 
advance a restructuring of laws or political institutions in order to redistribute power between 
elites and popular sectors within both the political and the socioeconomic arenas.  In 
analyzing why and how executives with ambitious agendas pursue  reform via CA, this 
dissertation has found confirmation for several central findings about the political 
motivations behind executive policymaking, the determinants of successful reform processes, 
and the broader consequences for democracy. These findings, discussed in detail below, 
contribute to a deeper understanding of democracy and power in contemporary Latin 
America. This chapter summarizes the main findings and contributions made by this 
dissertation, outlines several areas for future research, and concludes with a discussion of 
several broader theoretical issues raised by this work. 
Summary and Significance of Main Findings 
In Chapter 1, I ask three core questions. When might presidents with ambitious 
reform agendas choose a referendum and CA over other available options? What factors 
ultimately determine the success of this path of reform? Finally, what are the consequences 
for democracy of pursuing reform in this way? In answering these questions, this dissertation 
offers a conceptual framework for understanding institutional innovation and change in 
comparative perspective. I examine CA reform in Latin America by considering three 
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successful cases and one case of failure. Recently, constitutional reform has unfolded 
successfully in Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009) through a strikingly 
similar sequence of events and within a similar sociopolitical context.  This topic raises 
important questions about understandings of democracy more generally while also drawing 
upon several recent empirical cases. 
In Chapter 2, I situate this dissertation at the intersection of four general bodies of 
literature on: policymaking and conflict between the executive and legislative branches; 
institutional creation, change, and manipulation; the diffusion of innovations; and liberal 
representative vs. participatory conceptions of democracy.  I develop a conceptual 
framework and several hypotheses regarding the causes, consequences, and determinants of 
success of reform via CA. My principal contribution in this chapter is to advance the 
literature by situating this innovative path of reform within the full range of reform 
mechanisms available to executives. Moreover, academics have often held overly simplistic 
views of successful reform via CA, claiming that it is intrinsically authoritarian or 
unquestionably democratic (Colburn and Trejos 2010; J. Colón-Ríos 2010; Engler 2010; 
Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Instead, I acknowledge the complexities inherent to this type of 
reform.  
Chapter 2 also explains my methodological approach, which is centrally qualitative.  
Throughout the dissertation, I rely upon evidence from elite interviews in Bolivia and 
Ecuador. This approach is supplemented with quantitative analysis of public opinion data in 
Chapter 6. I conceptualize and discuss the measurement of key concepts advanced through 
this dissertation, including the concept of an ambitious reform agenda and the Constituent 
Assembly. To identify the universe of cases, I classify 125 presidential terms in 18 Latin 
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American countries from 1978 to the present according to whether or not the executive 
advanced an ambitious reform agenda. This demonstrates interesting trends across the region.  
To place these relatively recent processes of reform in historical perspective, Chapter 
3 draws on relevant political theory to demonstrate the theoretical foundation that executives 
have used to justify attempts to reform via CA where no legal precedent exists. It then 
provides a brief historical overview of such reform. I conclude by examining briefly the case 
of constitutional reform of the Articles of Confederation in the United States in 1787. This 
example displays similarities with modern cases of constitutional reform examined by this 
dissertation. It demonstrates how an environment of crisis can lead to a reform process that 
bends or breaks the institutionalized rules for reform, but shows that this does not necessarily 
have to lead to an undemocratic outcome. 
One of the central findings of this dissertation surrounds the conditions under which 
executives are more likely to engage in this type of reform. Chapter 4 places this choice in 
comparative perspective with the full range of policymaking options, including even those 
options outside the legal and institutionalized rules for reform. This framework makes the 
assumption that the executive has discretion over policymaking strategies, albeit constrained 
by history, context, and institutions. Several factors weigh into the executive's decision and 
make it more likely that he or she will choose to employ a CA: (1) low number of seats in 
Congress for the president and inability to build a sufficient coalitional majority, (2) weak 
presidential decree powers, (3) infeasibility of partial constitutional reform, (4) willingness 
by the president to bend or break existing institutions, and (5) the president‘s perceived high 
chance of success in relation to other strategies. Of these five factors, the two most central 
are the executive's partisan control of Congress and his or her willingness to bend the rules. 
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Executives would likely prefer to pursue reform through institutionalized mechanisms where 
possible. However, when facing constraints on the likelihood of success through traditional 
channels of reform, executives with ambitious agendas may be willing to step outside of the 
institutionalized rules. Presidents pursuing reform via CA are clearly not risk-averse. At the 
same time, I demonstrate that a process of diffusion has also played a role in their 
understanding of what types of reform are possible and likely to succeed.   
This dissertation draws additional theoretical and empirical attention to the point that 
executives often make a calculated decision about bending the institutionalized rules in order 
to have a chance to achieve their preferred policy agendas. In this way, it expands the focus 
beyond that of existing work on executive policymaking in democratic contexts by 
considering extra-legal or ambiguously legal reform options.
258
 
The second main finding of this dissertation concerns the determinants of success of 
the CA reform process if an executive chooses to pursue it. Chapter 5 identifies two factors 
that jointly determine executive success. By success, I mean the degree to which the 
president can control the CA process and hence the outcome of reform. A president must 
have mobilizational leverage, or the ability to rally popular support behind the reform 
agenda. He or she must also have institutional leverage. This is the capacity to persuade the 
judiciary or electoral council to allow a referendum to form a CA, and the ability to keep the 
Congress or, in extreme cases, the military from intervening in the process. These two factors 
are not independent, but rather interact at different stages of the reform process to determine 
the result of reform. In the beginning stage, the outcome of a CA process is highly uncertain 
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 At the time of Hugo Chávez's election and pursuit of a CA, Venezuela was still considered to be democratic 
even by those who now would code it as a competitive authoritarian regime. For example, Kurt Weyland (2013) 
considers Chávez's 1998 election to be "free and fair" but his "unfair" 2012 reelection demonstrates, in his view, 
"that Venezuela had already fallen under nondemocratic rule" (19). Likewise, Polity IV does not begin to code 
Venezuela as "open anocracy" until 2006. 
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but presidents may be able to take certain actions to increase their mobilizational and 
institutional leverage, thus improving their chances of success. These actions include: 
advancing reform within a context of crisis, the use of an anti-institutional agenda where 
democratic institutions are not highly represented, as well as the cooptation of powerful civil 
society organizations in an effort to more fully control the process and hence the outcome of 
reform. 
In essence, by drawing out the factors that allow these executives to succeed, this 
dissertation provides an explanation behind some of the most remarkable political processes 
that have occurred in the region in recent years. What is extraordinary about Chávez, Correa, 
and Morales is not only the scope of their ambitious reform agendas, but rather their ability 
to implement them without breaking with the strictures of political democracy. This 
dissertation has pointed out how extremely popular executives are sometimes able to 
leverage their popularity at various stages of the reform process to ensure success. Likewise, 
this has helped them apply institutional leverage and over time gain significant control over 
institutions, which in turn may be leveraged to sustain continued  popular support as 
ambitious reforms appear feasible. 
Lastly, this dissertation makes several important findings with respect to the 
consequences of the CA process for democracy. These hinge ultimately on the success of the 
reform, that is the executive's ability to control the process of reform and hence its outcome. 
Most notably, where the executive more fully controls the entire reform process, outcomes 
are less likely to advance democracy through contestation and participation. Likewise, 
dramatic failures of attempts at reform may lead to devastating consequences for contestation 
and participation, at least in the short-run. This particular finding will need to reevaluated and 
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tested with other cases, if possible, to see whether these relationships hold up over a longer 
period of time. It is really at intermediate levels of success that these reforms are most likely 
to advance democracy along the dimensions of contestation and participation. Chapter 6 
advances this argument through an analysis of the evolution of contestation and participation 
in cases where the CA was attempted. This investigation is preliminary and focuses on short-
term effects of these processes, given that three of the four under consideration have occurred 
only really taken effect within the last five years.  
For this period, what it demonstrates is that successful cases of reform via CA have, 
to varying extents, privileged inclusive participation over rights to contestation. There has 
generally been a concentration of power in the executive everywhere that reforms were 
successful. This has resulted in practical, and even sometimes legal, restrictions on the 
mechanisms of both vertical and horizontal accountability. At the same time, by moving 
toward a more participatory form of democracy, these constitutions have introduced new 
mechanisms for citizens' participation. They have also generally embraced more inclusive 
language and mechanisms for the incorporation of previously-excluded groups in the text of 
the constitutions. Lastly, there have been important socio-demographic shifts across formal 
participation (voting), as well as political tolerance during the time period of reform. 
Overall, the examination of indicators of contestation and participation in Chapter 6 
demonstrates that the most genuine advances in inclusive participation, particularly by formal 
measures, have been made in Bolivia. Likewise, it has seen the least backsliding in terms of 
contestation. This can be directly linked to the fact that Bolivia's reform process was more 
contested and deliberative overall. Throughout the process, Morales and the MAS faced an 
opposition-controlled Senate, as well as independent and powerful civil society actors who 
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exerted their policy preferences. In Ecuador and Venezuela, where executives and their 
political movements controlled the processes of reform in a more hegemonic way, the 
indicators of inclusive participation are not as strong. This finding underscores the 
importance of democratic deliberation in constituent assemblies, particularly during moments 
of institutional change when powerful political actors may determine future patterns in the 
exercise of democracy for years to come.   
Some might suggest that institutions do not matter but that, rather, these reform 
processes could be fully accounted for by history, economic development, geography, 
culture, or demographics, for example. This dissertation has offered evidence that, while 
these features may play a role, institutions are essential at every stage in processes of reform 
via CA. For example, the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated how 
institutions factor directly into both the executive's decision over how to reform, as well as 
condition the success of the outcome. Moreover, success cannot be reduced to the fact these 
executives were able to implement CA processes because of access to natural resource 
wealth from oil or gas. For example, the reform in Venezuela was highly successful in 1998, 
at a time when the price of a barrel of oil was at a 30-year low. Therefore, the Venezuelan 
case shows that natural resource rents are not a necessary condition determining success. 
Lastly, if institutions were really inconsequential, then these processes would not likely have 
much of an impact on democracy. However, Chapter 6 rejects this alternative explanation, 
showing that these institutional reform processes have the potential to generate important 
consequences for the broader political system with respect to contestation and participation. 
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Areas of Future Research 
Several issues raised by this research warrant further exploration. First, the 
policymaking tendencies of executives with ambitious reform agendas deserves future 
attention. I have taken a small first step toward understanding policymaking under an 
executive with extraordinary objectives, by focusing on the CA process and its short-term 
outcomes.   However, it would be valuable to analyze more completely the differences 
between executives with and without ambitious agendas. How is their approach to 
policymaking different?  What characteristics determine whether or not an executive 
campaigns on and pursues an ambitious agenda?  Are there salient differences in terms of the 
types of reform strategies employed by executives during the neoliberal period and 
executives that have gained power during the more recent resurgence of the left? These 
questions are consequential for our understanding of executive power and policymaking in 
Latin America. 
Secondly, there is very little reason to expect that the broad class of phenomena 
within which a CA falls - that is a novel approach to policymaking - should be limited to 
Latin America. Presidents are often resourceful and adept political leaders who have gained 
office precisely because of their ability to overcome barriers to success. Thus, particularly in 
institutional contexts where the bending of the rules is sometimes permissible and where the 
legislative process proves difficult, the use of novel strategies to advance ambitious agendas 
is likely to occur. It would be interesting to expand this framework to presidential systems 
around the world, particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia where states are 
increasingly linked to the west and sensitive to the need to preserve democracy but also 
where the institutional context is relatively weak. This question is important because 
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understanding presidential action under exceptional circumstances might tells us more about 
presidential power than analyzing their actions under normal policymaking circumstances. 
Important Theoretical Issues 
The Constituent Assembly process in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador has been 
historic in several ways. First, these executives have left indelible marks, not only on the 
political process within their respective countries, but also on the broader region as a whole. 
Hugo Chávez's 1998 election, the CA process and the other policies he enacted had a 
profound impact on the trajectory of politics in Venezuela and Latin America. He led the 
'turn to the left,' facilitated new regional spaces of cooperation, and radically reoriented 
responses to US foreign policy in Latin America. Moreover, his successful example, 
financial support, and direct advice was integral in the diffusion of the CA process as a viable 
option for advancing ambitious reforms. In a similar vein, subsequent cases have captured 
the imagination of the international community and political analysts for other reasons. Evo 
Morales' 2005 election reflected a dramatic shift in Bolivia; he became its first indigenous 
president. Moreover, his election represented, in many ways, the poor and indigenous 
majority's resurgence after centuries of exclusion. In Ecuador in 2006, Rafael Correa ran for 
the presidency, somewhat brazenly, without legislative candidates. He has since managed to 
remain in office with relative institutional stability longer than any other president since the 
return to democracy. In Honduras, Manuel Zelaya's sharply leftward drift was momentous, as 
the first executive to move leftward while in office, at least since the return to democracy in 
Latin America. The coup and his subsequent exile was a dramatic warning that the 
accomplishments of the left are by no means fail-safe and that the entrenched interests of 
traditional economic elites remain strong in the region. 
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At their core, these processes of reform via CA embody a larger and ever-present 
tension between traditional forms of representative democracy and more participatory 
approaches to governance. By marginalizing or closing Congress, these presidents 
undermined one of the primary institutions of liberal democracy while retaining democratic 
legitimacy by relying on mechanisms of direct democracy and constitutional reform. 
Likewise, new constitutions generated by the processes examined here put procedures in 
place to enhance participation. These mechanisms of direct democracy generally privilege 
the majority and some worry that they offer at least the potential for infringement on 
minority rights. At the same time, the previous structures in place in each of these cases was 
far from the liberal democratic ideal. The political systems were plagued by a host of issues 
prior to reform, not least of which was the political marginalization of a majority, generating 
considerable instability and moments of institutional crisis.  
While the CA has a long tradition within Latin America, more recent processes in 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador reflect its innovative use by an executive to advance an 
ambitious reform agenda, in some cases without legal precedent. Significant polarization 
accompanied this process through all stages: preceding the initiation of the CA, continuing 
throughout the process limiting deliberation in significant ways, and resulting after the 
process is complete as well. As a result, citizens, policymakers, and academics remain 
divided over the extent to which these reforms were democratic.  
First, there is a non-trivial question about the legal basis for reforms. Executives were 
willing to bend the institutional rules and relied upon their institutional leverage to initiate 
and carry out the process of reform via CA. In Bolivia, the path to the CA was relatively 
straightforward and more clearly lawful because of previous reforms to the constitution. 
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Where there was no legal precedent, executives in Venezuela and Ecuador justified their use 
of a CA, drawing upon a body of legal literature based on ideas of popular sovereignty and 
the constituent power. However, they ultimately needed the support of the Judiciary, which 
issued judgments in favor of the process, as well as the Electoral Council, which carried out 
elections to the CA. Still, the failed case of Honduras demonstrates that the idea of the poder 
constituyente (constituent power) is by no means a universally-accepted concept, and 
moreover that executives attempting these reforms took a calculated risk. 
Secondly, beyond legal basis of the process, all of these cases have thrown into 
question our broader understanding of democracy in the region. For example, was Zelaya's 
removal a democratic response to stop an unconstitutional process? Or was it an 
unconstitutional coup to remove a democratically-elected executive? The analysis presented 
here offers some evidence that the outcome of Zelaya's removal has been detrimental to 
democracy in the short-term. At the same time, was the Constituent Assembly a democratic 
process or the beginning of a slide into competitive authoritarianism? The outcome seems 
heavily dependent on the nature of the process and particularly the degree of deliberation 
involved. 
In Venezuela and Ecuador, executives controlled partisan super-majorities within the 
CA. They had an iron-fisted grip on the process, leaving little room for deliberation with 
opposition groups, and driving the reforms through in a relatively short window of time. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these CA processes are often lamented as a missed opportunity to 
generate consensus among historically opposed groups in society: the majority and 
minorities, as well as poor and wealthy citizens. In Ecuador, those critical of the process are 
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increasingly individuals who were once aligned with Alianza PAIS and have since broken 
away from Correa's movement. 
Despite a more clearly legal path to the CA in Bolivia, the MAS proved willing to 
bend institutionalized rules to effectively dominate the CA process as well. Morales 
ultimately overcame his failure to obtain a super-majority in the CA and the prolonged 
conflict over voting rules. When the rules within the assembly became a problem, the MAS 
proved willing to step outside of them to achieve their preferred reforms. Yet, a degree of 
deliberation was retained because of Morales' close ties to powerful and independent social 
movements and his inability to marginalize the opposition-controlled Senate. As a result, the 
Bolivian constitution retains a number of (somewhat conflicting) features that reflects this 
compromise. For example, the text approved in the CA originally eliminated references to 
"the Bolivian nation," but the Congress included it again during negotiations. The CA text 
also reinforced cooperation among branches of government while Congress emphasized the 
rule of law and judicial independence. Participatory mechanisms of direct democracy stand 
alongside references to the delegation of power to representative institutions (Cameron and 
Sharpe 2010, 72–73; C. Romero, Börth, and Peñaranda 2009). 
Differences in the deliberative nature of the process also determined into the degree 
of contestation after reform. Where the opposition was marginalized completely during the 
process, the outcome was an extreme concentration of power in the executive and the 
continued abuse of this power to limit horizontal and vertical mechanisms of accountability. 
In Honduras, the political crisis ensuing after Zelaya's removal led to sharp reductions in 
accountability as well. Yet, the full consequences of that process remain to be seen. The 2013 
elections demonstrated that the opposition is still participating in elections and contesting the 
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government. In the longer run, the coup could be an impetus to begin breaking up the 
traditional two party system in Honduras and generating a more inclusive political process 
and party system there.  
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Bolivia 
Alfaro, Luis - Former CA member for the MAS; Congressman for the MAS 
Argirakis, Helena - Political analyst and academic 
Ayo Saucedo, Diego - Academic 
Bravo, Manfredo - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Capobianco, Eliane - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Castro, Sergio - Vice President of the Institute of International Studies; advisor to the CA on 
the topics of subnational autonomy, judicial pluralism, and the maritime conflict; Advisor to 
the Diálogo Nacional for the National Federation of Municipalities 
Chivi Vargas, Idón Moisés - Member of REPAC 
Cordero Carraffa, Carlos H. - Political Scientist, Academic 
Costa, Jimena - Journalist 
Darío Cuéllar Suarez, Ruebén - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Dorado Middagh, Luis Felipe - Former CA member for PODEMOS and Congressman for 
PPB-CN 
Evia, José Luis - Economist, Academic 
Gamboa Rocabado, Franco - UNDP representative for the CA 
Garces, Fernando - Academic and worked closely with the Pacto de Unidad 
Gutiérrez Sardán, José Luiz - Advisor to Evo Morales for the CA and observer of the CA 
Guzman Vda. de Melgar, Loyola - Former CA member for MAS 
Kamodina, Jorge - Academic 
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Lazarte Rojas, Jorge - Former CA member for Unidad Nacional 
Limpias Chavez, Francisco Javier - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Mayorga, Fernando -  Academic 
Mendieta Romero, Gonzalo - Lawyer 
Mercado Céspedes, Oscar Bruno - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Mesa Gisbert, Carlos - Former President 
Molina, Fernando - Journalist and academic 
Oliva, Adrian - Congressman for Plan Progreso Para Bolivia - Convergencia Nacional (PPB-
CN)  for Tarija 
Oporto, Henry - Academic 
Orellana Mamani, Mario - Former CA member for the MAS 
Paz Ballivián, Ricardo - Under Carlos Mesa, member of the Unidad de Coordinación para la 
Asamblea Constituyente, managing the adoption of Law 2631 in 2004; the National 
Coordinator for the implementation of the Referendum on energy policy 
Pedraza, Gustavo- Academic 
Peña, Paula - Academic 
Pinto Quintanilla, Juan Carlos - Member of REPAC 
Prada Alcoreza, Oscar Raul - Former CA member for the MAS, Member of the Grupo 
Comuna 
Quiroga, María Soledad - Manager of Information, Research, and Conflict Analysis for 
UNIR 
Revollo Quiroga, Miriam Marcela - Former CA member for the MAS; MSM 
Rodriguez Veltzé, Eduardo - Former President, former Supreme Court Justice, academic 
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Rojas Ortuste, Gonzalo - Academic 
Rojas Tudela, Farit - Lawyer, academic, and advisor 
Seleme, Susana - Journalist and academic 
Serhan Jaldín, Edwin Gamal - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Tuero, Roger - Political analyst and academic 
Ulloa Pena, Oswaldo - Former CA member for PODEMOS 
Urioste, Juan Cristóbal - Justice and academic 
Vargas, Antonio - Journalist 
Vega Camacho, Oscar - Academic and member of the Grupo Comuna 
Zuazo, Moira - Academic 
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Ecuador 
Acosta, Alberto - CA President, founding member of Alianza PAIS, and academic 
Alvarado, Rosana - CA member for Alianza PAIS 
Alvear, Jorge - Lawyer and former justice of the Constitutional Tribunal 
Aragundi, Zobeida - Lawyer and advisor 
Ávila, Ramiro - Lawyer, academic, and member of the Redaction Committee 
Baca Mancheno, Carlos - Advisor  
Burbano de Lara, Felipe - Academic 
Calle, Maria Augusta - CA Member for Alianza PAIS 
Campaña Mora, Joffre - Lawyer and academic 
Cano, Diego - Union leader 
Castro Patiño, Iván - Lawyer and member of CONESUP 
Chuji, Monica - CA member for Alianza PAIS, leader of CONAIE and CONFENIAE 
de la Torre, Rosa Elena - Member of the CA for Alianza PAIS 
Durán, Liliana - Leader, Foro Nacional de la Mujer 
Ell, Elizabeth - Advisor to the Constitutional Tribunal 
Escala, Jorge - CA member for Movimiento Popular Democrático 
Espinoza, Alfredo - Advisor to the CA for César Rodríguez  
Gaviria Díaz, Carlos - Former justice on the Colombian Constitutional Court 
Girjalva, Agustín - Academic and advisor  
Godoy, Gina - CA member for Alianza PAIS 
Granja, Pedro - Lawyer  
Gutierrez, Lucio - Former President 
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Jiménez, María Leonor - Lawyer 
Larrea, Gustavo - Advisor and academic, leader of Participación Ciudadano  
Martínez, Esperanza - Advisor to the CA for Alberto Acosta 
Montaña, Juan - Lawyer, advisor in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador 
Morales Viteri, Juan Pablo - Advisor to the CA for Gina Godoy 
Noboa, Gustavo - Former President 
Pachano, Simón - Academic 
Palacio, Alfredo - Former President 
Paredes, Pablo Lucio - CA member for Movimiento Ciudadano Independiente Futuro Ya 
Rodríguez, César - CA member for Alianza PAIS 
Roldós, Martha - CA member for Red Ética y Democracia 
Rosero, Rocio - Advisor and leader of CONAMU 
Trujillo, Julio Cesar - Academic and member of the 1998 Constitutional Assembly  
Vareles, Juan - Lawyer and academic 
Ventimilla, Ximena - Justice for the Constitutional Court 
Viciando, Roberto - Academic from Spain and advisor in Bolivia and Ecuador 
Viteri, Leonardo - CA member for the Partido Social Cristiano 
Vizueta Ronquillo, Juan - Lawyer 
Zamudio, Fanny - Advisor to the CA for César Rodríguez
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APPENDIX B: PRESIDENTIAL AGENDAS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1978-2014 
 
Country Year President Empowering Masses Empowering Elites 
Argentina 1983 Raúl Alfonsín 0 0 
Argentina 1989 Carlos Menem 0 1 
Argentina 1995 Carlos Menem 0 1 
Argentina 1999 Fernando de la Rúa 0 0 
Argentina 2002 Eduardo Duhalde 0 0 
Argentina 2003 Néstor Kirchner 1 0 
Argentina 2007 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 1 0 
Bolivia 1982 Hernán Siles Zuazo 0 0 
Bolivia 1985 Víctor Paz Estenssoro 0 1 
Bolivia 1989 Jaime Paz Zamora 0 0 
Bolivia 1993 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 0 1 
Bolivia 1997 Hugo Banzer 0 1 
Bolivia 2001 Jorge Quiroga 0 0 
Bolivia 2002 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 0 0 
Bolivia 2003 Carlos Mesa Gisbert 1 0 
Bolivia 2005 Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé 0 0 
Bolivia 2006 Evo Morales 1 0 
Brazil 1985 José Sarney 0 0 
Brazil 1990 Fernando Collor 0 1 
Brazil 1992 Itamar Franco 0 1 
Brazil 1995 Fernando Henrique Cardoso 0 1 
Brazil 1998 Fernando Henrique Cardoso 0 0 
Brazil 2003 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 1 0 
Brazil 2006 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 1 0 
Chile 1990 Patricio Aylwin Azócar 0 0 
Chile 1994 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 0 0 
Chile 2000 Ricardo Lagos Escobar 0 0 
Chile 2006 Michelle Bachelet Jeria 0 0 
Colombia 1978 Julio César Turbay Ayala 0 0 
Colombia 1982 Belisario Betancur Cuartas 0 0 
Colombia 1986 Virgilio Barco Vargas 0 0 
Colombia 1990 César Gaviria Trujillo 0 0 
Colombia 1994 Ernesto Samper Pizano 0 0 
Colombia 1998 Andrés Pastrana Arango 0 0 
Colombia 2002 Álvaro Uribe Vélez 0 1 
Colombia 2006 Álvaro Uribe Vélez 0 1 
Costa Rica 1978 Rodrigo Carazo Odio 0 0 
Costa Rica 1982 Luis Monge Álvarez 0 0 
Costa Rica 1986 Óscar Arias 0 0 
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Country Year President Empowering Masses Empowering Elites 
Costa Rica 1990 Rafael Calderón Fournier 0 1 
Costa Rica 1994 José Maria Figueres Olsen 0 0 
Costa Rica 1998 Miguel Rodríguez Echeverría 0 1 
Costa Rica 2002 Abel Pacheco de la Espriella 0 0 
Costa Rica 2006 Óscar Arias 0 0 
Dom. Republic 1978 Antonio Guzmán Fernández 0 0 
Dom. Republic 1982 Salvador Jorge Blanco 0 1 
Dom. Republic 1986 Joaquín Balaguer 0 0 
Dom. Republic 1990 Joaquín Balaguer 0 1 
Dom. Republic 1994 Joaquín Balaguer 0 0 
Dom. Republic 1996 Leonel Fernández Reyna 0 0 
Dom. Republic 2000 Hipólito Mejía 0 0 
Dom. Republic 2004 Leonel Fernández Reyna 0 0 
Dom. Republic 2008 Leonel Fernández Reyna 0 0 
Ecuador 1979 Jaime Roldós Aguilera 1 0 
Ecuador 1981 Osvaldo Hurtado 0 0 
Ecuador 1984 León Febres Cordero 0 1 
Ecuador 1988 Rodrigo Borja Cevallos 0 0 
Ecuador 1992 Sixto Durán Ballén 0 1 
Ecuador 1996 Abdalá Bucaram 0 0 
Ecuador 1997 Fabián Alarcón 0 0 
Ecuador 1998 Jamil Mahuad 0 1 
Ecuador 2000 Gustavo Noboa 0 1 
Ecuador 2003 Lucio Gutiérrez 0 0 
Ecuador 2005 Alfredo Palacio 1 0 
Ecuador 2007 Rafael Correa 1 0 
Ecuador 2009 Rafael Correa 1 0 
El Salvador 1984 José Napoleón Duarte 1 0 
El Salvador 1989 Alfredo Cristiani 0 1 
El Salvador 1994 Armando Calderón Sol 0 1 
El Salvador 1999 Francisco Flores Pérez 0 1 
El Salvador 2004 Antonio Saca 0 0 
Guatemala 1986 Vinicio Cerezo 0 0 
Guatemala 1991 Jorge Serrano Elías 0 1 
Guatemala 1993 Ramiro de León Carpio 0 0 
Guatemala 1996 Álvaro Arzú 0 1 
Guatemala 2000 Alfonso Portillo 0 0 
Guatemala 2004 Óscar Berger 0 0 
Guatemala 2008 Álvaro Colom 1 0 
Honduras 1982 Roberto Suazo Córdova 0 0 
Honduras 1986 José Azcona del Hoyo 0 0 
Honduras 1990 Rafael Leonardo Callejas 0 1 
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Country Year President Empowering Masses Empowering Elites 
Honduras 1994 Carlos Roberto Reina 0 0 
Honduras 1998 Carlos Roberto Flores 0 0 
Honduras 2002 Ricardo Rodolfo Maduro Joest 0 0 
Honduras 2006 Manuel Zelaya Rosales 1 0 
Honduras 2009 Roberto Micheletti 0 0 
Honduras 2010 Porfirio Lobo Sosa 0 0 
Mexico 2000 Vicente Fox 0 0 
Mexico 2006 Felipe Calderón 0 0 
Nicaragua 1985 Daniel Ortega 1 0 
Nicaragua 1990 Violeta Chamorro 0 1 
Nicaragua 1997 Arnoldo Alemán 0 0 
Nicaragua 2002 Enrique Bolaños 0 0 
Nicaragua 2007 Daniel Ortega 1 0 
Panama 1989 Guillermo Endara 0 0 
Panama 1994 Ernesto Pérez Balladares 0 1 
Panama 1999 Mireya Moscoso 0 0 
Panama 2004 Martín Torrijos 0 0 
Paraguay 1993 Juan Carlos Wasmosy 0 1 
Paraguay 1998 Raúl Alberto Cubas Grau 0 0 
Paraguay 1999 Luis Ángel González Macchi 0 0 
Paraguay 2003 Óscar Nicanor Duarte Frutos 0 0 
Paraguay 2008 Fernando Armindo Lugo Méndez 1 0 
Paraguay 2012 Luis Federico Franco Gómez 0 0 
Peru 1980 Fernando Belaúnde Terry 0 0 
Peru 1985 Alan García Pérez 1 0 
Peru 1990 Alberto Fujimori 0 1 
Peru 1995 Alberto Fujimori 0 1 
Peru 2000 Alberto Fujimori 0 0 
Peru 2000 Valentín Paniagua 0 0 
Peru 2001 Alejandro Toledo 0 0 
Peru 2006 Alan García Pérez 0 0 
Uruguay 1985 Julio María Sanguinetti 0 0 
Uruguay 1990 Luis Alberto Lacalle 0 1 
Uruguay 1995 Julio María Sanguinetti 0 0 
Uruguay 2000 Jorge Batlle 0 0 
Uruguay 2005 Tabaré Vázquez 1 0 
Venezuela 1979 Luis Herrera Campins 0 0 
Venezuela 1984 Jaime Lusinchi 0 0 
Venezuela 1989 Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez 0 1 
Venezuela 1993 Ramón José Velásquez 0 0 
Venezuela 1994 Rafael Caldera Rodríguez 0 1 
Venezuela 1998 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias 1 0 
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Country Year President Empowering Masses Empowering Elites 
Venezuela 2000 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias 1 0 
Venezuela 2006 Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias 1 0 
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APPENDIX C: DATA & TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 6 
 
Coding of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Subcategory Scores 
Subcategory scores are coded by experts, including analysts and senior-level 
academic advisors. Each component ranges from a score of 0 (least free) to 4 (most free). 
Subcategory scores are calculated by summing across component scores. These measures 
range from 0 (least free) to 16 (most free). 
Freedom of Expression 
This measure assesses the presence of: independent media and cultural expression [0, 4]; 
religious freedom [0, 4]; academic and educational freedom [0, 4]; open and free private 
discussion [0, 4]. 
Freedom of Association 
This measure assesses the presence of freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open 
public discussion [0, 4]; free nongovernmental organizations (civic organizations, interest 
groups, foundations, etc.) [0, 4]; free trade unions, peasant organizations, professional/private 
organizations, and effective collective bargaining [0, 4]. 
 
Coding of Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Measure 
Press freedom scores are coded by experts on the basis of a diverse set of indicators, 
which fall within three broad categories: the legal environment for the press; the political 
environment for the press; and the economic environment for the press. First, components 
falling under the legal environment category assess the presence of laws and regulations with 
the potential to restrict media content.  Next, components falling under the political 
environment category assess the extent to which the government may exert control over 
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media content. Last, components falling under the economic environment category capture 
the economic independence of the media by examining the structure and concentration of 
media ownership. Individual subcomponents within each of these categories are detailed on 
the Freedom House website under ―Methodology.‖259  
 
 
LAPOP Technical Information 
Table 30: Overview of LAPOP Dataset Technical Information 
Country Year Months N Weight 
Bolivia 
2004 October 3070 Weighted 
2006 March - April 3013 Weighted 
2008 February - March 3003 Weighted 
2010 February - March 3018 Weighted 
2012 March - April 3029 Weighted 
Ecuador 
2004 Unavailable 3000 Weighted 
2006 January 2925 Weighted 
2008 January - February 3000 Weighted 
2010 February - March 3000 Weighted 
2012 February 1512 Unweighted 
Honduras 
2004 February - March 1500 Unweighted 
2006 June - July 1585 Unweighted 
2008 February - March 1522 Unweighted 
2010 February - March 1596 Unweighted 
2012 January - February 1728 Weighted 
 
 
                                                 
259
 See: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2014/methodology#.VGqs7PnF9QE (accessed: 
9/1/2014). 
 320 
 
Figure 17: Average Ethnic Composition of Survey Respondents vs. Census Data 
  
  
  
Sources: LAPOP Data and the CIA World Factbook, which takes figures from the most 
recent national census 
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Figure 18: Turnout and Invalid Votes in Venezuela, 1993-2013 
 
Source: IFES Election Guide and Venezuelan CNE
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Table 31: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Voting Participation in Bolivia 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic 
Status 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.02 * 0.04 ** 0.02   
  (0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01)   
Female -0.06 
 
-0.51 *** -0.05 
 
-0.12 
 
0.07   
  (0.19) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.13)   
Age 1.12 *** 0.48 *** 0.81 *** 0.33 *** 0.84 *** 
  (0.19) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.09)   
Education 0.18 *** 0.24 *** 0.25 *** 0.15 *** 0.20 *** 
  (0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04)   
Rural 0.18 
 
0.16 
 
0.08 
 
-0.04 
 
0.25   
  (0.23) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.16)   
Media Luna -0.17 
 
-0.44 *** -0.38 *** -0.28 * -0.17   
  (0.20) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.14)   
Ethnicity: 
Indigenous 0.44 ** -0.06 
 
0.62 *** 0.90 *** 0.06   
  (0.22) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.29)   
Ethnicity: 
Mestizo -0.37 
 
0.23 
 
0.29 * 0.49 ** 0.05   
  (0.49) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.23)   
Ethnicity: 
Other 0.51 
 
0.29 
 
0.71 * 1.51 * 1.22 * 
  (0.33) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.69)   
Constant -2.71 *** -0.65 ** -2.08 *** 0.10 
 
-1.31 *** 
  (0.59)   (0.31)   (0.32)   (0.46)   (0.40)   
N 1564 2815 2916 2808 2902 
Wald ch2 (k) 59.75 (9) 143.52 (9) 219.30 (9) 48.99 (9) 111.41 (9) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.14 
Note: Logit regressions, all with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 
0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 32: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Voting Participation in Ecuador 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic Status 0.02 * -0.04 ** 0.003 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002   
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02)   
Female 0.39 *** 0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
0.24 
 
0.24   
  (0.15) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.18)   
Age 0.24 *** 0.55 *** -0.08 
 
-0.04 
 
0.19 *** 
  (0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06)   
Education 0.22 *** 0.30 *** 0.31 *** 0.24 *** 0.29 *** 
  (0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06)   
Rural 0.31 * 0.20 
 
0.35 * 0.53 ** -0.22   
  (0.18) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.19)   
Guayaquil 0.15 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
0.44 ** 0.40 ** 
  (0.11) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.19)   
Ethnicity: Indigenous 0.34 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.55 
 
0.84 
 
0.76   
  (0.43) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.47)   
Ethnicity: Mestizo 0.34 
 
0.34 * 0.02 
 
0.60 ** 0.80 *** 
  (0.22) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.26)   
Ethnicity: Other 0.08 
 
-0.14 
 
0.33 
 
-0.23 
 
0.15   
  (0.30) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.34)   
Constant -0.31 
 
-0.47 
 
1.53 *** 1.05 ** -0.15   
  (0.40)   (0.38)   (0.54)   (0.51)   (0.51)   
N 2928 2879 2904 2887 1456 
Wald ch2 (k) 43.39 (9) 96.23 (9) 41.10 (9) 42.55 (9) 45.55 (9) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Note: Logit regressions, all but 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, 
** 0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 33: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Voting Participation in Honduras 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic 
Status 0.004 
 
0.01 
 
-0.004 
 
0.02 ** 0.01   
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)   
Female -0.19 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.34 *** -0.02   
  (0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.10)   
Age 0.51 *** 0.35 *** 0.70 *** 0.24 *** 0.33 *** 
  (0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04)   
Education 0.01 
 
0.11 ** 0.13 *** 0.06 
 
0.08 ** 
  (0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04)   
Rural 0.14 
 
0.09 
 
-0.14 
 
0.24 ** 0.07   
  (0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11)   
Ethnicity: 
Indigenous -0.44 * 0.28 
 
0.43 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.35   
  (0.25) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.30)   
Ethnicity: 
Mestizo -0.16 
 
0.11 
 
0.16 
 
0.16 
 
0.02   
  (0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11)   
Ethnicity: 
Other -0.39 
 
0.07 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.32   
  (0.28) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.25)   
Constant -0.28 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.25 *** -0.62 ** -1.30 *** 
  (0.24)   (0.28)   (0.27)   (0.25)   (0.23)   
N 1500 1585 1512 1594 1706 
Wald ch2 (k) 156.52 (8) 64.50 (8) 244.60 (8) 56.97 (8) 93.56 (8) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.05 
Note: Logit regressions, 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, 
** 0.05, * 0.10 
 
 
  
 325 
 
Table 34: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Political Tolerance in Bolivia 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic 
Status 0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 * 0.13 *** -0.03   
  (0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04)   
Female -0.80 
 
-0.81 ** -1.19 *** -0.58 
 
0.11   
  (0.62) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.35)   
Age -0.17 
 
-0.54 
**
* 0.06 
 
-0.39 *** -0.23 ** 
  (0.24) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.12)   
Education -0.04 
 
0.09 
 
0.48 *** 0.34 *** 0.47 *** 
  (0.18) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11)   
Rural 1.04 
 
0.80 * -1.12 ** -0.53 
 
0.54   
  (0.73) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.42)   
Media Luna 1.04 
 
0.95 ** 2.27 *** 1.65 *** 1.16 *** 
  (0.67) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.35)   
Ethnicity: 
Indigenous -1.27 * -0.59 
 
-0.37 
 
1.28 
 
-0.77   
  (0.72) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.79)   
Ethnicity: 
Mestizo 0.19 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.18 
 
0.94 
 
0.39   
  (2.08) 
 
(1.51) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.56)   
Ethnicity: Other -4.03 *** -0.09 
 
0.06 
 
0.52 
 
-2.09 * 
  (1.12) 
 
(0.74) 
 
(1.54) 
 
(1.83) 
 
(1.22)   
Constant 16.00 *** 16.38 
**
* 12.54 *** 13.40 *** 14.89 *** 
  (1.49)   (0.91)   (1.08)   (1.11)   (1.13)   
N 1453 2507 2626 2545 2392 
F (k) 2.64 (9) 4.09 (9) 12.72 (9) 9.24 (9) 6.41 (9) 
Prob > F 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Note: OLS regressions, all with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 
0.10 
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Table 35: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Political Tolerance in Ecuador 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomic 
Status -0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.002 
 
0.100 ** 0.003   
  (0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05)   
Female -1.50 *** -0.92 ** -1.00 ** -0.63 
 
-0.20   
  (0.40) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.46)   
Age -0.22 
 
-0.43 *** -0.04 
 
0.38 *** -0.40 ** 
  (0.14) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.16)   
Education 0.19 
 
0.25 * 0.23 
 
0.55 *** 0.23   
  (0.14) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.15)   
Rural -0.10 
 
0.29 
 
0.15 
 
0.94 * 0.58   
  (0.49) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.50 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.51)   
Guayaquil 0.19 
 
0.76 ** -0.19 
 
0.23 
 
-1.03 *** 
  (0.30) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.34)   
Ethnicity: 
Indigenous -0.55 
 
-0.10 
 
-2.16 * 0.04 
 
0.29   
  (1.37) 
 
(1.30) 
 
(1.23) 
 
(1.51) 
 
(1.39)   
Ethnicity: 
Mestizo -0.65 
 
-0.33 
 
1.19 * 1.83 *** 1.78 ** 
  (0.59) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.81)   
Ethnicity: Other -1.09 
 
-0.78 
 
-0.76 
 
1.73 
 
1.94 * 
  (0.90) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(1.11) 
 
(1.20) 
 
(1.11)   
Constant 18.87 *** 16.87 *** 16.17 *** 11.22 *** 15.77 *** 
  (1.20)   (1.41)   (1.32)   (1.32)   (1.53)   
N 2710 2731 2709 2623 1300 
F (k) 2.46 (9) 2.92 (9) 3.29 (9) 5.61(9) 3.84 (9) 
Prob > F 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Note: OLS regressions, all but 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 
0.05, * 0.10 
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Table 36: Socio-Demographic Determinants of Political Tolerance in Honduras 
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Socioeconomi
c Status 0.01 
 
-0.08 ** 0.030 
 
-0.001 
 
0.10 *** 
  (0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.04)   
Female -0.86 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.14 
 
0.11 
 
0.15   
  (0.55) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.45)   
Age 0.06 
 
0.26 
 
0.05 
 
-0.08 
 
0.54 *** 
  (0.19) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.16)   
Education 0.14 
 
0.64 *** -0.13 
 
-0.01 
 
0.38 ** 
  (0.24) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.16)   
Rural 0.09 
 
-0.64 
 
-0.60 
 
0.58 
 
0.92 * 
  (0.63) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.48)   
Ethnicity: 
Indigenous 1.93 * 0.13 
 
-4.16 *** -1.91 
 
1.70   
  (1.12) 
 
(1.31) 
 
(1.22) 
 
(1.60) 
 
(1.47)   
Ethnicity: 
Mestizo 1.55 *** -0.62 
 
0.71 
 
-0.09 
 
-1.01 ** 
  (0.60) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.49)   
Ethnicity: 
Other 0.97 
 
1.05 
 
0.33 
 
-0.20 
 
-3.79 *** 
  (1.40) 
 
(1.52) 
 
(1.15) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(1.05)   
Constant 18.95 *** 16.64 *** 16.58 *** 17.03 *** 9.42 *** 
  (1.14)   (1.08)   (1.00)   (0.85)   (0.99)   
N 1289 1499 1279 1460 1459 
F (k) 1.42 (8) 2.37 (8) 2.60 (8) 0.56 (8) 5.47 (8) 
`Prob > F 0.000 0.016 0.008 0.814 0.000 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.003 0.03 
Note: OLS regressions, 2012 with sampling weights and robust standard errors; *** 0.01, ** 
0.05, * 0.10 
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Coding of Variables and Indexes 
 
Age 
In the 2004 surveys, age is coded in 10-year age groups. Therefore, I recoded continuous 
measures in later surveys to match earlier categorical codings. The age groups are defined as 
follows: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 65 and older. 
 
Civic Engagement [Index] 
This index is composed of four variables measuring citizen's involvement. Responses for all 
items are categorical: "never, ones or twice a year, once or twice a month, or once a week." 
The first question asks, "Do you attend meetings of a religious organization?" The second 
component question asks, "Do you attend meetings of a parents' or school association?" The 
third component asks, "In the last twelve months, have you attended reunions of a committee 
to improve the community?" The final component question asks, "In the last twelve months, 
have you attended meetings of an association of professionals, businessmen, producers, 
and/or campesino organizations?" The Cronbach's alpha for this index ranges from a low of 
0.31 in Ecuador 2010 to a high of 0.56 in Bolivia 2004. This scale reliability score is actually 
too low (less than 0.6) and so in the future, I will look at reconstructing this index, creating a 
factor, or choosing a single variable. 
 
Education 
A continuous measure of education is included in the LAPOP surveys; it is simply the 
number of years of education. However, I have recoded this variable so that it is categorical 
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because categorical differences in education are important. Thus, completing high school and 
obtaining a diploma is quite different than completing three years of high school. Therefore, I 
constructed a categorical measure of education in the following way: None = 0 years of 
education; Primary, 1st-5th Grade = 1-5 years of education, Primary, 6th-8th Grade = 6-8 
years of education, Incomplete Secondary = 9-11 years of education, Complete Secondary = 
12 years, Incomplete University = 13-15 years of education, Complete University = 16 years 
of education, and finally Graduate School = 17 or more years of education. 
 
Ethnicity 
This question asks respondents to self-identify their ethnicity. The question asks, "Do you 
consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black or Afro-[Bolivian/Ecuadorian], mulato, 
[Montubio (Ecuador)] or other." The category with most responses was mestizo, while 
mulato, black, and other had very few responses in all countries, and Montubio had very few 
responses in Ecuador, therefore I collapsed these categories into other. I created a series of 
dummy variables for white, mestizo, indigenous, and other. White served as the baseline in 
the analyses presented here. 
 
Gender, Female 
This question was scored by the interviewer. Therefore, it was not asked directly to 
respondents but instead asked the interviewer to record whether the respondent was male (0) 
or female (1). 
 
 
 330 
 
Ideology, Left-Right 
This question asks respondents to place themselves along a left-right ideological continuum. 
It asks, "According to the sense you have for the terms `left' and `right' when you think about 
your political point of view, where would you place yourself on the scale?" Responses are on 
a 10-point scale from left (0) to right (9). 
 
Institutional Trust [Index] 
Trust in institutions is an index composed of four questions. All four questions are structured 
the same way, asking respondents to what extent they have confidence in an individual 
institution. Responses fell along a 7-point scale from "not at all" to "a lot." The five 
institutions that are included in this index are: the National Congress, the National Electoral 
Council, the Supreme Court, and Tribunals. The Cronbach's alpha score varies from a low of 
0.66 in Bolivia 2004 to a high of 0.79 in Honduras 2012, falling well within the adequate 
range of scores for the reliability of this index. 
 
Interpersonal Trust 
This question gets at how trusting respondents are in their personal lives. It asks, "Now, 
talking about the people around here, would you say that the people in your community are: 
not trustworthy at all, not very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or very trustworthy?" 
Responses fall on this 4-point scale. 
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Political Interest 
The 2006 - 2012 surveys contained a question about general interest in politics. 
Unfortunately, this basic question was not available in 2004. Therefore, I have constructed an 
index of political interest based on respondents' frequency of watching, listening, or reading 
the news. The LAPOP surveys contain a battery of questions asking how often people watch 
the news on TV, listen to the news on the radio, or read the news in a newspaper or online. 
Responses are categorical frequencies: "never, rarely, 1 or 2 times a week, daily." However, 
there are several incompatibilities across surveys which I needed to overcome. First of all, in 
2010 and 2012, there is only one question which asks with what frequency do you follow the 
news through any of these sources: TV, radio, newspapers, or online. The other surveys 
disaggregate these responses so that people can indicate that they watch the news on TV 
daily, but never follow the news through other sources. Therefore, the first challenge was to 
collapse all responses into one frequency measure. I did this by coding as `daily' anyone who 
answered daily to any of the four methods of following the news. Next, for less frequent 
responses, I created an additive interest score. I then chose sensible, though ultimately 
arbitrary, cutoffs to code this categorically into: "none, a little, some, or a lot" of interest in 
politics. Moreover, in 2004, this same battery of questions does not ask about online 
readership. Therefore, I adjusted my scale and cutoff points to take this into account. 
 
Political Tolerance [Index] 
The political tolerance index is composed of four different questions aimed at measuring 
respondents' degree of tolerance for those who hold different political views. The first 
question asks: "There are people who always speak badly of the form of government in 
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[Bolivia/Ecuador/Honduras], not only the incumbent government, but rather the system of 
government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of their right to vote?" Responses 
are arrayed on a 10-point scale from "strongly disapprove" (0) to "strongly approve" (9). The 
second question asks: "How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people realizing 
peaceful demonstrations with the goal of expressing their points of view?"  The third 
questions asks: "Continuing to think about those who speak badly of the form of government 
in [Bolivia/Ecuador/Honduras], how strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people 
being allowed to run for public office?" The fourth question asks: "How strongly do you 
approve or disapprove that these people go on TV to give a speech?" (Latin American Public 
Opinion Project 2014) The index is additive with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum 
score of 36. The Cronbach's alpha for this index was sufficiently high, ranging from a low of 
0.73 in Honduras 2010 to a high of 0.87 in Bolivia 2010. 
 
Presidential Approval 
This is a single question asking respondents about their support for the incumbent president. 
The question asks, "Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that 
the job that [president's name] is doing is..." and responses are on the following scale: "Very 
good," "Good," "not good or bad (regular)," "Bad," or "Very bad (terrible)."  
 
Region 
In Bolivia, this variable is coded based on the department. I have coded the departments of 
the "Media Luna" as 1; these are the departments of Pando, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, 
and Beni. These areas are purple in the figure below. All remaining departments were coded 
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0, the baseline. In Ecuador, I have coded for the traditional split between Quiteños and 
Guayaquileños by coding respondents from the province of Guayas as "Guayaquileño." 
Likewise, respondents in any province bordering Guayas were also coded as 
"Guayaquileño." This leaves respondents from Pichincha, bordering provinces, and those 
provinces that do not border either Pichincha or Guayas as coded 0, the baseline.  These areas 
are green in the figure below. In Honduras, there is no salient regional split as in the other 
two cases. 
 
Figure 19: Coding Regionalism in Bolivia and Ecuador 
  
Map of Media Luna in Bolivia  Map of Guayaquileños in Ecuador
 
Rural 
This variable codes whether respondents live in an urban rural area. In 2004 and 2006,  
surveys included a binary response question about whether the respondent was from an urban 
or rural area. Later LAPOP surveys had a more complex categorical breakdown of the city of 
the urban area/city that the respondent lived in. I simply collapsed this categorical question 
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into a binary urban-rural dummy variable. Rural areas are coded 1, while urban areas, 
regardless of the size of the city, are coded 0. 
 
Socioeconomic Status [Index] 
The LAPOP questionnaires include a battery of questions about whether or not respondents 
possess certain things in their home. This group of questions was used to construct an index 
of socioeconomic status, following (Espinal, Hartlyn, and Morgan 2006). The eight items 
included in the index are: a television, a refrigerator, a conventional telephone, a vehicle, a 
washing machine, a microwave, potable water, and indoor plumbing. Each item in the index 
is weighted by the percentage of people who responded that they did have the item. This 
accounts for the rarity of each component among the general population. Next, the weighted 
item responses are added up and scaled so that the maximum score is 25. The Cronbach's 
alpha scores for this index are well within the acceptable range, from a low of 0.68 in 
Ecuador 2006 to a high of 0.83 in Honduras 2004, 2008. 
 
Support for Democracy 
This is a single question asking respondents "Changing the subject again, to what extent do 
you agree with the affirmation that democracy can have problems, but it is better than any 
other form of government?"  Responses array along a 7-point scale from "Disagree strongly" 
to "Strongly agree." 
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Voted 
This is a measure of voter turnout in presidential elections, a single question from the 
LAPOP surveys: "Did you vote in the last presidential elections of [YEAR]?" The election to 
which the question refers differs across countries, but is always the most recent. Responses 
were "Yes, I voted" or "No, I didn't vote" across all countries and years of the survey, with 
only two exceptions. In Bolivia (2004), responses include "Yes," "I was registered but I 
didn't vote," "I am not registered," and "I am underage." In Bolivia (2006), responses include 
"Yes, I voted," "No, I didn't," and "Does not apply." For consistency, I dichotomize 
responses to so that only individuals who responded affirmatively, "Yes," receive a 1 in my 
coding. 
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Descriptive Statistics of LAPOP Data, 2004-2012 
Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age Bolivia 2004 3073 2.61 1.46 1 6 
 
Ecuador 2004 2933 2.90 1.46 1 6 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 2.96 1.58 1 6 
 
Bolivia 2006 2846 2.72 1.50 1 6 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 2.81 1.47 1 6 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 2.51 1.41 1 6 
 
Bolivia 2008 2999 2.64 1.49 1 6 
 
Ecuador 2008 2916 2.80 1.54 1 6 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 2.52 1.43 1 6 
 
Bolivia 2010 2872 2.74 1.48 1 6 
 
Ecuador 2010 2892 2.94 1.55 1 6 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 2.53 1.45 1 6 
 
Bolivia 2012 2930 2.74 1.51 1 6 
 
Ecuador 2012 1484 2.88 1.47 1 6 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 2.85 1.59 1 6 
Civic Engagement Bolivia 2004 3005 4.83 3.00 0 12 
 
Ecuador 2004 2897 2.86 2.39 0 12 
 
Honduras 2004 1428 3.95 2.49 0 12 
 
Bolivia 2006 2938 3.87 2.33 0 12 
 
Ecuador 2006 2854 3.59 2.17 0 11 
 
Honduras 2006 1562 3.64 2.25 0 12 
 
Bolivia 2008 2902 3.30 2.30 0 12 
 
Ecuador 2008 2937 3.04 2.27 0 12 
 
Honduras 2008 1429 2.51 2.13 0 11 
 
Bolivia 2010 2872 3.40 2.25 0 12 
 
Ecuador 2010 2954 2.61 2.08 0 12 
 
Honduras 2010 1545 2.95 2.43 0 12 
        
 
Bolivia 2012 2930 3.76 2.45 0 12 
 
Ecuador 2012 1449 2.74 2.26 0 12 
 
Honduras 2012 1674 3.25 2.59 0 12 
Education Bolivia 2004 3073 3.51 1.86 0 7 
 
Ecuador 2004 2994 3.31 1.69 0 7 
 
Honduras 2004 1496 1.92 1.44 0 7 
        
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 3.37 2.08 0 7 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 3.43 1.64 0 7 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 2.37 1.50 0 7 
 
Bolivia 2008 2987 3.38 1.95 0 7 
 
Ecuador 2008 2998 3.47 1.70 0 7 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Honduras 2008 1520 2.37 1.55 0 7 
 
Bolivia 2010 3011 3.44 1.84 0 7 
 
Ecuador 2010 2996 3.44 1.66 0 7 
 
Honduras 2010 1594 2.34 1.46 0 7 
 
Bolivia 2012 3026 3.35 1.89 0 7 
 
Ecuador 2012 1481 3.58 1.71 0 7 
 
Honduras 2012 1706 2.20 1.65 0 7 
Ethnicity: White Bolivia 2004 3073 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.07 0.25 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.10 0.30 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.08 0.27 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Ethnicity: Indigenous Bolivia 2004 3073 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.04 0.19 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.07 0.26 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.03 0.18 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.04 0.19 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.01 0.11 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.15 0.35 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Ethnicity: Mestizo Bolivia 2004 3073 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.77 0.42 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.55 0.50 0 1 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.63 0.48 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.80 0.40 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.62 0.49 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.69 0.46 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.82 0.39 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.81 0.39 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.64 0.48 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.75 0.43 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.78 0.42 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Ethnicity: Other Bolivia 2004 3073 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.10 0.30 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.02 0.13 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.01 0.11 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.01 0.09 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Gender: Female Bolivia 2004 3073 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.60 0.49 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.53 0.50 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.57 0.49 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.50 0.50 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.50 0.50 0 1 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Ideology Bolivia 2004 2530 4.19 2.09 0 9 
 
Ecuador 2004 2047 4.35 2.18 0 9 
 
Honduras 2004 1018 5.50 2.35 0 9 
 
Bolivia 2006 2205 4.34 2.22 0 9 
 
Ecuador 2006 1922 4.62 2.34 0 9 
 
Honduras 2006 1318 5.64 2.61 0 9 
 
Bolivia 2008 2311 4.27 2.15 0 9 
 
Ecuador 2008 2018 4.31 2.40 0 9 
 
Honduras 2008 1257 5.09 2.38 0 9 
 
Bolivia 2010 2399 4.31 2.00 0 9 
 
Ecuador 2010 2019 4.43 2.31 0 9 
 
Honduras 2010 1422 5.67 2.29 0 9 
 
Bolivia 2012 2296 4.12 2.18 0 9 
 
Ecuador 2012 1178 4.33 2.43 0 9 
 
Honduras 2012 1319 4.43 2.75 0 9 
Institutional Trust Bolivia 2004 2712 10.78 4.35 0 24 
 
Ecuador 2004 2630 7.84 4.87 0 24 
 
Honduras 2004 1253 11.32 5.65 0 24 
 
Bolivia 2006 2564 11.31 4.86 0 24 
 
Ecuador 2006 2637 6.71 4.62 0 24 
 
Honduras 2006 1390 10.57 4.54 0 24 
 
Bolivia 2008 2498 11.89 4.52 0 24 
 
Ecuador 2008 2621 8.13 4.66 0 24 
 
Honduras 2008 1173 10.13 4.37 0 22 
 
Bolivia 2010 2638 12.10 4.23 0 24 
 
Ecuador 2010 2487 9.90 4.82 0 24 
 
Honduras 2010 1471 13.97 4.19 0 24 
 
Bolivia 2012 2487 10.31 4.61 0 24 
 
Ecuador 2012 1199 10.41 5.26 0 24 
 
Honduras 2012 1513 8.90 5.13 0 24 
Interpersonal Trust Bolivia 2004 3021 1.45 0.90 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2004 2939 1.75 0.93 0 3 
 
Honduras 2004 1455 1.90 1.05 0 3 
 
Bolivia 2006 2928 1.42 0.90 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2006 2887 1.67 0.91 0 3 
 
Honduras 2006 1568 2.02 0.94 0 3 
 
Bolivia 2008 2947 1.60 0.87 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2008 2961 1.68 0.91 0 3 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Honduras 2008 1513 1.56 0.90 0 3 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 2946 1.62 0.85 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2010 2957 1.69 0.95 0 3 
 
Honduras 2010 1587 1.92 0.91 0 3 
        
 
Bolivia 2012 2978 1.65 0.80 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2012 1481 1.81 0.83 0 3 
 
Honduras 2012 1688 1.94 0.96 0 3 
Political Interest Bolivia 2004 3041 2.06 0.88 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 2.45 0.99 0 3 
 
Honduras 2004 1499 2.30 1.17 0 3 
        
 
Bolivia 2006 2825 2.39 1.05 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2006 2813 2.58 0.89 0 3 
 
Honduras 2006 1584 2.42 1.03 0 3 
        
 
Bolivia 2008 2918 2.20 1.17 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2008 2906 2.52 0.92 0 3 
 
Honduras 2008 1517 2.21 1.20 0 3 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 2981 2.48 0.71 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2010 2994 2.62 0.67 0 3 
 
Honduras 2010 1590 2.39 0.82 0 3 
 
Bolivia 2012 3017 2.38 0.82 0 3 
 
Ecuador 2012 1474 2.33 0.82 0 3 
 
Honduras 2012 1716 1.94 1.08 0 3 
Political Tolerance Bolivia 2004 2891 15.08 8.07 0 36 
 
Ecuador 2004 2777 16.56 8.73 0 36 
 
Honduras 2004 1289 20.15 9.78 0 36 
        
 
Bolivia 2006 2666 15.52 7.71 0 36 
 
Ecuador 2006 2777 16.59 9.40 0 36 
 
Honduras 2006 1499 16.60 9.00 0 36 
        
 
Bolivia 2008 2678 15.54 8.38 0 36 
 
Ecuador 2008 2791 16.50 9.07 0 36 
 
Honduras 2008 1284 17.01 7.75 0 36 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 2715 17.32 7.74 0 36 
 
Ecuador 2010 2724 18.17 9.21 0 36 
 
Honduras 2010 1462 17.05 6.98 0 36 
        
 
Bolivia 2012 2483 16.14 7.61 0 36 
 
Ecuador 2012 1333 15.70 8.29 0 36 
 
Honduras 2012 1479 13.18 8.46 0 36 
Presidential Approval Bolivia 2004 3047 2.16 0.67 0 4 
 
Ecuador 2004 2938 1.72 0.85 0 4 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Honduras 2004 1464 1.84 0.95 0 4 
 
Bolivia 2006 2794 2.36 0.69 0 4 
 
Ecuador 2006 2871 1.52 0.84 0 4 
 
Honduras 2006 1563 2.09 0.79 0 4 
 
Bolivia 2008 2966 2.18 0.90 0 4 
 
Ecuador 2008 2964 2.49 0.88 0 4 
 
Honduras 2008 1501 1.90 0.81 0 4 
 
Bolivia 2010 2963 2.42 0.86 0 4 
 
Ecuador 2010 2979 2.46 0.87 0 4 
 
Honduras 2010 1519 2.65 0.83 0 4 
        
 
Bolivia 2012 3007 2.06 0.84 0 4 
 
Ecuador 2012 1492 2.73 0.89 0 4 
 
Honduras 2012 1705 1.80 0.88 0 4 
Region: Guayaquil Ecuador 2004 3000 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2879 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Region: Media Luna Bolivia 2004 3073 0.53 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.53 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.53 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.53 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Rural Bolivia 2004 3073 0.35 0.48 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.44 0.50 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 3008 0.37 0.48 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.55 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 3003 0.37 0.48 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.57 0.50 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 3018 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 0.38 0.49 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.55 0.50 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2012 3029 0.36 0.48 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 0.34 0.48 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Socioeconomic Status Bolivia 2004 1564 13.05 7.08 0 25 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 17.13 6.33 0 25 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 11.75 8.20 0 25 
 
Bolivia 2006 2995 15.78 6.73 0 25 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 18.30 4.97 0 25 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 15.18 7.37 0 25 
 
Bolivia 2008 2966 15.89 6.96 0 25 
 
Ecuador 2008 3000 17.71 5.67 0 25 
 
Honduras 2008 1514 14.16 8.27 0 25 
 
Bolivia 2010 2976 16.62 6.50 0 25 
 
Ecuador 2010 3000 17.87 5.47 0 25 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 14.46 7.32 0 25 
 
Bolivia 2012 3028 16.89 6.13 0 25 
 
Ecuador 2012 1500 16.89 5.51 0 25 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 15.47 7.12 0 25 
Support for Democracy Bolivia 2004 2995 3.82 1.42 0 6 
 
Ecuador 2004 2826 3.83 1.71 0 6 
 
Honduras 2004 1341 4.06 1.89 0 6 
 
Bolivia 2006 2800 3.97 1.29 0 6 
 
Ecuador 2006 2787 3.87 1.79 0 6 
 
Honduras 2006 1499 4.10 1.75 0 6 
 
Bolivia 2008 2821 4.23 1.44 0 6 
 
Ecuador 2008 2901 3.89 1.70 0 6 
 
Honduras 2008 1415 3.59 1.77 0 6 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 2857 4.21 1.43 0 6 
 
Ecuador 2010 2821 4.08 1.63 0 6 
 
Honduras 2010 1526 3.75 1.58 0 6 
 
Bolivia 2012 2835 3.76 1.58 0 6 
 
Ecuador 2012 1394 3.85 1.83 0 6 
 
Honduras 2012 1567 3.15 2.11 0 6 
Voted Bolivia 2004 3073 0.75 0.43 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2004 3000 0.87 0.33 0 1 
 
Honduras 2004 1500 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2006 2990 0.77 0.42 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2006 2925 0.85 0.36 0 1 
 
Honduras 2006 1585 0.76 0.43 0 1 
 
Bolivia 2008 2968 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2008 2989 0.90 0.30 0 1 
 
Honduras 2008 1522 0.64 0.48 0 1 
        
 
Bolivia 2010 2999 0.89 0.31 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2010 2999 0.93 0.26 0 1 
 
Honduras 2010 1596 0.61 0.49 0 1 
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Variable Country Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Bolivia 2012 3005 0.83 0.37 0 1 
 
Ecuador 2012 1490 0.89 0.31 0 1 
 
Honduras 2012 1728 0.50 0.50 0 1 
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